Mindfulness and eating: An exploration of effects and mediators. by KIMBERLEY, JENKINS
  Swansea University E-Theses                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
   
Mindfulness and eating: An exploration of effects and mediators.
   
Jenkins, Kimberley
   
 
 
 
 How to cite:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
Jenkins, Kimberley (2013)  Mindfulness and eating: An exploration of effects and mediators..  thesis, Swansea
University.
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa42213
 
 
 
 Use policy:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence: copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder. Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from
the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
Please link to the metadata record in the Swansea University repository, Cronfa (link given in the citation reference
above.)
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/
 Mindfulness and eating: an 
exploration of effects and 
mediators
Kimberley Jenkins
Submitted to Swansea University in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Swansea University
2013
ProQuest Number: 10797915
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10797915
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
LIBRARY
Summary (Abstract)
Mindfulness meditation is increasingly being incorporated into psychotherapeutic 
interventions. However, whilst much research has addressed the question of whether 
mindfulness-based interventions work, less has been directed at how they work. The 
current thesis describes four studies that explored potential mechanisms by which 
mindfulness interventions may bring about change. Study 1 employed a correlational 
design to examine whether mindfulness practice is associated with increased 
attentional control. Studies 2 to 4 used experimental methods to examine the ways in 
which individual mindfulness-based techniques might exert their effects on a health- 
related behaviour (chocolate consumption). Study 1 (N=125) showed no evidence 
that meditation practice was associated with reduced attentional bias (assessed using 
dot-probe and emotional Stroop tasks). Study 2 (N=135) showed that a cognitive 
defusion task (but not an acceptance task) helped individuals to resist chocolate over 
a five-day period. There was evidence to indicate that the defusion task worked by 
interrupting automatic links between chocolate-related thoughts and chocolate 
consumption. Study 3 (N=108), however, failed to find evidence that the defusion 
strategy worked either by reducing automaticity or increasing the accessibility of 
competing goals. Study 4 (N=60) further showed that the defusion strategy did not 
influence chocolate cravings. In conclusion, the current research demonstrated the 
need to go beyond merely describing the positive effects of mindfulness on changing 
self-control related behaviours. The findings also highlighted the potential problems 
of current mindfulness-based interventions due to their complexity, and that one 
mindfulness-based intervention does not ‘fit’ all health-related behaviours to bring 
about change. Ensuring the population maintains a healthy diet is important. Brief 
mindfulness training may be a useful means of helping people choose more healthy 
options. Further dismantling design studies were however advised before the 
evidence can be used to inform public health policy and services.
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Chapter One
General Introduction
Mindfulness is ‘awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the 
present moment, and non-judgementally to the unfolding o f experience moment by 
moment’ (Kabat-Zinn, 2003, p. 145). Formally, mindfulness skills are taught as an 
eight-week, group-based course whereby participants can learn new ways of 
handling stress, pain and difficult feelings through guided instruction, group 
dialogue, and home assignments (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Mindfulness is most frequently 
cultivated in practices such as sitting meditation, walking meditation or mindful 
movements and is considered separate from relaxation (Baer, 2003). According to 
Holzel et al. (2011) mindfulness consists of an array of distinct but interacting 
mechanisms which constitute a process of enhanced self-control, leading to positive 
behavioural outcomes (Carver & Scheier, 2011; Vohs & Baumeister, 2004). Some of 
these mechanisms include attention to present internal and external experience, a 
non-judgmental stance which involves the component o f decentering (Segal, 
Williams & Teasdale, 2002) or defusion (Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson, 1999) of 
cognitive content, and an attitude of acceptance toward oneself and one’s experience 
(Segal et al., 2002). Others however have suggested that these mechanisms are not 
related to one another (Baer, 2003; Brown, Ryan & Creswell, 2007) or that differing 
components are more or less critical in leading to behavioural change (Shapiro, 
Carlson, Astin & Freedman, 2006). The continued disagreement within the literature 
about the precise mechanisms of action has caused the development of mindfulness 
research to become somewhat stunted. As a result of this, important questions such 
as; ‘how does mindfulness work?’ and ‘which specific component(s) bring about its’ 
effects?’ remain largely unanswered. The current thesis attempted to address this 
issue with the wider aim of re-stimulating the growth o f novel mindfulness research.
To date, attempts to explore mindfulness have predominately been achieved via 
clinical intervention studies. These interventions typically combine mindfulness 
strategies with existing health-related treatments, such as cognitive therapy 
(mindfulness-based cognitive therapy, MBCT; Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002), 
stress reduction (mindfulness-based stress reduction, MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990), 
relapse prevention (mindfulness-based relapse prevention, MBRP; Bowen et al.,
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2009; Brewer et al., 2009) as well as Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (DBT;
Linehan, 1993) and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl & 
Wilson, 1999). The results have been promising, suggesting that mindfulness-based 
interventions are effective at bringing about health-behaviour change (Baer, 2003; 
Bishop, 2002; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt & Walach, 2004). Whilst such research 
is fundamental to evaluating mindfulness as an efficacious psychological 
intervention, they fail to offer any interpretation as to how mindfulness achieves the 
change in behaviour. Thus, any one, if  not all o f the tested mindfulness mechanisms 
could have contributed to the clinical effects o f these interventions. Furthermore, 
traditional mindfulness interventions mainly target symptom management for a few 
psychological disorders, such as anxiety and depression (Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt & 
Oh, 2010; Roemer, Orsillo & Salters-Pedneault, 2008; Teasdale et al., 2000). Thus, 
based on these studies, understanding how mindfulness works is limited given that 
these interventions are designed to treat a specific type o f health behaviour. 
Mindfulness is a complex practice. Its plasticity to be applied to several diverse 
health-related issues and behaviours may therefore lead to the logical suggestion that 
the same intervention may work differently depending on the health behaviour being 
targeted. For example, current mindfulness-based interventions which focus on 
symptom reduction may work in a different way from those which focus on 
changing self-control related behaviours. The present thesis aimed to further explore 
the effects of mindfulness on self-control related behaviours.
Studies investigating the use of mindfulness to change self-control related 
behaviours were first published in the late 1990’s with the majority focusing on 
improving health by targeting smoking cessation, drug and alcohol abuse, binge 
eating and weight-loss (Davis, Fleming, Bonus & Baker, 2007; Gifford et al., 2004; 
Kristeller & Hallett, 1999; Tapper et al., 2009; Zgierska et al., 2008). Tapper et al. 
(2009) found that compared to controls, participants who were still employing 
mindfulness techniques six months after a mindfulness-based weight loss 
programme showed reductions in body mass index (BMI) and increased levels o f 
physical activity. Similarly, Gifford et al. (2004) found higher levels of smoking 
abstinence at one year follow-up amongst individuals who had completed a 
mindfulness-based programme compared to those that had received nicotine 
replacement therapy. Bowen et al. (2006) also reported that inmates who had
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completed a ten-day intense mindfulness course showed a significant decrease in 
substance use three months following their release compared to a control group. The 
value of using mindfulness to change self-control related behaviours is considered 
important for health research given that self-control is a fundamental and major 
determinant o f health behaviour (Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice, 1994; Tangney, 
Baumeister & Boone, 2004; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). The main focus of 
these studies is however to identify whether mindfulness is effective at changing 
self-control related behaviours, as opposed to exploring how they bring about its’ 
effect. Thus, understanding how mindfulness works in terms of changing self-control 
related health behaviours remains ambiguous within mindfulness research. The 
current thesis aimed to breech this ‘literature gap’ by exploring how mindfulness 
works to change such behaviours using unhealthy eating as an example.
Unhealthy eating behaviour is commonly defined as the consumption o f excessive 
quantities of energy dense foods that are high in fat and sugar (Epstein, Paluch, 
Beecher & Roemmich, 2008). It can also however be defined as the reduced control 
of eating when not metabolically hungry (Berthoud, 2011). More formally referred 
to as ‘non-homeostatic’, this term implies that eating is not only regulated by 
metabolic feedback but also cognitive, reward and emotional factors. Much progress 
has been made to identify the metabolic feedback signals and neutral systems that 
represent a homeostatic regulator. These are typically located in the brainstem and 
hypothalamus. The same level of knowledge of the neural pathways and functions 
for non-homeostatic eating has however not yet been achieved. To obtain a greater 
knowledge of the different processes involved in unhealthy eating behaviour it is 
necessary to understand how these metabolic (bottom-up) and non-metabolic (top- 
down) pathways interact together. A brief description o f each process is discussed. 
Figure 1.1 (see page 6) is also included as a visual overview o f some of the main 
factors involved in top-down and bottom-up modulation processes.
Bottom-up: The metabolically regulated appetite is controlled by homeostatic 
mechanisms. Thus the over-consumption of unhealthy foods has been, by some, 
attributed to individuals having a faulty metabolic brain (Guyenet & Schwartz,
2012). This is also sometimes referred to as the homoeostatic regulator (Bouchard, 
1995). In support of an ineffective homoeostatic regulator being a causal factor in
unhealthy eating behaviour, research has shown evidence of impaired leptin and/or 
melanocortin-signalling in obese individuals (Farooqi & O ’Rahilly, 2006). These 
impaired signals are responsible for the modulation of ‘wanting’ of food, thus 
causing the desire for, and ultimately consumption of, certain foods to be increased 
irrespective of there being no physiological ‘need’ for food. Related to this is the 
notion that, overconsumption of unhealthy foods it attributable to specific genes 
which are ineffective in curbing appetite during times when food is abundant. This is 
demonstrated in studies whereby better success is evident with leptin-treatment when 
given in addition to moderate food intake restriction (Bouchard, 1995). An alternate 
view is that an inability to control unhealthy eating behaviours is due to the 
homoeostatic regulator acting to defend against the under-intake of nutrients, but not 
the over-intake of nutrients. When functioning in this way, the regulator is believed 
to be a physiological adaptation to internal (e.g. pregnancy) and external (e.g. 
seasonal changes) contingencies (Hall et al., 2012; Speakman et al., 2011). Whilst 
this may have been an effective survival process in ancient years, in the modem 
‘obeseogenic’ environment it may lead to severe consequences of peoples overall 
health and well-being.
Unhealthy eating by metabolic signals is however not only achieved via 
bottom-up modulation. Rather, bottom-up processes continually interact with top- 
down influences. For instance, in addition to the hypothalamus other brain areas 
involved in the circuitry of the homoeostatic regulator are also involved in reward- 
based decision making. Attempting to abstain from eating an unhealthy food product 
has shown to increase the reinforcement value of a food reward (Zheng, Lenard,
Shin & Berthoud, 2009). Several neuro-imaging studies have supported this, 
showing greater neural activity in reward related areas in the brain when fasting 
individuals viewed pictures o f high-calorie compared to low-calorie foods (Asmaro 
& Liotti, 2014). These findings suggest that some fasting-related signals which 
convey ‘caloric need’ modulate the hedonic value assigned to certain foods, making 
them more preferred if  available for eating. The interaction between the cognitive 
and emotional brain can better help us understand how unhealthy eating develops in 
an ever changing environment. This evidence shows that the metabolic state can 
strongly modulate emotional effects of food and food-related stimuli. Together, these 
ascending modulatory influences determine the level of incentive salience directed to 
specific foods.
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Top-down: Similarly to bottom-up processes, the top-down modulation of food 
intake encompasses a number o f different cognitive and emotional factors. Some of 
these include external sensory input (e.g. taste and smell) to the hypothalamus and 
other related brain areas, food-related cues and social influences, along with 
thoughts, memory and mental imagery (Epstein et al., 2009). Emotional regulation 
has also been found to involve top-down regulation of pre-frontal brain regions such 
as the amygdala (Quirk & Beer, 2006). Importantly, appetite and food consumption 
in this context are influenced by the mental representations o f the food rather than 
the actual sensory properties which would be involved in bottom-up processes. 
Furthermore, it has been recognised that an increasing consumption of foods high in 
fat and sugar is driven by ‘hedonic hunger’ (Lowe & Butryn, 2007) rather than the 
homeostatic principles of energy balance. In turn, increased attention has been 
focused on the influence of reward sensitivity (Davis et al., 2008) and the 
mechanisms underlying liking and wanting (Finlayson, King & Blundell, 2007). In 
an obesity-promoting environment, the hedonic response to food stimuli is believed 
to disrupt the homeostatic mechanisms that regulate satiety, thus leading to the over­
consumption of unhealthy food products (Hofmann et al., 2010). Following on from 
this, another important process in the top-down modulation of eating is the executive 
functioning system. This involves regulating and inhibiting impulsive responses to 
food (Guerrieri, Nederkoom & Jansen, 2008). Inhibitory control exerts the stop- 
signal necessary to override automatic responses, thereby enabling goal-oriented 
actions. The pre-frontal cortex guides this ‘top-down’ processing in order to align 
behaviour with internal states, goals or intention (Goghari & MacDonald, 2009). 
Many have shown that a less efficient response inhibition is related to increased food 
intake and overeating (Logan, Schachar & Tannick, 1997; Nederkoom et al., 2006). 
Neuro-imaging studies have confirmed a role for the pre-frontal cortex in hedonic 
feeding inhibition by linking activation patterns with motivation to consume 
palatable foods (Fregni et al., 2008; Goldman et al., 2011; Uher et al., 2005). 
Conversely, the ability to adopt and maintain healthy eating habits has been linked to 
greater inhibitory control.
In conclusion, it is clear that unhealthy eating is driven by many factors. 
Over-eating can be triggered by metabolic need and hedonic drive, or an interaction 
between several different factors. Importantly, metabolic signals of energy status can 
modulate processing of cognitive and reward functions in various brain regions
5
systems (bottom-up processing), which influence regulatory processes to restore 
energy status to the optimal level. Yet the cognitive and emotional brain can also 
override homeostatic regulation (top-down processing), to yield an energy 
imbalanced state. With the rate o f  health-related problems set to increase due to the 
unhealthy diets o f the population, investigations into the mechanisms underlying top- 
down and bottom-up processes are needed to effectively target unhealthy eating 
behaviours and halt further overindulgence.
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balance. Bottom-up modulation o f cognitive and emotional processes by metabolic 
signals and its derivatives. Top-down modulation by cognitive and emotion/reward 
systems.
As previously discussed, the beneficial effects o f mindfulness have received 
substantial support from empirical studies (Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice, 1994; 
Tangney, Baumeister & Boone, 2004; Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). The 
functional neural mechanisms underlying these benefits have however not been 
investigated to the same extent. Some suggest that mindfulness is best described as a 
top-down regulatory strategy given that mindfulness is described as a central element
facilitating positive appraisal (Garland et al., 2010). Supporting the top-down 
process underlying mindfulness training, Fresco, Segal, Buis, & Kennedy (2007) 
observed a modest but significant correlation between decentering, a psychological 
construct within cognitive psychology that shares strong resemblances with the 
concept of mindfulness, and positive reappraisal. Research has also shown that 
mindfulness can support the maintenance of healthy behavioural habits in a top- 
down manner by strengthening executive control such as, reducing behavioural 
automaticity (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Others however disagree instead arguing that 
mindfulness should be described as a bottom-up regulatory strategy (Grabovac et al., 
2011). This is based on the definition of mindfulness being ‘an increased attention to 
present moment experiences in a non-judgemental manner’ (Brown et al., 2007). 
Accordingly, mindfulness training should be associated with reduced activation of 
limbic regions in response to emotionally salient stimuli (i.e. cues). Supporting the 
bottom-up process underlying mindfulness training, Slagter et al. (2007) amongst 
others (van Leeuwen, Muller, & Melloni, 2009) have provided evidence that 
mindfulness is associated with improvements in attentional blink tasks performance. 
These findings reflect a reduction in brain allocation that is independent from 
cognitive evaluation processes. Mindfulness therefore supports healthy habits in a 
bottom-up manner by wakening existing habitual patterns (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
Others have found that mindfulness practitioners gradually shift from a larger use of 
top-down mechanisms of regulation during early stages of practice to a larger use of 
bottom-up mechanisms of regulation during later stages o f practice. For instance, 
initially, the attentional training component of mindfulness strengthens attention 
regulation to create awareness of stimuli, internal and external to individuals, and 
enhances cognitive control and top-down regulations (Holzel et al. 2011). In more 
advanced practitioners of mindfulness however, non-judgmental acceptance and 
non-reactivity has been found to weaken earlier neural connections freeing 
individuals from old habitual emotional reactions (Holzel et al. 2011).
At present, it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions about these claims 
because the studies supporting each process have several methodological 
shortcomings. As a result, it is unclear whether the observed neural effects associated 
with the cultivation of mindfulness are specifically attributable to mindfulness 
training or to other non-specific factors. Current discrepancies about the neural 
mechanisms involved in mindfulness also derive, in part, from the many different
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descriptions and applications of mindfulness (Farb et al., 2007, 2010; Westbrook et 
al., 2011). Moreover, contradictions in opinions of the processes involved in 
mindfulness have been debated suggesting that certain mindfulness strategies are 
more or less important than other (Bishop et al., 2004; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, 
Masuda, & Lillis, 2006; Chiesa & Malinowski, 2011). Understanding whether 
mindfulness involves a top-down or a bottom-up regulation strategy has many 
important clinical implications (DeRubeis, Siegle, & Hollon, 2008; Roffman, Marci, 
Glick, Dougherty & Rauch, 2005). Further exploration o f the relationship between 
mindfulness and eating behaviour is therefore advised. The current thesis 
investigates the hypothesis that mindfulness can be used to change unhealthy eating 
behaviours by top-down regulation strategies.
Only a relatively small number of studies which investigate the effectiveness of 
mindfulness in the domain of unhealthy eating behaviours currently exist. For 
instance, the practice of mindfulness has shown to reduce binge eating (Kristeller & 
Hallett, 1999), decrease food cravings (Alberts, Mulkens, Smeets & Thewissen, 
2010) and also reduce BMI in an overweight sample (Tapper et al., 2009). More 
studies are however beginning to emerge. A recent publication by Alberts, 
Thewissen & Raes (2012) demonstrated that participants who had undergone an 
eight-week mindfulness-based cognitive behavioural intervention showed 
significantly greater decreases in food cravings, dichotomous thinking, body image 
concern, emotion eating and external eating compared to controls. Timmerman & 
Brown (2012) also found that, compared with a no treatment control group, women 
who had completed a mindful restaurant eating intervention reported lower totals of 
energy and fat intake. Whilst these are encouraging findings, understanding how 
mindfulness brings about a change in unhealthy eating behaviour is largely 
unexplored. It is therefore important that further research is conducted. 
Understanding how mindfulness can change unhealthy eating behaviour can also be 
considered important to help reduce the adverse effects on health caused by 
unhealthy eating. An unhealthy diet, often characterised by an excessive intake of 
high sugar and fat snack foods, has been associated with numerous health problems 
such as obesity, type 2 diabetes, stroke, cancer, heart disease and hypertension 
(Kopelman, 2007; Must et al., 1999). Each of these major health risks adds further 
strain to the already over-stretched National Health Service’s financial budget.
Recognition of this has led to the launch of several government supported healthy 
eating campaigns aimed at encouraging individuals to take responsibility for their 
eating habits (e.g. Change for Life, 2013). Given that these health initiatives are not 
evidence based, a scientifically evaluated mindfulness-based intervention may offer 
a new, improved approach to help change society’s unhealthy eating behaviours.
The lack of understanding about how mindfulness works is in part due to the current 
method used to acquire this knowledge; namely, the evaluation of mindfulness-based 
interventions. Mindfulness interventions incorporate several different mindfulness 
components, or combine mindfulness skills with a range o f intervention techniques. 
Mindfulness is a multifaceted practice, thus in order to understand how mindfulness 
works, a simplified evaluation method is needed. One suggestion is to separate and 
analyse individually the central constructs and different mindfulness strategies using 
a dismantling design. Whilst dismantling studies are not new (Cahill, Carrigan & 
Frueh, 1999; Foley & Spates, 1995; Roehrig, Thompson, Brannick & van den Berg,
2006), their application to help understand how mindfulness works is only apparent 
in the literature within the last few years. The first study to use a dismantling design 
to explore potential mechanisms accountable for the effects o f mindfulness was 
pioneered by Sears & Kraus (2009). The authors attempted to tease apart different 
core practices of mindfulness-based interventions, including bare attention and 
loving-kindness in order to measure their unique effects. Interestingly, the results 
showed that both interventions decreased cognitive distortions. No new attempts 
have recently been made to understand how mindfulness works through the use o f a 
dismantling design. At best, most mindfulness studies simply acknowledge the 
benefits o f dismantling methods, highlighting the need for its further use in 
mindfulness research. Baer (2003) for example concluded that both the integrative 
treatments such as ACT, and even interventions where mindfulness appears to be 
predominant, need to be dismantled to identify the true active ingredients. Shapiro, 
Carlson, Astin & Freedman (2006) also proposed that with the efficaciousness o f 
mindfulness fairly well established, a next line of inquiry would be to determine 
mediators and moderators of these beneficial effects via the use of dismantling 
research designs. Dismantling designs have also been considered important in 
determining whether mindfulness-based interventions work by altering the
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relationship between thoughts and feelings (Roemer & Orsillo, 2003), though as o f 
yet, no research has been conducted to support this assumption.
In view of the above, the current thesis aimed to investigate the mechanisms of 
action underlying mindfulness by carrying out two different, but complementary, 
lines o f inquiry. The first line of inquiry examined the central construct of 
mindfulness; attention. The second line of inquiry used a dismantling design to 
separate and compare two mindfulness strategies (cognitive defusion and 
acceptance) which are widely used within mindfulness-based interventions. Research 
on how mindfulness works is still in its infancy. The current thesis therefore made 
three assumptions o f how the individual mechanisms explored brought about 
behavioural change. The first suggested that attention is one of the main components 
of mindfulness. It was therefore predicted that practicing mindfulness positively 
effects behaviour change by increasing attentional control. Study One explored this 
hypothesis by comparing differences in attentional bias to chocolate-related stimuli 
between those who practice meditation and those who do not. The second predicted 
that mindfulness works by reducing automaticity and increasing tolerance of difficult 
thoughts and feelings. Study Two therefore looked at the effects o f two different 
mindfulness-based strategies, cognitive defusion and acceptance, on resisting 
chocolate over a five-day period. Based on the findings from Study Two, a follow-on 
study (Study Three) was conducted in an attempt to further understand how the 
defusion strategy brings about its effects. The third assumption predicted that 
mindfulness changes the self-control related behaviour, unhealthy eating, by 
reducing the total number of cravings experienced. This was explored in Study Four 
by asking participants to practice either a mindfulness-based strategy or a control 
strategy during a ten-minute craving induction task whilst sitting in front of a range 
of chocolate products.
To conclude, the thesis used a two-pronged approach to identify the way in which 
mindfulness brings about its effects in relation to changing self-control behaviours, 
using unhealthy eating as an example. The present research was mainly exploratory 
given that existing literature in this area is limited. It is believed that the findings 
have many important implications. For instance, the current research may contribute 
to wider mindfulness research in that it aimed to identify the precise mechanisms at
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work. Moreover, the current study may help to identify how mindfulness changes 
self-control related health behaviours in addition to helping to improve health and 
health research. The latter is important given that health psychologists are frequently 
asked to offer their expertise in the development of new government health 
initiatives (Johnston, Weinman & Chater, 2011). This empirical work is also 
considered critical in order to optimally apply mindfulness to a diverse population 
and to advance techniques that specifically target the treatment of unhealthy eating 
behaviours.
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Chapter Two
Relationship between mindfulness meditation experience and 
attentional bias to chocolate
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Chapter overview
This chapter aimed to explore whether the practice of mindfulness meditation is 
associated with changes in self-control related health behaviours by increasing 
attentional control. If so, mindfulness may prove useful for reducing attentional bias 
to emotionally motivating stimuli. The current study examined links between 
mindfulness and attention by examining differences in attentional control and 
attentional bias between those with different levels of meditation experience. 
Meditation experience was defined by self-assessment (i.e. practitioner’s personal 
opinion of whether they were an experienced or novice meditator) and the length of 
time mindfulness was practiced (i.e. average number o f minutes, weeks and months 
spent meditating). In addition to this, a novel method of defining meditation 
experience, based on the type of attentional skills (i.e. focused attention or open 
monitoring) currently used by the recruited meditators, was explored to identify any 
significant effect on attentional control and attentional bias. Attentional bias was 
measured using emotional Stroop and dot-probe tasks. The main purpose o f this 
study was to identify how the practice of mindfulness meditation may work to 
change unhealthy eating behaviours, namely reducing chocolate consumption.
2.1.2 Mindfulness: A form of attention re-training
Mindfulness practices and meditation are not synonymous. Most mindfulness-based 
interventions however utilise some form of meditative practice which highlight 
attention as a core component (Bishop et al., 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Walach, 
Buchheld, Buttenmuller, Kleinknecht & Schmidt, 2006). Consequently, mindfulness 
is readily described as a set of diverse practices that train attention and awareness, 
with the ultimate goal of fostering physical and psychological wellbeing due to 
improved attentional control (Moore, Gruber, Derose & Malinowski, 2012).With an 
emphasis placed on attention, mindfulness is believed to be neither contemplative
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nor ruminative. Instead, it is considered a process whereby the mind becomes 
functionally re-trained to increase mental focus (Davidson, Kabat-Zinn, Schumacher, 
Rosenkranz, Muller & Santorelli, 2003; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt & Walach, 
2004; Jha, Krompinger & Baime, 2007). In the context o f mindfulness practice, 
paying attention involves observing the operations of one’s moment to moment 
internal and external experience. Practitioners are invited to focus on present 
experiences, or in the event of their attention becoming distracted from the object of 
focus, to redirect their attention back to the current moment (Shapiro & Schwarz, 
2000; Teasdale, 1999; Teasdale et al., 1995, 2003). Mindfulness practice therefore 
enhances many different aspects of attentional abilities. These include sustained 
attention and attentional switching, thus incorporating elements o f both attention 
regulation and an open attentional orientation (Bishop, 2002; Bishop et al., 2004; 
Brown & Ryan, 2004; Hayes & Shenk, 2004). In view of this, it has been suggested 
that mindfulness practices may be effective at reducing automatic or inappropriate 
reactive behaviours by significantly decreasing attentional bias (Brewer, Elwafi & 
Davis, 2013).
2.1.3 What is attentional bias?
Attentional bias is defined as the ability to selectively attend to personally relevant or 
emotionally motivating information over neutral information (Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005). Behaviourally, attentional bias is the tendency for a stimulus to attract and 
hold attention whilst also impairing disengagement from, and possibly elaborative 
processing of, relevant stimuli (Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Kavanagh, Andrade & 
May, 2004; Waters, Sayette & Wertz, 2003; though see Pothos & Tapper, 2010). 
Such effects may be the result of novel or past association of the stimulus with threat 
(Calvo & Avero, 2005) or reward (Krank, O’Neill, Squarey & Jacob, 2008). When 
attention is directed to such stimuli there is less available cognitive capacity to focus 
on other stimuli. Thus, cognitive models assume that attentional bias is not simply a 
by-product of emotional disorders but it plays a vital role in their causation and 
maintenance. It is believed to facilitate a vicious cycle of events whereby increases 
in either emotional disturbance or emotional excitement causes certain stimuli to 
become even more salient (Ohman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001). Research has shown that 
an individual’s performance can become impaired as a result o f selective attention to
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emotionally relevant stimuli on tasks where the processing of such information 
would be disruptive (Buckley, Blanchard & Neill, 2000). Any intervention that 
enhances voluntary control of these attentional components may help to bring about 
reductions in both attentional bias and the associated behaviour. Attentional re­
training has been found to lower attentional bias in this context (Tang & Posner, 
2009). One identified form of attentional re-training is mindfulness meditation 
(Valentine & Sweet, 1999).
2.1.4 Effects o f mindfulness training on attention
There is increasing evidence to suggest that mindfulness training enhances 
attentional control (e.g. Baijal & Gupta, 2008; Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz, Schaefer, 
Levinson & Davidson, 2007; Carter et al., 2005; Chambers, Lo & Allen, 2008; Jha, 
Krompinger & Baime, 2007; Lazar et al., 2000, 2005; Lutz, Greischar, Rawlings, 
Ricard & Davidson, 2004; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Moore, Gruber, Derose & 
Malinowski, 2012; Rani & Rao, 1996, 2000; Redfering & Bowman, 1981; Semple, 
2010; Tang et al., 2007; Wallace, 2007; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). To describe just a few 
examples, in a study investigating motion-induced blindness and binocular rivalry, 
Carter et al. (2005) found that meditators who practiced mindfulness at least every 
other day were less prone to change blindness and were faster at identifying changes. 
Hodgins & Adair (2010) also reported that frequent mindfulness meditation caused 
more effective attentional orientation in that the meditators suffered less from invalid 
cues in a spatial cueing task. Moreover, this type of meditation has been found to 
reduce attentional blink after training in addition to causing less distractibility 
(Slagter et al., 2007). In further support o f the relationship between mindfulness and 
attentional control, van Leeuwen, Muller & Melloni (2009) found that compared to 
matched meditation naive controls, meditators showed higher detection rate on an 
attentional blink task. The result therefore supported the hypothesis that meditation 
practice alters the efficiency with which attentional resources are distributed. 
Mindfulness training has also been associated with better response inhibition and 
conflict monitoring by more effective voluntary response levels as well as input level 
selection processes (Baijal, Jha, Kiyonaga, Singh & Srinivasan, 2011). In addition, 
Lutz et al. (2009) concluded that training attention via mindfulness was associated
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with higher levels of sustained attention, as demonstrated by better attentional 
stability and lower task effort.
More recently, Kerr, Krishnapriya & Littenberg (2011) found that after eight weeks 
o f mindfulness training, meditators had greater ability to sustain attention. This was 
shown by an enhanced alpha power modulation in early sensory cortices in response 
to a cue. van den Hurk, Giommi, Gielen, Speckens & Barendregt (2010) also 
reported that compared to a control group, experienced mindfulness meditators were 
more efficient at several different attentional processes. Interestingly, mindfulness 
users responded more slowly to the attention tasks and therefore had better accuracy 
rates. Another supportive finding was published by MacLean et al. (2010). In a 
perceptual discrimination task, greater discriminative skills were associated with 
meditation training compared to controls. This association was also evident at five- 
month follow-up testing, though the improvements in visual discrimination (i.e. 
increased perceptual sensitivity and improved vigilance during sustained visual 
attention) were positively correlated with the amount of post-meditation training 
practice (MacLean et al., 2010). Additionally, practitioners have reported that regular 
meditation practice enables them to focus attention for an extended period of time 
without their attention being biased (Barinaga, 2003). While trained mindfulness 
meditators are able to keep their attention on the object of meditation, non­
meditators switched between the task and a day-dreaming state, demonstrating 
increased attention shifting (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman & Raichle, 2001). 
Consequently, self-report data indicated that the meditators kept more continuous 
attention on the task, felt less bored, and encountered fewer difficulties with 
attentional bias tasks than the non-meditators.
So far, the evidence described offers consistent support for the notion that the 
practice of mindfulness meditation is significantly associated with improved 
attentional control. Other findings are however less conclusive (Lutz et al., 2008). 
Lutz et al. (2008), for example, reported no significant group difference between 
meditators and non-meditators for any o f the attentional tasks used in their study. 
Polak (2009) also found no meditation-related differences in attention after 
completing two attentional control tasks. In addition, using a randomised controlled 
trial Semple, Lee, Rosa & Miller (2010) found that, although the meditation group
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demonstrated a greater ability to discriminate on a signal detection task and more 
effective sustained attention, differences in concentration and inhibition of 
distraction were not found.1 As a result, this study only partially supported the 
hypothesis that mindfulness enhances attentional control by reducing attentional 
bias. Furthermore, Srinivasan & Baijal (2007) found that mindfulness meditators’ 
increased awareness of their environment was only enhanced immediately after full 
meditation compared to when they performed their daily breathing exercises. This 
latter finding brings into question whether attentional benefits derived from 
meditating carry over into everyday life or are limited to following meditation 
practice. More generally, it also questions whether mindfulness training truly affects 
attention by increasing attentional control.
2.1.5 Summary
It is clear that the evidence for and against the theory that mindfulness increases 
attentional control is inconclusive. One explanation for this may be the different 
types of methodology used to explore the effects of meditation on attentional control. 
For instance, in an attempt to use the ‘gold standard’ of determining whether a cause 
and effect relation exists, some researchers have used randomised controlled trials 
(e.g. Semple et al., 2010). This particular type of methodology however does not 
allow the experimental groups sufficient training to become ‘experienced’ 
meditators. This would require too much commitment from the participants as 
adequate training to acquire the skills of an experienced meditator may span decades. 
Consequently, very high attrition rates would be likely. In support of this 
explanation, studies which use randomised control trials do not always reflect the 
positive effects o f mindfulness on attentional control which non-randomised control 
trials often claim (Anderson, Lau, Segal & Bishop, 2007). Given that the current 
study included a sample of highly experienced meditators, in addition to a group of 
novice meditators and non-meditative controls, a RCT design was considered 
inappropriate.
1 Semple et al (2010) measured sustained attention using the Continuous Performance Task (Rosvold 
et al., 1956) whereas concentration was measured using the Digit Symbol Substitution Task 
(Wechsler, 1997). The difference between these two attentional components was therefore defined by 
target detection (i.e. vigilance of distractors) (sustained attention) verses freedom from distraction 
(concentration).
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In addition to exploring the effects of meditation experience on attention, the current 
study aimed to bring further clarity to this area o f mindfulness research by exploring 
whether mindfulness was useful for reducing attentional bias specifically to 
emotionally motivating stimuli.
2.1.6 Effects of mindfulness experience on attentional bias
It has been suggested that improvements in attentional control, as demonstrated by a 
decrease in attentional bias, will depend on an individual’s level of mindfulness 
experience (Chan & Woollacott, 2007). In view o f this, some have suggested that 
more experienced meditators will perform more effectively on attentional control 
tasks compared to novice meditators (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007). A literature 
review on the relationship between attention and mindfulness experience is provided. 
Experienced and novice meditators are discussed individually.
2.1.6.1 Experienced meditators
A large number of studies have reported that attentional control related changes are 
associated with long term practice of mindfulness meditation (Carter et al., 2005; 
Slagter et al., 2007; Srinivasan & Baijal., 2007; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David & 
Goolkasian, 2010). Carter et al. (2005) found that extensive mindfulness training by 
Tibetan monks improved practitioners’ ability to sustain attention on a particular 
object for a prolonged period of time, compared to both short-term meditators and 
non-meditator controls. Additional support for the notion that experienced 
mindfulness meditators demonstrate reduced attentional bias compared to novice 
meditators was shown by Tang et al. (2007). In this study, Tang et al. found that 
experienced mindfulness meditators were able to detect targets more easily and 
efficiently than when cues about where and when the targets would appear were 
unavailable. This suggested that the meditators had more attentional readiness and 
alertness. Additionally, Valentine and Sweet (1999) reported that mindfulness 
meditators scored significantly higher than non-meditators on a Wilkins’ Counting 
Test, again demonstrating greater sustained attention and decreased attentional bias. 
More specifically however, the results showed that when the meditators were 
analysed based on their level of meditation experience, the experienced meditators 
(more than 24 months of meditation experience) from a variety o f traditions scored
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significantly higher than novice meditators (less than 24 months of meditation 
experience).
Experienced mindfulness meditators are also considered to perform better on 
attentional bias tasks because, unlike novice mindfulness meditators, they learn to 
monitor attention (also referred to as open monitoring; OM). This helps them to 
determine when their focus of attention has wandered; subsequently enabling the 
effective disengagement from distracters and re-orientation of attention to the 
intended object (Lutz, Slagter, Dunne & Davidson, 2008). Over time, less energy is 
required to maintain focus and their attention monitoring capacity increases allowing 
them to detect distraction more quickly. The practitioner is therefore able to achieve 
moment to moment awareness of internal and external experiences, as they occur, 
without prioritizing or rejecting particular elements o f experience. In support of this, 
findings from an attentional blink task showed that experienced mindfulness 
meditators who practiced OM were more efficient than novice meditators at 
registering the first target by not ‘over investing’ in it and disengaging from it 
relatively quickly. This gave the experienced meditators sufficient resources to 
process the second target upon detection of the first more often than non-meditators 
(van Leeuwen, Muller & Melloni, 2009; Lutz et al., 2008; Slagter et al., 2007).
An investigation o f the effects of novice and experienced meditation practice on 
attentional control was also conducted by Brefczynski-Lewis et al. (2007). In this 
study it was found that, compared to novice meditators, on the Hick’s S-light 
Reaction Time task experienced mindfulness meditators reported they were able to 
perceive the whole field of eight lights simultaneously. They also responded more 
quickly and accurately when the target light came on, rather than serially scanning 
the lights and trying to anticipate the correct choice. Furthermore, in response to 
distracter sounds, expert meditators had more activation (as measured by fMRI) in 
regions related to response inhibition and attention than did novice meditators. 
However, as van Leeuwen et al. (2009) noted, in addition to having practiced OM 
meditation, experienced meditators also often engage in extensive focused attention 
meditation training. Thus, it may be this attentional component (i.e. focused attention 
as opposed to open monitoring) that caused a reduction in attentional bias. Given that 
novice mindfulness meditators also use focused attention, it is difficult to conclude
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from this data if experienced meditators benefit from superior attentional control 
compared to novice meditators. Furthermore, despite the abundance of evidence to 
suggest that intensive mindfulness meditation training can better attention, as 
previously discussed (see section 2.1.5), it is impossible to use randomised control 
trials to confirm these findings.
Experience based on the duration of meditation practice is not the only factor which 
has been found to effect attentional control by reducing attentional bias. The 
intensity of which meditation is practiced may also be relevant. Chambers, Lo & 
Allen (2008) found that an intense period of meditation training (over ten-days) 
showed higher levels o f self-reported mindfulness, sustained attention, and attention 
switching relative to a comparison group who did not undergo any meditation 
training. Slagter et al. (2007) also found that after only three months of meditation 
training the experimental group performed significantly better on an attentional bias 
task compared to the control group. Similar findings have been reported by others 
(Doyon et al., 2002; Lutz et al., 2008). Defining meditation experience using more 
than one method is therefore advised when exploring its effects on attention.
2.1.6.2 Novice meditators
Whilst the literature supporting the benefits of long-term meditation in relation to 
reducing attentional bias is substantial (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Chambers et 
al., 2008; van Leeuwen, Muller & Melloni, 2009; Lutz et al., 2008; Slagter et al.,
2007) more recently, some have found that short-term mindfulness meditation 
training can also enhance attentional control. Although considered to be less 
effective than extensive meditation practice, the positive effects of short-term 
meditation training is important from an applied point o f view. Dickenson, Berkman, 
Arch & Lieberman (2012) found that the neural mechanisms of a brief mindfulness 
induction were related to more effective attentional control in novice meditators. 
Zeidan et al. (2010) also reported that even with short-term meditation training there 
were significant differences (i.e. higher levels) in both sustained attention and 
executive functioning in the meditation group compared to the non-meditating 
group. This suggests that short-term meditation is associated with greater ability to 
focus on timed or speed tasks, which may be the result o f the meditation practice 
reducing attentional bias to the stimuli presented throughout the tasks. Furthermore,
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novice meditators who completed a five-day mindfulness course showed higher 
scores in conflict resolution on the Attentional Network Task, as well as higher fluid 
intelligence scores, compared to a similarly chosen group given relaxation training 
(Tang et al., 2007). The importance of the latter finding is that fluid intelligence is 
closely related to processes of attention control (Carpenter, Just & Shell, 1990; Kane 
& Engle, 2002). Thus, these results suggest a main effect of short-term mindfulness 
meditation training on processes of cognitive control and subsequently, attentional 
bias. In further support of this, McHugh, Simpson & Reed (2010) found that a 
focused attention meditation group displayed lower levels o f stimuli over-selectivity 
and greater levels of stimulus control when training was provided over only a ten- 
minute period. However, when mindfulness and concentrative meditation practices 
were compared using an auditory counting task susceptible to lapses in sustained 
attention, superior attentional performance was obtained for only long-term 
meditators. Thus the benefits of short-term meditation may only be immediate and 
fade away gradually over time.
In view of the discussed literature, it may be concluded that the study o f long-term 
meditators offers the most realistic assessment of the effects o f meditation practice 
on attentional functioning (Lykins et al., 2010). Furthermore, if  more effective 
attention is only short lived, it would be logical to expect there to be higher levels of 
attentional control and lower levels of attentional bias for only those who are 
actively practicing meditation on a regular basis. Moreover, not all studies agree that 
short-term meditation practice is beneficial. McMillan, Robertson, Brock & Chorlton 
(2002) for instance found that brief exposure (five-weeks) to mindfulness meditation 
cannot be recommended as a treatment technique for patients suffering from 
attentional regulation difficulties. This was because significantly higher levels of 
attentional control were not evident in the mindfulness group relative to a non­
treatment control group. The participants in their study had however suffered 
significant brain injuries and as a result, their attentional networks may have been 
too compromised to make remediation via mindfulness-based intervention viable. It 
is therefore possible that a brief mindfulness meditation practice may demonstrate 
greater reductions in attentional bias but only within a non-clinical population. 
Further research is needed to confirm this assumption. McMillan’s study can also be 
criticised for using a training period (five-weeks) which was unrepresentative of the
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effects of brief mindfulness training compared to other studies which have used a 
much shorter training period (e.g. McHugh et al., 2010).
2.1.7 Summaiy and limitations of the current literature
The evidence for the effects of mindfulness meditation experience on attention is 
promising, yet contradictory. Whereas some studies support the notion that 
mindfulness requires intense practice of meditation to demonstrate better attentional 
control and thus, lower attentional bias (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Chambers et 
al., 2008; Slagter et al., 2007) others argue that only a brief exposure to mindfulness 
practice is needed for the same effects to be seen (Dickerson et al., 2012; Tang et al., 
2007; Zeidan et al., 2010). One possibility for these conflicting findings may be due 
to meditators varying widely in the length and consistency o f their practice. As no 
standard method currently exists for denoting levels o f meditation experience, it is 
unsurprising that there is considerable variation in how meditation experience is 
defined across studies. Some studies classify the level o f experience as measured by 
minutes of meditation practiced per day, or by the total hours spent meditating across 
a practitioners’ lifetime (e.g. between 2,000 and 45,000 lifetime hours) (Grant et al., 
2010; Perlman et al., 2010). Others have classified the level of meditation experience 
depending on attendance rates of intense meditation retreats (e.g. either a 5-7 days 
retreat, or a silent retreat lasting a minimum of a week; Falkenstrom, 2010).
A weak method of operationalising practitioners’ level of meditation experience was 
noted as a flaw in a study carried out by Sabel (1980). In Sabel’s study, meditators 
ranged from a few days to 99 months, yet no statistical analyses were performed to 
compare possible differences between novice meditators and experienced meditators. 
Limited studies have incorporated assessments from meditation teachers to denote 
level of proficiency (Brown & Engler, 1980), but the majority simply report how 
long individuals have engaged in meditation practice. Shapiro and Walsh (2003) 
suggested that in order to ensure rigorous research is conducted the “frequency and 
duration of meditation practice must be recorded to determine if  greater meditation 
induces greater effects (p. 94).” The current study aimed to address this issue by 
analysing the effects of mindfulness meditation experience on attention by; (1) the 
self-reported level of experience by the practitioner, (2) the number of times
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mindfulness meditation was practiced per week, (3) the number of minutes 
mindfulness meditation was practiced per meditation session, and (4) the number of 
months mindfulness was practiced in total. To my knowledge, this was the first study 
to explore the effects of mindfulness experience on attentional bias using these 
different defining methods.
Another possibility for the inconsistency in the literature is that, current research has 
failed to identify a reliable method of exploring the effects on meditation experience 
on attention between meditators across different practices. Often, to obtain a 
sufficient sample size the majority of mindfulness studies, including some of those 
outlined previously (e.g. Valentine & Sweet, 1999), do not contain pure mindfulness 
meditators (i.e. practitioners may identify themselves as mindfulness meditators but 
still practice strategies from other meditations). It is therefore difficult to determine 
with confidence whether better attentional control and lower levels of attentional 
bias is associated with meditation experience or meditational type. The current study 
proposed the novel idea that meditation experience can be defined by practitioners’ 
ability to utilise the attentional components; focused attention and/or open 
monitoring. Mindfulness meditators are generally taught both o f these skills 
(Chambers et al., 2009), whereas non-mindfulness meditators (e.g. concentrative and 
transcendental meditators) are typically taught only focused attention (Lutz, Slagter, 
Dunne & Davidson, 2008; Rapgay & Bystrisky, 2009).
Given the greater simplicity of learning focused attention, the current study 
predicted that meditations which place more of an emphasis on focused attention 
would be practiced by ‘novice’ meditators whereas meditations which encourage the 
learning of focused attention in addition to the more complex skill, open monitoring, 
would be practiced by ‘experienced’ meditators. In support o f this, some have argued 
that the complexity of mindfulness meditation compared to concentrative meditation 
encourages a high drop-out rate of novice users (Delmonte, 1988). Despite some 
obvious limitations of this new categorisation method (e.g. assuming that all 
mindfulness meditators practice open monitoring in addition to focused attention, 
and non-mindfulness meditators the opposite of this), given the complexity of 
meditation, in addition to this study being the first to use this method, initial 
explorations were believed to benefit from a simplistic approach.
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2.1.8 The current study
The idea that attention could be trained through mindfulness meditative practice is an 
intriguing possibility and one that formed the subject o f this investigation. As 
previously discussed, there is increasing evidence to suggest that meditation training 
enhances attentional control by reducing attentional bias (e.g. Chambers et al., 2008; 
Jha et al., 2007; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005; Tang et al., 2007; Moore & Malinowski,
2009). The current study aimed to further investigate the impact of mindfulness 
training, taking into account meditation experience on attentional bias to the 
emotionally motivating stimuli; chocolate. No other studies have directly 
investigated the impact of experience of mindfulness training on attentional bias 
towards this emotionally motivating stimulus.
2.1.8.1 Evidence for attention bias to emotionally motivating food-related stimuli 
Research has shown that when individuals are attempting to abstain from a substance 
with a high reward or threat value, attentional bias for information in the 
environment relating to that substance is increased (Cox, Fadardi & Pothos, 2006; 
Pothos et al., 2009). Using various versions of the Stroop paradigm (Channon & 
Hayward, 1990, but see Stewart & Samoluk, 1997 for a non-replication) and also the 
dot-probe task (Mogg, Bradley, Hyare & Lee, 1998) research has consistently shown 
attentional bias to high sugar, high fat food names, including chocolate (Mogg et al., 
1998; Pothos et al., 2009). Specifically, attentional biases to such food products have 
been identified amongst dieters (Cooper & Fairbum, 1992), restrained eaters 
(Francis, Stewart & Hounsell, 1997) and those particularly sensitive to the appetitive 
qualities of food (i.e. external eaters; Daryna, 2005). Newman et al. (2008) also 
found a significant interaction between the effect of external eating and 
experimentally induced stress in the colour-naming interference o f snack-related 
food words. These findings were very similar to attentional biases reported in drug 
dependence research, with enhanced attentional bias evident at the visual probe 
exposure durations, 500 and 2000ms. The findings are also consistent with previous 
research which has indicated a bias for appetitive cues operating in the maintenance 
o f attention (Field et al., 2004). Thus, there may be a common mechanism that 
controls the holding of attention on emotionally motivating stimuli. Successfully 
identifying a way o f lowering levels o f attentional bias to such stimuli has many 
health-related benefits given that attentional biases may contribute to the
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maintenance and escalation of addictive behaviours (e.g. Cox, Pothos & Hosier,
2007; Field & Eastwood, 2005; Waters & Feyerabend, 2000; Waters et al., 2003). To 
name just one advantage, lower levels of attentional bias may help to reduce obesity 
given that Calitri, Pothos, Tapper, Brunstrom & Rogers (2010) found that an 
attentional bias to unhealthy foods (as measured by an emotional Stroop task) 
predicted an increase in BMI one year later.
2.1.8.2 Effects o f  mindfulness meditation on attention bias to food-related stimuli 
The current study proposed that practicing mindfulness meditation may be one 
approach of lowering levels of attentional bias to emotionally motivating stimuli. In 
support of this, it has been suggested that applying the principle of meditation offers 
a powerful means of preventing impulsive reactions as demonstrated by less 
attentional bias (Papies et al., 2011). Papies et al. hypothesised that mindfulness 
attention training would lower or even possibly eliminate participants’ attentional 
bias to attractive foods, compared to a control condition. Mindful participants should 
therefore respond to attractive food pictures in the same unbiased manner that they 
respond to neutral pictures. In Papies et al’s study, participants were randomly 
allocated to either a mindful attention condition or to a control condition. First, a 
sample of forty student participants were shown a number of emotionally evoking 
pictures. The mindfulness group were instructed during this task to observe any 
thoughts they had about the pictures without suppressing or avoiding them. Each 
picture was viewed for a brief period of five seconds. The control group (i.e. reverse 
instruction group) were told to ‘completely experience’ and ‘get immersed’ in the 
emotions and thoughts they experienced in relation to each picture. After this task 
had finished, participants completed an approach-avoidance task which contained 
five pictures of attractive foods (e.g. pizza), five pictures o f neutral foods (e.g. 
cucumber) and ten filler pictures.
The findings showed that spontaneous approach reactions elicited by 
attractive food were fully eliminated in the mindful attention condition compared to 
the control condition in which participants viewed the same items without mindful 
attention training. This effect occurred systematically across three experiments 
when, (1) compared to a non-mindful attention control group, (2) independent o f 
participants’ goal of dieting, and (3) evident to be persistent over a five minute 
distraction period. Papies et al. concluded that mindfulness meditation training helps
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people to recognise that the desire they have for a certain food can be attributed to 
transient thoughts, rather than to the stimulus itself. It is potentially this change in 
attribution that dissipates food impulses by lowering attentional bias. Whilst these 
findings are promising, further examination of the precise mechanisms underlying 
these effects was advised.
2.1.9 Measuring attentional bias
To obtain a measure of attentional bias numerous paradigms have been implemented, 
with the most common of these being various versions of the Stroop task (e.g. 
original and emotional) (Schatzberg, Posner, DeBattista, Kalehzan, Rothschild & 
Shear, 2000; Tapper, Pothos, Farardi & Ziori, 2008; Williams, Mathews &
MacLeod, 1996) and the dot-probe (visual probe) task (Bradley, Mogg & Lee, 1997; 
Tapper, Pothos & Lawrence, 2010). In view of this, the current study also used these 
tasks to assess whether mindfulness experience had a significant effect on attention. 
The emotional Stroop, as opposed to the original Stroop task, was however used 
given that the current study aimed to explore the effects o f meditation on attentional 
bias to emotionally motivating stimuli. The emotional Stroop assessed attentional 
bias in the form of elaborative processing. The dot probe was used to assess 
attentional bias in the form of impaired disengagement at 100, 500 and 2000ms 
durations. The shorter durations of 100 and 500ms were chosen to allow for the 
investigation of initial attentional orientation, whilst the longer 2000ms duration 
provided a measure of sustained attention. These time durations were also selected 
based on their used in similar research studies (Field, Mogg, Zetteler & Bradley, 
2004; Tapper, Pothos & Lawrence, 2010).
2.1.9.1 The emotional Stroop task
In the original Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) participants are asked to identify the colour 
of a series o f words as quickly as possible and to ignore their semantic content. 
Typically for this version of the task the words are matched on variables such as 
word length and number of syllables. Colour naming reaction times are significantly 
slower when the words are incongruent colour names compared to non-colour words, 
or strings of letters. The Stroop effect is taken as evidence that attention paid to the 
words themselves interferes with attention that would otherwise be focused on the
colour-naming task. Over the years, the Stroop has been modified with newer 
versions of the task (i.e. the emotional Stroop) having the ability to examine whether 
words related to an individual’s emotional problems interfere more greatly with 
colour naming than control words. For example, an individual with an eating 
disorder may demonstrate greater colour-naming interference when the target words 
refer to food. There exists a vast body o f literature demonstrating that colour naming 
is significantly impaired when the target words are relevant to an individual’s area of 
emotional concern, including anxiety disorders, phobias, and obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (see Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996, Williams, Watts, MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1997 for a review). Findings from studies using the emotional Stroop 
demonstrate that this task can act both as a diagnostic of an emotional condition 
(Foa, Ilai, McCarthy, Shoyer & Murdock, 1993; McNally, English & Lipke, 1993) 
and successful treatment of a disorder, as shown by a reduction in the Stroop effect 
(Mathews, Mogg, Kentish & Eysenck, 1995). Some researchers have however 
argued that the emotional Stroop task does not provide a reliable measure of 
attentional allocation. This is because colour-naming can result from attention either 
being directed towards or away from emotionally relevant stimuli (de Ruiter & 
Brosschot, 1994). Despite this criticism, researchers have still chosen to utilise the 
emotional Stroop task to investigate the effects o f mindfulness training on attentional 
control and attentional bias (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005).
2.1.9.1.1 Using the emotional Stroop task to explore the effects o f  
mindfulness training on attention.
The demonstration of decreased Stroop interference in mindfulness meditators 
implies that cognitive processes that become automated can be brought back under 
cognitive control, and previously automatic responses can be interrupted or inhibited 
(Deikman, 2000). The literature investigating the effects o f meditation practice on 
emotional Stroop task performance is less researched than that on the original Stroop 
task (Dillbeck & Orme-Johnson, 1987). Some positive findings have however been 
shown. Wenk-Sormaz (2005), for example, demonstrated that a mindfulness 
induction in the laboratory promoted less automatic and habitual responding on an 
emotional Stroop task; suggesting increased attentional control in the emotional 
domain. Lutz et al. (2008) later replicated this finding. These results support Bishop 
et al’s (2004) argument for the utility of using the emotional Stroop task to assess
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mindfulness skills. This is because mindfulness training cultivates the ability to 
inhibit semantic/secondary elaborative processing of the thoughts, feelings, and 
sensations that arise following confrontation with a stimulus. Bishop predicted that 
this should lead to shorter latency and fewer mistakes in colour-naming emotional 
words in this paradigm. Not all studies which use the emotional Stroop to explore the 
effects of meditation training on attention however demonstrate these findings. A 
study by Anderson, Lau, Segal & Bishop (2007) failed to find greater attentional 
control after participation in an eight-week mindfulness-based programme as 
assessed by emotional Stroop interference . Accordingly at present, no definitive 
conclusions can be made in terms of the efficacy of the emotional Stroop task to 
measure the effects of meditation training on attention. The current study aimed to 
further understand the effects of mindfulness on emotional Stroop task performance 
by using a food version of the task (Tapper & Pothos, 2009) to test for attentional 
biases to chocolate (Faunce, 2002).
2.1.9.2 The dot-probe task
This task was first devised by MacLeod, Mathews & Tata (1986) and involved the 
presentation of word or picture pairs side by side on a computer screen for a fixed 
duration. One half of the pair is concern or interest-related whereas the other 
stimulus is a matched, concem/interest-neutral picture or word. After the fixed 
duration has lapsed, the images are removed and a probe stimulus (e.g. a dot) 
appears in the location of one of the previously occupied pair members. Participants 
are asked to indicate the probe location by selecting the correct response key out of 
two options as quickly as possible. Attentional bias is indicated by either faster 
reaction times to probes that replace concem/interest-related images or words 
(orienting) and/or slower response times to probes replacing the neutral stimuli 
(disengagement). Many of the limitations posed by Stroop-based task are believed to 
be avoided by the dot-probe task (see Cisler, Bacon & Williams, 2009). The dot- 
probe for instance is less subjective to carryover effects (i.e. colour-naming 
interference produced by concern-related words slowing down responding to the 
next word in the list). This is because the location of the control and emotional
2 The emotional words used in this study were positive (e.g. loyal) and negative (e.g. shallow) 
adjectives which the participants had previously rated as being ‘most characteristic o f them’.
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stimuli are randomly varied across trials between the left and right sides of the 
computer screen.
The dot-probe task also provides a more ecologically valid assessment o f attentional 
bias than the emotional Stroop task. Shifting visual attention between different 
stimuli reflects situations in the natural environment in which individuals are 
confronted with multiple events competing for his/her attention. Another advantage 
of the dot-probe task is that it measures the two components o f attention used in 
mindfulness meditation; continued maintenance of attention (i.e. focused attention) 
and shifting attention away from stimuli of threat or reward (i.e. open monitoring). 
Thus, this task is able to individually measure the different components o f attention. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of the dot-probe in addition to the emotional Stroop tasks 
allows for more clear interpretation of how different levels of mindfulness 
experience effects attention. Research has shown that there is no significant 
correlation between these two tasks (Egloff & Hock, 2003; Pothos, Calitri, Tapper, 
Brunstrom, & Rogers, 2009). A limitation of the dot-probe task however is that some 
studies report identifying attentional bias after only brief stimulus presentations 
(500ms or less) (Bradley et al., 1997; Mogg et al., 1995, 2004) whereas others report 
attentional bias using longer stimuli presentations (1000ms or more) (Gotlib, 
Krasnoperova, Yue & Joormann, 2004). As a result o f this, further investigation is 
needed to explore the efficacy of measuring attentional bias using the dot-probe task.
2.1.9.2.1 Using the dot-probe task to explore the effects o f  mindfulness 
training on attention
In comparison to the emotional Stroop task, investigations into the effects of 
mindfulness experience on performance of the dot-probe task are to date, 
unexplored. Hodgins & Adair (2010), however, recently used a similar visual 
selection attention task to the dot-probe task to explore the effects o f mindfulness 
training on attention. The findings were promising, showing that meditators 
demonstrated less interference from invalid cues compared to non-meditators. No 
direct use of the dot-probe task has though been published. This demonstrates a gap 
in the research literature which has the potential to uncover novel findings in the area 
o f meditation and attention. The current study aimed to bridge this gap. It also 
attempted to explain how mindfulness works to achieve more effective attentional
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control (e.g. delaying orientation to, or enhancing disengagement from 
motivationally stimulating stimuli).
2.1.9.2.2 Using the dot-probe task to explain reductions in attentional bias; 
delayed orientation or enhanced disengagement
Attentional bias is often measured in two parts; orientation o f bias and maintenance 
o f bias (Calvo & Avero, 2005; Calvo & Lang, 2004; Field et al., 2006; Fox, Russo, 
Bowles & Dutton, 2001; Mogg et al., 2005). The first component is involved in early 
attentional processing (typically within 0-2 seconds) whereas the second component 
is involved in late attentional processing (Calvo & Avero, 2005; Calvo & Lang,
2004; Field et al., 2006). The distinction between the initial orienting of selective 
attention and the maintenance, or disengagement, of attention is recognised as an 
important one (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). The orientation of bias and maintenance 
o f bias have been found to differ depending on the type o f stimuli and the 
experiences of the individuals. Many studies have shown that higher levels of 
attentional bias to concern/interest stimuli is the result o f delayed disengagement as 
opposed to heightened orientation (Fox, Russo, Bowles & Dutton, 2001; Georgiou et 
al., 2005; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere & De Houwerm 2006; Salemink, van der 
Hout & Kindt, 2007; Yiend & Mathews, 2001; but see Mogg, Holmes, Gamer & 
Bradley, 2008). Using a modified visual probe task to examine the influence of 
hunger and trait reward drive on food-related attentional bias, Tapper, Pothos & 
Lawrence (2010) found that these predicted delayed disengagement from food 
images at short (100ms), but not long (500, 2000ms) stimulus durations. A study by 
Kemps & Tiggemann (2009) also found difficulties in disengaging attention from 
chocolate images in chocolate cravers.
Similarly to Tapper et al. (2010) and Kemps & Tiggemann (2009) the current study 
aimed to investigate the effects of food stimuli on attentional bias. More specifically 
however, the study aimed to explore the effects of mindfulness experience on 
participants’ ability to lower levels of attentional bias to these emotionally 
motivating stimuli. Ortner, Kilner & Zelazo (2007) explored the effects of 
mindfulness meditation on attentional control in emotional contexts. Using an 
emotional interference task (Buodo et al., 2002) participants were asked to judge 
whether a tone was high- or low-pitched while viewing neutral, pleasant, or
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unpleasant pictures. The results showed that participants with more mindfulness 
meditation experience showed less interference from affective pictures compared to 
those who had experience of relaxation meditation or no meditation at all. This study 
suggested that experienced meditators were better able to disengage their attention 
from emotional stimuli. Others studies have however found the opposite, with 
meditation training being associated with delayed orientation of attention (Jha et ah, 
2007; van den Hurk et al., 2010) . Thus, it remains ambiguous whether mindfulness 
is associated with lower levels of attentional bias by delaying attentional orientation 
to emotionally motivating stimuli, or by enhancing a practitioner’s ability to 
successfully disengage from the stimuli. Given the limited amount of literature 
published in this research area, the current study aimed to offer further clarity as to 
how mindfulness experience affects attention control and attentional bias.
2.1.10 Predicted mediators: mindfulness, attentional control and self-control
Several researchers have reported that meditation training is associated with greater 
self-reported mindfulness (Chambers et ah, 2008; Jha et ah, 2010; Moore & 
Malinowski, 2009; Zeidan et ah, 2010), attentional control (Singh et ah, 2007, 2003) 
and self-control (Tang et ah, 2009, 2007). Reported lower levels of attentional bias 
to emotionally motivating stimuli, due to the practice of meditation, may therefore be 
caused by these variables mediating the effects. As a result, using questionnaire 
measures the current study aimed to examine the extent to which the effects of 
meditation training on attention were brought about by increases in mindfulness, 
attentional control and self-control ability. A brief literature review in support o f the 
potential mediator effects of each variable is provided.
2.1.10.1 Mindfulness
Research using the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) has shown that 
after controlling for demographic variables such as age, education and mental health, 
meditation experience is significantly associated with levels of self-reported 
mindfulness (Baer et ah, 2008; Carmody & Baer, 2008; Lykins & Baer, 2009). This 
may suggest that the practice of meditation leads to a greater ability to use
3 Both studies measured orientation of attention using attentional network tests.
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mindfulness skills in daily life. Furthermore, the subjective sense of attentional 
control has been found to correspond to individual differences in trait mindfulness 
(Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietmeyer & Toney, 2006; Herndon, 2008). Schmertz et al.
(2009) for example reported that self-reported mindfulness was positively related to 
performance on a task of sustained attention. More specifically, the findings showed 
that mindfulness scores were negatively related to task target omission. Schmertz 
and colleagues therefore concluded that self-reported mindfulness is related to 
exaggerated lapses of attention. Baer (2009) also reported that higher levels of 
mindfulness appeared to mediate improvements in psychological functioning (e.g. 
observation of internal and external experiences), probably by cultivating an 
adaptive form of self-focused attention. The aforementioned evidence supports the 
notion have self-reported mindfulness may mediate the effect of mindfulness training 
on attention.
2.1.10.2 Attentional control
Attentional control refers to attention-related regulatory processes which are needed 
to ensure that information processing is in accord with long- and short-term goals. 
One possible way of achieving greater attentional control is through meditation 
training. Some have suggested that, although there is strong evidence to infer that 
meditation training is positively related to attention, the strength of the relationship is 
mediated by individual differences in attentional control abilities (longitudinal study; 
Singh et al., 2003). Walsh et al. (2009) for example found that self-reported 
attentional control correlated with mindfulness scores. Doijee (2010) also found that 
increased sustained attention in a meditation group was marked by significantly 
lower levels of variability of individual reaction times. Furthermore, Derryberry & 
Reed (2002) reported that people high in attentional control were better at focusing 
attention, shifting attention, and controlling thoughts in a flexible manner than low 
control counterparts. Some have suggested that these characteristics overlap 
considerably with meditative practices (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Dickenson, 
Berkman, Arch & Lieberman, 2012). As a result of this, many scientific studies have 
been carried out to investigate whether greater attentional control, and consequently, 
lower levels of attentional bias, is a true benefit of meditation (see Shapiro & Walsh, 
2003 for a review).
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Another measure of attentional control is absorption. Absorption is typically 
assessed using Tellegen's Absorption Scale (TAS; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), a 
questionnaire that measures an individual^ openness to new emotional and cognitive 
experiences, as well as the ability to engage attention fully in an experience (Roche 
& McConkey, 1990). The TAS is believed to capture an aspect of attention that may 
act as a meditating variable in studies of meditation. Davidson, Goleman & Schwartz 
(1976) found a reliable linear increase in TAS scores from controls to long-term 
meditators. This study however used a cross-sectional design o f meditators from 
different traditions, therefore it remains unclear whether absorption was developed 
by, or was a predisposing characteristic of, long-term meditation. Warrenburg, 
Pagano, Woods & Hiastala (1980) reported that long-term meditators who 
maintained regular meditation practice were significantly higher in absorption than 
non-meditators. Moreover, there was a significant correlation between absorption 
and tonal memory in the meditation group. This evidence, plus a failure to find an 
association between length of meditation practice and absorption, led the authors to 
conclude that the attention trait was not a result of practice, but possibly a 
predisposing variable. In view of this, future investigations o f the relationship 
between meditation and attention ought to include a measure o f absorption, in 
addition to other measures of self-reported attentional control. The purpose of this is 
to gain some statistical control over performance variability.
2.1.10.3 Self-control
Self-control is described as the capacity to maintain stability o f functioning in the 
face o f unpleasant internal states and to be less controlled by particular emotions and 
thoughts (Wright, Day & Howells, 2009). Self-reported scores on self-control 
measures have been found to be significantly positively correlated with mindfulness 
scores (Black et al., 2011). As a result, some studies have supported the use of 
mindfulness meditation in the self-control of health-related disorders including, 
anxiety and depression, pain management, cancer support, hypertension, coronary 
artery disease, substance abuse, binge eating and stress management (Alterman, 
Koppenhaver, Mulholland, Ladden & Baime, 2004; Bowen et al., 2006; Carlson, 
Ursuliak, Goodey, Angen & Speca, 2001; Chang et al., 2004; Davidson et al., 2003; 
Kabat-Zinn, 1982; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992; Kristeller & Hallett, 1999; Majumdar, 
Grossman, Dietz-Waschkowski, Kersig & Walach, 2002; Miller, Fletcher & Kabat-
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Zinn, 1995; Tacon, McComb, Caldera & Randolph, 2003; Williams, Kolar, Reger & 
Pearson, 2001). The concept of self-control through the practice of meditation has 
also been supported in the development, testing and use of the Mindfulness 
Awareness Assessment Scale (MAAS) (Brown & Ryan. 2003).
The intentional cultivation of mindfulness attention may promote self-control by 
allowing for greater attention to internal and environmental cues (Kabat-Zinn, 1982; 
Linehan, 1993). Trait mindfulness has been found to correlate significantly with self- 
reports of self-control, goal setting, goal clarity, and a stronger intention-behaviour 
relationship (Baer et al., 2006; Chatzisarantis & Hagger, 2007; Kee & Wang, 2008; 
Lykins & Baer, 2009), while a mindfulness induction and the intentional direction of 
attention, respectively, have been shown to lead to less automatised and habitual 
responding and the ability to override unwanted responses (Baumeister, Heatherton 
& Tice, 1994; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). This is all suggestive o f more effective self- 
control. Thus, if the deliberate direction of attention involves self-control, and if  
meditation practice cultivates the ability to direct attention mindfully while using 
fewer executive resources, then meditators should show higher performance on the 
attentional control tasks compared to non-meditators. It is also possible that 
individuals with naturally high levels o f mindfulness in the absence of meditation 
experience will also show lower levels o f attentional bias on these tasks. Testing for 
the effects of self-reported self-control is therefore advised when exploring the 
effects of meditation training on attention.
2.1.11 Methodological problems in research exploring the effects o f meditation on 
attention and how to overcome them
There are many studies that have investigated the benefits o f meditation training on 
attention (Shapiro et al., 2006; Slagter et al., 2007; Zeidan et al., 2010). These 
studies are however not free from limitations. A discussion of some of these 
limitations is provided, followed by a discussion o f how to overcome the noted 
methodological problems.
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2.1.11.1 Subject selection factors
One recognised methodological problem is the inconsistent subject selection factors 
when comparing meditators with non-meditator controls. This makes the 
interpretation of findings difficult. Failing to identify predisposing factors that may 
influence the effect of meditation on attention also has its limitations. Some have 
reported that certain personality characteristics such as openness, neuroticism, 
impulsivity and anxiety predispose an individual to start, or maintain, meditation 
practices (West, 1980; Takahashi et al., 2005) which, in turn, may impact their 
attentional control ability. More specifically, neuroticism, impulsivity and anxiety 
have been found to be negatively correlated with mindfulness (Brown & Ryan,
2003). Thus, people high in these traits are thought to possess attentional biases 
which may be contrasted with mindfulness. On the contrary, openness has been 
found to be positively associated with mindfulness; people high in this trait are 
thought to possess less attentional biases due to acceptance o f what is present. 
Positive associations have also been observed between trait mindfulness and the 
personality characteristics, agreeableness and conscientiousness (Brown & Ryan, 
2003; Thompson & Waltz, 2007). The relationship between other personality 
characteristics, such as extraversion and meditation practice, however remains 
unclear due to the fact that research has found both positive (Baer et al., 2004) and 
negative (Thompson & Waltz, 2007; Waters, 2007) correlations.
2.1.11.2 Practitioners ’ psychological well-being
Another confounding factor may be practitioners’ psychological well-being. 
Empirical findings suggest that meditation training can be applied to help reduce 
symptoms in a considerable number of psychological disorders including, stress, 
anxiety and depression (Atin, 1997; Baer, 2003; Carmody & Baer, 2008; Giommi, 
2006; Grossman, Niemann, Schmidt & Walach, 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 1982, 1990,
2003; Kabat-Zinn, Lipworth & Burney, 1985; Kristeller & Hallett, 1999; Nyklicek & 
Kuijpers, 2008; Speca, Carlson, Goodey & Angen, 2000; Teasdale, Segal & 
Williams, 1995; Teasdale et al., 2000). Many studies have found that self-report 
mindfulness scores are negatively associated with measures o f anxiety, depression 
and negative affect (Baer et al., 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Feldman et al., 2007) 
with significant group differences between meditators and non-meditators evident in 
the expected direction (Lykins & Baer, 2009). Chambers et al. (2008) also found that
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participation in an intensive meditation retreat led to significant decreases in 
depressive symptoms and rumination relative to a control group, while Tang et al. 
(2007) found that a brief mindfulness training session led to lower anxiety, 
depression, and stress-related cortisol levels.
Furthermore, Schreiner & Malcolm (2008) investigated the effect of 
meditation on these three emotional states, in addition to exploring whether people 
with varying severity of stress, anxiety and depression responded differently after 
meditation training. The results showed that the severity levels of all affective 
measures decreased by the end of the meditation courses. More specifically, 
participants with severe emotional difficulties at the time of starting the meditation 
course demonstrated the most notable improvements over time. Schreiner &
Malcolm (2008) concluded that meditation training is beneficial in reducing the 
symptoms of sub-clinical depression and anxiety and can substantially reduce stress. 
Meditation practice may improve psychological wellbeing by teaching unbiased 
observation of all stimuli, therefore potentially reducing maladaptive forms of 
selective attention. Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown & Hofmann (2006) supported 
this, finding that when individuals diagnosed with mood and anxiety disorders were 
asked to watch a distressing film clip in an accepting, mindful way, they experienced 
faster recovery from the induced negative affect than those instructed to suppress 
their reactions to the film. Arch & Craske (2006) also showed that individuals 
completing a focused breathing induction experienced the least emotional volatility 
while viewing emotion-relevant slides and the greatest willingness to view highly 
negative slides, compared with individuals engaging in unfocused attention or 
worrying.
2.1.11.3 Individual differences
Individual differences in eating behaviours are also thought to influence the effect of 
meditation on attention. Restrained eaters (i.e. people who restrict food intake to 
achieve weight loss or to prevent weight gain, Herman & Mack, 1975) can be driven 
by appearance-related evaluative processes (e.g. self-judgement o f the self, such as 
body weight and shape) (Papies & Nicolaije, 2012). Mindfulness meditation 
cultivates acceptance of the self and reduced self-judgement. Consequently, it is 
believed that the practice of mindfulness is beneficial in that it is likely to reduce 
restrained eating (Alberts, Thewissen & Raes, 2012). As a result o f this, mindfulness
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meditators are considered to have lower attentional bias than unrestrained eaters 
(Francis, Stewart & Hounsell, 1997; Stewart & Samoluk, 1997).
2.1.11.4 Overcoming these methodological limitations: identifying group differences 
Whilst controlling for the identified methodological flaws in meditation and 
attention research is very difficult, one suggested way o f doing so involves 
identifying significant group differences prior to conducting the main data analyses. 
Lykins & Baer (2009) highlighted the importance of this, arguing that many studies 
showing significant and non-significant effects of meditation training on attentional 
bias may be due to a failure to control for demographically dissimilar meditator and 
non-meditator groups. Whereas it seems that making no attempt to explore the 
similarity of meditators and non-meditator controls is a thing of the past (Jha et al., 
2007), the majority of studies in this research area limit investigations to only a few 
demographic and characteristic variables, with the most common being age (Holzel 
et al., 2008; Lazar et al., 2005; Luders et al., 2009; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; 
Travis & Shear, 2010) or gender (Valentine & Sweet, 1999; van den Hurk et al.,
2010). Others have also however included the variable, level of education (Chan & 
Woollacott, 2007; van Leeuwen et al., 2009). The addition of this latter variable has 
been welcomed as it is believed that relationships with education may be especially 
important due to many attentional tasks involving fluid intelligence. Despite this, 
checking for differences between meditators and non-meditators on a maximum of 
three variables is still considered insufficient (Lykins, Baer & Gottlob, 2012).
A study by Lykins et al (2012) attempted to address this criticism by purposefully 
comparing the performance of meditators with demographically similar non­
meditators on attention-based tasks. Lykins et al. conducted checks of group 
similarity on a total of nine variables: age, gender, ethnicity, years of education, past 
and present diagnosis of a psychological disorder (depression, anxiety or stress), 
current practice of yoga, number of months of meditation practice, number o f 
meditation sessions practiced per week, and number o f minutes meditated per 
session. Lykins et al. however still concluded that further similarity checks between 
the meditators and non-meditators could have been even more appropriate by 
including personality variables and measures o f intelligence (Aron, Orme-Johnson & 
Brubaker, 1981; Cranson et al., 1991; Dillbeck, Assimakis, Raimondi, Orme-
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Johnson & Rowe, 1986). In view of this, administration of a range o f individual 
difference assessments are required in order to help determine both how experienced 
meditators may differ from novice meditators and control subjects. Furthermore, a 
range of assessments is needed to elucidate what contribution, if  any, such measures 
might make to lower levels of attentional bias. Another reason for identifying group 
differences in meditation research is to clarify if attentional processing is truly 
enhanced by meditation training. The current study therefore aimed to conduct 
sufficient similarity checks between the meditator and non-meditator groups by 
taking measures of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992), meditation training and 
general demographic information, as well as measures o f hunger (Grand, 1968), 
reward sensitivity (Carver & White, 1994) and eating behaviour (Van Strien, Frijters, 
Bergers & Defares, 1986) (see Pothos, Tapper & Calitri, 2009; Tapper et al., 2010).
2.1.12 Other design features of the current study
To enhance attentional bias, dieters were screened out o f the current study given that 
previous evidence has shown high restrained current dieters to demonstrate lower 
food-related processing bias related to high restrained non-dieters (Tapper, Pothos, 
Fadardi & Ziori, 2008). Research has also shown that subjective hunger should be 
taken into consideration when investigating attentional bias (Mogg, Bradley, Hyare 
& Lee, 1998; Placanica, Faunce & Soames, 2002). Tapper, Pothos & Lawrence
(2010) for example identified that hunger predicted attentional bias to both 
appetising and bland food-cues at 100ms cue duration. Hunger was also found to 
impair disengagement from food-cues (Tapper et al., 2010). Furthermore, a period of 
fasting prior to completing attentional bias tasks has been shown to increase 
subjective hunger and attentional bias for food cues (Castellanos et al., 2009). 
Participants in the current study were therefore asked to fast for at least three hours 
before taking part (Tapper et al., 2008; Tapper et al., 2010). Furthermore, the current 
study did not explicitly test task performance before and after meditation. The reason 
for this was due to traditional accounts of meditation suggesting that the cognitive 
effects o f its practice are maintained outside of the mediation session (Alexander et 
al., 1989; Goleman, 1976; Kabat-Zinn, 1990). A community sample was also used 
given that learning to observe internal stimuli mindfully requires more meditation 
experience than typically found in student samples (Baer et al, 2008). Finally, to
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obtain a sufficient sized sample, both mindfulness and non-mindfulness (i.e. those 
practicing another type or meditation) were recruited.
2.1.13 Aims and predictions
The current study aimed to (1) compare data from experienced meditators, novice 
meditators, and a comparable control group of non-meditators in order to examine 
links between meditation training and attentional bias for the unhealthy snack, 
chocolate, and (2) examine the extent to which the effects o f mindfulness training on 
attentional bias were brought about by increases in self-reported mindfulness, 
attentional control, and self-control ability. Thus, an investigation of predicted 
mediators was undertaken in an attempt to explain potential links found between 
mindfulness and attention. Participants completed emotional Stroop (Tapper, Pothos, 
Fadardi & Ziori, 2008) and dot-probe (Tapper, Pothos & Lawrence, 2010) tasks. 
Following these tasks participants were asked to complete standardised measures of 
mindfulness (Baer et al., 2008; Brown & Ryan, 2003), attentional control 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and self-control ability (Tangney, Baumeister & Boone,
2004). Additional questionnaire measures of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992), 
meditation training and general demographic information were also included, as well 
as measures of hunger (Grand, 1968), reward sensitivity (Carver & White, 1994) and 
restrained eating (Van Strien, Frijters, Bergers & Defares, 1986) (see Pothos, Tapper 
& Calitri, 2009; Tapper et al., 2010). Based on the hypothesis that mindfulness 
meditation training is associated with lower levels of attentional bias, the following 
predictions were made.
• Meditators would show the best performance on the emotional Stroop and 
dot-probe tasks compared to non-meditator controls.
• All predictor mediators would be associated with lower attentional bias. Thus 
it is expected that the effects o f meditation experience on attentional bias 
would be mediated by self-reported mindfulness, attentional control and self- 
control ability.
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Examination of the long-term effects of meditation on attention was carried out by 
comparing meditators who differed in the level of experience, as measured by 
practitioner self-assessment, and also minutes, days, months and total hours spent 
meditating. Meditation experience was also investigated based on the attentional 
skills practiced by the meditators; focused attention and open monitoring, 
irrespective of the type of meditation practiced. It was predicted that;
• On tests of selective attention (e.g. emotional Stroop) where participants were 
required to focus attention on a particular object, novice and experienced 
meditators would perform similarly.
• On tests which require participants to attend to different areas o f a scene (e.g. 
dot-probe) it was assumed that experienced-mindfulness meditators would 
demonstrate superior performance compared to novice-concentrative 
meditators.
• When compared to non-meditating controls, both novice and experienced 
meditators (irrespective of how the groups were determined) were expected 
to demonstrate the best performance on the attentional bias measures.
• Both novice and experienced meditator groups would also show stronger 
correlations between the mediators and attentional bias to chocolate-related 
stimuli compared to non-meditator controls.
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2.2 Method
2.2.1 Power analysis
To determine the total number of participants needed to reach statistical power, a 
power analysis was conducted using an online sample size calculator (University of 
Surrey, Guildford). The parameters set for computing power were for a t-test with 
.80 (80%) power and an alpha level o f p<.05. To detect a mean difference between 
groups of 10 milliseconds on the emotional Stroop task (SD =15; Tapper et al., 
2008; Tapper et al., 2009), 37 participants were required per group. An attempt was 
made to recruit a minimum of 40 participants to statistically ensure full task 
completion by 37 participants. This was carried out successfully, with the smallest 
group (non-meditator controls) comprising 38 participants and the largest group 
(experienced meditators) consisting of 48 participants. Allocation to each group was 
determined by participant’s self-selected level of meditation experience 
(experienced, novice or non-meditators).
2.2.2 Participants
The study recruited a community sample of 130 participants through the display of 
flyers at meditation retreats, yoga studios, and community centres located within the 
South West Wales area. An advert was also placed in a holistic magazine. 
Additionally, emails were sent to members of meditation groups, to students 
attending evening adult education classes, and to individuals currently holding 
memberships at local leisure and fitness centres. In order to achieve a sufficient 
sample size, flyers and advertisements were worded to attract individuals who were 
either currently practicing meditation, or who had no experience o f meditation, as 
opposed to pure mindfulness meditators.
O f the 130 participants recruited, 49 considered themselves (i.e. self-assessment) to 
be experienced meditators and 40 considered themselves to be novice meditators. 
Forty-one reported being non-meditators (i.e. those with no experience of any 
meditation practice). All participants were native English speakers, over the age of 
18, not currently dieting and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants 
received a remuneration of £8 for participation and were asked to fast (i.e. consume
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no food) for three hours prior to taking part in the study. Ethical approval was 
provided by Swansea University Psychology Department Research Ethics 
Committee. All participants completed the study in full.4
2.2.3 Materials and apparatus
2.2.3.1 Questionnaires
2.2.3.1.1 Baseline characteristics
2.2.3.1.1.1 Screening questionnaire
To check the eligibility of those interested in taking part in the study, participants 
were asked eight preliminary screening questions over the telephone or via email 
(see appendix A). The questions ensured that the participants met all criteria o f the 
study (i.e. were 18 years of age or older, had normal or normal-to-corrected vision, 
did not suffer from epilepsy, were not currently dieting, a native English speaker, 
and had the ability to fast [no food to be consumed] for a period o f three hours). A 
measure of how many times participants had dieted in the past 12 months was also 
recorded.
2.2.3.1.1.2 Meditation practice questionnaire
Participants with meditation experience completed a questionnaire designed to assess 
various aspects of their meditation history, including length o f practice in days per 
week, type of meditation practiced, length of individual meditation sessions in 
minutes, details of any meditation retreats attended or training undertaken, pattern of 
meditation use, and motivation for practice (see appendix B). Participants were also 
asked to provide details of both past and present experiences of yoga, if  they had any 
other activities/hobbies that involved meditative practice techniques, and if  they had 
ever used any specific meditative breathing exercises. An opportunity to express any 
additional comments or information about their personal meditation practice was 
also offered to participants at the end of the questionnaire.
4 For full analysis on how the participant groups were checked for significant differences, see section 
2.3.1.5 of the Results.
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2.2.3.1.1.3 Demographic questionnaire
All participants were asked questions relating to gender, age, education, occupation, 
and ethnic background (see appendix C). Participants were further asked to provide 
any present or historic information relating to being clinically diagnosed with a 
psychological disorder (e.g. stress or depression), details of any physical condition(s) 
that may affect what they eat, and if they were currently pregnant. Measures of how 
much participants liked chocolate and the frequency (per average week) they 
consumed chocolate was also obtained using a seven-point Likert scale.
2.2.3.1.1.4 Trait self-description inventory
This Likert type short version o f the Trait Self-Description Inventory (TSDI; Collis 
& Elshaw, 1998; Roberts, Zeidner & Matthews, 2001) was used to measure the Big 
Five personality dimensions of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism (Tupes & Christal, 1961). TSDI (short version) 
consists of 50 items in two sections. The first section contains 28 trait descriptive 
adjectives such as “responsible” to which the participant responds using a seven- 
point scale where 1 represents “extremely not characteristic of me” and 7 represents 
“extremely characteristic of me” compared with other individuals. The second 
section contains 22 statements (e.g. “I worry more than most people”) and the 
participant responds using a nine-point scale where 1 represents “very strongly 
disagree” and 9 represents “very strongly agree”. To enable aggregation of the items 
with different response scales the appropriate trait and behavioural responses were 
summed to generate the five composites which represent the Big Five factors. The 
scale was found to have a Cronbach's a of 0.77
2.2.3.1.1.5 Dutch eating behaviour questionnaire
The Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire (DEBQ; van Strien, 1986) consisted of 
33 questions, 13 of which assessed emotional eating, 10 external eating and 10 
restrained eating. The DEBQ-emotional subscale measured overeating due to 
‘confusion between internal arousal states accompanying emotional states and 
physiological states of hunger and satiety’ (van Strien, 1986, p. 137) (e.g. “Do you 
have a desire to eat when you are feeling lonely?”). A subdivision was made 
between eating in response to diffuse emotional states and eating in response to 
clearly labelled emotions. The DEBQ-extemal subscale reflects overeating due to
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‘hyper-responsiveness to food-related cues in the environment together with 
unresponsiveness to internal cues of hunger or satiety’ (van Strien, 1986, p. 137)
(e.g. “If you see or smell something delicious, do you have a desire to eat it?”). The 
DEBQ-restraint subscale reflects the degree to which one eats less than he or she 
actually would like to eat (e.g. “Do you try to eat less at mealtimes than you would 
like to eat?”). Each question was answered on a five-point scale: never, rarely, 
sometimes, often, and very often. For all indices values, higher values indicated 
higher levels of emotional, external, and restrained eating. The scale was found to 
have a Cronbach's a of 0.93
2.2.3.1.1.6 Behavioural inhibition and behavioural approach scale
The BIS/BAS scale (Carver & White, 1994) is a 24-item self-report questionnaire 
that assesses how people typically react to certain situations. It has two subscales: 
Behavioural Inhibition (BIS) and Behavioural Approach (BAS). Representative 
subscale items include: “If I think something unpleasant is going to happen, I usually 
get pretty worked-up” (BIS) and “When I’m doing something well, I love to keep at 
it” (BAS). The BAS scale measures the tendency to experience strong positive affect 
or behavioural approach when cues o f reward are present. The BIS scale measures 
the tendency to experience negative affect or behavioural inhibition when cues of 
threat are present. Items were rated on a scale from 1 (very true for me) to 4 (very 
false for me). The scale had a Cronbach's a of 0.88.
2.2.3.1.1.7 Depression anxiety stress scale: short version
The Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS) (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993) is a 21 
item self-report questionnaire designed to measure the severity of a range of 
symptoms common to depression, anxiety and stress. In completing the DASS 
individuals are required to indicate the presence of a symptom over the previous 
week. Each item is scored from 0 (did not apply to me at all over the last week) to 3 
(applied to me very much or most of the time over the past week). Responses on the 
short form version of the DASS were multiplied by two in order to obtain the final 
score. Higher scores signified a higher severity rating. Severity categories include 
normal, mild, moderate, severe, and extremely severe. The scale demonstrated a 
Cronbach's a of 0.93.
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2.23.1.1.8 Grand hunger scale 
The Grand Hunger Scale (Grand, 1968) was used to assess hunger at the time of 
testing. Participants were asked how hungry they were at the time of testing and how 
much of their favourite food they could eat at that time. Responses were indicated 
using visual analogue scales anchored by ‘not at all hungry’/ ’extremely hungry’ and 
‘none at all7‘as much as I could get’, respectively.
2.2.3.1.1.9 National adult reading test 
The National Adult Reading Test (Nelson, 1991) was administered according to 
standard procedures. To estimate verbal intellectual functioning, this test requires 
subjects to accurately read and pronounce 50 irregularly spelt words that become 
increasingly less familiar (e.g. cough, plumb, exigency, ubiquitous). Performance of 
the NART was scored as an expression of the number o f items correct rather than 
number of errors.
2.2.3.1.2 Mediator measures
2.2.3.1.2.1 Five facet mindfulness questionnaire
Participants completed the 39-item version of the Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006). The measure assesses five facets of a 
general tendency to be mindful in daily life: observing, describing, acting with 
awareness, non-judging of inner experience, and non-reactivity to inner experience. 
Items were rated on a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (never or very 
rarely true) to 5 (very often or always true). The FFMQ has good psychometric 
properties (i.e. assessing different aspects o f mindfulness, internal reliability and the 
level o f mindfulness, test-retest reliability) in community members and meditators 
(Baer et al., 2006, 2008). The scale had a Cronbach’s a o f 0.93.
2.2.3.1.2.2 Mindful attention awareness scale
The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) was used to 
measure participant’s frequency and strength of mindfulness. The MAAS assesses 
the extent to which an individual is attentive to and aware of what is taking place in 
the present. It consists of 15 items designed to assess a core characteristic of 
dispositional mindfulness, namely, open or receptive awareness of and attention to 
moment by moment experiences. Respondents have to indicate how frequently they
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currently experience each condition, using a six-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(almost always) to 6 (almost never). Respondents rate how often they have 
experiences of acting on automatic pilot, being preoccupied, and not paying 
attention. Items include "I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious 
of it until sometime later' and “I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or 
discomfort until they really grab my attention''. It has a single factor structure and 
yields a single total score. The MAAS was found to be a reliable instrument with a 
Cronbach's a of 0.87. Adequate test-retest reliability, convergent, and discriminant 
validity have also been previously reported (Brown & Ryan, 2003).
2.2.3.1.2.3 Attentional control questionnaire
Individual variations in self-reported ability to control attention and inhibit unwanted 
distractions were assessed using the Attentional Control Questionnaire (ACQ; 
Derryberry & Reed, 2002). The scale includes 20 items related to attention focusing 
(e.g. My concentration is good even if there is music in the room around me), 
attention shifting (e.g. After being distracted or interrupted, I can easily shift my 
attention back to what I was doing) and flexible control o f thought (e.g. I can 
become interested in a new topic very quickly if  I need to). Ratings were made on a 
four-point scale (1-almost never, 2-sometimes, 3-often, and 4-always). Scores were 
calculated by summing ratings across all items. Responses were reversed scored 
where appropriate. The scale was shown to have good internal reliability (a=.87).
2.2.3.1.2.4 Self-control scale
The Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004) is a 36-item questionnaire. It aims to 
assess people’s ability to control their impulses, alter their emotions and thoughts 
and to interrupt undesired behavioural tendencies and refrain from acting on them. 
Items are endorsed on a five-point scale, where 1 represents ‘not at all like me’ and 5 
represents ‘very much like me’ and included those such as, “I am good at resisting 
temptation” and “I allow myself to lose control”. The scale was found to have a 
Cronbach’s a of 0.85.
2.2.3.1.2.5 Tellegen absorption scale
Participants completed the Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS) (Tellegen & Atkinson, 
1974), a 34-item inventory derived from Tellegen’s Multidimensional Personality
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Questionnaire. The TAS is intended to measure a person’s propensity to become 
involved in perceptual and imaginative experiences. An example of a question used 
on this scale is “If I wish, I can imagine (or daydream) some things so vividly that 
they hold my attention as a good movie or story does”. The version of the TAS 
employed in this study used a five-point Likert scale, where 0 is labelled ‘not at all’ 
and 4 is labelled ‘completely’ (the ratings relate to how many times an individual 
had experienced the item in their life time). Previous research shows that this 
modified TAS scoring (as opposed to the standard version which requested 
individuals to rate each items using a true or false scale) retains convergent validity. 
With each questionnaire item measured on a five-point scale, the possible range of 
scores is between 0 and 136. A higher score reflects a high capacity for absorption. 
The scale was found to have very good internal reliability (Cronbach’s a  = 0.96).
2.23.2  Computer-based tasks
The visual display and response recording for the dot-probe and the emotional 
Stroop tasks were controlled by Cedrus SuperLab Pro (version 2.0.4) software. Both 
computer tasks were presented on a Sony laptop computer, with a 15.4 inch screen. 
Participants responded using a Cedrus RB-730 seven-button response box to ensure 
millisecond (ms) accuracy.
2.23.2.1 Dot-probe task
The dot-probe task, developed by Tapper and Pothos (2009) assessed initial 
orientation and sustained attention to unhealthy and neutral food words. The stimuli 
consisted of 58 different colour photographs, 10 of which were o f appetising snack 
foods (in this instance, chocolate), and 10 of which were office (neutral) items (e.g. 
pencil and stapler). Thus, there were 10 appetising-neutral pairs. Each food and 
neutral picture was matched as closely as possible for content (e.g. shape, jpeg, size, 
and colour). The pictures were also matched on familiarity and excitability. The 
images used in the dot-probe task were chosen based on the findings reported by 
Tapper and Pothos (2009). In this study participants were asked to rate the level o f 
familiarity of different food-related and office-related pictures using a five-point 
rating scale where 1 = ‘I don’t know what this item is’ and 5 = ‘I recognise this item 
instantly’.
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Excitability was also rated using a five-point rating scale where 1 = ‘completely 
calm’ (i.e. relaxed, sluggish, dull, sleepy or unaroused) and 5 = ‘completely excited’ 
(i.e. stimulated, frenzied, jittery, wide-awake, or aroused). Pictures were paired 
based on how well they matched on all factors mentioned above. Examples of 
pairing of chocolate-related and office-related pictures include: a Cadbury’s Flake-a 
yellow highlighter pen, a Bounty Bar-a blue and white packaged eraser. An 
additional 10 neutral pictures were matched, forming five neutral-neutral pairs. An 
additional 28 neutral pictures made up 14 neutral pairs for use as practice and buffer 
trials. The objective of the practice and buffer trials here was to reduce practice 
effects on reaction times. No time breaks were given between blocks. There were an 
equal number of trials in each condition, as a function of picture duration, location of 
the food picture, and probe location. All trials were randomised for each participant. 
Participants were seated 100cm from the computer screen.
The design was similar to that used by Bradley et al. (1998, 2003) and by Tapper, 
Pothos and Lawrence (2010). Each trial commenced with a fixation cross which was 
displayed for 500ms in the centre of the screen, followed by a pair o f pictures 
presented side by side. The pictures varied in height and width, depending on their 
shape. There was a distance of 60mm between the fixation cross and the centre of 
each image. The pictures were displayed for three durations (100, 500, and 2000ms) 
depending on the experimental block. This allowed for comparisons with previous 
research using these durations to examine motivation-related biases in initial 
orienting and maintained attention, respectively. Thus, three sets o f dot probe trials 
were created, one in which the dot probe replaced the pictures very quickly, 100ms, 
another in which the dot-probe replaced the pictures quickly, 500ms (initial 
orientation) and another in which the dot-probe replaced the words slowly, after 
2000ms (sustained attention). Each picture pair was followed by a probe (a square 
dot measuring 2mm by 2mm) which appeared in the location o f one of the 
proceeding pictures. Picture and probe locations were counterbalanced for each pair. 
For food-neutral pairs, congruent trials were those in which the probe replaced the 
food picture, whereas the incongruent trials were those in which the probe replaced 
the neutral picture. Participants were instructed to fixate the central cross at the start 
o f each trial and identify the location of the dot-probe (either left or right), as quickly 
and as accurately as possible by pressing either the white coloured far left-hand key
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01* far right-hand key on the response box. The probe was displayed until the 
participant made a response. There was an inter-trial interval of 500ms. The task 
began with ten practice trials. These were followed by instructions informing 
participants that the real trials were about to commence, four buffer trials (i.e. 
‘warm-up’ trials, the data for which were not analysed), 60 critical trials at 100ms 
exposure duration, 60 critical trials at 500ms, and 60 critical trials at 2000ms. An 
attentional bias for food cues were indicated by faster reaction times (RTs) to probes 
replacing food rather than control (neutral) cues, as RTs are typically faster to probes 
which appear in attended, as opposed to unattended, locations.
2.23.2.2 Emotional Stroop task
A food version of the emotional Stroop task, developed by Tapper and Pothos 
(2009), was employed to test for attentional biases to chocolate in accordance with 
previous studies (Faunce, 2002). Participants first viewed either chocolate words 
(e.g. cadbury, kitkat, ferrero rocher) or neutral, office-related words (e.g. stapler, 
telephone, drawing pin). Participants were required to identify the colour of the word 
that appeared on the computer screen by pressing one of four coloured buttons (red, 
blue, green, yellow) on a response pad (Cedrus R-730) which corresponded to the 
ink colour of each word. Each trial ran as follows: a fixation point (+) appeared in 
the centre of the screen for 500ms. A word was then presented in the centre of the 
screen and remained there until the participant made a response. There was a 1000ms 
inter-trial interval. Words were matched between categories (chocolate-related and 
office-related) for number of syllables, word length, familiarity, and 
representativeness. The words used in the emotional Stroop task were chosen based 
on the findings reported by Tapper and Pothos (2009). In this study participants were 
asked to rate the level of familiarity of different food-related and office-related 
words using a five-point rating scale where 1 = ‘not at all familiar’ and 5 = ‘very 
familiar’. Representativeness was also rated using a five-point rating scale where 1 = 
‘not at all representative’ and 5 = ‘very representative’. Only chocolate-related 
words and office-related words which were highly matched were used.
All word characters were approximately 8-10mm in height. Both chocolate-related 
and office-related words were presented on a screen background which was plain 
white in colour, the same as for the dot-probe task. The font style of the words was
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Ariel and the font was size 60. The ink colours used were limited to red, blue, green 
or yellow. Participants first completed an initial practice phrase consisting of one 
block of 16 trials. The stimuli in the practice phase were written number words (e.g. 
one, three, and seven). After the practice block, but before the experimental block, 
there was also a buffer block of trials containing four trials of number words. The 
experimental block consisted of 120 trials where each of the 15 chocolate-related 
words and 15 office-related words were presented in each of the four ink colours. 
Presentation of the chocolate-related and office-related words was blocked such that 
participants either first responded to all the chocolate-related words, or first to all the 
office-related words. This followed the recommendations of Cox et al. (2006). For 
each participant the order of these blocks was randomised, as was the order of words 
within the blocks. The rationale was that the greater the attentional bias for 
chocolate-related information, the longer it would take participants to disengage their 
attention from a chocolate-related word and identify its ink colour relative to the 
time required for neutral, office-related words.
2.2.4 Procedure
The study employed a 3 (group: experienced, novice, control) x 4 (attentional bias 
measure: dot-probe [presentations times 100ms, 500ms and 2000ms] and emotional 
Stroop) between-subjects design. Participants were allocated to one o f the three 
groups based on self-assessment (i.e. depending on how each participant rated their 
own level o f meditation experience; experienced or novice). Prior to taking part in 
the study, participants were sent, via email, the study information sheet (see 
appendix D) and the screening questionnaire (see appendix A). The study 
information sheet outlined the nature and the procedure of the study whereas the 
screening questionnaire provided the experimenter with information o f the 
participant’s eligibility to take part. At this time, the meditators were also asked to 
fill out a meditation questionnaire (see appendix B) before arriving at their 
appointment. Meditators were instructed to complete this questionnaire as if  they 
were providing information about their meditation practice to someone with no prior 
knowledge o f meditation. If inadequate detail had initially been provided, the 
experimenter obtained more detailed information at the face-to-face appointment.
49
Participants were tested individually in the laboratory. Each participant provided 
written consent (see appendix E) before commencing the study. The procedure for 
the study was identical for all participants. First, the computer tasks (dot-probe and 
emotional Stroop) were completed. The tasks were counter-balanced for each group; 
experienced meditators, novice meditators, and non-meditators. Next the participants 
completed the NART test followed by the eleven questionnaire measures. The order 
o f the questionnaires was based on those most important to the study. The order was 
as follows; Participant Demographics Questionnaire, Five Facet Mindfulness 
Questionnaire, Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale, Attentional Control 
Questionnaire, Self-Control Scale, Tellegen Absorption Scale, Trait Self-Description 
Inventory, Dutch Eating Behaviour Questionnaire, BIS/BAS, Depression Anxiety 
Stress Scale, and Grand Hunger Scale. This order was chosen with the appreciation 
o f possible fatigue effects occurring as the study progressed. Once the study had 
ended, participants were debriefed (see appendix F) and then given the opportunity 
to ask the experimenter any questions they may have had. The study took 
approximately one hour to complete.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Data cleaning and preliminary analysis
2.3.1.1 Overview o f analysis
The distribution of all dependent measure scores were assessed for violations of 
normality using histograms and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests. Levene’s test was 
used to check for homogeneity of variances. The statistics reported here are for 
untransformed measures. The evidence of some skewed distributions dictated the use 
o f non-parametric statistics in the preliminary analysis. Self-report data were 
analysed using grouped repeated measures MANOVA and correlations. Means, 
standard deviations and frequencies (where appropriate) were calculated for the 
variables.5
2.3.1.2 Computation o f measures
In order to calculate attentional bias scores for the dot-probe and Stroop6 tasks two 
different methods of computation were used. These are described in the following 
sections.
2.3.1.2.1 Computing dot-probe scores
An attentional bias score for chocolate was computed by subtracting the mean 
response times for congruent trials from the mean response times for incongruent 
corresponding trials. Positive scores indicated attention towards chocolate cues 
respectively, with higher scores reflecting a stronger bias for chocolate-related 
information.
2.3.1.2.2 Computing food Stroop scores
To obtain a measure of interference, the difference between average reaction time for 
trials with chocolate food words minus average reaction time for trials with neutral 
words (office equipment) was computed for each participant. Higher (more positive) 
scores indicated more attentional bias towards chocolate.
5 Unless otherwise stated, the term ‘meditation experience’ and all analyses exploring the effects of  
meditation experience was conducted using this self-assessment categorisation method (i.e. 
participant’s self-assessment of whether they were an experienced, novice, or non-meditator).
6 The term ‘Stroop’ is always used in reference to the food version o f the emotional Stroop task.
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2.3.1.3 Treatment o f  outliers
Preliminary analysis of the data was conducted to identify outliers. Outliers were 
investigated for all measures (i.e. both computer tasks and self-report 
questionnaires).
2.3.1.3.1 Outliers and attentional bias (AB) computer tasks (dot-probe and
Stroop)
Treatment of outliers followed a three-stage process. First, errors and outliers were 
examined and excluded at the individual trial level (i.e. for individual reaction time 
[RT] scores) (Ratcliff, 1993). This was achieved by removing trials with errors or 
RTs < 100ms or >4000ms. Means and SDs were then calculated for each participant 
for the nine trial types of the dot-probe task (chocolate incongruent, chocolate 
congruent and neutral at each of the three exposures, 100ms, 500ms and 2000ms) 
and for each of the two trial types for the Stroop task (chocolate and control). RTs 
less than -3.5 and greater than 3.5 SDs from the participants’ relevant trial type were 
discarded. A total of 1 % of data were removed in this way from the dot-probe, and a 
total o f 2.66% from the Stroop.
Second, outliers were examined and excluded in relation to attentional bias scores. 
For each participant, attentional bias (AB) scores for the dot-probe incongruent and 
congruent chocolate-related foods at each of the exposure times were calculated by 
subtracting the mean RT for congruent trials from the mean RT for incongruent 
trials. Also, for each participant, AB scores for the Stroop task chocolate and neutral 
foods were calculated by subtracting the mean RT for the control trials from the 
mean RT from the chocolate trials. Outliers here were likely to reflect atypical 
influences at the participant level (e.g. poor concentration). Such scores violate 
assumptions of parametric statistical tests (Osborne & Overbay, 2004). AB scores 
across each of the nine trial types for the dot-probe task and the two trial types for 
the Stroop task were standardised. Outliers were defined as data below -3.5 and 
above 3.5 SDs from the mean. Where outliers were detected due to skewness or 
heteroscedasity, log transformations were investigated. After transformation, the AB 
scores were again standardised and outliers checked via the process stated previously 
(i.e. below -3.5 and above 3.5 SDs). Log transformation did not correct the skewed 
data. As a result, participants who fell outside the 3.5 SD range were removed from
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the data set and therefore from any further calculations. Outliers were detected for 
four participants; three outliers at the 100ms dot-probe presentation time and one 
outlier at 2000ms dot-probe presentation time.)
Third, outliers for the dot-probe and Stroop tasks were detected by calculating error 
percentage. Outliers were defined as errors above 10% (i.e. the dot-probe totalled 
180 trials therefore 10% errors equalled error numbers greater than 18). The Stroop 
totalled 120 trials, thus 10% errors equalled error numbers greater than 12. No 
outliers were found using this method for the dot-probe task. One participant was 
found to exceed 10% errors in the Stroop task (errors =15). This participant was 
removed from the data set and therefore from any further calculations.
Outliers were removed in order to avoid biasing subsequent analyses. The number of 
participants with outliers detected from examination of the dot-probe and Stroop 
tasks was five (i.e. one from the dot-probe and four from the Stroop), reducing the 
overall sample size from 130 to 125 participants (48 experienced meditators, 39 
novice meditators, and 38 non-meditators).
2.3.1.3.2 Outliers and non-screening self-report measures (DASS excluded) 
Outliers were also examined in relation to self-reported questionnaire scores. Self- 
reported scores for ten questionnaires were standardised. No outliers were detected 
for any of the measures.
2.3.1.3.2.1 Data screening: depression, anxiety and stress scale (DASS)
The DASS measure was used as a screening questionnaire to identify and exclude 
participants with certain characteristics (i.e. high levels of depression, anxiety and 
stress) that may influence their responses on the dot-probe and Stroop tasks (see 
introduction section 2.1.11.2). The DASS uses five labels (normal, mild, moderate, 
severe and extremely severe) to categorise participants’ level o f stress, anxiety and 
depression.
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Stress
Normal Mild Moderate Severe Extremely Severe
Experienced 42 1 4 1 0
Novice 30 3 4 2 0
Control 25 4 4 4 1
Table 2.1 The number of participants in each DASS category (normal, mild, 
moderate, severe, and extremely severe) for stress within each of the three groups 
(experienced meditators, novice meditators, and non-meditator controls) (N=125).
Anxiety
Normal Mild Moderate Severe Extremely Severe 
Experienced 41 3 1 2 1
Novice 23 5 9 1 1
Control 24 3 5 2 4
Table 2.2 The number of participants in each DASS category (normal, mild, 
moderate, severe, and extremely severe) for anxiety within each of the three groups 
(experienced meditators, novice meditators, and non-meditator controls) (N=125).
Depression
Normal Mild Moderate Severe Extremely Severe
Experienced 44 1 1 1 1
Novice 29 7 2 0 1
Control 22 6 6 2 2
Table 2.3 The number of participants in each DASS category (normal, mild, 
moderate, severe, and extremely severe) for depression within each of the three 
groups (experienced meditators, novice meditators, and non-meditator controls) 
(N=125).
As shown in Tables 2.1-2.3, a high number of participants (stress; n=28, anxiety; 
n=37, depression; n=30) reported above ‘normaT levels for one or more of these 
psychological disorders. Excluding all participants from the data with scores above
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'normal' for at least one psychological disorder would have reduced the sample size 
to that which would be challenged in term of its statistical power (n=30).
AB100 AB500 AB2000 Stroop
Depression (N=125) -0.11 0.02 -0.02 0.05
Anxiety (N=125) -0.07 -0.06 0.06 -0.02
Stress (N=125) -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.07
Table 2.4 Pearson product moment correlations showing the relationship between 
depression, anxiety and stress scores and attentional bias on the dot-probe
o
(presentation times, 100ms, 500ms and 2000ms) and Stroop tasks.
Table 2.4 shows that the majority of the correlations were very close to zero. Only 
AB at the 100ms dot-probe presentation time was shown to be slightly negatively 
correlated with depression. No statistically significant associations were however 
found when depression, anxiety or stress was correlated with AB for the whole 
sample.
In addition to Pearson r correlation analyses, scatter graphs were also created in an 
attempt to identify any relationships between stress, anxiety and depression and AB 
scores. Scatter graphs were carried out in three different ways by looking at 1) the 
whole sample, 2) just those with ‘normal’ stress, anxiety and depression scores, 3) 
just those with scores above ‘normal’ (i.e. within the clinical range). Scatter graphs 
were not created for those who scored highly on only one psychological disorder due 
to the limitation of insufficient sample sizes. From visual interpretation of the 
graphs, no clear positive or negative correlations were found for any of the 
psychological disorders and the AB measures for the whole sample, those with 
‘normal’ scores, or those with scores above ‘normal’. It was therefore concluded that 
variation of the levels of these disorders were unlikely to have had any confounding 
effect o f the AB scores.
7 For this analysis, if  an individual scored highly for more than one psychological disorder (e.g. both 
stress and anxiety), they were counted as n=l, not n=2.
8 AB100 refers to attentional bias for the dot-probe presentation time, 100ms. AB500 refers to 
attentional bias for the dot-probe presentation time, 500ms. AB2000 refers to attentional bias for the 
dot-probe presentation time 2000ms. Stroop refers to attentional bias for the emotional Stroop task.
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2.3.1.4 Group demographics
Meditation history and demographic information for the experienced and novice 
meditator groups were examined. Table 2.5 summarises this information showing, 
per group, the percentage of participants who currently practiced different attentional 
control skills (mindfulness and concentrative), the length of time meditation had 
been practiced and the regularity of the meditators’ practice.
Experienced Meditators Novice Meditators
Male 14 Males 8
Female 34 Females 31
Age (Mean, SD) 53 (11.57) Age (Mean, SD) 44(11.97)
White-British (%) 87.5 White-British (%) 92.3
Mindfulness (%) 26 (54.2) Mindfulness (%) 24 (61.5)
Concentrative (%) 22 (45.8) Concentrative (%) 15(38.5)
< 3 years (%) 1 (2.1) 0-6 months (%) 10(25.6)
3-5 years (%) 4(8.3) 7-18 months (%) 5 (12.8)
6-11 years (%) 9(18.8) 19-36 months (%) 5 (12.8)
12-20 years (%) 16(33.3) 37-72 months (%) 8 (20.5)
21-30 years (%) 9(18.8) 10-12 years (%) 7 (17.9)
> 30 years (%) 9(18.8) 16-20 years (%) 2(5.1)
Regular (%) 40 (83.3) > 20 years (%) 2(5.1)
Irregular (%) 8 (16.7) Regular (%) 18 (46.6)
< 3 times a week (%) 10(20.8) Irregular (%) 21 (53.8)
3-7 times a week (%) 25 (52.1) < 3 times a week (%) 13 (33.3)
7-14 times a week 11 (22.9) 3-6 times a week (%) 10(25.6)
More than twice daily (%) 1 (2.1) Once a day (%) 10(25.6)
Once a fortnight or less (%) 1 (2.1) Once a fortnight or less (%) 6(15.4)
Table 2.5 Demographic information of the experienced and novice meditator groups.
Table 2.5 shows that over half of both the meditator groups had experience of 
mindfulness meditation. The novice meditators had less experience of concentrative 
meditation in comparison to the experienced meditators.
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2.3.1.5 Investigation o f group differences: checks fo r  group similarity 
To ensure that the groups were sufficiently matched on relevant criteria, various 
statistical checks were carried out. Similarity between groups would allow for 
confident interpretation that any significant effect found was likely to be caused by 
the independent variable under investigation. Differences between groups may result 
in any significant or non-significant effects being influenced by variations between 
the groups. To assess this, analysis was first conducted to identify any group 
differences. Secondly, on the basis of group differences being detected, further 
analysis was carried out to identify if  these variable differences were significantly 
correlated with the main dependent variable, AB.
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23.1.6 Investigation o f group differences: correlations between variables that 
differed between the groups and AB
In order to explore whether the variables that differed between the groups were 
likely to have a confounding effect on the results, each variable was correlated with 
dot-probe (presentation times 100ms, 500ms and 2000ms) and Stroop AB scores 
across the whole sample (N = 125).
AB100 AB500 AB2000 Stroop
Age 0.05 -0.09 0.11 0.08
Highest level of education 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03
Current occupation 0.00 0.09 0.14 0.07
Rating of how much chocolate is liked -0.10 -0.10 0.04 0.04
Rating of the frequency chocolate is eaten -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.13
Stress -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.07
Anxiety -0.07 -0.06 0.06 -0.02
Depression -0.11 0.02 -0.02 0.05
DEBQ -Emotional -0.14 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
DEBQ -  External -0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.05
DEBQ -  Total 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.02
Openness (OCEAN) 0.23* 0.12 -0.12 0.15
Neuroticism (OCEAN) -0.09 0.01 -0.03 0.09
Level of hunger 0.11 0.11 0.05 -0.14
Favourite food 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.00
BAS Drive 0.13 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10
BAS reward responsiveness 0.06 0.15 -0.22* -0.09
* p  < 0.05
Table 2.7 Pearson product moment correlations showing the relationship between 
the variables which significantly differed between the groups (experienced, novice, 
and controls) and all measures of attentional bias.
As shown in Table 2.7, Openness was significantly positively correlated with the 
dot-probe presentation time 100ms. Furthermore, BAS reward responsiveness was 
significantly negatively correlated with the dot-probe presentation time, 2000ms.
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However, given the number of correlations conducted, it was deemed possible that 
these significant findings were found by chance alone.
2.3.2 Effects of meditation experience on attention (Aim 1)
This section explores the hypothesis that meditators would show the best 
performance on the dot-probe and emotional Stroop tasks compared to non-meditator 
controls. This was predicted to be irrespective o f whether meditation experience was 
determined by participant's self-assessment, or the number of minutes, days, months 
or total hours spent meditating.
2.3.2.1 Comparison o f  groups with different levels o f  meditation experience 
(experienced, n=48, novice, n=39, and no experience controls, n=38) based on 
practitioner’s self-assessment.
In order to identify if  different levels of meditation experience (experienced, novice, 
and no experience as determined by the assessment of the participant) were 
significantly associated with attentional bias, ANOVA tests were performed for each 
of the measures (dot-probe task, Stroop task, and self-report questionnaires).
2.3.2.1.1 Dot-probe task
N Mean SD
AB100 Experienced 48 3.79 19.58
Novice 39 2.34 17.64
Control 38 -5.12 22.77
AB500 Experienced 48 0.68 23.24
Novice 39 -1.92 20.41
Control 38 -1.24 23.09
AB2000 Experienced 48 -3.47 20.87
Novice 39 0.84 18.08
Control 38 4.42 20.99
Table 2.8 Comparison of mean attentional bias scores (and SDs) across the different 
experienced groups (experienced, novice, and no experience controls) for each of the 
dot-probe presentation times (100ms, 500ms, and 2000ms).
60
A 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA with attention bias (dot-probe task presentation times, 
100ms, 500ms, and 2000ms) as the within-subjects factor and level of meditation 
experience (experienced, novice, no experience) as the between subject factors 
revealed no main effect of level o f meditation experience, F (2, 122) = 0.271, p = 
0.763, r)p2= 0.004, or presentation time, F (2, 244) = 0.316, p = 0.730, r|p2 = 0.003. 
Furthermore, no significant interaction was found between presentation time and 
level of meditation experience, F (2, 244) = 1.773, p = 0.135, rjp2= 0.028.
23.2.1.2 Stroop task
n M ean SD
Experienced 48 18.63 51.32
Novice 39 19.16 47.26
Control 38 20.67 57.01
Table 2.9 Comparison of mean attentional bias scores (and SDs) across the 
experienced, novice, and no meditation experience groups for the Stroop task.
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the attentional bias scores of the 
Stroop task in experienced, novice and no meditation experience conditions. The 
results showed no significant group effect, F (2, 124) = 0.017, p = 0.983, rjp2 = 
0 .001.9 10
9 This analysis was recalculated by (1) removing participants who had previously practiced 
mindfulness meditation from the data and then comparing AB with the original group (experienced, 
novice, and controls) and (2) removing eight experienced meditators who reported practicing 
meditation on an irregular basis and then comparing AB with the original experience group 
(experienced, novice, and controls). No significant difference was found between the groups for the 
dot-probe task, F (2, 72) = 2.218, p = 0.116; F (2, 114) = 0.377, p = 0.686 or the Stroop task, F (2, 74) 
= 0.277, p = 0.759; F (2,116) = 0.018, p = 0.982 (n values; experienced = 23, novice = 14, controls = 
38; experienced = 40, novice = 39, control = 38) respectively.
10 The dot-probe and Stroop analyses were also repeated by comparing those with meditation 
experience (i.e. experienced and novice meditators combined, n=87) with those with no meditation 
experience (n=38). Whilst there was no significant difference in Stroop reaction time scores between 
the meditation experience and no experience conditions, t (123) = 0.179, p = 0.858, an interaction 
between presentation time and meditation experience was nearing significance on the dot-probe task, 
F (2, 246) = 2.931, p = 0.056. Further analyses revealed a significant difference between experience 
versus no experience at the 100ms presentation time, t (123) = 2.127, p = 0.035. It was however 
considered possible that this result either reflected a Type 1 error due to the many different analyses 
conducted, or sample differences as outlined in section 2.3.1.5 between the meditator and non­
meditator groups.
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2.3.2.2 Investigation o f whether meditation experience, determined by the number o f  
times meditation is practiced per week, significantly predicts AB  
Level of meditation experience determined by the self-assessment of participants did 
not show any significant group effect on attentional bias scores (dot-probe and 
Stroop tasks). Further analysis was therefore carried out with level of meditation 
experience based on an alternate measure; the number o f times meditation was 
practiced per average week. This was measured as a continuous variable using a 
correlation analysis.
2.3.2.2.1 Dot-probe and Stroop tasks 
To identify if meditation experience was associated with AB scores, each measure of 
attentional bias was correlated with the number of times meditation was practiced 
per average week.
N = 125 AB100 AB500 AB2000 Stroop
Number of times meditated (per week) .157 .155 -.144 -.021
Table 2.10 Correlations between meditation experience and attentional bias scores
for the whole sample.
Table 2.10 shows that the number of times meditation was practiced per week was 
not statistically correlated with any AB measure, suggesting that greater or fewer 
meditation sessions practiced per average week did not impact on AB scores. This 
finding was inconsistent with the study’s predictions which stated that greater 
meditation practice would be associated with decreased AB. Despite the lack of 
statistical significance, in support of the pre-stated hypotheses, AB at the dot-probe 
2000ms presentation time was negatively correlated with meditation practice. 
Although contradictory to the hypotheses, AB at the dot-probe presentation time,
100ms and 500ms were shown to be positively correlated with meditation practice. 
The Stroop measure showed no correlation. This pattern o f results (i.e. a positive 
correlation at 100ms, and a negative correlation at 2000ms) is similar to those 
reported in previous sections of this results chapter.
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23.2.3 Investigation o f  whether meditation experience, determined by the number o f  
minutes meditated per meditation session, significantly predicts AB 
Given that level of meditation experience determined by the self-assessment of 
participants and level of meditation experience, determined by the number of times 
meditation was practiced per average week did not show any significant group 
effects on attentional bias scores (dot-probe and Stroop tasks), further analysis was 
carried out with level of meditation experience based on an alternate measure; the 
number of minutes meditated per meditation session. This was measured as a 
continuous variable using correlation analyses.
23 .23 .1  Dot-probe and Stroop tasks 
To identify if  meditation experience was associated with AB scores, each measure of 
attentional bias was correlated with the number of minutes meditation was practiced 
per session.
N = 125 AB100 AB500 AB2000 Stroop
Number of minutes meditated (per session) -.018 .043 .023 -.045
Table 2.11 Correlations between meditation experience and attentional bias scores 
for the whole sample.
Table 2.11 shows that all four correlations were close to zero, indicating that the 
number of minutes meditation was practiced per session was not significantly 
correlated with any AB measure. This suggests that shorter or longer meditation 
sessions practiced did not impact on AB scores. This finding was inconsistent with 
the study’s predictions which stated that longer meditation practice would be 
associated with decreased AB.
23.2.4 Investigation o f  whether meditation experience, determined by number o f  
months meditated, significantly predicts AB
Further analysis was subsequently carried out with level of meditation experience 
based on number o f months meditated. Again, this was measured as a continuous 
variable using correlation analyses.
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2.3.2.4.1 Dot-probe and Stroop tasks 
To identify if  meditation experience was associated with AB scores, each measure of 
attentional bias was correlated with the total number o f months meditated.
N = 125 AB100 AB500 AB2000 Stroop
Number of months meditated .149 -.009 .036 .004
Table 2.12 Correlations between meditation experience and attentional bias scores 
for the whole sample.
Table 2.12 shows that AB for the 100ms dot-probe presentation time was positively 
correlated with the number of months meditated. No correlation was shown between 
length of meditation practice and AB for the 500ms and 2000ms dot-probe 
presentation times, or for the Stroop task. The total number of months meditated was 
however not significantly correlated with any AB measure. This suggests that a 
longer or shorter duration of meditation practice did not impact on AB scores.
2.3.2.5 Investigation o f  whether meditation experience, determined by the type o f  
attentional control skills used (focused attention or open monitoring) across 
different practices, significantly predicts AB.
When meditation experience was determined by the type o f attentional control skills 
used, the following hypotheses were made. First, and similar to the hypothesis of 
previous analyses, it was predicted that both novice and experienced meditators 
would demonstrate the best performance on the attentional bias measures compared 
to non-meditator controls. It was however further predicted that on the dot-probe 
task, experienced meditators would demonstrate superior performance compared to 
novice meditators whereas on the emotional Stroop task, novice and experienced 
meditators would perform similarly.
Exploratory analysis was carried out to investigate whether the ease o f practicing 
different types of attentional skills (focused attention or open monitoring) would 
affect group AB scores across different types of meditations currently practiced. For 
this analysis, meditation experience was categorised into three groups: those 
currently practicing mindfulness meditation and thus open monitoring (experienced,
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n=50), those currently practicing concentrative meditation and thus focused attention 
(novice, n=37), and those who practice no meditation, thus neither open monitoring 
nor focused attention (non-meditator controls, n=38). ANOVA tests were performed 
for each of the measures (dot-probe task, Stroop task, and self-report questionnaires).
2.3.2.5.1 Dot-probe task
n Mean SD
AB100 Experienced (Mindfulness) 50 3.267 18.94
Novice (Concentrative) 37 2.964 18.49
Control (Non-meditator) 38 -5.123 22.77
AB500 Experienced (Mindfulness) 50 0.129 20.61
Novice (Concentrative) 37 -1.315 23.86
Control (Non-meditator) 38 -2.981 23.09
AB2000 Experienced (Mindfulness) 50 -3.524 20.57
Novice (Concentrative) 37 1.148 18.34
Control (Non-meditator) 38 4.418 21.00
Table 2.13 Comparison of mean attentional bias scores (and SDs) across the 
different types of meditation practiced for each of the three dot-probe presentation 
times (100ms, 500ms and 2000ms).
A 3 x 3 mixed ANOVA with attention bias (dot-probe task, presentation times, 
100ms, 500ms, and 2000ms) as the within-subjects factor and experience based on 
the type of attentional skills used by different meditation practices (mindfulness -  
open monitoring, concentrative -  focused attention, non-meditator controls) as 
between the subject factors revealed no main effect o f experience, F (2, 122) = 
0.351, p = 0.704, rjp2 = 0.006 or presentation time, F (2, 244) = 0.329, p = 0.720, r|p2 
= 0.003. Also, no significant interaction was found, F (4, 244) = 1.696, p = 0.151, 
r|p2= 0.027.
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2.3.2.5.2 Stroop task
Mean SD
Experienced (Mindfulness) 23.17 47.99
Novice (Concentrative) 13.06 51.00
Control (Non-meditator) 20.67 57.01
Table 2.14 Comparison of mean attentional bias scores (and SDs) across the 
experienced (mindfulness -  open monitoring, n=50), novice (concentrative -  focused 
attention, n=37), and non-meditator (n=38) groups for the Stroop task.
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the attentional bias scores of the 
Stroop task across the three conditions. The results showed no significant group 
effect, F (2, 124) = 0.421, p = 0.657, r\p2 = 0.007. This finding only partially 
supported the pre-stated hypotheses.
The above analysis shows that, similarly to when meditation was determined by 
participant’s self-assessment and length and frequency of practice, meditation 
experience determined by the type o f attentional control skills practiced across 
different meditation practices does not significantly predict any of the AB dependent 
variables.
2.3.2.6 Exploring whether performance on the dot-probe task between the groups 
(experienced, novice and controls) was the result o f  delayed orientation or enhanced 
disengagement
Previous research has suggested that AB scores obtained in a dot-probe task may 
reflect a difficulty to disengage from appetitive, food-related stimuli (Tressler,
2008). To explore this, reaction times on congruent and incongruent trials were 
compared to reaction times on the neutral trials to determine whether the attentional 
bias scores reflect either delayed disengagement or faster orientation. Faster 
orientation was expected to be reflected in facilitated responding to congruent trials, 
whereas difficulty to disengage attention was expected to result in slower reaction 
times to incongruent trials.
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Experienced Novice Control
(n=48) (n=39) (n=38)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
AB100 Incongruent 449.80 74.47 421.91 48.13 460.30 97.82
Congruent 446.01 74.56 419.58 43.04 465.42 103.39
Neutral 434.58 64.84 411.87 43.38 448.17 90.50
AB500 Incongruent 456.06 71.47 423.82 42.40 458.65 82.83
Congruent 455.37 72.35 425.74 50.96 461.63 81.23
Neutral 440.90 69.40 417.63 46.23 451.87 80.02
AB2000 Incongruent 439.79 65.27 414.18 45.47 451.43 78.07
Congruent 443.26 70.27 413.34 43.04 447.01 74.65
Neutral 433.29 63.14 410.01 51.40 442.39 72.35
Table 2.15 Comparison of mean scores (and SDs) for congruent, incongruent and 
neutral trials across the meditation experience and no meditation experience groups 
for each of the three dot-probe presentation times (100ms, 500ms, and 2000ms).
Table 2.15 shows that none of the groups showed enhanced orienting. Instead, all 
three groups displayed delayed disengagement for each dot-probe presentation time 
(100ms, 500ms and 2000ms). This was indicated by slower mean scores on 
incongruent trials compared to mean scores on neutral trials, and mean scores on 
congruent trials that were not faster than mean scores on neutral trials. These 
findings suggest that meditators and non-meditators alike had greater difficultly 
detracting their attention away from old (i.e. currently presented) chocolate-related 
stimuli compared to moving their attention from the neutral stimuli. The results are 
in accordance with existing literature (Tressler, 2008).11
11 The analysis presented in Section 2.3.2 was calculated with the inclusion o f participants with 
depression, anxiety and stress scores above the population average due to the fact that no significant 
correlation was found between high levels o f these psychological disorders and AB. However, for 
exploratory purposes the above analysis was re-run with all participants scoring ‘severe’ or 
‘extremely severe’ on one or more of the psychological disorders removed from the analysis 
(experienced, n=44, novice, n=33, non-meditators, n=29). All p values for dot-probe and Stroop 
attentional bias scores remained greater than 0.05. All p values for the self-reported questionnaire 
measures remained less than 0.05. Thus, no significant changes in the findings were detected. It was 
therefore concluded that increased certainty that AB scores were not confounded by participants’ 
differing levels of depression, anxiety and stress.
67
2.3.3 Relationship between predicted mediators and attention (Aim 2)
This section explores the hypotheses that the effects of meditation experience on 
attentional bias would be meditated by self-reported mindfulness, attentional control 
and self-control ability. More specifically, it was predicted that both novice and 
experienced meditators (irrespective of how ‘experience’ was determined) would 
show stronger correlations between the mediators and attention bias to chocolate- 
related stimuli compared to non-meditator controls.
2.3.3.1 Comparing predicted mediators (mindfulness, attentional control and self- 
control) fo r  the whole sample [n=125] with each AB measure (dot probe 100ms, 
500ms, 2000ms, and Stroop).
This section correlates (across the whole sample) predicted mediators (mindfulness, 
attentional control and self-control questionnaire scores) and AB scores in order to 
identify any association between meditation and AB.
N = 125 AB100 AB500 AB2000 Stroop
FFMQ -observe .195* -.067 -.235** .030
FFMQ -  describe .158 -.002 -.026 .014
FFMQ -  act with awareness * .193* -.105 -.018 -.017
FFMQ -  non judge .088 .115 .002 -.092
FFMQ -  nonreact .178* .054 -.157 .046
MAAS .170 -.014 .065 .014
ACQ - total scores .198* -.090 -.038 .005
ACQ - focus attention .181* -.149 -.008 -.010
ACQ - shifting attention .171 -.013 -.059 .018
TAS .197* -.025 -.199* .093
SCS .118 .009 .120 -.001
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 2.16 Pearson product moment correlations showing the relationship between 
self-report scores of mindfulness (FFMQ and MAAS), attentional control (ACQ and 
TAS), and self-control (SCS) on four different measures of attentional bias.
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Table 2.16 shows that significant positive correlations were found between the dot-
probe presentation time, 100ms and the following factors; FFMQ -  observe, r =
.195, p = 0.030, FFMQ -  act with awareness, r -  .193, p = 0.031, FFMQ -  nonreact,
r = .178, p = 0.047, ACQ -  total scores, r = .198, p = 0.027, ACQ -  focus attention, r
= .181, p = 0.043, and TAS, r = .197, p = 0.027. Negative correlations were found
between AB2000 and the factors; FFMQ -  observe, r = -.235, p = 0.008 and TAS, r
= -.199, p = 0.026. No significant relationship was found between the dot-probe
presentation time, 500ms or Stroop AB and any of the self-report scores for
12mindfulness, attentional control or self-control.
It was hypothesised that increased mindfulness scores (FFMQ and MAAS) would be 
associated with lower AB (i.e. a negative correlation between these variables was 
expected). Table 2.16 shows that the results fairly consistently show the opposite of 
this, with a total of three mindfulness factors on the FFMQ measure (observe, act 
with awareness and non-react) indicating that lower levels o f mindfulness was 
significantly associated with lower AB. Significant correlations were only found 
between mindfulness and AB at the dot-probe presentation times 100ms and 
2000ms, with FFMQ observe factor being significant at both times. The correlations 
at the 100ms presentation time were however positive, whereas the correlation at the 
2000ms presentation time was negative. This suggests that as mindfulness scores 
increased, AB when measured at a longer duration was reduced.
Additionally, greater attentional control scores (ACQ and TAS) were predicted to be 
significantly associated with lower AB. Similarly to mindfulness scores, attentional 
control scores showed the opposite of what was hypothesised; that lower attentional 
control was associated with lower AB. Three of the four measures of attentional 
control (ACQ -  total scores, ACQ -  focus attention and TAS) showed this finding. 
Significant correlations were only found between attentional control and AB at the 
dot-probe presentation time, 100ms. The positive correlation between attentional 
control, as measured by the TAS questionnaire, was however reversed for AB at the
12 The TAS measures the tendency for one’s entire attentional capacity to become completely 
involved in experiencing a specific attentional object. Absorption has been found to be associated 
with openness and mindfulness.
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dot-probe presentation time, 2000ms. This suggests that as attentional control scores 
increased, AB when measured at a longer duration was reduced, creating a 
significant negative correlation between the variables.
As shown in Table 2.16, self-control was not significantly associated with any AB 
measure. Self-control scores were also shown to be in the opposite direction to that 
predicted for all three presentation times on the dot-probe task (i.e. positively 
correlated). Thus, despite no statistical significance, the findings suggest that lower 
self-control was associated with lower AB. Self-control scores and AB on the Stroop 
task was negatively, but not significantly, correlated. This suggests that for this 
particular AB task, higher levels of self-control were associated with lower AB.
23.3.2 Comparing predicted mediators (mindfulness, attentional control and self- 
control) fo r  the non-meditator sample (n=38) and the meditator sample (n=87) with 
each AB measure (dot probe 100ms, 500ms, 2000ms, and Stroop).
This section correlates (across the non-meditator and meditator samples) predicted 
mediators (mindfulness, attentional control and self-control questionnaire scores) 
and AB scores in order to identify any association between meditation and AB.
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Table 2.17 shows that, for the non-meditator group, significant positive correlations 
were found between AB2000 and the following factors; FFMQ -  act with awareness, 
r = .394, p = 0.014, MAAS, r = .408, p = 0.011, ACQ -  total scores, r = .361, p = 
0.026, ACQ -  focus attention, r = .351, p = 0.031, and TAS, r = .428, p = 0.007. No 
significant relationship was found between AB100, AB500 or Stroop AB and any of 
the self-report scores for mindfulness, attentional control or self-control. For the 
meditator group, a significant positive correlation was found between AB100 and 
ACQ -  focus attention, r = .239, p = 0.026. Significant negative correlations were 
also found between AB2000 and the factors, FFMQ -  observe, r = -.220, p = 0.040 
and FFMQ -  nonreact, r = -.214, p = 0.047. No significant relationship was found 
between AB500 or Stroop AB and any of the self-report scores for mindfulness, 
attentional control or self-control.
As shown in Table 2.17, compared to the non-meditator group, the meditator group 
show less significant associations between the predicted mediators (mindfulness, 
attentional control and self-control questionnaire scores) and AB scores. One
possibility for these different correlations may be that the meditators are interpreting
11
the questionnaire items differently to the non-meditators.
2 3 .3 3  Comparing predicted mediators (mindfulness, attentional control and self- 
control) fo r  the non-meditator sample (n=38), the novice meditator sample (n—39), 
and the experienced meditator sample (n—48) with each AB measure (dot probe 
100ms, 500ms, 2000ms, and Stroop).
This section correlates (across the non-meditator and meditator samples) predicted 
mediators (mindfulness, attentional control and self-control questionnaire scores) 
and AB scores in order to identify any association between meditation and AB.
13 The above analysis was repeated using the experienced meditator group only (n=48) and the novice 
meditator group only (n=39). A significant positive association was only found between AB 100 and 
ACQ -  focused attention for the novice group, r = .340, p = 0.034.
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Table 2.18 shows that, for the non-meditator group, significant positive correlations 
were found between AB2000 and the following factors; FFMQ -  act with awareness, 
r = .394, p = 0.014, MAAS, r = .408, p = 0.011, ACQ -  total scores, r=  .361, p = 
0.026, ACQ -  focus attention, r = .351, p = 0.031, and TAS, r = .428, p = 0.007. No 
significant relationship was found between AB100, AB500 or Stroop AB and any of 
the self-report scores for mindfulness, attentional control or self-control. For the 
novice meditator group, a significant positive correlation was found between AB 100 
and ACQ -  focus attention, r = .340, p = 0.034. No significant correlations were 
found between self-report scores of mindfulness (FFMQ and MAAS), attentional 
control (ACQ and TAS), or self-control (SCS) and any measure of attentional bias 
for the experienced meditator group.
The findings in Table 2.18 suggest a pattern between the meditator and non­
meditator groups. This pattern shows that, for the novice and experienced meditators, 
only positive correlations were found between the predicted meditators and AB 100 
scores. For the non-meditator group, a few negative correlations were evident 
between the predicted mediators and AB100 scores, though this pattern was reversed 
at the later dot-probe presentation time, AB2000 (i.e. the majority o f correlations 
between predicted mediators and AB2000 scores were negative for the meditator 
groups, but positive for the non-meditator group).
Furthermore, Table 2.18 shows that, compared to the non-meditator group, the 
meditator groups show less significant associations between the predicted mediators 
(mindfulness, attentional control and self-control questionnaire scores) and AB 
scores. Again, a possibility for these different correlations may be that the meditators 
are interpreting the questionnaire items differently to the non-meditators. A further 
possibility may be that these findings were caused by high variability in the scores.14
14 To explore the variability between the predicted mediator and AB scores, scatter graphs were 
created. For some variables, the scatter graphs indicated potential outliers in the data thus, in order to 
limit the impact of data variability the above analysis was repeated using non-parametric Spearman’s 
r correlations. The Spearman’s r correlations showed the same pattern o f findings as shown via the 
Pearson r test.
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2.33.4 Comparing correlations for the predicted mediators (mindfulness, attentional 
control and self-control) between the non-meditator sample (n=38) and the 
experienced meditator sample (n=48) fo r  dot-probe AB 100 and AB2000 
Previous correlations between predicted mediators and AB scores have shown a 
pattern between the meditator and non-meditator groups, with meditators showing 
positive correlations between the mediators and AB 100 scores, but negative 
correlations between the mediators and AB2000 scores. These findings were 
reversed for the non-meditator control group. To explore whether these correlations 
significantly differed between the meditator and control groups, each correlation 
between the predicted mediator and AB100 and AB2000 were individually 
compared using a Hotelling-Williams test (2-tailed).
Controls Experienced Difference
(n=38) (n=48) (p value)
AB100 AB2000 AB100 AB2000 AB100 AB2000
FFMQ -observe 0.073 -0.148 0.151 -0.249 0.493 0.468
FFMQ -  describe 0.102 0.268 0.042 -0.192 0.609 0.000**
FFMQ -  awareness 0.080 0.394* 0.141 -0.134 0.592 0.000**
FFMQ -  nonjudge -0.014 0.265 0.018 0.052 0.794 0.088
FFMQ -  nonreact 0.156 0.197 0.063 -0.139 0.419 0.013**
MAAS 0.072 0.408* 0.111 -0.007 0.737 0.000**
ACQ - total scores 0.068 0.361* 0.145 0.186 0.498 0.154
ACQ - focus attention -0.023 0.351* 0.150 -0.228 0.134 0.000**
ACQ - shifting attention 0.151 0.295 0.106 -0.107 0.696 0.002**
TAS 0.074 -0.030 0.114 -0.268 0.726 0.083
SCS -0.036 0.428** 0.036 0.099 0.550 0.003**
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Table 2.19 Hotelling-Williams test exploring correlations between predictor 
variables and AB100 and AB2000 scores between the experienced meditator and 
non-meditator groups.
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Table 2.19 shows that the correlations between the predicted mediators and AB100 
scores were not significantly different between the experienced meditator and control 
groups. The majority of correlations between the predicted mediators and AB2000 
scores were however significantly different between the two groups. The pattern of 
results show that for AB2000, with a few exceptions, there were all negative, or near 
zero, correlations for the experienced meditators, and all positive correlations for the 
controls. Both meditators and controls showed a similar pattern o f results for AB100 
(mostly positive, or near zero correlations).
2 3 3 .5  Comparing predicted mediators (mindfulness, attentional control and self- 
control) fo r  the whole sample (N=125) with level o f  meditation experience 
(experienced, novice and control).
This section correlates (across the whole sample) predicted mediators (mindfulness, 
attentional control and self-control questionnaire scores) and level of meditation 
experience in order to identify any association between these variables.
Measure (scale) Experienced Novice Control
FFMQ - observe (1-5) 3.98 (0.66) 3.89 (0.55) 3.16(0.72)
FFMQ - describe (1-5) 3.98 (0.62) 3.67 (0.66) 3.28 (0.74)
FFMQ - awareness (1-5) 3.66 (0.63) 3.29 (0.61) 3.20 (0.63)
FFMQ - nonjudge (1-5) 3.92 (0.75) 3.29 (0.94) 3.32 (0.74)
FFMQ - nonreact (1-5) 3.34 (0.60) 2.75 (0.61) 2.67 (0.39)
MAAS (1-6) 4.44 (0.73) 4.07 (0.60) 3.92 (0.73)
ACQ - total (1-4) 60.38 (7.30) 57.31 (8.52) 53.74 (8.95)
ACQ - focus attention (1-4) 26.71 (3.71) 24.26 (4.79) 22.89 (5.17)
ACQ - shifting attention (1-4) 33.67 (4.75) 33.05 (4.88) 30.84 (4.80)
TAS (0-4) 97.98 (21.43) 88.36 (25.57) 58.32 (24.59)
SCS (1-5) 134.77(12.89) 123.18(14.42) 122.50(15.82)
a. Values are means (SDs) unless otherwise stated.
b. Values are based on multivariate tests.
Table 2.20 Mean self-report scores o f individuals with different levels o f meditation 
experience (experienced, n=48, novice, n=37, no meditation controls, n=38).
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One-way ANOVAs were used to examine the effects of the independent variable 
(level of meditation experience) on multiple dependent variables (self-reported 
mindfulness scores, attentional control scores, and self-control scores). Results 
showed significant group differences for all the factors; FFMQ -  observe, F (2, 124) 
= 19.440, p = 0.001, Cohen's d = 0.24, FFMQ -  describe, F (2, 124) = 11.549, p = 
0.001, Cohen’s d=  0.16, FFMQ -  act with awareness, F (2, 124) = 6.141, p = 0.002, 
Cohen’s d=  0.10, FFMQ -  nonjudge, F (2,124) = 8.718, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d =
0.13, FFMQ -  nonreact, F (2, 124) = 19.558, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d=  0.24, MAAS, F 
(2, 124) = 6.425, p = 0.002, Cohen’s d = 0.10, ACQ -  total, F (2, 124) = 6.938, p = 
0.001, Cohen’s d=  0.10, ACQ -  focus attention, F (2, 124) = 7.883, p = 0.001, 
Cohen’s d=  0.11, ACQ -  shifting attention, F (2, 124) = 3.896, p = 0.023, Cohen’s d 
= 0.06, SCS, F (2, 124) = 10.292, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d =  0.14, TAS, F (2, 124) = 
31.069, p = 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.34.ls
Tukey HSD post-hoc comparisons of the three groups indicate that experienced 
meditators reported significantly higher FFMQ-observe (0.001), FFMQ-describe 
(0.001), FFMQ-act with awareness (0.002), FFMQ-nonjudge (0.002), FFMQ- 
nonreact (0.001), ACT-total (0.001), ACT-focus attention (0.001), ACT-switching 
attention (0.021), SCS (0.001), and TAS (0.001) scores compared to those with no 
meditation experience. Post-hoc tests also show that experienced meditators reported 
significantly higher FFMQ-act with awareness (0.019), FFMQ-nonjudge (0.001), 
FFMQ-nonreact (0.001), MAAS (0.042), ACT-focus attention (0.036), and SCS 
(0.001) scores compared to novice meditators. Furthermore, post-hoc comparisons 
indicated that novice meditators reported significantly higher FFMQ-observe 
(0.001), FFMQ-describe (0.030) and TAS (0.001) scores compared to controls. All 
other comparisons were not significant.16
15 It is noted that many ANOVA analyses have been conducted. Further analyses which adjust for the 
effects of multiple analyses were however not conducted given that none o f the main analyses, in 
isolation, reported statistical significance.
15 Comparing groups based on level of meditation experience (experienced, novice and no experience) 
was also repeated with participants who did not fast for the full 3 hours before the study removed 
from the analysis (experienced, n=44, novice, n=35, no experience, n=36). All p values for dot-probe 
and Stroop attentional bias scores remained greater than 0.05. Analysis o f potential covariates showed 
that only openness (p = 0.041), Cohen’s d  = 0.04 and reward drive (p = 0.017), Cohen’s d  = 0.05 were 
significant predictors of attentional bias at the dot-probe presentation time, 100ms. All p values for 
the self-reported questionnaire measures remained less than 0.05.
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2.3.3.6 Comparing predicted mediators (mindfulness, attentional control and self- 
control) fo r  the whole sample (N=125) with and without meditation experience 
(experience, no experience).
This section correlates (across the whole sample) predicted mediators (mindfulness, 
attentional control and self-control questionnaire scores) and meditation experience 
in order to identify any association between these variables.
Measure (scale) Control Experience /j-value
FFMQ - observe items (1-5) 3.16(0.72) 3.94 (0.61) 0.001*
FFMQ - describe items (1-5) 3.28 (0.74) 3.84 (0.65) 0.001*
FFMQ - act with awareness items (1-5) 3.20 (0.63) 3.49 (0.64) 0.018*
FFMQ - nonjudge items (1-5) 3.32 (0.74) 3.64 (0.89) 0.056
FFMQ - nonreact items (1-5) 2.67 (0.39) 3.07 (0.67) 0.001*
MAAS (1-6) 3.92 (0.73) 4.27 (0.69) 0.011*
ACQ - total scores (1-4) 53.74 (8.95) 59.00 (7.97) 0.001*
ACQ - focus attention scores (1-4) 22.89 (5.17) 25.61 (4.38) 0.003*
ACQ - shifting attention scores (1-4) 30.84 (4.80) 33.39 (4.79) 0.007*
TAS (0-4) 58.32 (24.59) 93.67 (23.73) 0.001*
SCS (1-5) 122.50 (15.82) 129.57(14.71) 0.017*
a. Values are means (SDs) unless otherwise stated.
b. Values are based on multivariate tests 
* p < 0.05.
Table 2.21 Mean self-report scores o f individuals with (n=87) and without (n=38) 
meditation experience.
T-tests were used to examine the effects o f the independent variable (meditation 
experience) on multiple dependent variables (self-reported mindfulness scores, 
attentional control scores, and self-control scores). Results showed significant group 
differences for the factors; FFMQ -  observe, t (123) = 6.222, p = 0.001, FFMQ -  
describe, t (123) = 4.254, p = 0.001, FFMQ -  act with awareness, t (123) = 2.390, p 
= 0.018, FFMQ -  nonreact, t (123) = 3.422, p = 0.001, MAAS, t (123) = 2.568, p = 
0.011, ACQ -  total, t (123) = 3.271, p = 0.001, ACQ -  focus attention, t (123) = 
3.014, p = 0.003, ACQ -  shifting attention, t (123) = 2.735, p = 0.007, SCS, t (123) = 
2.417, p = 0.017, TAS, t (123) = 7.578, p = 0.001. Means revealed that the no
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meditation experience group had lower self-reported mindfulness, attentional 
control, and self-control scores compared to the meditator group. No significant 
group differences was found for the mindfulness factor, FFMQ -  nonjudge, t (123) = 
1.926, p = 0.056.
2.3.4 Summary
In relation to Aim 1 of the current study, the results show that meditation experience 
(experienced, novice, control) was not statistically associated with AB to chocolate- 
related stimuli, as measured by the dot-probe task. Although non-significant, the 
mean AB scores indicated that the non-meditator controls showed the least AB at the 
100ms presentation time and the most AB at the 2000ms presentation time. These 
findings were reversed for the experienced meditators. Additional analyses 
investigating various alternate definitions o f ‘meditation experience’ showed a 
similar pattern. Furthermore, combining the two meditation experience groups 
(experienced and novice) to form one meditation experience group (compared to 
controls) also showed that compared to controls, meditators showed a higher 
attentional bias on the dot-probe at 100ms, but a lower attentional bias at 2000ms, 
though again, these results failed to reach statistical significance. No significant 
association was detected between meditation experience and AB to chocolate-related 
stimuli using the emotional Stroop task. The majority of mean AB scores were 
however in line with the pre-stated hypothesis (i.e. experienced meditators showing 
the least AB and controls the most AB). In relation to Aim 2 of the current study, 
analysis o f the relationship between predicted mediators and dot-probe measures 
showed significant positive correlations at 2000ms for non-meditators. For 
meditators, there were no significant correlations between the mediators and the dot- 
probe measures. There was however a pattern of positive correlations at 100ms and 
negative correlations at 2000ms. Meditators also showed stronger correlations 
between the predicted mediators and AB to chocolate-related stimuli compared to 
controls.
79
2.4. Discussion
2.4.1 Summary
This study explored links between mindfulness and attentional control by examining 
differences in attentional bias to chocolate-related stimuli between experienced 
meditators, novice meditators, and non-meditator controls. The study also examined 
the extent to which the effects of mindfulness training on attentional bias were 
brought about by increases in self-reported mindfulness, attentional control, and self- 
control ability. Meditation experienced was determined by (1) practitioner’s self- 
assessment, (2) the number of times meditation was practiced per week, (3) the 
number of minutes meditation was practiced per session, (4) the number o f months 
meditation was practiced in total and (5) the type of attentional control skills 
currently used (focused attention and/or open monitoring). Attentional bias was 
measured using emotional Stroop and dot-probe (100, 500 and 2000ms durations) 
tasks, completed after a period of fasting. The main findings demonstrated that 
meditation experience, irrespective o f how it was determined, was not statistically 
associated with attentional bias to chocolate-related stimuli, as measured by the dot- 
probe task. Mean attentional bias scores indicated that the non-meditator controls 
showed the least attentional bias at the 100ms presentation time and the most at the 
2000ms presentation time. These findings were however reversed for the 
experienced meditators. Although, evidence of only small effect sizes suggested that 
no actual effect of meditation experience on AB was present using the dot-probe.
No significant differences between the groups were also found using the emotional 
Stroop task.
Analysis of the relationship between predicted mediators (self-reported 
mindfulness, attentional control and self-control scores) and dot-probe measures 
showed significant positive correlations at 2000ms for non-meditators, with the 
effect sizes being o f large strength (range 0.351 - 0.428). For meditators there were 
no significant correlations between the mediator and the dot-probe measures, though 
there was a pattern o f positive correlations at 100ms and negative correlations at 
2000ms. The effect sizes for this group were however small (range 0.003 - 0.239). 
Given that none of the results reached statistical significance further research would 
need to be conducted before inferring a relationship between mindfulness meditation 
experience and attentional bias to chocolate-related stimuli.
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2.4.2 Effects of meditation experience on attention (Aim 1)
2.4.2.1 Dot-probe task
It was hypothesised that both experienced and novice meditators, irrespective of how 
meditation experience was determined, would perform better on the dot-probe task 
compared to non-meditator controls. It was also predicted that experienced 
meditators (determined by practitioner self-assessment and the length of meditation 
practice [time spent meditating per week, number of total months spent meditating 
and number of minutes meditated per session]) would significantly impact 
attentional bias scores, with experienced meditators showing lower levels of 
attentional bias compared to novice meditators. The findings showed that, 
irrespective o f how meditation experience (i.e. experienced and novice) was 
determined, there was no significant effect of meditation experience on attentional 
bias found using the dot-probe task. These results are inconsistent with previous 
literature which has reported significant associations between attentional control and 
long term practice of mindfulness meditation (Carter et al., 2005; Slagter et al., 2007; 
Srinivasan & Baijal., 2007; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David & Goolkasian, 2010).
A possible explanation for the inconsistency between the findings may be due to the 
diverse range of tasks used to measure attentional control. The majority o f tasks used 
in previous research (e.g. Wilkins’ Counting Test) are believed to be capable of 
measuring only a single component of attention, namely sustained attention (Carter 
et al., 2005; Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2007; Valentine & Sweet, 
1999), whereas the dot-probe task is believed to be capable of measuring two 
components of attention; sustained attention and attention switching (Posner, Snyder 
& Davidson, 1980). It stands to reason that using different attentional bias tasks 
which tap into different components of attention would be likely to produce different 
results. In disagreement with this notion however, Hodgins & Adair (2010) who 
used similar visual selection attention tasks to the dot-probe (change blindness 
flickering task, Rensink, O’Regan & Clark, 1997; gorilla video, Simons & Chabris,
1999) found that meditators showed less interference from invalid cues than non­
meditators. This study therefore suggests that differences in the type o f attentional 
control test used to measure attentional bias may not be such a plausible explanation 
for the null findings as first thought. However, unlike the current study, which was 
conducted within the community, Hodgins & Adair conducted their research in a
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laboratory. Thus, the findings could be subject to greater demand characteristics and 
consequently, reduced validity.
Another reason why no differences were found statistically between the experienced 
meditator, novice meditator and non-meditator group maybe because the 100ms 
presentation time used in the current study was simply too fast to allow the 
meditators to make use of their attentional control skills. This may be a potential 
limitation of the study. Eriken & Hoffman (1972) reported that improvement in the 
efficiency of attending rapidly to a pre-directed location is often found within a 
minimum of 150ms after the event occurs at the attended location. It may therefore 
be argued that 100ms was too short a duration to allow for the accurate detection of 
attentional bias. There is also evidence to suggest that the detection o f targets 
occurring earlier than expected (e.g. 100ms) involve involuntary shifts of attention, 
whereas the detection o f targets later than expected (e.g. 2000ms) involves voluntary 
disengagement and switch of attention (Coull, 2004; Rohenkohl, Coull & Nobre,
2011). In future research it would therefore be useful to include an eye tracking 
measure.
No significant findings between meditation experience and attentional bias scores 
were found. The descriptive statistics o f the dot-probe task did however show some 
interesting findings in terms of the mean attentional bias scores across the 
experienced, novice, and non-meditator groups for the different presentation times. 
Contrary to prediction, at the short 100ms presentation time both meditator groups 
(experienced and novice) showed higher levels o f attentional bias to the chocolate- 
related stimuli displayed compared to the controls. The experienced meditators 
showed the greatest attentional bias. Furthermore, at the 500ms presentation time, 
again contrary to prediction, the novice meditators showed the lowest attentional bias 
and the experienced meditators the greatest attentional bias. In support o f the pre­
stated hypotheses however, at the longer 2000ms presentation time, the experienced 
meditators showed the least attentional bias and the controls the most attentional 
bias. The findings at the shortest (100ms) and longest (2000ms) presentation times 
were therefore reversed for the experienced and control groups. These findings 
suggest that the effect of meditation experience on attentional control is not as 
simple as maybe believed. Instead meditation experience appears to affect attention
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differently depending on how long the emotionally motivating stimulus is presented 
for.
In support of this notion, when meditation experience was determined based on the 
ease with which attentional controls skills are used across different meditation 
practices (focused attention [novice-concentrative] or open monitoring [experienced­
mindfulness]) the results showed that, at the shorter dot-probe presentation times, 
(100 and 500ms) the novice-concentrative meditators showed lower attentional bias 
to chocolate-related stimuli compared to the experienced-mindfulness meditators. 
However, at the 2000ms duration, the findings were inverted, with the experienced- 
mindfulness meditators showing the lowest attentional bias compared to the novice- 
concentrative meditators. Given that both types of meditators practice focused 
attention it may be unsurprising that, despite the novice meditators showing slightly 
lower attentional bias at the shorter presentation times, the mean reaction times 
scores for both meditator groups were fairly similar. At the longer 2000ms duration, 
the variation in mean reaction time scores between the meditator groups was 
however greater. Thus, when presented with an emotionally motivating stimulus for 
an extended period it appears that more than focused attention is required to control 
attention. Rather, focused attention in addition to open monitoring is needed to 
prevent attention from becoming distracted, causing higher levels of attentional bias.
In agreement with this, Lutz et al. (2008) argued that unlike novice meditators, 
experienced mindfulness meditators are able to effectively disengage from 
distracters and re-orient their attention back to the object of focus. Many others have 
also found that meditators who practiced open monitoring were able to resist the 
temptation to ‘over invest’ attention to a particular stimulus and therefore 
demonstrated greater emotional flexibility compared to novice meditators who 
practice concentrative meditations (i.e. only focused attention) (Brefczynski-Lewis et 
al., 2007; van Leeuwen, Muller & Melloni, 2009; Lutz et al., 2008; McHugh et al., 
2010; Slagter et al., 2007). Thus, by being able to monitor attention in addition to 
achieving sustained attention experienced-mindfulness meditators may have found 
the dot-probe task less difficult than the novice-concentrative meditators. It could 
therefore be interpreted that meditation experience, determined by the type of 
attentional-control skills used, may affect attentional bias by reducing the amount of
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cognitive effort required to complete attention tasks. Experienced and novice 
meditators in the discussed literature (e.g. Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007) were 
however mainly determined by the type of meditation practiced (i.e. practitioners 
considered themselves to be either concentrative or mindfulness meditators). In the 
current study, experienced and novice meditators were determined by the type of 
attentional control skills currently used (focused attention and/or open monitoring) 
irrespective of practice type. This latter grouping method may be unreliable, and
1 7consequently have affected the data. Furthermore, it must be reiterated that no 
significant group effect or interaction was found in the current study; therefore 
caution must be taken when making assumptions based on the pattern o f mean 
reaction time scores.
In addition to showing no significant effect o f meditation experience (experienced 
versus novice) on attention using the dot-probe task, the results failed to identify 
how meditation experience may be associated with lower levels of attentional bias to 
emotionally motivating stimuli. The results showed that, when reaction times on 
congruent and incongruent trials were compared to reaction times on the neutral 
trials, both meditators (experienced and novice) and non-meditators displayed 
delayed disengagement for each dot-probe presentation time (100ms, 500ms and 
2000ms). While these findings offer some support to past research (Fox, Russo, 
Bowles & Dutton, 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001; Georgiou et al., 2005; Koster, 
Crombez, Verschuere & De Houwerm 2006; Salemink, van der Hout & Kindt, 2007; 
but see Mogg, Holmes, Gamer & Bradley, 2008) it fails to explain why meditators 
and non-meditators alike had greater difficultly detracting their attention away from 
the presented chocolate-related stimuli. As a result, the current findings do not 
support studies such as that by Ortner et al. (2007), which demonstrated that 
participants with more mindfulness experience showed less interference from 
affective pictures compared to those who had experience o f a different meditation or 
no meditation at all. This may be explained by the fact that mindfulness meditators, 
experienced or novice, are taught to take time to observe present-moment stimuli 
carefully and to refrain from reacting to them until they have been explored with 
nonjudgmental acceptance (Bishop et al., 2004). The time taken to explore the
17 Further discussion o f this point is provided in section 2.4.5.
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different experiences (i.e. the presented stimuli) may have been incorrectly recorded 
by the dot-probe task as higher levels of attentional bias and delayed disengagement 
amongst the meditator group. In support of this, Holzel et al. (2007) showed that 
mindfulness meditators demonstrated a stronger processing of distracting events 
resulting in increased reaction time scores. It is possible that the dot-probe task 
which requires speed and accuracy is not where mindfulness training has its largest 
effect.
In summary, this is the first study to investigate the effects o f meditation experience 
on attention using the dot-probe task. Without any other studies to directly compare 
to, it is difficult to conclude whether these findings suggest that meditation 
experience fails to have the proposed beneficial effect on attention, or whether, given 
the infancy of the dot-probe task in this research context, a lack of significant effects 
was due to the current design of the task. Thus, further research using the dot-probe 
task to investigate the relationship between meditation experience and attention 
control is required before any definitive conclusions can be drawn. Although, given 
the novelty of the dot-probe task to investigate the effects of meditation experience 
on attention, it may also be wise to also attempt to replicate previous findings using 
different attentional bias tasks (Carter et al., 2005; Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; 
Tang et al., 2007; Valentine & Sweet, 1999). If a replication is found, this will help 
to explain with greater confidence the effects of meditation experience on attention 
using the dot-probe task.
2.4.2.2 Emotional Stroop
Two hypothesises were made. First, it was predicted that both experienced and 
novice meditators (determined by practitioner self-assessment and the length of 
meditation practice) would perform the best on the emotional Stroop task compared 
to non-meditator controls as demonstrated by lower attentional bias. Second it was 
hypothesised that the novice and experienced meditators (determined by the type of 
attentional control skills currently practiced; focused attention or open monitoring) 
would perform similarly on the emotional Stroop task given that both novice- 
concentrative meditators and experienced-mindfulness meditators use focused 
attention; a skill required to perform optimally on this attentional bias measure. None 
of these hypotheses were supported. That is, mindfulness training was not related to
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better performance as evident by lower levels of attentional bias on the emotional 
Stroop task irrespective of how meditation experience was determined. These 
findings were in direct contrast to those found previously (Bishop et al., 2004; Lutz 
et al., 2008; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). Rather, the current study’s findings were in 
greater accordance with studies showing that meditators and non-meditator controls 
do not significantly differ in their reaction time scores on the emotional Stroop 
measure (Anderson et al., 2007; Joesfssona & Brobergb, 2010; van Leeuwen et al., 
2009; Lykins, 2009; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Polak, 2009).
One possibility for the non-significant group differences in the current study is that, 
as de Ruiter & Brosschot (1994) argued, the emotional Stroop task was not a reliable 
measure of attentional bias. This is because colour-naming can result in attention 
either being directed towards or away from emotionally relevant stimuli.
Furthermore, it is believed that this is the first study to use the food version of the 
emotional Stroop task (Tapper & Pothos, 2009) to test for attentional biases to 
chocolate amongst meditators. Thus, similarly to the dot-probe, the novelty of this 
task to measure the effects of meditation experience on attentional bias may account 
for the null findings. Also, previous research has shown that the emotional Stroop is 
effective at diagnosing an emotional condition as shown by individuals 
demonstrating an enhanced interference for words specific to their disorder (Foa,
Ilai, McCarthy, Shoyer & Murdock, 1993; McNally, English & Lipke, 1993). Whilst 
effective in identifying lower levels of attentional bias amongst ‘problematic eaters’, 
the sample tested in the current study did not fall into this population category. 
Dieters were also excluded from the current sample which may have affected the 
findings, especially as attentional biases to this food product have been identified 
amongst restrained eaters (Cooper & Fairbum, 1992).
2.4.3. Explanation of the null findings and study limitations
There are many possible explanations for why the experienced meditators did not 
perform significantly better than novice and non-meditator controls on measures of 
attentional control (dot-probe and emotional Stroop). Whilst some have already been 
discussed, the following section will outline a number of alternative interpretations.
A discussion of some of the study’s limitations is also provided.
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The null findings may be accounted for by the fact that meditation practice does 
relate to attentional control, but the behavioural measures used in the current study 
simply failed to validly measure the intended constructs. The current study aimed to 
explore differences in attentional bias to emotionally motivating chocolate-related 
stimuli between individuals with varying mindfulness meditation experience. During 
the practice of mindfulness, practitioners equally attend to internal stimuli such as, 
thoughts and feelings, as external stimuli. Both the dot-probe and the emotional 
Stroop task have been criticised for only assessing the capacity o f individuals to 
sustain and/or shift the focus of their attention between external stimuli (Garavan, 
1998). Garavan (1998), for instance, found that exercising the ability to intentionally 
switch attentional focus from unpleasant (e.g. angry) thoughts to more pleasant ones 
(e.g. compassion) was more time consuming than switching attention from one 
external counter to another (e.g. keeping count of red and blue cars that pass you on 
your way home). Murphy et al. (1999) also concluded that emotive or personally 
relevant information may pose an increased challenge to attentional control, and 
subsequently, affect reaction time scores on tasks measuring attentional bias. 
Consequently, the ability to lower levels of attentional bias in the external 
environment may be fundamentally different to disorders or behaviours that require 
the ability to control attention in the internal domain. The type of tasks used in the 
current study may therefore have inadequately measured meditators’ ability to retain 
attentional control, causing little difference to be identified between meditators with 
different levels of meditation experience, and also between meditators and non­
meditator controls.
Furthermore, the validity of the emotional Stroop task has been questioned in the 
literature because participants are able to cheat by squinting their eyes, therefore 
preventing themselves from reading the words (MacLeod, 1991). Despite being 
aware of this limitation, the emotional Stroop task was used in the current study 
given that it seems to predict behaviour and behavioural change better than the dot- 
probe task. It is however possible that this particular task was not the most 
psychometrically reliable and valid. Alternative measures should therefore be 
considered for use in future studies. In contrast to the latter explanation, it is possible 
that meditation practice is not significantly associated with attentional control. 
Significant associations found in previous research (Carter et al., 2005; Slagter et al.,
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2007; Srinivasan & Baijal., 2007; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David & Goolkasian, 
2010) may instead be simply due to demand characteristics. As an example of this, 
meditators are often made aware throughout the course o f learning a meditation 
practice o f the effects practice should produce. It is well known that such non­
specific factors can significantly influence study outcomes (e.g. Baskin et ah, 2003). 
Related to this point, the null findings may be due to the unanticipated difference 
between meditators and non-meditators in motivation to perform at one's highest 
level o f capacity. The current study offered no performance-based incentives 
therefore internal motivation to perform would be the only factor strongly 
influencing participants' approach to the tasks. All participants however received a 
small sum of money as a token of appreciation for taking part. If the meditators 
believed that the goal of the study was to validate meditation, they might have been 
extremely motivated to do well and thus aim to complete the tests more quickly and 
accurately than if they were performing the tests for other reasons. The current study 
cannot verify this possibility because no measure o f motivation was taken. Some 
have though argued that even if meditators perceive their participation to be more 
rewarding than controls, performance in attentional bias tasks has been found to be 
impervious to manipulations of motivation (Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2005). Olivers 
& Nieuwenhuis (2005) found that even after introducing a reward condition in their 
attentional bias experiment, there was no significant difference in attentional bias 
scores between the reward and the non-reward groups. In contrast to this, some 
research has shown that mindfulness meditators are more emotionally stable 
(Heppner & Kemis, 2007) through being non-judgmentally accepting of all 
experiences (Bogels, Sijbers & Voncken, 2006; Segal et al., 2002). These combined 
factors may produce the surprising effect of minimizing striving toward optimal 
performance in the meditating group.
In further support of the explanation that mindfulness meditation does not have 
specific attentional control advantages, Anderson et al. (2007) argued that 
mindfulness may impact awareness o f the present moment rather than attention. The 
inclusion of the dot-probe task in the current study, which aimed to measure both of 
these factors, in addition to the emotional Stroop however suggests that this 
explanation is unlikely. It may instead be questioned whether mindfulness training 
provides a different type of cognitive advantage than the type o f attentional control
investigated in this study. In view of this finding, future research might want to focus 
on evaluating the effects of mindfulness training on other cognitive gains.
Another reason for the null findings may be that the stimuli used in the tasks failed 
to evoke sufficient levels of temptation for some participants, allowing attention to 
be controlled more easily. For instance, the researcher informally reported that a 
number of participants expressed a dislike for the type of chocolate used in the tasks 
(e.g. chocolates from standard brands such as Nestle were used, whereas some 
preferred more high quality branded chocolate). Some participants may therefore 
have perceived the so-called ‘attractive’ food words/pictures as ‘unattractive’. As a 
result of this, a reliable measure o f attentional bias was unable to be taken. To 
identify whether this was a possible explanation for the lack o f significant group 
differences in attentional bias scores, the design o f future studies could either tailor 
the stimuli to each individual after identification o f their personal chocolate 
preference, or experiment by using different chocolate stimuli such as luxury brands 
(e.g. Green and Blacks or Thorntons). In relation to the former o f the two 
alternatives, thought would have to be given to how the different chocolate stimuli 
will be sufficiently matched to the control stimuli. Alternatively, future research 
could explore the effects of different attractive food stimuli such as, crisps or 
pastries. Also, given the limitations of visual stimuli, future research might extend 
this type of investigation to different sensory modalities. Early exploratory research 
into this has recently been published with some promising findings shown (McHugh, 
Simpson & Reed, 2010).
It is also possible that the meditator group’s performance on the emotional Stroop 
and dot-probe tasks were not superior to that of the non-meditating control group 
because in the current study they were not asked to enter a mindful state before 
completing the tasks (Alexander et al., 1989; Goleman, 1976; Kabat-Zinn, 1990).
The fact that all participants were able to report on how ‘mindful’ they were even 
without meditation experience (i.e. via the mindfulness questionnaires) however 
contradicts this. Furthermore, all participants were aware that the study was 
examining the effects of meditation experience and over half o f both experienced 
and novice meditators had some mindfulness training. It may therefore be assumed 
that individuals with meditation experience were attempting to complete the tasks
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mindfully is reasonable. For exploratory reasons, a future replication of the study 
could investigate the effects of meditation of attention by asking individuals to 
meditate before completing the attentional control tasks (emotional Stroop and dot- 
probe).
A further possible explanation for the null findings could be related to the type of 
meditator sample used in the current study. Some of the most promising effects of 
meditation experience on attentional control have been identified using highly 
meditative samples. Carter et al. (2005), for example, tested a group of Tibetan 
monks to measure the impact of mindfulness practice on attentional bias. Recruiting 
similar practitioners with this intensity of meditation experience was not feasible in 
the current study. Other studies have however found significant effects using a 
similar sample to that used in the present study (e.g. Valentine & Sweet, 1999). This 
particular explanation may therefore be unjustified. It could be argued that the null 
findings were instead due to the recruited meditator groups being unrepresentative of 
typical meditator samples used in previous research (Lykins & Baer, 2009). 
Participants in the current study were, for example, found to have higher levels of 
psychological distress as evident by the self-reported scores on the Depression 
Anxiety Stress Scale measure. The current study however investigated the potential 
effect of high psychological distress and found no reason to suspect that the findings 
would be compromised.
The null findings may instead have been caused by simply labelling the sample as 
either experienced, novice or non-meditator controls. These labels may have created 
the illusion of a greater diversity between the groups in terms of their attentional 
control abilities than there actually was. For instance, given the lengthy process of 
mindfulness training, it begs the question; how many experienced meditators were 
really that different from the novice meditators? Similarly, research has shown that 
meditation training for as short as 15 minutes has been found to have an effective on 
behaviour (Arch & Craske, 2006). Thus how different were the novice meditators 
from the non-meditator controls?
As an additional point, whereas the current study compares meditators with controls 
and also meditation experience with the attentional bias measures (dot-probe and
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emotional Stroop) thus yielding useful correlation information (Chan & Woollacott, 
2007), these findings do not establish causal direction. Theoretically then it is 
possible that regular meditation does not lead to better attentional control, or 
alternatively, those with better attentional control do not choose to meditate 
regularly. It is also possible that a third unidentified factor causes individuals to have 
both superior attentional control and meditation experience. Future studies could 
address this issue by manipulating meditation training in order to directly assess its 
impact on attentional bias. This could involve training meditative naive participants 
and then measuring their attentional bias scores at baseline in addition to a week 
later. In such a study however, the inclusion of experienced meditators would not be 
possible due to the length of practice needed.
Finally, it must be noted that despite enforcing a more rigorous check of group 
similarity (i.e. consisting of 35 individual factors) compared to previous research 
(Lykins et al., 2012), the groups were found to significantly differ on approximately 
half of the variables examined. As a result of this, it may be concluded that the lack 
of significant effect found between meditation and attentional bias in the present 
study was due to individual differences in the sample. This was despite incorporating 
a greater number o f checks for similarities and differences between the groups. An 
improved design for future replications of the current study may involve purposive 
sampling on a smaller group of key variables, rather than the post-hoc attempt to see 
how the groups compared. Ideally, only including participants in the study who were 
matched sufficiently would have been favoured, however recruiting from a 
community sample with a target-specific group was a challenge in its own right. The 
availability of willing meditators and non-meditators to take part in the study was 
simply not large enough to reject participants on the basis that they were slightly 
older or less stressed than those who had already participated. It is though undeniable 
that the impact of the groups being ‘significantly different’ can have real 
consequences when it comes to interpreting the data. Those who choose to practice 
meditation have been identified as being fundamentally distinct from those who do 
not (e.g. Lutz et al., 2008), and it maybe these factors which effect attention and not 
meditation per se. In view o f this, achieving a perfectly matched group of meditators 
and non-meditators may not be possible. Also, the presence of these different
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characteristics may be important in order to identify group differences when 
measuring attentional bias.
Whilst the latter point is an important one, the fact that two personality 
variables (Openness and BAS Reward Responsiveness), which differed between the 
groups, significantly correlated with attentional bias on the dot-probe task begs the 
question; did they confound the overall findings? Given that multiple tests for group 
differences and correlation analyses were conducted, it was believed possible that 
these significant findings were merely Type 2 errors as opposed to being ‘true’ 
results. An alternative interpretation is that the differences in reported Openness and 
Reward Responsiveness between the groups resulted from the meditation. In other 
words, mindfulness meditation may work by increasing these supposedly ‘stable’ 
personality traits. It is however recognised that understanding how meditation may 
influence these variables cannot be answered using a cross-sectional design such as 
that used in the current study. It would therefore be worthwhile for future research to 
conduct further explorations of the relationship between these personality variables, 
meditation and attentional control in order to confidently answer the earlier posed 
question.
2.4.4 Predicted mediators: mindfulness, attentional control and self-control (Aim 
2)
It has been suggested that decreases in attentional bias to motivationally stimulating 
stimuli (e.g. tempting foods) maybe the result o f meditation training increasing self- 
reported mindfulness, attentional control and self-control scores (Chambers et al., 
2008; Jha et al., 2010; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Singh et al., 2007, 2003; Tang et 
al., 2009, 2007; Zeidan et al., 2010). The current study failed to support this. Each 
self-report measure showed that lower mindfulness, attentional control and self- 
control were associated with less attentional bias. Whereas positive correlations were 
found at the dot-probe 100ms presentation time negative correlations were found at 
2000ms presentation time. This suggests that as self-report scores on mindfulness, 
attentional control and self-control increased, attentional bias was lower when 
measured at a longer duration. Attentional control and self-control were however 
found to be significantly correlated with mindfulness, supporting that previously 
found by Walsh et al. (2009). This suggests that low self-report mediator scores may
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have been associated with low attentional bias due to this significant relationship 
acting as a confound. An interesting finding was that, compared to the non-meditator 
group the meditators showed less significant association between the predicted 
mediators and attentional bias scores. More specifically, a pattern in the findings 
showed that only non-significant positive correlations were found between the 
predictor meditators and attentional bias 100ms scores for the novice and 
experienced meditators. For the non-meditators non-significant negative correlations 
were evident. This pattern was, like previously reported findings, reversed at the 
later 2000ms presentation. These results may indicate that the meditators and non­
meditators were interpreting the items on the scales differently. Practicing meditation 
is said to influence all aspects o f the practitioner’s life, causing their perceptions and 
evaluations of both themselves and their circumstances to change (Kabat-Zinn,
2003). Compared to the non-meditators, those with meditation experience would 
therefore have been more likely to answer the items on the measures used in the 
current study from a ‘mindful’ perspective (e.g. more positive and accepting). This 
may not necessarily be a conscious decision, but one which has become automatic 
through their meditation training.
Even though the findings showed correlations between the predicted mediators and 
attentional bias 100 and 2000ms scores, closer analysis revealed that at 100ms the 
scores did not significantly differ between the meditator and non-meditator groups.
At 2000ms however, the groups were found to be significantly different with the 
meditators showing mostly negative, or near zero correlations and the non­
meditators showing positive correlations between the predicted mediators and 
attentional bias. These findings are in line with the pre-stated hypotheses which 
predicted that meditation would increase self-reported mindfulness, attentional 
control and self-control scores whilst decreasing attentional bias. Despite this, the 
study failed to correctly predict that this finding would only be evident when the 
stimuli were displayed for the longest time duration. Furthermore, irrespective o f this 
controversial pattern of findings, overall the results showed that meditators reported 
experiencing greater mindfulness, attentional and behavioural control compared to 
non-meditators. This reported increase was not shown when they were required to 
exercise these skills. It may therefore be concluded that practicing meditation causes 
a heightened feeling of control in practitioners, but this does not appear to lead to an
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actual decrease in attentional bias to motivationally stimulating stimuli. This was 
evident by both meditators and non-meditators performing very similarly on the dot- 
probe and emotional Stroop tasks. Despite the fact that no significant differences in 
mediator scores were found, the higher mindfulness, attentional control and self- 
control mean scores reported by meditators compared to non-meditators indicates 
that the self-reported mediator measures chosen were suitable for the purpose of the 
study.
2.4.5 Determining meditation experience
The current study was original in that it used five different methods to determine 
meditation experience. These included methods previously used in other meditation 
studies (e.g. the number of minutes or hours spent meditating; Chan & Woollacott, 
2007; Perlman, Salomons, Davidson & Lutz, 2010) and novel methods (e.g. the type 
o f attentional skills used). None of these methods were significantly associated with 
any attentional bias measure (dot-probe or emotional Stroop). This therefore 
contradicts other researchers who have suggested that frequency and intensity of 
meditation practice will show a significant effect on attentional bias (Chambers et 
al., 2008; Doyon et al., 2002; Lutz et al., 2008). Also, given that no other study has 
determined meditation experience based on the type o f attentional skills practiced, it 
is difficult to make comparisons to explain why non-significant group differences 
were found. One reason for this however is that a large percentage (61.5%) of the 
novice meditators stated they had practiced mindfulness at some point in their lives, 
albeit not currently. It is therefore possible that the novice-concentrative meditators 
were very similar in their ability to use attentional control skills to the experienced­
mindfulness meditators as they too would have been taught open monitoring in 
addition to focused attention (Chambers et al., 2009; Rapgay & Bystrisky, 2009). 
Furthermore, the assumption that all mindfulness meditators practice open 
monitoring in addition to focused attention and non-mindfulness meditators the 
opposite maybe criticised for being too simplistic an approach to effectively 
determine meditation experience.
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2.4.6 Further limitations: methodological issues
Whilst the study’s limitations have been outlined throughout this discussion section, 
it is possible that some further aspects such as, the current experimental design or 
sample tested may be responsible for the null findings. As a cross-sectional study 
comparing meditation experts with non-meditators or less experienced meditators, it 
was impossible to blind participants to the nature of the study; in this case, 
meditation. Another design weakness may be insufficient power (though the sample 
size for the current study did exceed previous work using the emotional Stroop and 
dot-probe tasks, Tapper et al., 2008; Tapper et al., 2010) or the length of time it took 
to complete the study; an average o f one hour. Thus, the effort required during the 
lengthy tasks might have been high, resulting in less optimal performance. 
Additionally, the time of day and location which participants completed the tasks 
varied greatly. Again, this may have had a negative effect on the study’s findings as 
a result o f fatigue effects. Another methodological limitation is that the study relied 
heavily on self-reported data (e.g. meditation experience). As a result o f this, some 
o f the information provided may have been subject to error given the reliance of 
accurate memory recall. Moreover, the study cannot confirm that the participants’ 
meditated as often or as irregularly as reported, and also some aspects of mindfulness 
may be difficult to report on. Future research could overcome these limitations by 
allowing meditators a sufficient amount of time to accurately and fully record their 
meditation experience. Alternative ways o f assessing mindfulness (e.g. using a 
mobile phone application to monitor how often meditators complete mindfulness 
practices; Hudlicka, 2011) could also be explored. Furthermore, whilst the current 
study aimed to recruit participants from similar meditation centres to try to minimise 
variability across meditation practice, obtaining only mindfulness meditators was not 
achieved. It is therefore difficult to conclude from the findings that mindfulness 
meditation is not significantly associated with greater attentional control by lowering 
levels of attentional bias. It is instead possible that this is true of meditation practice 
in general.
2.4.7 Future research
The main findings demonstrated that there was no statistically significant link 
between meditation experience, attention control and attentional bias to chocolate.
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Previous research has however provided evidence that mindfulness meditation can 
better attention control by lowering levels of attentional bias when practiced both for 
short (e.g. several days to weeks; Jha et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2010) and long periods 
(e.g. several months; MacLean et al., 2010) of time. Further investigation is thus 
warranted to clarify precisely how much mindfulness training is necessary to 
produce its benefits. Longitudinal studies and randomised controlled trials with 
larger sample sizes are needed to explore this relationship. In addition to this, despite 
the findings failing to reach statistical significance, a repeated trend was identified 
throughout the analysis, showing that experienced meditators performed better on 
the emotional Stroop and dot-probe tasks when the stimuli were presented at 
2000ms. These findings suggest that meditation practice lowers levels of attentional 
bias to emotionally motivating stimuli but only when attention is directed to stimuli 
over an extended period o f time. To bring greater clarity to these findings, the study 
could be replicated by including only the 100ms and 2000ms presentation times.
Future studies could also use more sensitive measures of attention. It may, for 
example, be argued that the dob-probe ‘probe’ points are quite arbitrary. One way to 
avoid this would be, as previously stated, to use eye tracking to measure duration of 
gaze and disengagement without having to guess what time points need to be 
attended to or avoided. Moreover, the tasks used in the current study (emotional 
Stroop and dot-probe) aimed to find improvements in a non-clinical sample. This is 
more difficult to measure than the deficits of, for instance, adults suffering from an 
attention-related disorder such as ADHD. Replicating the study using a different 
population may therefore be of some interest to the wider meditation literature. 
Alternatively, replications of the study could include brain imaging technology in 
order to provide a more detailed understanding o f how mindfulness practice relates 
to attention (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007). The meditators and non-meditators 
may have performed similarly on the dot-probe and emotional Stroop tasks because 
the tasks used were too simplistic, and therefore using more difficult tasks may 
produce significant links between meditation experience and attention control. 
Additionally, it may be beneficial to the field o f meditation research to have multiple 
testing over several time periods. An extended design lasting up to 12 weeks with 
testing every two weeks would yield more detailed information, particularly at what
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specific point benefits in the ability to control one's attention are seen in the practice 
o f meditation.
Finally, given the null findings it may be useful for future work to identify 
performance-based tasks that are consistent with other attention qualities than that of 
attention control (Anderson et al., 2007). In particular, the ability to observe internal 
experiences (e.g. thoughts and emotions) in a decentered and accepting way is often 
described as a primary goal of mindfulness training (Segal et al., 2002). Thus, 
whereas the practice o f attentional control did not lead to better performance on the 
types of tasks examined in the current study, using alternative tasks which measure 
other qualities of attention may produce more promising results. In support of this, 
Papies et al (2011) found that mindfulness meditation was significantly associated 
with lower levels of attentional bias to the emotionally motivating stimulus, 
chocolate when participants used mindfulness-based cognitive defusion and 
acceptance strategies (e.g. the mindfulness group were asked to view their thoughts 
about viewed pictures without suppression or avoidance). Thus, although attentional 
control maybe a core component in mindfulness meditation it may be the practice of 
other associated attention-based mindfulness strategies that lead to greater self- 
control.
2.4.8 Conclusion
Mindfulness meditation is an increasingly popular research topic and the last few 
decades have seen an explosion in scientific publications dedicated to investigating 
the effects of meditation on attention (Baijal & Gupta, 2008; Brefczynski-Lewis, 
Lutz, Schaefer, Levinson & Davidson, 2007; Carter et al., 2005; Jha, Krompinger & 
Baime, 2007; Chambers, Lo & Allen, 2008). The current findings however failed to 
support the many previous claims of significant associations between attentional 
control and mindfulness training using both self-report and behavioural measures 
(Carter et al., 2005; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Slagter et al., 2007; Zeidan et al., 
2010). Despite this, the findings point to several potentially fruitful directions for 
future research, serving as a building block which can contribute to a better 
understanding of how mindfulness is related to changes in the self-control related 
health behaviour; reducing chocolate consumption.
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Chapter Three 
A comparison of brief mindfulness strategies for resisting chocolate
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Chapter overview
The current chapter aimed to answer the question ‘how do mindfulness interventions 
work?’ A dismantling design was used to compare the efficacy of cognitive defusion 
and acceptance as brief mindfulness-based strategies to change the self-control 
related health behaviour, resisting chocolate temptation. A literature review of each 
strategy is outlined. An overview of the different mediator measures is also provided, 
followed by a brief description o f the aims and hypotheses. This study predicted that 
cognitive defusion works by reducing automaticity, whereas acceptance works by 
increasing self-control resources. The current study stated two aims related to the 
investigation of cognitive defusion (Aim 1 & 2) and two aims related to the 
investigation of acceptance (Aim 3 & 4). For both strategies the aims explored; does 
the strategy help individuals to reduce their chocolate consumption, and if so, how 
does the strategy bring about its effects, respectively. The study further aimed to 
explore whether the effects of the cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies were 
mediated by self-reported mindfulness, defusion and acceptance (Aim 5). Lastly, the 
present study aimed to identify any behavioural re-bound effects in the defusion and 
acceptance groups via a post-study taste-task (Aim 6). The current study therefore 
had six aims in total.
3.1.2 Cognitive defusion (Aims 1 & 2)
3.1.2.1 What is cognitive defusion?
Cognitive defusion strategies aim to reduce distress from thoughts by training people 
to focus on their process of thinking rather than on its meaning (Blackledge, 2007). 
This results in a separation between themselves, metaphorically, and their thoughts 
(Eifert & Forsyth, 2005; Gregg, Callaghan, Hayes & Glenn-Lawson, 2007; Hayes, 
Strosahl & Wilson, 1999; Healy et al., 2008). When separation does not occur (i.e. 
the person is fused with their thoughts) the thoughts are automatically presumed true 
and worthy of being followed with the appropriate behavioural action. In contrast,
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when a person is defused from their thoughts they view these thoughts from a 
detached perspective. As a result o f this, such thoughts are less likely to be taken 
literally and to dominate behaviour (Harris, 2009; Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda & 
Lillis, 2006; Healy et al., 2008). Instead, the achieved psychological distance from 
the private experience allows individuals to persist in more favourable behaviours 
which are consistent with their values and goals. Cognitive defusion is considered 
distinct from other cognitive processes, such as cognitive restructuring given that 
defusion strategies are not intended to change the way people think. Rather, 
individuals are asked to simply notice their thoughts and to see their thoughts as 
‘merely thoughts’ rather than as statements o f fact.
3.1.2.2 How is cognitive defusion used as a mindfulness strategy?
Cognitive defusion achieves distance between a person and their thoughts by 
diverting attention away from the context o f the thought and temporarily disrupting 
the usual connection between the thought and the associated behaviour. Several 
different defusion strategies based on this notion have been developed for a wide 
variety of clinical presentations (Hayes & Strosahl, 2004). For example, an 
individual could label the process of thinking, “I am just having a thought that 
Alternatively, a negative thought could be observed dispassionately, repeated out 
loud until only its sound remains and its meaning lost. A thought may also be treated 
as an external event to be observed by giving it a shape, size, colour, speed, or form. 
Such procedures attempt to reduce the literal quality of the thought, weakening the 
tendency to treat the thought as what it refers to (“ I am a failure” ) rather than what 
it is directly experienced to be (e.g. the thought “ I am a failure” ). Each cognitive 
defusion strategy operates on the assumption that ‘distancing from thoughts, rather 
than modifying them, can improve behavioural outcomes through minimising literal 
response to cognitive content’ (Kohlenberg, Hayes & Tsai, 1995; Masuda, Hayes, 
Sackett & Twohig, 2004; Moffitt, Brinkworth, Noakes & Mohr, 2012). Cognitive 
defusion reduces the believability and behavioural impact o f negative thoughts by 
the relentless emphasis on seeing thoughts for what they are, just thoughts. To 
illustrate how the distinction between thoughts and the self is achieved, metaphors 
are used, including the ‘mindbus’. During the mindbus exercise the individual is 
asked to imagine that he/she is the driver o f the bus which represents his/her 
movement towards a particular personal goal. Unhelpful thoughts are conceptualised
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as passengers on the bus who demand that he/she change course and head in the 
opposite direction which will not allow them to achieve their planned goal (Heffner 
et al., 2002). This exercise encourages the ability to allow negative thoughts to be 
present without acting in accordance with them, and while maintaining movement in 
the valued direction. The mindbus metaphor also helps the individual to see their 
previous negative reactions to thoughts and emotions in an automatic and mindless 
manner, rather than self-controlled and conscious.
3.1.2.3 Cognitive defusion works by changing the perception o f  thoughts 
Many studies have found supportive evidence to suggest that cognitive defusion 
techniques work by effecting negative self-referential thoughts (Healy et al., 2008; 
Masuda, Hayes, Sackett & Twohig, 2004; Masuda et al., 2009). Healy et al. (2008) 
found that participants who used the cognitive defusion technique, “I am just having
a thought th a t ” in relation to the statement ‘my life is pointless’ experienced
significantly less emotional discomfort and an increased willingness to be further 
exposed to similar statements. A study which investigated the effectiveness of 
another commonly used defusion technique (rapid vocal repetition of a one word 
version of a negative self-referential thought until it loses all meaning) also showed 
that the defusion condition decreased emotional discomfort and thought believability 
more than two control conditions (Masuda et al., 2004).
A subsequent study using the same cognitive defusion technique found that the 
reduction of emotional discomfort was evident between 3-10 seconds o f rapid word 
repetition, whereas the maximum reduction of thought believability occurred after 
20-30 seconds of repetition (Masuda et al., 2009). From these findings, Masuda et al. 
concluded that, whilst the actual experiential exercise of rapid thought repetition is 
crucial for altering the stimulus function of negative self-referential thoughts and 
subsequent emotional discomfort, thought believability may be a distinctive 
functional aspect of cognitive events. Despite these interesting findings, the above 
studies can be criticised for multiple treatment interference given that participants in 
the studies outlined received several different interventions and not just those 
specific to the use o f cognitive defusion. Some studies also failed to compare the 
defusion condition with an active control condition (Masuda et al., 2009). However, 
a more recent study which evaluated the efficacy of defusion in isolation found
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similar findings, suggesting that cognitive defusion may indeed work by affecting 
negative self-referential thoughts irrespective of the noted limitations (i.e. multiple 
treatment interference and lack of an active control) (Deacon, Fawzym Lickel & 
Wolitzky-Taylor, 2011).
In view of the above evidence, the current study proposed that cognitive defusion 
strategies may be useful for changing behaviours, especially those requiring self- 
control. The reason for this is because people often behave impulsively to avoid 
feeling discomfort (Anestis et al., 2011) or because they perceive thoughts as facts 
which need to be followed (Mace, 2007). Mindfulness has been found to reduce 
impulsivity by improving awareness of internal experience which in turn facilitates 
monitoring of impulses (Peters, Erisman, Upton, Baer & Roemer, 2011). 
Mindfulness training has also been found to enhance self-control of volitional 
behaviours (Singh et al., 2007). Furthermore, it has been argued that in order to 
control behaviours thoughts often have to be monitored (Baumeister et al., 1994). 
Cognitive defusion strategies maybe an effective strategy to achieve this.
3.1.2.4 Using cognitive defusion strategies to change self-control related health 
behaviours
Automatic and controlled processes can come into conflict, such as when a heavy 
smoker attempting to abstain experiences a strong automatic (i.e. unintentional and 
difficult to control) appetitive response when offered a cigarette. In such situations 
the smoker may attempt to self-regulate by controlling the automatic response. 
Willpower alone is not enough to change the behaviour (Loewenstein, 2000). 
Instead, techniques which foster self-control skills, such as mindfulness strategies, 
are required. Research investigating the association between mindfulness and self- 
control has been widely supported (Baer, Smith & Allen, 2004; Brown & Ryan, 
2003; Chan & Woollacott, 2007; Hodgins & Adair, 2010; Jha, Krompinger & 
Baime, 2007; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David & Goolkasian, 2010). Shapiro & 
Zifferblatt (1976) for instance suggested that the practice o f mindfulness strategies 
increases a person’s ability to identify distracting stimuli and therefore are able to 
avoid reacting to these stimuli automatically. Furthermore, mindfulness has been 
found to improve self-control by facilitating an individual’s ability to recognise cues 
both internal and external (Marlatt, 1994). Marlatt (1994) reported that self-control
skills acquired via mindfulness training helped individuals to identify and resist cues 
which were encouraging of substance use. Linehan (1993) also suggested that such 
skills aided the individual in recognising the consequences of their behaviour, which 
as a result may lead to more effective behavioural choices being made. The 
aforementioned research however mainly focuses on mindfulness as a whole 
practice. They fail to investigate the individual effects of cognitive defusion on self- 
control.
Cognitive defusion is used in Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) (Bach & 
Hayes, 2002). There exists much support for the clinical effectiveness of ACT which 
includes cognitive defusion techniques, especially in relation to positively effecting 
self-control related health behaviours such as smoking cessation (Brown et al., 2008; 
Gifford et al., 2004), polysubstance abuse (Hayes et al., 2004), and marijuana 
dependence (Twohig, Schoenberger & Hayes, 2007) (for a comprehensive review, 
see Hayes, Masuda, Bissett, Luoma & Guerrero, 2004). Additionally, evidence for 
the effectiveness of ACT has been found for the treatment of different types of 
impulse control disorders such as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (Twohig, 2008; 
Twohig et al., 2006) and Trichotillomania (chronic skin picking and hair pulling) 
(Twohig & Woods, 2004; Woods et al., 2006). Cognitive defusion is however just 
one o f five components used in ACT, and to date, very few research studies have 
used a dismantling design to ascertain the individual effects of each ACT 
component. Instead, most studies have only conducted small scale studies which aim 
to examine if each component is psychologically present and works in accordance to 
the theory underlying ACT (Hayes et al., 2006). Thus, empirical evidence to support 
the efficacy of individual cognitive defusion strategies is limited.
Indirect evidence for the utility of defusion to increase self-control may be derived 
from chronic pain analog studies involving the Cold Presser Task (Hayes et al.,
1999; Takahashi, Muto, Tada & Sugiyama, 2002). Hayes et al. (1999) found that in a 
cold presser task, participants who practiced a cognitive defusion technique were 
able to keep their hand in the cold water significantly longer than participants in the 
participants in the cognitive behavioural therapy or placebo condition. This study, 
including others using cold presser tasks (Takahashi, Muto, Tada & Sugiyama,
2002) indicate that Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) rely heavily on
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defision strategies to control participant's pain tolerance. It must however be noted 
that Hayes et al. (1999) also investigated the simultaneous effects of other ACT 
comoonents, such as acceptance. Thus, it is difficult to conclude that cognitive 
defusion was effective as an individual component in bringing about this change. 
Furthermore, findings from ACT intervention studies which use cognitive defusion 
do not always produce a decrease in symptomatology or a change in behaviour 
(Bach & Hayes, 2002; Gaudiano & Herbert, 2006) therefore bringing into question 
the true efficacy of defusion strategies. Current research literature also offers very 
little supportive evidence on the applied impact of cognitive defusion therefore 
exploration of the unique effects of cognitive defusion is warranted. Only one study 
has attempted to investigate the unique effects of cognitive defusion on self-control 
related health behaviour (Moffitt et al., 2012). Moffitt and colleagues explored the 
efficacy of cognitive defusion strategies to reduce unhealthy snacking behaviour. 
The results showed that cognitive defusion was significantly associated with 
improved self-control ability, though it was acknowledged that further research is 
needed in order to confirm this given the novelty of the findings.
3.1.2.5 Using cognitive defusion strategies to change unhealthy eating behaviours 
There is evidence to suggest that cognitive defusion strategies are useful to help 
people abstain, or limit the intake of a craved substance (Gifford et al., 2004). These 
studies however mainly focus on substances such as smoking and drug abuse 
(Hemandez-Lopez, Luciano, Bricker, Roales-Nieto & Montesinos, 2009; Twohig et 
al., 2007). Less research has focused on exploring the use o f cognitive defusion 
strategies to reduce other craved substances, such as unhealthy food products. Given 
the modem ‘obesogenic environment’ many people report difficulty resisting urges 
to eat high-energy foods (Alsene, Li, Chevemeff & de Wit, 2003). Refraining from 
consuming high palatable foods requires self-control (Dishman, 1991; Williams, 
Grow, Freedman, Ryan & Deci, 1996). Hayes et al. (2006) argued that cognitive 
defusion strategies may be useful to change unhealthy eating behaviours because 
they are designed to increase willingness to experience internal states (e.g. thoughts) 
which in turn will prevent them from dictating behaviour (Hayes et al., 2006). Thus, 
cognitive defusion changes behaviour by targeting experiential avoidance (i.e. 
engagement in activities to evade discomfort; Wolgast, Lundh & Viborg, 2011).
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Several studies have found evidence for ACT interventions incorporating cognitive 
defusion strategies for managing eating behaviours (Forman, Hoffman, McGrath, 
Herbert, Brandsma & Lowe, 2007; Forman, Butryn, Hoffman & Herbert, 2009;
Gregg et al., 2007; Lillis, Hayes, Bunting & Masuda, 2009; Tapper et al., 2009). 
Forman et al. (2007), for instance, examined the effectiveness o f two types of 
strategies (control-based and acceptance-based) for coping with food cravings. 
Participants were randomised to one o f three groups, (1) no intervention, (2) 
instruction in control-based coping strategies, such as distraction or cognitive 
restructuring, or (3) instruction in acceptance-based strategies, such as defusion 
techniques (e.g. participants were taught to ‘step back from’ the craving and to 
instead see themselves having the craving). Participants were asked to keep 
chocolates in their possession but instructed not to eat them for 48 hours. The results 
of Forman’s study showed that both of the strategy types examined (control-based 
and acceptance-based) appeared somewhat effective in helping people to maintain 
their abstinence from chocolate. The acceptance-based intervention, which included 
cognitive defusion, was however found to be more effective in promoting abstinence 
amongst individuals who were highly challenged by cravings (i.e. more susceptible 
to food). This finding has interesting implications in that, individuals who are likely 
to be highly susceptible to food, such as overweight and obese people, may benefit 
from acceptance-based interventions. These findings also suggest that changing 
unhealthy eating habits may benefit from less emphasis on control-based strategies 
and instead more emphasis on confronting food urges. Whilst these findings imply 
that acceptance-based strategies which include cognitive defusion may be effective 
in changing unhealthy eating behaviour by reducing food intake, the defusion 
strategy was analysed in conjunction with other mindfulness techniques. As a result 
o f this, again it is very difficult to conclude if  it was specifically the defusion 
strategy which brought about this behavioural change.
As previously stated, exploring the efficacy of cognitive defusion as an individual 
mindfulness-based strategy to reduce unhealthy food consumption has only been 
attempted by Moffitt et al. (2012). Moffitt et al. compared the effects of cognitive 
defusion and cognitive restructuring techniques on the consumption of chocolates. 
One hundred and ten self-identified chocolate cravers carried a bag of chocolates 
with them over a seven-day period. Participants were asked to resist eating the
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chocolates for the duration of the study. Those in the restructuring condition were 
told that it is possible to resist acting on one’s thoughts about food by actively 
challenging, disputing, and changing these thoughts and replacing them with more 
helpful thoughts. Those in the defusion group were told that it is possible to resist 
acting on thoughts about food by distancing themselves from these thoughts, or 
creating a sense of separateness between them and their thoughts. Each intervention 
lasted approximately 60 minutes. The findings showed that participants in the 
defusion group were more likely to abstain from eating the chocolates compared to 
participants in the restructuring group. Cognitive defusion also led to greater self- 
reported reductions in external eating and increased personal responsibility for eating 
behaviours. Moffitt et al. concluded that defusion may exert its effectiveness through 
its capacity to enable efficient behavioural control even in the presence of very 
intense and distressing thoughts. Also, from another perspective, cognitive defusion 
may augment an individual’s ability to engage in self-control when making eating 
choices (Hall & Fong, 2010). Overall, these findings suggest that cognitive defusion 
can be a brief and simple approach to effectively manage the consumption of 
unhealthy snack foods. A limitation of Moffitt’s study however is that, it fails to 
identify ‘how’ the defusion strategy brings about its effects.
One aim of the current study was therefore to expand on the existing literature by 
investigating how cognitive defusion brings about behavioural change specifically in 
relation to the self-control related health behaviour, reducing chocolate consumption. 
The study predicted that cognitive defusion works by disrupting automatic links 
between thoughts and behaviours, thus breaking the habit of automatic responding.
In support of this, Hayes et al. (1999) stated that ‘defusion works by breaking down 
the tight equivalence classes and dominant verbal relations that establish stimulus 
functions through verbal means’ (p.74). To understand the mechanics o f how this is 
predicted to work, first a description of habits is outlined.
3.1.2.6 What are habits and how are they formed?
Verplanken & Aarts (1999) defined habits as Teamed sequences o f acts that have 
become automatic responses to specific cues, and are functional in obtaining certain 
goals or end-states’ (p i04). In order for a habit to develop, practice is required. Lally 
et al. (2010) reported that level of practice ranges between 18-254 days; indicating
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considerable variation in how long it takes for habits to develop. Bargh (1994) 
defined the concept of automaticity as 1) occurring outside awareness, 2) difficult to 
control, 3) mentally efficient, and 4) unintentional. The last component is defined in 
terms of being goal directed as opposed to being consciously planned (Aarts & 
Dijksterhuis, 2000). Habits are created and maintained under the influence of 
reinforcement, with behaviours with positive outcomes more likely to be repeated 
than those with negative outcomes. Habits thus serve some goal. For instance, a 
habit of eating a balanced diet serves the goal o f health, whereas a habit o f exercising 
may give a physical sensation o f fitness.
Another important feature in the definition of habits is that it is a form of 
automaticity which is triggered by specific cues. These cues can be related to many 
factors, though the majority of studies suggest that the performance o f habitual 
behaviour is guided by situational or environmental cues (Adriaanse, de Ridder & de 
Wit, 2009; Graybiel, 1998; Ji & Wood, 2007; Tucker & Ellis, 2004; Wood & Neal.,
2009). Traditionally, investigations into habit formation were largely behaviourist. It 
was believed that habits form due to associative learning causing a stimulus (cue) - 
response (S-R). Automaticity underlies habits and it is this automaticity between 
context cues and actions which arise intentionally or unintentionally on a day to day 
basis. Initially the S-R pattern needs to be encoded in procedural memory, although 
once formed the habitual response becomes primed by cues in the performance 
context. Over time, the mental association between the situation and the behaviour is 
strengthened. With the co-occurrence between the situation and the behaviour, the 
association is strengthened to the extent that whenever the situation is encountered 
the behaviour is performed automatically, therefore without awareness and with 
limited control (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, 1994; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1994; 
Verplanken, 2006).
3.1.2.7 Breaking existing habits
Numerous studies within the literature demonstrate how habits are formed and how 
they affect behaviour (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Danner, Aarts & De Vries, 2008; 
Verplanken & Aarts, 1999), though relatively little is known about ways to change 
habits once they have formed. Some suggest that existing habits can be broken by 
changing the performance cue. This is achieved by altering the situations in which
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the behaviour is performed by acts of stimulus control. In order to quit smoking, for 
example, a smoker may remove items from their home that remind them of the 
behaviour (Prochaska et al., 1988). Whilst people often use stimulus control as a 
means to change behaviour, changing performance cues has not been found to be 
very helpful when attempting to break existing habits. The main reason for this is 
that people cannot easily identify relevant performance cues for habits (Quinn, 
Pascoe, Wood & Neal, 2010).
Another self-control technique useful for breaking existing habits is to identify cues 
and exert control in order to reduce unwanted habitual responses. This is more 
readily known as vigilant monitoring. Vigilant monitoring is thought to be more 
successful than the previously mentioned strategy, stimulus control, given the 
difficulty of detecting triggering cues (Quinn et al., 2010). It has been found 
however, that vigilant monitoring is most successful when the cued response is not 
only inhibited, but replaced by a new response (Quinn et al., 2010; Wood & Neal, 
2007). Thus another useful self-control technique is counter-conditioning. Counter­
conditioning aims to inhibit habits by enabling the individual to replace the cued 
response with another more helpful response. Research shows that a lot o f smokers 
make use of this technique, for instance engaging in physical exercise when having 
the urge to smoke (Prochaska et al., 1988). The use o f counter-conditioning has also 
been significantly associated with successful cessation (Sun et ah, 2007). In view of 
the discussed research, it is possible that vigilant monitoring is a helpful strategy for 
identifying when the habitual behaviour is cued, and that counter-conditioning helps 
people to substitute an alternative habit for the old unwanted habit.
The current study offered a different approach for breaking existing habits. Unlike 
previous studies (Verplanken & Wood, 2006), it is argued that cues which trigger 
automatic behaviour in many instances may be cognitive rather than environmental. 
An individual; for example, thinks ‘I need something sweet’ and responds 
accordingly by automatically reaching for the biscuit tin. Thus, instead o f changing 
the environment to break existing habits, it is alternatively proposed that focus needs 
to be placed on changing an individual’s response to their thoughts. Cognitive 
defusion strategies may achieve this by teaching individuals to become aware of 
their thoughts and to identify thought cues which are counter-intentional (i.e. those
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contrary to one's goal). For instance, a person may intend to eat less chocolate, but 
experience the thought; ‘I'm stressed. I need chocolate!'. Being aware of the 
counter-intentional cues enables the individual to distance themselves from them by 
using the defusion strategy to see their thoughts as ‘just thoughts'. To my 
knowledge, no other studies have directly examined whether cognitive defusion 
brings about its effects by breaking existing habits. It is however predicted that the 
defusion strategy works by heightening awareness of and attention to inner 
experiences (i.e. thoughts) which act as cues, thus interrupting the automaticity 
between the cue and the behaviour. An aim of the current study was to test this 
theory.
3.1.2.8 Association between habits, cues and self-control related health behaviours 
Research into self-control related behaviours mainly focus on addiction treatment. 
Much evidence has been found to suggest that addictive behaviours become 
automatic with repeated practice and therefore form habits (Tiffany, 1990).
According to Tiffany, addictive behaviours (e.g. drug-use) are performed when 
triggered by cues. Addictive behaviours become so highly automatic through 
repetition that these individuals will only experience conscious urges and cravings if 
this automatic behaviour is prevented in some way, such as in those attempting 
abstinence. Tiffany’s theory of cue reactivity has also been applied to other self- 
control related health behaviours, such as eating behaviour (e.g. Fedoroff, Polivy & 
Herman, 1997; Green, Rogers & Elliman, 2000; Nederkoom & Jansen, 2002; Sobik, 
Hutchison & Craighead, 2005). Overduin & Jansen (1996) found that individuals 
reported greater food cravings during the presentation of a food cue when food- 
deprived. The current study explored the relationship between food thoughts and 
eating behaviour. A more in depth literature review of the association between 
habits, cues and unhealthy eating is therefore provided.
3.1.2.9 Association between habits, cues and eating behaviours
Eating is often an automatic behaviour (Diliberti, Bordi, Conklin, Roe & Rolls,
2004; Krai, Roe & Rolls, 2004; Levitsky & Youn, 2004; Meyers, Stunkard & Coll, 
1980; Rolls, Roe & Meengs, 2006; Painter, Wansink & Hieggelke, 2002; Wansink, 
Painter & Lee, 2006). In support of this, studies have shown that people are 
generally not aware of how much they eat. Diliberti et al. (2004), amongst others
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(Levitsky & Youn, 2004; Rolls et al., 2006) found that people given larger portions 
than normal did not believe they had eaten any more, nor did they report greater 
fullness than participants who had eaten normal-sized portions. Research has also 
shown that people tend to eat food which is within easy access to them (Painter et al., 
2002; Wansink et al., 2006) or simply because time is indicative of a ‘meal time’
(e.g. 12pm being lunch time) as opposed to eating because of feeling hungry 
(Tuomisto, Tuomisto, Hetherington & Lappalainen, 1998). Eating habits have 
therefore proven to be an important predictor of eating behaviour (Brug, de Vet, de 
Nooijer & Verplanken, 2006; Honkanen, Olsen & Verplanken, 2005; Verplanken, 
2006; Verplanken, Herabadi, Perry & Silvera, 2005).
Adriannse, de Ridder & Evers (2011) also reported that snack consumption was 
related to the habit of snack eating and restraint. This provides support for the 
consumption of unhealthy snacks without conscious awareness. Characterising 
eating as an automatic behaviour however does not mean that human beings cannot 
bring eating under volitional control. Although, unlike continued eating, refraining 
from eating requires great effort (Wansink, 2006). Overconsumption of unhealthy 
foods may therefore be supported by over learned automatic behaviours and by 
unconscious responses to the subjective experience o f food cravings. In support of 
this, Wills, Isasi, Mendoza & Ainetter (2007) found that high self-control was related 
to lower intakes of high-fat foods. Vohs & Heatherton (2000) also reported that poor 
self-control is associated with people breaking diets more readily. Lack of control 
over eating behaviour (often characterised by the consumption o f highly palatable 
desserts and snack foods) has also been associated with an unawareness o f eating 
(Wolkoff et al., 2011). In addition to this, loss of control has been related to 
inaccurate estimates of food intake (Wansink & Sobal, 2007), particularly recall of 
sweet food consumption (Wolkoff et al., 2011).
Unhealthy eating behaviour has been found to be ‘cued’ by a number o f factors, 
including negative emotions (Conner, Fitter & Fletcher, 1999; Dube, LeBel & Lu, 
2005) and social situations (Herman & Polivy, 2005). Some have however argued 
that unhealthy eating is not directly related to specific situational cues. Rather cues 
for eating unhealthily more often reflect internal states or subjective cues (e.g. being 
bored or feeling sad). If these motivational cues are consistently related to unhealthy
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eating behaviour then it may be possible to change unhealthy eating habits by 
making individuals aware of these cues and to identify them for what they are; just 
cues. Research has shown promise in terms of reducing unhealthy snack 
consumption by influencing motivational cues (Adriannse et al., 2009), though these 
studies have mainly focused on using implementation intentions. Significantly less 
research has been conducted on the effectiveness of cognitive defusion strategies to 
change unhealthy eating habits by identifying and breaking the critical cue-behaviour 
link.
To summarise, eating is a behaviour that can become a habit and can be triggered by 
cues. The current study proposed that these cues can be internal and cognitive 
defusion strategies may be useful to break unhealthy eating habits by allowing 
individuals to become aware of their thought cues and to describe them accordingly. 
To date, research on the effectiveness of cognitive defusion strategies to break habits 
is very limited. A description of those which do exist is provided.
3.1.2.10 Using cognitive defusion to break habits
A study conducted by Ostafin & Marlatt (2008) found evidence to suggest that 
mindfulness works by decoupling the relation between automatic appetitive 
responses and substance use behaviour, namely excessive drinking. This study 
however argued that this break in automaticity was due to greater participant 
acceptance, not cognitive defusion. Interestingly, possessing an awareness of 
thoughts and feelings was not hypothesised to reduce drinking behaviour. Ostafin & 
Marlatt argued that this was because awareness might actually increase the 
association between affective associations and alcohol behaviour. In agreement with 
this notion, alcohol expectancies have been shown to more strongly predict alcohol 
use in participants who are more aware of their internal experience (Bartholow, Sher 
& Strathman, 2000). This study however evaluates the effectiveness o f ‘mindfulness’ 
to break automatic behaviour and not cognitive defusion strategies specifically. A 
single study has previously stated that it explores the effectiveness o f cognitive 
defusion to break links between thoughts and behaviour. Conducted by Tapper et al. 
(2009) it was speculated, based on qualitative post-hoc analyses, that the cognitive 
defusion component of the mindfulness intervention was most successful at bringing 
about behavioural change in terms of both exercise and healthy eating. Caution must
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however be taken when interpreting these results given that the effectiveness of 
cognitive defusion was again analysed in conjunction with other ACT strategies, 
including acceptance and values. More research is therefore needed.
3.1.3 Conclusion of literature review
3.1.3.1 Summary
Some behaviours develop into habits (Ronis et al., 1989; Verplanken & Aarts, 1999), 
thus are readily performed with little awareness and high automaticity. Breaking 
these habits is difficult, especially for behaviours which require self-control to inhibit 
immediate rewards for long term gratification such as, reducing unhealthy eating in 
favour o f improving health (Prochaska et al., 1988; Quinn, Pascoe, Wood & Neal,
2010). The performance of habitual behaviours is often triggered by the presence of 
cues, with the majority of research focusing on the effects of environmental cues 
(Adriaanse, de Ridder & de Wit, 2009; Graybiel, 1998; Ji & Wood, 2007; Tucker & 
Ellis, 2004; Wood & Neal., 2009). Whilst traditional methods for trying to change 
automatic behaviours (e.g. removing the cue) have been o f some success (Prochaska 
et al., 1988) the current study suggests that cognitive defusion strategies may also be 
useful to break existing habits. It was predicted that the defusion strategy works by 
disrupting the automatic link between the cue and the behaviour (i.e. reducing 
automaticity) (Bartholow, Sher & Strathman, 2000; Ostafin & Marlatt, 2008; Tapper 
et al., 2009). Very little research has been carried out to investigate the efficacy of 
cognitive defusion to change self-control related health behaviours and therefore 
highlights the need for further research in this area. Considering the effects 
unhealthy eating has on health it is important to develop a more in-depth knowledge 
o f how cognitive defusion strategies work. Having an understanding o f how 
cognitive defusion changes self-control related health behaviours will also be 
beneficial for developing more informed interventions aimed at reducing unhealthy 
habits, and thus decrease health-risk factors associated with the overconsumption of 
food containing high levels of fat and sugar.
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3.1.4 Measuring reductions in automaticity
To explore if cognitive defusion works by breaking automatic links between thought 
cues and behaviours, a measure of automaticity was required. The standard method 
used to measure habits is to record the frequency with which a behaviour has been 
performed in the past. This type of measure is consistent with the view that 
behaviour can be guided by automatic processes outside of conscious awareness. 
However a noted problem of this method is that, although past performance 
frequency appears to be an effective predictor of future behaviour, this relation is not 
necessarily informative about habits (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Whilst repetition of 
behaviour is certainly part of the automatic process, repeated behaviour need not be a 
habit, for example cooking lunch for a spouse (Ajzen, 2002). Thus, behavioural 
frequency is not necessarily a valid measure of habit. Furthermore, it fails to measure 
whether habits are automatic responses to specific cues. Given the noted limitations 
associated with measuring habits in terms of behavioural frequency, researchers now 
favour the use of the Self-Report Habit Index (SRHI). The SRHI was developed by 
Verplanken & Orbell (2003) as an alternative measure of habit strength by asking 
individuals to report on a number of qualities of habitual behaviour which are easy to 
conceptualise (e.g. history of repetition, lack of control, and lack of awareness). The 
SRHI consists of a 12-item scale and has been used to measure a variety o f habits, 
including eating behaviours (e.g. fruit and snack food consumption) (Verplanken, 
2004; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). The SRHI was used in the current study given 
that this measure of habit strength has shown high test-retest reliability (Verplanken 
& Orbell, 2003) and high internal reliabilities for health behaviours (De Bruijn et al., 
2008, 2009), including food intake (Brug et al., 2006; De Bruijn et al., 2007).
3.1.5 Acceptance (Aims 3 & 4)
3.1.5.1 What is acceptance?
This strategy encourages the acceptance of thoughts and feelings, both pleasant and 
unpleasant, without the need to change or control them (Baer & Krietemeyer, 2006). 
By doing so, individuals build up a degree of tolerance for uncomfortable feelings 
allowing undesired thoughts and emotions to be explicitly invited, welcomed and 
easily accepted. The aim of teaching people to accept internal events is to give them 
the freedom to use their energies more effectively instead of investing them in trying
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to control thoughts and feelings. This enables individuals to pursue their goals, 
despite any difficult thoughts or feelings. Some researchers label acceptance as an 
emotion control strategy and therefore it is often compared to strategies aimed at 
regulating emotions, such as suppression, distraction or reappraisal (Aldao, Nolen- 
Hoeksema & Schweizer, 2010; Dunn, Billotti, Murphy & Dalgleish, 2009; Hofmann 
& Asmundson, 2008; Liverant, Brown, Barlow & Roemer, 2008; Szasz, Szentagotai 
& Hofmann, 2011). Acceptance however is not a strategy which aims to change 
emotions. The emphasis on the active nature of acceptance as a deliberate yielding 
experience defines acceptance as a qualitatively different form of control (Decter, 
2010).
3.1.5.2 How is acceptance used as a mindfulness strategy?
During the practice of mindfulness acceptance, individuals are encouraged to simply 
observe their feelings and accept their presence, rather than try to control or 
eliminate them. One acceptance technique used is called ‘urge surfing’ (Marlatt & 
Kristeller, 1999). Urge surfing uses the imagery of a wave to help a person gain 
control over their impulses to avoid feeling uncomfortable. The person is first taught 
to label internal sensations and cognitive preoccupations as an urge, and then to 
foster an attitude of unattached, curious observation of the experience. This 
technique encourages the identification and acceptance of urges, rather than acting 
on or attempting to struggle against them using suppression or avoidance strategies. 
‘Urge surfing’ allows thoughts and feelings experienced by individuals to be seen 
simply as arising events that will pass with time. In support of the effectiveness of 
this technique Bowen & Marlatt (2009) found that, among participants who wanted 
to change their smoking behaviour, those who practiced the urge surfing technique 
smoked significantly fewer cigarettes over a seven-day period compared to those in 
the control group. The groups did not differ significantly on measures of urges. 
Bowen & Marlatt therefore concluded that mindfulness acceptance strategies may 
not initially reduce urges, but they may change an individual’s response to them.
3.1.5.3 Acceptance works by increasing tolerance o f  uncomfortable experiences 
The empirically demonstrated benefit o f acceptance is that it decreases the aversive 
properties of negative private events and increases an individual’s willingness and 
ability to engage in difficult activities while experiencing them (Eifert & Heffner,
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2003; Levitt, Brown, Orsillo & Barlow, 2004). Thus, acceptance increases a person’s 
ability to tolerate uncomfortable thoughts and feelings. In support o f this, Felder, 
Zvolensky, Eifert & Spira (2003) conducted a study to explore whether practicing 
mindfulness acceptance techniques had an effect on the tolerance to exposed carbon 
dioxide (CCL) enriched air. Participants were randomly assigned to either a 
computerised acceptance-based condition or a suppression condition. The 
acceptance-based condition taught participants to observe their feelings and to let go 
of any struggle with them during the exposure to the CCL enriched air. The 
suppression condition was instructed to suppress their feelings during the CO2 
inhalation. The findings showed that, those who scored highly on the experiential 
avoidance measure in the suppression condition but not the acceptance condition 
reported greater levels of anxiety relative to those with low experiential avoidance.
Eifert & Heffner (2003) found similar outcomes, with participants in an acceptance 
condition demonstrating less behavioural avoidance, fewer negative thoughts and 
greater willingness to experience the CO2 inhalation procedure again compared to an 
emotional control condition (i.e. controlling psychological experiences by abdominal 
breathing) or a no-instruction condition. These findings have also been successfully 
replicated using a brief acceptance task. Levitt, Brown, Orsillo & Barlow (2004) 
reported that the acceptance group showed significantly greater levels of willingness 
to participate in the CO2 inhalation for a second time and lower levels of anxiety 
than those in suppression or distraction conditions when the techniques were only 
taught using a 10 minute audiotape. These findings suggest that acceptance works by 
encouraging individuals to cope with uncomfortable thoughts and feelings, allowing 
them to sit with this discomfort without trying to control or change it in any way. 
Acceptance is therefore believed to reverse the depleting effects of avoiding 
uncomfortable situations. A positive association between avoidance and self-control 
is widely documented, with evidence showing that acceptance strategies foster self- 
control abilities (Alberts, Martijn, Greb, Merckelbach & De Vries, 2007). In view of 
this, the current study proposed that acceptance strategies may by effective at 
changing self-control related health behaviours.
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3.1.5.4 Using acceptance strategies to change self-control behaviours
Similarly to cognitive defusion research, the application of psychological acceptance 
is most often considered within substance abuse literature (Bowen, Witkiewitz, 
Dillworth & Marlatt, 2006; Davis, Fleming, Bonus & Baker, 2007). The overuse o f 
substances is generally conceptualized as an attempt to moderate emotions or bodily 
states that have been evaluated as aversive. Often, substance users report great 
difficulty in controlling their urges (e.g. see McKay, Franklin, Patapis & Lynch, 
2006).Whereas traditional control-based strategies aim to directly reduce undesirable 
emotions, thoughts and cravings, acceptance strategies instead attempt to changes 
one’s intention to control these experiences. Ostafin & Marlatt (2008) suggested that 
having an accepting attitude towards one’s experience would moderate the relation 
between automatic alcohol motivation and hazardous drinking. In support o f this, 
among fifty undergraduate drinkers it was found that mindful acceptance o f current 
experience reduced unhealthy drinking behaviour. Acceptance strategies have also 
been used to change other self-control related health behaviours, including reducing 
chronic pain symptoms (Geiser, 1992). Acceptance of pain includes responding to 
pain-related experiences without attempts at control or avoidance, particularly when 
these attempts have limited the patient’s quality of life (McCracken & Eccleston, 
2005). Hayes et al. (1999) found that subjects in the acceptance group demonstrated 
greater tolerance of pain compared to the control-based and placebo groups. Many 
others have supported this (McCracken, 1998; McCracken, Spertus, Janeck, Sinclair 
& Wetzel, 1999; Viane, Crombez, Eccleston, Devulder & De Corte, 2004). The use 
o f acceptance to change self-control related behaviours is promising. An aim o f the 
current study was therefore to expand this literature by exploring whether acceptance 
strategies are effective at changing the self-control related health behaviour; resisting 
chocolate temptation.
3.1.5.5 Using acceptance strategies to change unhealthy eating behaviours 
There is a growing body of research suggesting that mindfulness and its related 
constructs are relevant to understanding the development and maintenance of 
dysfunctional eating behaviours (e.g. eating disorders such as anorexia and binge 
eating). Such behaviours are characterized by experiential avoidance and a strong 
desire to maintain control over eating-related behaviours, urges, thoughts, and 
feelings (Corstorphine et al., 2007, Merwin & Wilson, 2009, Merwin, Zucker, Lacy
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& Elliot, 2010; Orsillo & Batten, 2002). However, control-related strategies have 
found to increase as opposed to decrease these unhealthy eating behaviours. A small 
number o f case studies and pilot studies have suggested that mindfulness acceptance 
might be effective for the treatment o f eating disorders (Anderson & Simmons,
2008, Baer et al., 2005, Juarascio et al., 2010, Kristeller et al., 2006; Safer, Telch & 
Chen, 2009). Kristeller & Hallett (1999), for instance, found promising reductions in 
binge eating among participants practicing an acceptance strategy. Furthermore, 
Heffner, Sperry, Eifert & Detweiler (2002) reported that acceptance-based therapies 
were effective in the treatment o f anorexia. Despite these positive findings, 
unfortunately these studies fail to identify if  it was the acceptance strategy alone 
which brought about this change. In fact, very little data have been collected to 
determine whether improvements in acceptance are related to changes in eating 
behaviour. Moreover, the main focus o f research explores the effects of mindfulness 
strategies on eating pathologies (Heffner et al., 2002; Kristeller & Hallett, 1999). 
There is limited research on the effects o f these strategies on general unhealthy 
eating behaviour (e.g. overconsumption of snack foods). Some studies (see section 
3.1.2.5) have found evidence for acceptance-based strategies in changing eating 
behaviours (Forman et al., 2007). Although, as already stated, these studies evaluate 
the efficacy of many different acceptance-based strategies and not acceptance alone. 
Additionally, not one of these studies has attempted to explain how acceptance 
strategies change self-control related behaviours.
In view of this, like for the cognitive defusion strategy the current study aimed to 
provide some insight into the unanswered question; how do acceptance strategies 
work? Again, this question was explored in relation to the self-control related health 
behaviour, reducing chocolate consumption. The study predicted that acceptance 
works by increasing a person’s ability to sit with uncomfortable feelings without 
trying to control or change it in any way. As a result o f this, it was believed that 
acceptance strategies may change self-control related health behaviours by 
increasing a person’s self-control capacity due to freeing up greater self-control 
resources. To understand the mechanics o f how this works, first a description of the 
term ‘self-control capacity’ is outlined.
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3.1.5.6 What is self-control capacity?
Self-control refers to the capacity for altering one’s own responses, especially to 
bring them into line with standards such as ideals, values, morals, and social 
expectations, and to support the pursuit o f long-term goals (Baumeister et al., 2007). 
Self-control is also referred to ‘willpower’, thus implying a kind of strength or 
energy (Baumeister et al., 2007). Baumeister and colleagues posit that self-control 
capacity is limited therefore exerting self-control in one domain depletes resources 
and increases chances of self-control failure in other tasks requiring self-control 
thereafter (Baumeister, Schmeichel & Vohs, 2007; Baumeister, Vohs & Tice, 2007). 
The basic approach to testing the depleted-resource hypothesis is to have some 
participants perform a first self-control task, while others perform a comparable but 
neutral task, and then all perform a second, unrelated self-control task. If self-control 
consumes a limited resource, then it is expected that performing the first task should 
deplete the person’s resource, leaving less available for the second task. As a result, 
the person will perform more poorly on the second task relative to the first task. The 
idea that self-control has limited energy resource has been widely supported (see 
Hagger, Wood, Stiff & Chatzisarantis, 2010 for a meta-analysis).
Early laboratory evidence for depleted resources in self-control was reported by 
Muraven, Tice & Baumeister (1998) and Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven & Tice 
(1998). In one study, participants who were instructed to suppress their emotions 
while watching an emotional video performed significantly worse on a subsequent 
self-control task compared to participants who did not control their emotions during 
the video. Suppressing a forbidden thought has also been found to weaken people’s 
ability to stifle laughter afterwards (Baumeister et al., 2007). In another study by 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven & Tice (1998) participants were given a bowl of 
radishes and a bowl of attractive looking cookies. Some participants were instructed 
to eat only from the radishes whereas others were invited to eat the cookies. This 
manipulation was found to undermine subsequent persistence with unsolvable 
puzzles. Participants who refrained from eating cookies (and thus exerted self- 
control) spent relatively less time at solving the puzzles than participants who were 
allowed to eat the chocolates and cookies. Ludwig & Stark (1974) also found that 
alcoholics who were trying to quit drinking were poorer at regulating their moods, 
thoughts, and attention in comparison with those not currently trying to break such
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an addiction. This was because the repeated efforts of self-control required to resist 
temptation depleted the person’s self-control capacity. All of the aforementioned 
studies point toward the conclusion that self-control resources are limited, resulting 
in the energy used for the initial self-control attempt (i.e. suppression of emotions to 
avoid discomfort) to deplete resources for later self-control attempts.
There are far-reaching consequences of self-control failures. Compared to 
individuals with higher self-control resources, individuals with low self-control 
resources have been shown to break their diets more readily (Vohs & Heatherton, 
2000), give into alcohol temptation more easily (Muraven, Collins & Nienhaus, 
2002), manage their emotions less efficiently (Muraven, Tice & Baumeister, 1998), 
and spend more money on impulse (Vohs & Faber, 2007). Thus, to name just a few, 
poor self-control is significantly associated with obesity, crime and drug use (for 
overviews, see Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice, 1994; Vohs & Baumeister, 2011). It 
is therefore important to identify ways to improve self-control even when resources 
are depleted. One aim of the current study was to test the idea that a brief 
mindfulness-based acceptance strategy can avoid the deleterious effects of self- 
control depletion.
3.1.5.7 How can self-control capacity be increased?
As previously discussed, the availability of energy (i.e. self-control) is depleted by 
exertion and must be replenished before the full measure of energy is available 
again. Self-control capacity therefore resembles a muscle that becomes fatigued by 
exertion and becomes less able to function (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; 
Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice, 1994). Research has however shown that it is 
possible to improve self-control capacity with exercise over time (Schweitzer & 
Sulzer-Azaroff, 1988). Thus it is suggested that a decrease in self-control strength is 
not permanent, and therefore can be improved. These improvements typically take 
the form of resistance to depletion in the sense that performance at self-control tasks 
deteriorates at a slower rate. Furthermore, it is believed that this increased self- 
control strength should generalise to any and all tasks that require self-control.
Hence, the particular self-control task being practiced is unimportant, providing it 
requires the individual to override or inhibit a response. There is much research 
which has provided evidence that practicing self-control leads to a general increase
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in self-control capacity (Gailliot, Plant, Butz & Baumeister, 2007). Muraven, 
Baumeister & Tice (1999) found that individuals who exerted self-control over their 
eating habits for two weeks performed better on a task that required overriding 
physical discomfort. Other research has shown that people who practiced self-control 
by exercising (Oaten & Cheng, 2006) also exhibited better self-control. Exposure to 
food temptations in a supportive environment has further shown to result in better 
self-control in a subsequent eating task (Geyskens, Dewitte, Pandelaere & Warlop, 
2008; Kroese, Evers & de Ridder, 2009).
Despite such suggestive findings, this prior research has several noteworthy 
shortcomings. For instance, laboratory controlled exertions of self-control often 
show decrements, not increments (Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven et al., 1998).
The reason for this is that the confines of typical laboratory experiments allow little 
opportunity for self-control to gain in strength. Furthermore, research has shown that 
if  participants are told that they will need to exert self-control later, they often curtail 
current performance more severely than if  no such demands are anticipated 
(Muraven, Shmueli & Burkley, 2006). Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that 
people can exert self-control despite depleted resources if there is a high enough 
reward, such as cash incentives (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). These 
aforementioned factors question the accuracy and reliability o f Baumeister’s strength 
model of self-control. Thus, caution needs to be taken when interpreting the findings 
of self-control studies especially as more recently, researchers have found that 
reduced self-control after a depleting task is more of a reflection o f people’s beliefs 
about the availability of willpower rather than true resource depletion (Job, Dweck & 
Walton, 2010).
It cannot however be ignored that there are several studies which support the theory 
that self-control capacity can be increased by identifying procedures which moderate 
or even counteract the effects of self-control depletion (Gailliot et al., 2007; Webb & 
Sheeran, 2003). Richards & Gross (2000), for example, argued that construing a 
potentially emotional situation, in a way that decreases its emotional relevance, 
consumed considerably less resources than strategies that aim to regulate one’s 
emotional reactions during the occurrence of an emotional event. Others have 
suggested that control strategies are important when exerting self-control to delay a
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gratifying reward (Mischel, 1974; Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970). Self-control capacity 
has also been enhanced by the formation of implementation intentions (Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006). The current study however proposed a new hypothesis; that 
mindfulness-based acceptance strategies are effective at preventing the depletion of 
self-control resources and thus allow people to resist eating the unhealthy snack 
food, chocolate.
3.1.5.8 Using acceptance strategies to increase self-control capacity
Some studies have suggested that the brief practice of general mindfulness may
counteract the deleterious effects of self-control depletion (Hayes, Strosahl &
Wilson, 1999). This pattern of results has also been observed in other studies 
(Martijn, Tenbult, Merckelbach, Dreezens & De Vries, 2002). With the exception of 
Masedo & Esteve (2007), no study has examined self-control costs nor attempted to 
assess any other possible self-control benefits of acceptance-based interventions. 
Although, more recently, Alberts, Schneider & Martijn (2012) showed that 
participants who accepted their negative emotions (based on mindfulness) 
outperformed both participants who suppressed their emotions and control-group 
participants on a subsequent self-control task. This supports the notion that 
acceptance-based coping is more efficient in terms of resource usage and relies less 
on self-control compared to suppression. Despite this new evidence, the empirical 
research which examines how the practice of mindfulness-based acceptance 
strategies relates to one’s ability to control behaviour is very limited. One aim o f the 
current study was therefore to offer further insight and support to this research area.
It was predicted that acceptance strategies work by increasing self-control resources, 
due to less energy being used to control uncomfortable feelings associated with 
refraining from eating a tempting snack. In other words, acceptance strategies may 
help individuals resist chocolate by freeing up self-regulatory resources that would 
otherwise have been used for regulating chocolate cravings
3.1.6 Conclusion of literature review
3.1.6.1 Summaiy
When faced with an uncomfortable situation people often try and change or control it 
in order to decrease the level of discomfort experienced. Achieving emotional
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control (e.g. trying to control or change uncomfortable feelings) however requires 
effort, and therefore is thought to draw on self-control resources (Muraven et al., 
1998). Self-control resources are needed to change self-control behaviours, such as 
resisting the temptation to eat unhealthy snack foods. Research has shown that self- 
control resources (or, self-control capacity) can be depleted when more than one task 
which requires self-control is completed within close proximity. For instance, if  a 
person successfully resists a glass o f wine with their meal but then is handed the 
dessert menu, they are less likely to resist a dessert because they had used up the 
self-control resources to resist the wine. Thus, self-control is believed to be a limited 
resource (Muraven et al., 1998). As a result of this, learning to accept rather than 
regulate difficult emotions may result in the increased availability o f self-control 
resources for self-control related health behaviours, including resisting chocolate 
(Alberts, Schneider & Martijn, 2012). Very little research has been carried out to 
investigate the efficacy of acceptance to increase self-control capacity and 
consequently, change self-control related health behaviours. Further research is 
therefore needed. Understanding how acceptance strategies work will not only 
increase our knowledge on how they can be used to change self-control behaviours, 
but also the effect of doing so on other situations that require self-control. 
Furthermore, this research will help to develop more effective health-based 
interventions.
3.1.7 Measuring self-control resources
Researchers have used many different self-control tasks to measure self-control 
capacity. Some tasks require participants to suppress thoughts about a white bear 
after planting the idea of that thought (Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987). 
Other tasks require participants to break a habit (Baumeister, De Wall, Ciarocco & 
Twenge, 2005; Muraven et al., 1998) or resist temptation (Baumeister et al., 1998). 
Measures of self-control capacity also exist in the form of measuring persistence in 
an unsolvable task (Baumeister et al., 1998) or performance on a hand-grip task 
which requires physical stamina (Muraven et al., 1998). The latter is perceived as a 
validated procedure for assessing self-control (Muraven et al., 1998) in which 
participants are asked to squeeze together a hand-grip for as long as possible both 
before and after completing another task that also requires self-control resources
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(such as emotion control or resisting a tempting food). The length of time the 
individual can keep the hand-grip squeezed together for the second time is generally 
less than the first time since they will have used up some o f their self-control 
resources during the intervening task. The extent of this reduction is taken as an 
indication of the amount of self-control resources used up, with smaller reductions 
indicating reduced vulnerability to fatigue. The current study measured self-control 
using a hand-grip task (Muraven et al., 1999). The hand-grip task was completed 
both before and after a five-minute intervening task whereby participants were asked 
to refrain from a bowl of eating chocolate placed in front o f them.
3.1.8 The current study
3.1.8.1 Addressing the research gaps
3.1.8.1.1 Cognitive defusion 
The present research was designed to explore how cognitive defusion works to 
reduce chocolate consumption. Existing research suggests that mindfulness strategies 
may be helpful for changing such behaviours (Hayes et al., 2006; Wolgast, Lundh & 
Viborg, 2011). It is however unknown if it is cognitive defusion strategies which are 
effective, or how they bring about their effects. There is some suggestion that 
cognitive defusion breaks automatic links between cognitive cues and behaviour by 
increasing awareness of the cue and by encouraging the perception o f thoughts as 
‘just thoughts’ (Ostafin & Marlatt, 2008). The current research was novel in that 
there remains a lack of understanding in the literature in terms of how cognitive 
defusion strategies (1 ) change self-control behaviours, (2 ) change specifically, 
unhealthy eating behaviour, and (3) break pre-formed habits. The present study was 
also one of only a few which aimed to identify the unique effects o f cognitive 
defusion in achieving behavioural change as opposed to its effects when combined 
with several different acceptance-based strategies. Furthermore, it was one of the 
first to suggest that habits are cued by cognitive cues as opposed to environmental 
cues. Snack consumption has increased significantly in recent years (Zizza, Siega- 
Riz & Popkin, 2001). Thus, as a means of tackling the overconsumption o f sweet 
high fat foods, the current study proposed that interventions should focus on 
influencing thought cues in order to change unhealthy eating behaviour.
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3.1.8.1.2 Acceptance 
In addition to cognitive defusion, the present research was designed to explore if  a 
brief mindfulness acceptance strategy can reduce chocolate consumption, and if so, 
how? Present research fails to offer an explanation as to how acceptance strategies 
specifically bring about these effects. There is some suggestion that acceptance 
strategies work by freeing up self-control resources. This research is however very 
limited and knowledge of how acceptance changes unhealthy eating behaviours lacks 
sufficient depth and scope for any valid conclusions to be drawn. The current 
research was novel in that it aimed to investigate how acceptance strategies (1 ) 
change self-control behaviours, (2 ) change specifically, unhealthy eating behaviour, 
and (3) increase self-control resources. The present study was also one of only a few 
which aimed to identify the unique effects of acceptance strategies in achieving 
behavioural change as opposed to its effects when combined with several different 
acceptance-based strategies.
3.1.8.2 Considerations o f  the current study
The current study examined the effects of two mindfulness-based strategies on 
ability to resist chocolate over a five-day period. Cognitive defusion and acceptance 
strategies were compared with a control strategy, relaxation. At baseline, the control 
group was tested for similarity with the mindfulness groups.
3.1.8.2.1 Why cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies?
Only one study has attempted to explore the effects of an individual cognitive 
defusion strategy on resisting chocolate (Moffitt et al., 2012). It was therefore 
considered important to develop this research further because o f its novelty. 
Furthermore, cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies were chosen based on 
their ease of separation from mindfulness practices and their ability to be 
investigated in their unique form.
3.1.8.2.2 Why resisting chocolate?
The self-control related behaviour, resisting chocolate, was chosen because resisting 
the temptation to eat chocolate is a difficult endeavour and if  not controlled, can lead 
to a multitude o f negative health consequences (Erskine & Georgiou, 2011). 
Chocolate was also chosen since most individuals’ report great liking for chocolate
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and it is also a food that elicits strong cravings (e.g. Rozin et al., 1991). Given that 
training to reduce food consumption should only affect eating behaviour o f those 
experiencing strong impulses to indulge in that food type (Houben & Jansen, 2011), 
the study recruited participants who expressed an interest in reducing their chocolate 
intake.
3.1.8.2.3 Why a ‘b rie f training period?
The current study explored individual mindfulness-based strategies. Thus, the 
training period required to teach participants their allocated strategy was 
significantly reduced from the traditional eight-weeks (Kilpatrick et al., 2011) to 
minutes (approximately 30 minutes). Although very few studies have explored the 
brief training effects of mindfulness strategies on self-control functioning, the 
findings of those which do are promising (Erisman & Roemer, 2010; Hooper, Davies 
& McHugh, 2011; Moffitt et al., 2012).
3.1.8.2.4 Why a relaxation control?
Many wrongly assume that mindfulness and relaxation are strongly related and 
therefore bring about similar effects (Sharpe, Nicholson Perry, Rogers, Refshauge & 
Nicholas, 2012). In an attempt to demonstrate this misassumption, mindfulness 
studies often measure the efficacy of mindfulness in comparison to relaxation 
interventions. These relaxation interventions typically require the participant to tense 
and relax different muscle groups throughout the body (Benson, 1975; Bernstein & 
Borkovec, 1973). The findings of these studies have shown to be inconsistent (Jain et 
al., 2007; Steffens, 2009). Empirical research is therefore needed to compare 
individual mindfulness strategies with relaxation to determine its potential efficacy 
and specificity in changing health behaviours. The current study aimed to achieve 
this by exploring the effects of the mindfulness strategies cognitive defusion and 
acceptance in comparison to a relaxation control strategy to reduce chocolate 
consumption. Relaxation was also chosen as a control strategy because it was 
considered important for all groups to be active. The purpose of this was to avoid 
any potential placebo effects.
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3.1.8.2.5 Why check for group differences?
The current study aimed to identify whether participants in the mindfulness 
(cognitive defusion and acceptance) and control (relaxation) groups were sufficiently 
similar on factors that may influence chocolate consumption other than the 
independent variable under investigation (i.e. mindfulness strategies). The effect of 
age was measured given that older individuals have reported having values which 
linked to more negative consumption of saturated fats and sugar compared to 
younger individuals (Drewnowski, Renderson, Driscoll & Rolls, 1997). Gender 
differences were measured because chocolate has been found to be more highly 
craved by women (Weingarten & Elston, 1991) and that chocolate is a more 
preferable choice of comfort food to women compared to men (Wansink, Cheney & 
Chan, 2003). Differences in level of study was considered an important factor given 
that undergraduates are more likely than postgraduates to be ( 1 ) new to the 
university lifestyle and social freedom, (2) new to living away from home, and (3) 
responsible for food preparation and financial management. These have been found 
to be the most common reasons which affect food choices in a young student 
population (Beasley, Hackett & Maxwell, 2004; Brevard & Ricketts, 1996; Nicklas 
et al., 2001; Pan et al., 1999; Papadaki & Scott, 2002; Papadaki et al., 2007).
Measures of how much chocolate is liked, how frequently chocolate is eaten, and 
level of motivation to reduce chocolate intake were also taken given that the 
temptation to eat chocolate has been found to be associated with these factors 
(Finlayson et al., 2007; Mela, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2007). In addition to this, 
similarity was checked against the participant’s level of openness(Costa & McCrae, 
1992; Schmutte & Ryff, 1997). Presently there is no research which demonstrates an 
association between the personality trait, openness, and chocolate consumption. 
However, cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies both encourage a willingness, 
or openness, to notice and accept thoughts and feelings. In view o f this, it was 
considered possible that the effects of the mindfulness strategies may be moderated 
by this trait, thus checking for group similarity would allow for confident 
interpretation o f how the defusion and acceptance strategies bring about their effects. 
Furthermore, participants were tested for similarity between their external, emotional 
and restrained eating behaviours (Van Strien, Frijters, Bergers & Defares, 1986).
This was because each of these behaviours has been found to significantly affect the
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consumption of high fat, energy dense sweet snack foods (de Lauzon et al., 2004; 
Elfhag, Tholin & Rasmussen, 2008; Macht, 2008; Macht & Mueller, 2007; Oliver, 
Wardle & Gibson, 2000; Wallis & Hetherington, 2004). Research has also shown 
that compared to non-dieters, dieters ignore internal cues such as hunger and satiety, 
which assist in the control o f food consumption (Herman & Polivy, 1975; Rogers & 
Hill, 1989). As a result, dieters and restrained eaters often report increased food 
consumption compared to non-dieters.
3.1.8.2.6 Why was the current study conducted during only weekdays?
The study was conducted from Monday to Friday. These five consecutive week days 
were selected to give participants a sufficient amount o f time to use their strategy 
whilst also limiting respondent burden in terms of diary completion. Also, it has 
been found that people change their eating habits on the weekend (Hart, Raynor, 
Osterholt, Jelalian & Wing, 2011). Thus, weekends days were avoided in order to 
decrease variability in the data. Furthermore, completing the study over the weekend 
may have made it more difficult for participants to keep the bag o f chocolates with 
them at all time.
3.1.8.3 Measures o f  chocolate consumption
To measure chocolate consumption the study employed two separate dependant 
measures: diary and bagged chocolates.
3.1.8.3.1 Diary
The main purpose of the diary was to obtain a measure of chocolate intake. To 
prevent recall bias, participants were asked to record each product at the time of 
eating. Dovey (2010) argued in favour o f this recording technique because it limits 
difficulties associated with impaired memory. Some methodological issues with 
using diaries however include inaccuracies or missing data with participants failing 
to recall all relevant entries. Further difficulties include, ensuring that participants 
follow the correct guidelines for completing the diary, keeping the diary in their 
possession, and controlling for the affect that keeping a diary may make participants’ 
aware o f their unhealthy eating habits or inability to complete the task (i.e. to resist 
eating chocolate). As a result, entries maybe withheld. This would be portrayed 
unfavourably by the researcher. To overcome some o f these issues, participants were
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informed of the importance of recording all entries accurately and in full. The diary 
was also designed so that it could be manipulated easily to fit into a participant’s bag 
or clothing pocket, therefore increasing the likelihood that the diary would be carried 
around with them.
The various difficulties involved in the use of a self-monitoring diary have made 
some researchers question the consistency and reliability o f the data derived from 
such methods (Todd, Hudes & Howes Calloway, 1983). However, in certain studies, 
the use of diaries is the only appropriate option. For the present study for instance, it 
would have been impractical to provide participants with weighing equipment both 
due to cost and the level of demand placed on the participant. Diaries have also been 
successfully used to measure eating behaviour (Schlundt, 1995), thus it was 
considered appropriate to also use this method in the current study (Gersovitz et al., 
1978; Tomiyama, Mann & Comer, 2009). As an example, Gersovitz et al. asked 
participants to keep a seven-day diary of the amount of food consumed. The findings 
showed good agreement between the amount of food recorded in the diary by the 
participants and the actual amount of food consumed. This study was one o f many 
which demonstrate a high degree o f validity when tested empirically. In further 
support of the use of diary measures, Schlundt (1995) argued that accurate self­
monitoring is possible if the diary was designed carefully and was appropriate to the 
research. It was believed that the diary used in the current study was designed in 
such a manner.
To summarise, the lack of control in diary studies does highlight problems related to 
accurately measuring food consumption. The use of diaries does however allow 
participants to record what foods are eaten with easy and simplicity. The lack of 
control that is exerted over participants taking place in a diary study also allows for 
more flexible generalisation of this behaviour within a real-life setting. The current 
study aimed to measure chocolate consumption and it was considered that a dairy 
measure was most appropriate to obtain this data.
3.1.8.3.2 Bagged chocolates 
As previously noted, there are many difficulties related to self-report measures when 
assessing dietary intake. In view of this, an additional measure of ‘bagged chocolate’
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was included to add weight to the current study’s findings. Using a similar measure, 
Forman et al. (2007) explored the effectiveness o f two strategies (acceptance-based 
and control-based) for coping with food cravings. Participants were given 
transparent boxes of chocolate Hershey’s Kisses for a period of 48 hours and were 
instructed to refrain from eating them. Each chocolate were given an identifying 
mark. The findings showed that a high abstinence rate o f 91% was obtained. Forman 
et al. concluded that this was expected because o f the explicit instructions given to 
participants (i.e. to try to resist chocolate) and therefore they were likely to possess a 
desire to create a positive impression on the researcher. Low consumption in similar 
tasks has also been reported by Stirling & Yeomans (2004).
To improve the bagged chocolate measure used by Forman et al. (2007) the current 
study made three minor adjustments. First, a bag was used as opposed to a box to 
allow the chocolates to be carried with ease (i.e. a bag can be more easily 
manipulated than a box). Second, Hershey’s Kisses were changed for Mars 
Celebrations. Hershey’s Kisses contain only one type o f chocolate, whereas Mars 
Celebrations consist of eight different varieties. The variation in chocolates provided 
in the current study aimed to increase chocolate temptation. It was believed that eight 
varieties as opposed to one were likely to tempt a large percentage of the sample. 
Whereas Hershey’s Kisses could not offer any temptation to those individuals who 
did not like the particular chocolates provided, in the current study, if  an individual 
did not like one of the Celebrations in the bag then they had another seven different 
chocolate types to be tempted by. Third, although participants were given 12 
chocolates, they were told that the bag contained a total o f 14 chocolates. The 
purpose of this was to make it easier for participants to eat some o f the bagged 
chocolates because they may think that the researcher had counted the chocolates 
incorrectly. This also aimed to reduce floor effects. Despite these modifications, 
similar to Forman et al. the chocolates were surreptitiously marked to ensure that 
substitutions can be identified, and presented in a transparent container.
3.1.9 Additional hypothesised mediator measures (Aim 5)
In addition to the main mediator measures (SRHI questionnaire and hand-grip task) 
secondary mediator measures were taken with the aim o f further identifying how the
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cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies change the self-control related health 
behaviour, resisting chocolate. Four questionnaires were employed at baseline and 
follow-up to measure three hypothesised mediators. These included general trait 
mindfulness measures (Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, FFMQ, Baer et al., 
2006; Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale, PHLMS, Cardaciotto et al., 2008), a measure 
of cognitive defusion (Experiences Questionnaire, EQ, Fresco et al., 2007) and a 
measure of acceptance (Food Acceptance and Action Questionnaire, FAAQ, 
Juarascio et al., 2011). Given that very limited research has been conducted on 
exploring the individual effects of cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies, no 
specifically designed questionnaires to measure mindfulness-based defusion and 
acceptance were available. The measures by Fresco and Juarascio et al. were 
therefore considered the most suitable for use in the current experiment.
3.1.10 Taste-task (Aim 6j
The current study also tested for behavioural rebound by measuring the amount of 
chocolate consumed by the participant in the laboratory following the five-day 
period of abstinence. Behavioural rebound refers to a tendency to engage in higher 
levels of a behaviour following a period of abstinence. Binge eating, for example, 
has been shown to follow periods of dieting (Polivy & Herman, 1985). This is 
important since any dieting or healthy eating strategy that results in behavioural 
rebound is unlikely to be associated with long term success. The last aim o f the 
current study was therefore to support an existing study by Hooper et al. (2012). This 
study employed a brief taste test at the end of a period o f abstinence to measure any 
behavioural rebound effect in terms of chocolate eating. A bowl o f 40 ‘Minstrel’ 
chocolates were placed on the desk in front o f the participant and the number 
remaining was counted once the participant had completed the experiment. The 
results showed no evidence of behavioural rebound effects amongst the mindfulness 
group at the end of the abstinence period. In view o f these findings, it was predicted 
that there would be an abstinence of rebound effects as demonstrated by the 
cognitive defusion and acceptance groups consuming the least number of chocolates 
at the taste test compared to the control group. This finding was important in order 
for the cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies to have applied utility.
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3.1.11 Aims and hypotheses
Existing research suggests that mindfulness strategies may be helpful for self-control 
related health behaviours, such as resisting tempting foods (Brown et al., 2008; 
Gifford et al., 2004). It is however less clear which strategies are effective, or how 
they bring about these effects. The current study examined six different aims. Aim 1 
and 3 explored whether the cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies were 
effective in helping individuals to reduce their chocolate consumption. Aim 2 and 4 
explored how the defusion and acceptance strategies bring about their effects. The 
potential mediators, automaticity and self-control were explored. Aim 5 further 
investigated whether the effects of the cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies 
were mediated by self-reported mindfulness, defusion and acceptance. Aim 6 , via a 
post-study taste-task, aimed to identify any behavioural re-bound effects evident in 
the defusion and acceptance groups.
Despite the study being mainly exploratory in nature, the following hypotheses were 
made:
• If cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies are effective at helping 
individuals resist chocolate, lower levels of chocolate consumption were 
expected amongst these two groups, relative to a relaxation control group, 
over the five-day study period.
• If cognitive defusion brings about these effects by reducing the extent to 
which chocolate is consumed automatically, reductions in automaticity (as 
assessed by the SRHI) were expected amongst the cognitive defusion group 
relative to the control group, together with positive correlations between 
levels of automaticity reported at follow-up and the amount o f chocolate 
consumed.
• If acceptance brings about its effects by increasing the availability of self- 
control resources (as assessed by the hand-grip task), increases in self-control 
ability amongst the acceptance group were expected relative to the control 
group and negative correlations between self-control ability at follow-up and 
amount of chocolate consumed.
130
• If the cognitive defusion and acceptance manipulations result in general 
increases in mindfulness, significantly greater increases in mindfulness (as 
assessed by the FFMQ PHLMS, EQ and FAAQ) were expected between 
baseline and follow-up in these groups compared to the control group.
• An absence of behavioural rebound effect was expected in the acceptance 
and cognitive defusion groups.
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3.2 Method
3.2.1 Participants
Participants (N = 135) were students at Swansea University (96 females, 39 males). 
They had a mean age of 20.45 years (SD = 2.39) and were able to speak and read 
English fluently. Participants were recruited by the display o f posters around the 
University campus (see appendix G). An email containing the poster’s content was 
also sent to undergraduate and postgraduate students currently registered at the 
University. All participants met the inclusion criteria which were; to enjoy eating 
chocolate, have a desire to reduce the amount of chocolate currently consumed, over 
18 years of age, not pregnant, no current or previous history of suffering from an 
eating disorder, and the ability to eat chocolate due to good health (i.e. does not 
suffer from high cholesterol, diabetes etc). These criteria were assessed by means of 
a simple screening questionnaire with yes-no response options for each criterion (see 
appendix H). As a token of appreciation, participants received a small payment of 
£ 1 0  on receipt of the first and second sets of questionnaires, and after attendance of 
both appointment sessions. The study received ethical approval from Swansea 
University’s Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee. All participants 
completed the study in full.
3.2.2 Design and randomisation
The study employed a mixed-subjects design with three conditions (cognitive 
defusion, acceptance and relaxation-control). Laboratory measures were taken at 
baseline and follow-up (after five days). Participants were alternatively allocated to 
either an intervention or a control condition using a single blind randomisation 
protocol. The time of day (morning or afternoon) each participant was able to attend 
session one was also taken into account during the randomisation process. This was 
to ensure that each group consisted o f a similar number of morning and afternoon 
appointments (each group had 14 participants who attended morning appointments 
and 31 participants who attended afternoon appointments). Only eligible participants 
were entered into the randomisation process. It was acknowledged that full 
attendance of a two part study can be difficult to achieve. A number of features were 
therefore incorporated into the design o f the study to both maximise attendance and
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minimise the impact of nonattendance (i.e. incomplete data). First, the study was run 
over a five day period with participants able to choose their appointment times. Same 
time appointments at both sessions were not compulsory. Participants were also able 
to vary the time they attended session two if other commitments intervened (e.g. 
change in academic timetable). Sessions were available on both days (Mondays and 
Fridays) from 8 am until 6 pm. Second, participants were able to choose the week 
they wanted to take part (the study was run for a total o f eight weeks). Third, via 
email, participants were reminded on several occasions prior to, and during, the 
study o f their appointment dates and times.
3.2.3 Materials and apparatus
3.2.3.1 Questionnaires completed prior to attending session one (baseline) only.
3.2.3.1.1 Demographic questionnaire
Measures of age, gender, level of study (i.e. undergraduate or postgraduate) and 
weight-loss behaviour (i.e. if  currently dieting to lose weight) were completed (see 
appendix I).
3.2.3.1.2 Chocolate questionnaire
Using Likert scales, participants were asked to provide ratings of; how much 
chocolate is liked (1=1 hate it, 7 = I love it), how often chocolate is eaten (1 = 
never, 7 = everyday) and the level of desire to reduce the amount of chocolate 
consumed (1 = not very much, 5 = very much) (see appendix J).
3.2.3.1.3 Trait self-description inventory
This Likert type short version of the Trait Self-Description Inventory (TSDI; Collis 
& Elshaw, 1998; Roberts, Zeidner & Matthews, 2001) was used to measure one of 
the Big Five personality dimensions; openness (Tupes & Christal, 1961). TSDI 
(short version) consists o f 50 items in two sections, the first containing 28 trait 
descriptive adjectives such as ‘contemplative’ to which the participant responds 
using a seven-point scale where 1 represents “extremely not characteristic of me” 
and 7 represents “extremely characteristic of me” compared with other individuals. 
The second section contains 22 statements (e.g. ‘I have a lot of intellectual 
curiosity’) and the participant responds using a nine-point scale where 1 represents
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“very strongly disagree" and 9 represents “very strongly agree”. Only questions 
relating to openness were given to the participants to complete (nine questions in 
total; five questions from section one, and four questions from section two). To 
enable aggregation of the items with different response scales the appropriate trait 
and behavioural responses were summed to generate the required composite, 
openness. This questionnaire wras shown to have high internal reliability, with a 
Cronbach alpha score of .84.
3.2.3.1.4 Dutch eating behaviour questionnaire 
The DEBQ (Van Strien, 2002) is designed to assess emotional eating (eating in 
response to emotional states), external eating (eating in response to food-related 
cues) and restrained eating (attempts to limit food intake). It contains 33 statements 
each rated by participants as never/rarely/sometimes/often/very often. The DEBQ is 
a standardised questionnaire that was shown to have good reliability (Cronbach 
alpha .93).
3.2.3.2 Questionnaires completed prior to attending both sessions one (baseline) and 
two (follow-up).
3.2.3.2.1 Five facet mindfulness questionnaire
Participants completed selected sections of the 39-item version of the Five Facet 
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006). These measured two of the 
five facets assessing a general tendency to be mindful in daily life: non-judging of 
inner experience, and non-reactivity to inner experience. Items were rated on a five- 
point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (never or very rarely true) to 5 (very often or 
always true). The FFMQ had acceptable internal reliability at baseline (Cronbach 
alpha .73) and follow-up (Cronbach alpha .74).
3.2.3.2.2 Philadelphia mindfulness scale
The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS; Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra 
& Farrow, 2008) is a self-report measure assessing level o f mindfulness as defined 
by its two key constituents, present-moment awareness and non-judgmental 
acceptance. Items were rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (never) to 4 
(very often) according to the frequency that the item was experienced within the past
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week. Cronbach alpha scores of the measure at baseline and at follow-up were both 
.85, indicating moderate to high internal reliability o f this questionnaire.
3.2.3.2.3 Experiences questionnaire
To assess decentering (i.e. defusion), the 20-item experiences questionnaire (EQ; 
Fresco et al., 2007) was used. Decentering is defined by Fresco et al. (2007) as the 
ability to regard thoughts and feelings as temporary and transit. The EQ focuses on 
three facets of decentering: the ability to view one’s self as separate from one’s 
thoughts, the ability to non-judgementally observe one’s negative experiences 
without habitually reacting, and the capacity for self-compassion. Items are rated on 
a five-point Likert scale (1 = never, 5 = all the time). Items include, T can observe 
unpleasant feelings without being drawn to them’ and ‘I can slow my thinking at 
times of stress.’ Coefficient alphas of the measure at baseline and at follow-up were 
.79 and .81 respectively, which indicated moderate to high internal reliabilities of 
this questionnaire.
3.2.3.2.4 Self-report habits index
This 12-item scale breaks down the habit construct into a number of features (i.e. 
lack of awareness, automaticity) (Verplanken, 2005). This measure was used 
because it has the ability to monitor habit strength independently of actual 
behavioural frequency and has the benefit of being previously used to investigate a 
variety of health behaviours. The SRHI uses a five-point response scale ranging from 
1 = disagree to 5 = agree, thus items were scored such that higher scores indicated 
greater habit. The items of each respective SRHI were averaged to obtain an overall 
score. Coefficient alphas of the measure at baseline and at follow-up were .89 and 
.92 respectively, which indicated high internal reliabilities of this 12-item 
questionnaire. A correlation of .255 (p = 0.003) between baseline and follow-up 
measures also indicated high test-retest reliability .255 (p = 0.003).
3.2.3.2.5 Food acceptance and action questionnaire
The Food Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (Juarascio et al., 2011) measures the 
degree to which a person avoids food-related internal experiences (i.e. cravings). The 
FAAQ is a 10-item questionnaire rated on a seven-point Likert scale. Higher scores 
indicate greater acceptance of motivations (e.g. cravings) to eat (Juarascio et al.,
135
2011). This questionnaire showed low to moderate internal consistency at baseline 
(Cronbach alpha score .43) and follow-up (Cronbach alpha score .64).
3.2.3.3 Questionnaires completed at session two (follow-up) only.
3.2.3.3.1 Strategy adherence and acceptability
To measure strategy adherence and acceptability (see appendix K), participants were 
asked post-intervention to answer the following three questions: “How many times 
did you use the strategy? (cognitive defusion, acceptance, or control) ( 1  = not at all,
4 = always), “How helpful did you find the strategy in helping you to cope with your 
chocolate cravings?” (1 = not at all helpful, 5 = extremely helpful), and “How 
effective did you think the strategy was in helping you to resist eating chocolate?” ( 1  
= not very effective, 5 = extremely effective). Participants were also asked to rate, 
using the same five-point Likert scale (1 = not very effective, 5 = extremely 
effective), how effective they predicted the strategy to be immediately after being 
taught the strategy five days previously. Finally, participants were asked if  they had 
applied the strategy to help them deal with any other situations (e.g. everyday life 
situations, such as work or family) in addition to using it to help them resist eating 
chocolate.
3.2.3.3.2 Cravings
An average rating of distress caused by chocolate cravings was measured using a 
five-point Likert scale (1= not at all distressing, 5 = extremely distressing) (see 
appendix L).
3.2.3.3.3 Suspicion probe
To explore participants’ suspicion about the main aims of the study, a brief 
questionnaire was completed (see appendix M). Questions consisted of “Do you 
think you were in an intervention or control group?”, “Did you notice anything 
unusual about the chocolate in the bag?”, “How many chocolates were in the bag?” 
and “ Other than the amount of chocolate consumed, do you have any other ideas 
about what is being investigated in this study?”.
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3.23.4 Measures o f  chocolate consumption
3.2.3.4.1 Bag o f chocolates 
Participants were given a transparent bag of chocolates (Mars Celebrations) at the 
end of session one (baseline) to keep in their possession at all times over the five 
days. The bag contained 14 chocolates in total (three mars, three snickers, two 
bounty, one galaxy, one galaxy caramel, two milkyway, one twix, and one 
malterser). Mars Celebrations were chosen because they offered a variety of 
chocolates, thus were likely to appeal to a range of taste preferences. The bag was 
collected at session two (follow-up) and the chocolates individually counted to 
provide a measure of chocolate consumption. Chocolates returned without an 
identifying mark (one comer removed) were assumed to have been substituted for an 
eaten chocolate and were not counted.
3.23.4.2 Chocolate diary 
As a measure o f ‘other’ chocolates and chocolate-related products consumed (i.e. not 
those from the bag), participants were provided with a chocolate diary (see appendix 
N). Participants were asked to record in the diary the type of chocolate/chocolate- 
related product eaten, the product brand, the size (in grams) and the overall portion 
(i.e. half, quarter) consumed. If participants were unaware of the size o f the product 
they were advised to describe the size in as much detail as possible (e.g. equivalent 
in size to another product, or was a snack size bar etc). Where information was not 
available food weights were obtained from food labels or other manufacturer’s data. 
Total consumption was calculated by summing the number of chocolate products, in 
grams, eaten over the five-day period. Each chocolate or chocolate-related product 
(taking into account the actual portion size consumed) was weighed as a whole food 
item, despite some items containing less than 1 0 0 % chocolate (e.g. a chocolate chip 
cookie).
3.2.3.43 Taste-task
A brief taste-task was employed at the end of the abstinence period (i.e. after the 
five-day period) to measure any behavioural rebound effects in terms of chocolate 
eating once chocolate consumption was again permitted. This was the final task 
completed by participants at session two. Twenty-five chocolates (Cadbury Twirl 
Bites) were placed in a bowl on the table in front of the participant. Participants were
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made aware that they had successfully completed the experiment and therefore while 
the researcher went to collect their payment they were free to eat as many chocolates 
as they wished. Participants were left alone for three minutes. The chocolates were 
counted once the participant had received payment and been debriefed.
3.2.3.5 Measure o f  self-control ability
3.2.3.5.1 Hand-grip task
In order to measure self-control, a standard commercially available hand-grip 
exerciser was used. The hand-grip consisted of two foam coated handles connected 
by a metal spring. Squeezing the handles together compressed the spring.
Participants were asked to squeeze the hand-grip exerciser for as long as they were 
able to. In order to furnish a measure of when the person stopped, the experimenter 
inserted a single piece of A5 paper between the two handles when the subject 
squeezed them together, and the handles held it in place. When the participant began 
to relax his/her grip, the paper would fall. The experimenter started a stopwatch to 
time the performance as soon as the paper was placed between the handles. When 
the paper fell, this indicated to the experimenter that the participants had released 
their grip and the time was stopped. Next, participants were presented with a bowl 
containing Cadbury milk chocolate buttons. Participants were asked to keep looking 
at these chocolates (i.e. give them their full attention) for a total o f three minutes, but 
were not permitted to eat any. Once this time was over, the hand-grip task was 
repeated. To prevent participants from aiming towards a specific goal, participants 
were not given feedback (during or after the task) about their performance, nor were 
they allowed to talk or look at the stopwatch during the performance.
3.2.3.6 Intervention
The intervention drew on two mindfulness concepts (cognitive defusion and 
acceptance) previously employed in ACT interventions (Hayes & Smith, 2005;
Hayes et al., 1999). These concepts were adapted to the context of resisting 
temptation, specifically, how to cope with chocolate cravings. Each mindfulness 
strategy created one intervention group. The teaching of each strategy included 
reading through a written booklet which explained the concept in full using relevant 
information, metaphors and practice exercises (see appendices O and P to view the 
material used to teach the two mindfulness strategies). The practice exercises lasted
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for five minutes. Participants in the cognitive defusion group were taught that 
resisting the temptation to eat chocolate may be made easier if thoughts which may 
sabotage intentions were perceived as ‘just thoughts’. Participants in the acceptance 
group were taught that resisting the temptation to eat chocolate maybe made easier if 
any attempt made to control (i.e. suppress, ignore, battle against) uncomfortable 
feelings and thoughts linked to the craving was avoided. Thus, instead of attempting 
to control cravings, participants were asked to simply acknowledge their internal 
experiences (i.e. thoughts and feelings) and to accept them as they are without trying 
to change them in any way. Participants were told that acceptance aids in the ability 
to experience the cravings without taking the usual actions (e.g. eating the desired 
food) that may reduce the unpleasant experience of wanting something forbidden. 
Questions were encouraged throughout session one to ensure that the strategies were 
understood. As an additional check of their level of understanding, participants were 
also asked to complete a short multiple choice questionnaire. This questionnaire 
required them to choose the correct response option (choice o f four options) related 
to the question, “When you have a craving to eat chocolate, according to the 
technique we taught you, should you...” All participants reported a good 
understanding of the concept. At the end of the session, participants were given the 
written teaching aids to take away with them and told that they should refer back to 
the information if they need to over the study period.
3.2.3.7 Control
Participants in the control group were taught a simple muscle relaxation. The muscle 
relaxation strategy involved physically tensing and then physically relaxing one of 
three body parts either, the hands, stomach or thighs. Participants were free to 
practice the strategy using the body part which felt most comfortable for them. The 
researcher encouraged participants to keep tensing and relaxing the muscles 
continually throughout the experienced craving either until the intensity of the 
craving significantly reduced or stopped completely. Additionally, as much as 
possible, the intervention and control teaching materials were created and presented 
using similar wording and formatting (see appendix Q). All three groups had equal 
participant to research contact time.
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3.2.4 Procedure
The study was carried out over a period of five consecutive days (Monday-Friday). 
Participants were informed that the purpose of the study was to teach them a strategy 
which may help them resist the temptation to eat chocolate (i.e. to not give into their 
cravings). Each participant was tested individually. After registering their interest to 
take part in the study, participants were required to complete a series of 
questionnaires prior to attending session one (baseline). The questionnaires were 
completed on-line via SurveyMonkey. The majority of the questionnaires required 
the participant to provide answers relating to their behaviour ‘over the last week’. As 
a result of this, the questionnaires were only sent (i.e. a link by email) to participants 
one week before their scheduled session one appointment. The questionnaires took 
between 30-45 minutes to complete.
At session one, after providing written consent (see appendix R), participants first 
completed the hand-grip task. On completion of this task, the researcher taught the 
participants their allocated strategy (cognitive defusion, acceptance, or relaxation). 
Before leaving the session, participants were given a transparent bag containing 
individually wrapped chocolates. Participants were told by the researcher that there 
were 14 chocolates in the bag, when actually the bag contained only 1 2  chocolates. 
Each chocolate had been surreptitiously marked (one comer removed) so as to detect 
substitutions of eaten chocolates. Participants were instructed to keep the chocolates 
with them (i.e. in their possession) at virtually all times for the next five-days. 
Participants were told to “try their best” not to eat the chocolates in the bag or any 
other chocolate or chocolate-related product during the study period. Participants 
were also told that resisting chocolate is difficult and that they may find that they 
cannot always manage this. If so, participants were told to simply make of note of 
what they had eaten in the chocolate diary provided.
The participants were left to practice their strategy over the study period without 
intervention from the researcher. Only on day four (Thursday) did the researcher 
contact the participants by email in order to provide them with the new link to access 
the second set of questionnaires via SurveyMonkey. The participants were asked to 
complete these questionnaires before they attended their session two appointment the 
following day. At session two, the participants once again completed the hand-grip
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task before answering questions related to how much chocolate was consumed, 
adherence to and rated effectiveness o f  the strategy. Participants also completed a 
suspicion probe questionnaire. Before the end o f the session, the researcher counted 
the number o f chocolates returned in the bag, in addition to going through the 
information provided in the diary with the participants to ensure that all information 
was recorded in full and without error. Participants were also asked to rate using a 
five-point Likert scale (1 = not at all sure, 5 = very sure) how sure they were that 
they had not missed out any details from the diary. Next, the participants were told 
that the study had now been successfully completed. As a result o f  this, chocolate 
consumption was once again permitted. Unbeknown to the participants, this 
indicated the start o f the taste-task. On completion o f this task, the number o f 
chocolates consumed were counted and recorded. Lastly, the participants received 
payment, thanked for taking part and debriefed fully (see appendix S). A brief 
outline of the procedure is shown in Figure 3.1.
Cognitive defusion
(n = 45)
Relaxation
(n = 45)
Baseline Measures (n = 135):
Handgrip task - x2 handgrips, 3 m inute self-control period
Questionnaires completed prior to Follow-up (n = 135):
FFM Q, PHLM Q, EQ, SRHI, and FAAQ.
Follow-up Measures (n = 135):
Handgrip task -  x2 handgrips, 3 m inute self-control period 
M easure o f  chocolate consum ption, strategy adherence and acceptability, cravings and 
suspicion probe. Taste-task -  5 m inutes
Questionnaires completed prior to Baseline (n = 135):
Screening, dem ographics, m indfulness (FFM Q & PH LM S), experiences (EQ), habits 
(SRHI), food acceptance and action (FAAQ), personality  (TSDI) and restrained eating
(DEBQ).
Figure 3.1 A brief outline o f the study procedure.
141
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Data screening
3.3.1.1 Non-adherence to using the taught strategy
In response to the chocolate craving measure, two participants from the relaxation 
group reported having no chocolate cravings during the previous five-days. Since 
participants were only asked to use their strategy when they were tempted to eat 
chocolate, these two participants would not have had an opportunity to employ their 
given strategy and were excluded from subsequent analyses, yielding an n o f 135 
(cognitive defusion, n = 45, acceptance, n = 45, control, n = 45).
3.3.1.2 Suspicion probe
An additional participant in the acceptance group had chocolates missing from the 
bag but stated that a housemate must have eaten them. Data for this participant were 
excluded from the analysis o f bagged chocolate. This resulted in 135 participants for 
the chocolate diary measure (n = 45 in all groups) and 134 participants for the 
bagged chocolate measure (n = 45 in the defusion and control groups, n = 44 in the 
acceptance group).
3.3.1.3 Removal o f outliers
Outliers were detected by identifying scores above or below 3.5 standard deviations 
(SDs) from the mean. None of the sample reported chocolate intake (as measured by 
the chocolate diary) +/- 3.5 SDs from the mean. No outliers were also found for any 
questionnaire measure at either baseline or follow-up using this identification 
method.
3.3.1.4 Summaiy
From the different data screening processes carried out, two participants (both from 
the relaxation group) were removed from the dataset. This reduced the original 
sample size n = 137 to n = 135. One participant from the acceptance group was also 
removed from analyses o f the bagged chocolates (N = 134).
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3.3.2 Group demographics
3.3.2.1 Check for group similarity
To ensure that the groups were sufficiently similar on relevant criteria, various 
statistical checks were carried out. Similarity between groups would allow for 
confident interpretation that any significant effect found was likely to be caused by 
the independent variable under investigation. Differences between groups may result 
in any significant or non-significant effects being influenced by variations between 
the groups. To assess this, analysis was first conducted to identify any group 
differences. Secondly, on the basis of group differences being detected, further 
analysis was carried out to identify if these variable differences were significantly 
correlated with the main dependant variable, chocolate consumption. Means and 
standard deviations for all variables used to check for group similarity are included 
in Table 3.1. The analysis was compared by looking at the mindfulness groups 
individually.
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Table 3.1 shows that there were no significant differences in baseline characteristics 
across the three groups, with the exception of emotional eating (as measured by the 
DEBQ) which was significantly higher in the defusion compared to the control 
group. To identify whether this variable was likely to have a confounding effect on 
the results, DEBQ-emotional eating was correlated with both measures o f chocolate 
consumption across the whole sample. Across all groups, levels of emotional eating 
showed no significant association with either of the two chocolate measures 
(chocolates from the bag [n = 134], r = 0.136, other chocolate (diary) [n = 135], r = - 
0.023). It was therefore concluded that this group difference would be unlikely to act 
as a covariate.
3.S.2.2 Task adherence
3.3.2.2.1 Abstinence from chocolate
A greater number of participants in the defusion group (73%) successfully remained 
abstinent from chocolate during the five-day period according to the bagged 
chocolate and diary measure compared to the acceptance (55%) and relaxation- 
control (55%) groups. A chi-square test however revealed that the percentage of 
participants who remained abstinent did not significantly differ between the 
defusion, acceptance and relaxation-control groups, % (2, A = 1 3 5 ) = 3.113,p = 
0 .211 .
3.3.2.2.2 Possession o f  bagged chocolate
Participants followed instructions around keeping the chocolates with them at 
‘virtually all times’.
Defusion Acceptance Relaxation
(n=45) (n=45) (n=45)
Virtually all times (% yes) 93.0 91.0 98.0
Table 3.2 Reported percentage of time the bagged chocolates were kept in the 
participants’ possession for the mindfulness and non-mindfulness control groups.
A chi-square test revealed that the percentage of participants who adhered to the 
instruction of keeping the bagged chocolates in their possession did not significantly
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differ between the defusion, acceptance and relaxation-control groups, % (2,N  =
135) = 1.860, p = 0.395. For the participants who did not keep the chocolates with 
them at virtually all times, reasons such as, generally forgot, unable to fit into 
handbag and inappropriate place to take the bag of chocolates (e.g. gym) were given. 
The time the chocolates were not in the participant’s possession ranged between 1-8 
hours.
33 .2 .23  Accuracy o f  recorded diary entries 
Participants were asked to report how sure they were that they had accurately and 
fully recorded all chocolate products consumed during the five-day period in the 
diary provided. All participants in all three groups reported being ‘very sure’ that 
they had completed the diary in full and there were no unrecorded entries of 
chocolate consumption.
3 3 3  Effects of mindfulness (cognitive defusion and acceptance) on chocolate 
consumption (Aims 1 & 3)
The following analyses relate to aims 1 and 3 of the current study. These aims 
explored whether the cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies were effective at 
reducing chocolate consumption (i.e. do they work?).
The effects of the mindfulness strategies (cognitive defusion and acceptance) on 
chocolate consumption relative to the control strategy (relaxation) for both measures 
(diary and bagged chocolates) were compared across the three groups. The diary 
measured chocolate consumption in grams whereas the bagged chocolates measured 
chocolate consumption in terms of the overall number o f chocolates eaten. For the 
diary measure, if  participants failed to provide either the exact product weight, or 
enough detail for the researcher to calculate the number o f grams consumed 
accurately, the required information was obtained from food labels or manufacturer’s 
websites.
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3.3.3.1 Diaiy
Table 3.3 compares chocolate consumption for groups practicing different 
mindfulness (cognitive defusion, acceptance) and non-mindfulness (relaxation) 
strategies. Chocolate consumption as recorded by the diary provides a measure of all 
‘other’ chocolates and chocolate-related products (i.e. non-bagged chocolates).
Other chocolates (grams)
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Defusion 13.22 30.80 0 . 0 0 136.25
Acceptance 48.22 108.23 0 . 0 0 567.70
Relaxation 37.47 6 8 . 1 0 0 . 0 0 348.00
Table 3.3 Comparison of mean chocolate consumption (SDs, minimum and 
maximum scores) across the three groups (mindfulness [cognitive defusion, n = 45 
and acceptance, n = 45] and controls [relaxation, n = 45]) for the diary measure.
A series of two Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out to compare the amount of 
other chocolate consumed in the mindfulness (cognitive defusion and acceptance) 
and non-mindfulness (control-relaxation) groups. Non-parametric tests were used 
due to the data showing skewed distributions. These showed a borderline 
significance for chocolate recorded in the diary (z = -1.933, p = 0.053, cohen’s d = - 
0.46) with participants in the defusion group consuming less than those in the control 
group. There was no significant difference found between the acceptance group and 
the relaxation-control group for the diary measure of chocolate consumption (z = - 
0.027, p = 0.979, cohen’s d=  0.12).
3.3.3.2 Bagged chocolates
Table 3.4 compares the number of chocolates consumed from the bag for the groups 
practicing different mindfulness (cognitive defusion, acceptance) and non- 
mindfulness (relaxation) strategies.
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Number of bagged chocolates consumed
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Defusion (n = 45) 0 . 0 2 0.15 0 . 0 0 1 . 0 0
Acceptance (n = 44) 0.27 0.95 0 . 0 0 5.00
Relaxation (n = 45) 0.69 2.08 0 . 0 0 1 0 . 0 0
Table 3.4 Comparison of mean chocolate consumption (SDs, minimum and 
maximum scores) across the three groups (mindfulness [cognitive defusion and 
acceptance] and controls [relaxation]) for the bagged chocolate measure.
A series of two Mann-Whitney U tests also showed a significant difference between 
the cognitive defusion group and the control group for the number of chocolates 
eaten from the bag (z = -1.998, p = 0.046, cohen’s d = -0.45). There was no 
significant difference found between the acceptance group and the control group for 
this measure of chocolate consumption (chocolates from the bag, z = -0.711, p = 
0.477, cohen’s d=  -0.26).
3.3.3.3 Total amount o f  chocolate consumed (bagged and non-bagged chocolate 
combined)
To measure the total amount o f chocolate consumed (in grams) across the three 
groups, both chocolate consumption measures were combined. First the total number 
o f bagged chocolate eaten was re-coded from the total number eaten to the total 
amount of chocolates eaten in grams at the individual level. Chocolates from the bag 
each weighted an average of 9.5 grams.
Total grams of chocolate consumed
Defusion (n = 45) 13.43 (31.28)
Acceptance (n = 45) 51.78 (111.43)
Relaxation (n = 45) 44.02 (75.56)
Table 3.5 Comparison of the mean (and SD) total chocolate consumption (‘other’ 
chocolate and bagged chocolate) in grams across the three groups (mindfulness 
[cognitive defusion, acceptance] and non-mindfulness [relaxation]).
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Mann-Whitney U tests showed no significant differences between the cognitive 
defusion and control group (z = -0.827, p = 0.408, cohen’s d  = -0.53) or between the 
acceptance and control group (z = -0.803, p = 0.422, cohen’s d = 0.08) for the total 
number of chocolates consumed (in grams) across both consumption measures.
3.3.4 Associations between predicted mediators and chocolate consumption (Aims 
2 & 4)
The following analyses relate to aims 2 and 4 of the current study. These aims 
explored how the cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies brought about their 
effects. Two potential mediators were explored; automaticity and self-control.
3.3.4.1 Predicted mediator 1: Automaticity
The section explored the pre-stated hypothesis that cognitive defusion works by 
disrupting automatic links between chocolate-related thoughts and chocolate 
consumption. If true, it was expected that those in the defusion group would show 
greater reductions in automaticity (as measured by the SRHI questionnaire) relative 
to the relaxation control group.
First automaticity scores between the cognitive defusion and control groups were 
compared at baseline and follow-up. Changes in automaticity scores were calculated 
by subtracting baseline scores from follow-up scores. Secondly, automaticity scores 
at baseline were correlated (across the mindfulness and non-mindfulness samples) 
with the measures of chocolate consumption (chocolates from the bag and other 
chocolate) in order to identify any association between these variables.
Baseline (SI) Follow-up (S2) Difference (S1-S2)
Defusion Relaxation Defusion Relaxation Defusion Relaxation
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
3.45 3.39 2.14 2.61 1.31 0.78
(0.84) (0.78) (0.99) (1 .0 1 ) (1.14) (1 .0 2 )
Table 3.6 Mean and standard deviations. Group differences (cognitive defusion, 
n=45, control, n=45) between automaticity scores at baseline and follow-up.
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A 3x2 mixed ANOVA with group (cognitive defusion, control) and time (baseline, 
follow-up) as the independent variables and automaticity as the dependent variable 
were conducted. The findings showed a significant main effect of time on 
automaticity (SRHI) scores, F (1, 132) = 131.592, p = 0.001, r\p2= 0.50, with means 
indicating an overall reduction in automaticity between baseline and follow-up (M = 
3.41, SD = 0.84 and M = 2.33, SD = 0.98 respectively). No significant effects of 
group, or significant time-group interactions were however evident (SRHI; group, F 
(2, 132) = 1.145, p = 0.321, r | p2 = 0.02, time-group, F (2, 132) = 2.803, p = 0.064, r | p2 
= 0.04). A trend was though evident towards a significant interaction for the SRHI. 
Follow-up t-tests using change scores were therefore carried out. The findings 
showed significantly greater reductions in automaticity in the defusion group (M = - 
1.31, SD = 1.14) compared to the control group (M = -0.78, SD = 1.02), t (8 8 ) =
2.33, p = 0.022. Across the whole sample, SRHI score at follow-up showed 
significant (Spearmans) correlations with both diary chocolate consumption (r = .21, 
p = <.05) and chocolates from the bag (r = .20, p = <.05) indicating that lower levels 
of automaticity were associated with less chocolate consumption . 18
To explore the association between chocolate consumption (number o f chocolates 
eaten from the bag and other chocolates consumed) and automaticity scores at 
baseline, a Spearmans r correlation test were performed. A non-parametric test was 
used due to scatter plots showing outliers causing the data to be skewed.
Mediators (baseline) Bagged chocolates (N=134) Other chocolates (N=135)
SRHI 0.092 0 . 1 0 2
Table 3.7 Spearmans r correlation showing the relationship between measures o f 
chocolate consumption and baseline self-report scores of habitual behaviour (SRHI).
Table 3.7 shows that there were no significant correlations between automaticity and 
chocolate consumption.
18 Full mediation analysis was not conducted because the group by time effect on automaticity only 
showed a ‘trend’ towards significance. As a result of this, the initial criteria were not meant, 
rendering subsequent analyses redundant. It was therefore concluded that true mediation could not be 
claimed.
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3.3.4.2 Predicted mediator 2: Self-control
The section explored the pre-stated hypothesis that acceptance works by freeing up 
self-control resources that would otherwise have been used for regulating chocolate 
cravings. If true, it was expected that those in the acceptance group would show 
increased self-control ability (as measured by the hand-grip task) relative to the 
relaxation control group.
3.3.4.2.1 Calculating self-control by comparing the overall hand-grip score at 
session one with the overall hand-grip score at session two.
It was predicted that grip time for time 2 (T2) at baseline would be shorter compared 
to time 1 (Tl) in the same session due to ego depletion. Overall grip time at follow- 
up was however predicted to be longer for each group compared to overall grip time 
at baseline due to practice effects. Acceptance was hypothesised to positively 
influence self-control. It was therefore predicted that the acceptance group would be 
subject to less ego depletion (i.e. there would be less o f a time difference between 
hand-grip Tl and hand-grip T2 at follow-up) compared to the control group. This 
prediction was based on the assumption that practicing the acceptance strategy 
would be more beneficial to improving self-control given that participants in this 
group would have exercised ‘sitting with difficult situations’ for five-days 
previously. Self-control, as measured by hand-grip performance in the current study, 
may become increasingly both mentally and physically ‘difficult’ as the grip time 
increased and therefore become a situation which is difficult or uncomfortable to 
remain in.
To investigate the above hypothesis, the mindfulness group (acceptance) were 
compared individually with the control group. A measure of self-control was 
achieved by subtracting the second hand-grip (T2) score from the first hand-grip 
(Tl) score at session one (SI) and session two (S2), leaving a single hand-grip 
measure for both baseline and follow-up. A positive overall score would suggest that 
the hand-grip was held for a shorter amount of time at T2 compared to T l of the 
same session. A negative overall score would suggest that the hand-grip was held for 
a longer amount of time at T2 compared to Tl of the same session.
151
Hand-grip (SI) Hand-grip (S2) Difference S2-S1
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Acceptance (n=45) 16.38 58.02 10.97 33.71 5.41 39.30
Control (n=45) 6.64 37.17 7.33 2 2 . 2 1 -0 . 6 8 35.15
Table 3.8 Comparison of mean hand-grip times (and SDs) across the two groups 
(mindfulness [acceptance] and control [relaxation]) at baseline and follow-up.
A 3x2 mixed ANOVA with group (acceptance and control) and time (baseline, 
follow-up) as the independent variables and self-control as the dependent variable 
was conducted. The results showed no significant main effect of time, F (1, 132) = 
0.480, p = 0.490, riP2 = 0.004, or group, F (1, 132) = 0.609, p = 0.545, r|p2= 0.009. 
Furthermore, no significant interaction was found between group and time, F (2,
132) = 2.129, p = 0.123, r | p2 = 0.031. These results suggest that, overall, participants 
in both the mindfulness and the control groups scored similarly on the hand-grip 
task. The mean findings are however beginning to show a trend in support o f the pre­
stated hypothesis for the acceptance group, despite the differences failing to reach 
statistical significance.
3.3.4.2.2 Comparing baseline self-control hand-grip scores with chocolate 
consumption measures.
This section correlates (across the whole sample) the predicted mediator, self-control 
scores and chocolate consumption in order to identify any association between these 
variables. Significant negative correlations were expected if  self-control was 
associated with chocolate consumption.
Spearmans r correlation tests showed there was no significant correlation between, 
baseline self-control hand-grip scores and either measure of chocolate consumption 
(chocolates from the bag [n=134], r = 0.000, other chocolates [n=135], r = 0.038).
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3.3.5 Additional hypothesised mediators: Self-report measures of mindfulness, 
defusion and acceptance (Aim 5)
The following analyses relate to aim 5 of the current study. This aim explored 
secondary mediators (as measured by self-report questionnaires) in order to identify 
how the cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies bring about their effects.
This section first compares the scores o f the predictor mediators between the 
cognitive defusion, acceptance and control groups at baseline and follow-up. The 
change in mediator scores was calculated by subtracting baseline scores from follow- 
up scores for each individual mediator. Secondly, the predicted mediators 
(mindfulness, defusion and acceptance and awareness scores) at baseline were 
correlated (across the mindfulness and non-mindfulness samples) with the measures 
of chocolate consumption (chocolates from the bag and other chocolate) to identify 
any association between these variables.
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A series of 3x2 mixed ANOVAs with group (cognitive defusion, acceptance and 
control) and time (baseline, follow-up) as the independent variables and mediator scores 
as the dependent variables were conducted. For the FFMQ-nonjudge variable, a 
significant effect of time was found, F (1, 132) = 9.496, p = 0.003, r\v2 = 0.67. However, 
no significant effect of group, F (1, 132) = 2.818, p = 0.063, tV  = 0.41, or time-group 
interaction, F (2, 132) = 0.211, p = 0.810, r |p2 = 0.003 was evident. For the FFMQ- 
nonreact variable, no significant effect was shown for either time, F (1, 132) = 0.973, p 
= 0.414, r)p2= 0.005, group, F (2, 132) = 0.553, p = 0.576, r|p2= 0.008, or time-group 
interaction, F (2, 132) = 2.033, p = 0.135, r|p“ = 0.03. Similarly, non-significant findings 
were found for the variable, PHLMS-awareness; time, F (1, 132) = 3.008, p = 0.085, r |p2 
= 0.02, group, F (2, 132) = 2.103, p = 0.126, rjp2 = 0.03 and time-group interaction, F (2, 
132) = 0.257, p = 0.774, r |p2 = 0.004. However, for the PHLMS-acceptance variable, a 
significant effect of time, F (1, 132) = 7.574, p = 0.007, r |p2 = 0.05, and a significant 
time-group interaction, F (2, 132) = 3.259, p = 0.042, r\p2 = 0.05 was found. No 
significant effect of group was evident, F (2, 132) = 1.439, p = 0.241, r |p2 = 0.02. A 
series of three repeated-measure t-tests showed significantly greater reduction in self- 
reported mindfulness at follow-up compared to baseline in the acceptance group, t (44)
= 3.645, p = 0.001. No significant differences in mindfulness scores were however 
found between baseline and follow-up in either the defusion group, t (44) = 0.166, p = 
0.869, or the relaxation-control group, t (44) = 1.842, p = 0.072.
Significant effects of time were also found for the measures of defusion (experiences 
questionnaire), F (1, 132) = 23.089, p = 0.001, rip2= 0.15, food acceptance and 
awareness, FAAQ-sum, F (1, 132) = 35.746, p = 0.001, r|p2= 0.21, and FAAQ- 
willingness, F (1, 132) = 64.616, p = 0.001, r |p2 = 0.33. No significant effects of group, 
or significant time-group interactions were found for any of these measures 
(experiences; group, F (2, 132) = 1.721, p = 0.183, r|p2= 0.25, time-group, F (2, 132) =- 
0.771, p = 0.465, r|p2= 0.01, FAAQ-sum; group, F (2, 132) = 0.638, riP2= 0.01, p = 
0.530, time-group, F (2, 132) = 1.145, p = 0.321, r|p2= 0.02, FAAQ-willingness; group, 
F (2, 132) = 0.245, p = 0.785, y \ 2= 0.004, time-group, F (2, 132) = 0.962, p = 0.385, rjp2
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= 0.01). Furthermore, no significant effect of either time, F (1, 132) = 0.039, p = 0.843, 
r )p2 = 0.00, or group, F (2, 132) = 1.314, p = 0.272, r\p2 = 0.02 was found for FAAQ- 
acceptance. However, the interaction between time and group almost reached statistical 
significance, F (2, 132) = 2.898, p = 0.059, r |p2 = 0.04. A series of three repeated- 
measure t-tests showed no significant improvements in self-reported acceptance of 
motivations to eat (i.e. cravings) in the defusion group or the relaxation-control group at 
follow-up compared to baseline (respectively; t (44), 0.990, p = 0.328; t (44), 1.180, p = 
0.244). Differences in acceptance scores at follow-up compared to baseline for the 
FAAQ-acceptance measure were however bordering on statistical significance in the 
acceptance group, t (44) = 1.943, p = 0.058.
To explore the association between chocolate consumption (number of chocolates eaten 
from the bag and other chocolates consumed) and mediator scores at baseline, 
Spearmans r correlation test were performed. A non-parametric test was used due to 
scatter plots showing outliers causing the data to be skewed.
Mediators (baseline) Bagged chocolates (N=134) Other chocolates (N=135)
FFMQ-nonjudge -0.058 -0.069
FFMQ-nonreact 0.040 0 . 1 0 2
PHLMS-awareness -0 . 0 2 2 -0 . 0 1 2
PHLMS-acceptance 0.059 0.057
Experiences 0.065 0.087
FAAQ-sum -0 . 0 1 2 -0.014
FAAQ-willingness 0.029 -0.039
FAAQ-acceptance -0.043 -0 . 0 0 2
Table 3.10 Spearmans r correlations showing the relationship between measures of 
chocolate consumption and baseline self-report scores of mindfulness (FFMQ and 
PHLMS), defusion (Experiences) and acceptance and awareness (FAAQ).
Table 3.10 shows that there were no significant correlations between any of the 
predicted mediators and chocolate consumption.
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3.3.6 Differences in the amount o f  chocolate consumed at the taste-task between 
mindfulness and non-mindfulness groups (Aim 6)
The following analyses relate to aim 6  of the current study. This aim tested for any 
behavioural rebound (as measured by a post-study taste-task) effects between the 
groups.
Taste-task
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Defusion (n=45) 2.27 2.96 0 . 0 0 13.00
Acceptance (n=45) 3.58 3.32 0 . 0 0 15.00
Relaxation (n=45) 3.80 4.62 0 . 0 0 2 1 . 0 0
Table 3.11 Descriptive statistics for the number of chocolates eaten across the three 
groups (cognitive defusion, acceptance, and control).
A one-way AVOVA however revealed no significant group (cognitive defusion, 
acceptance, control) difference in the amount of chocolates consumed at the taste-task, F 
(2, 134) = 2.254, p = 0.109 (defusion -  relaxation, cohen’s d = -0.39, acceptance -  
relaxation, cohen’s d = -0.05).
Mann-Whitney U tests revealed there was no significant difference between the number 
of chocolates eaten by the cognitive defusion and control groups (z = -1.683, p = 0.092) 
or between the acceptance and control groups (z = -0.428, p = 0.669). A significant 
difference was however found in the amount of chocolate consumed at the taste-task 
between the two mindfulness groups (z = -2.188, p = 0.029). The mean values show that 
the acceptance group (M = 3.58) consumed more chocolates than the cognitive defusion 
group (M = 2.27). Thus the reduced chocolate consumption in the defusion group did 
not appear to result in a behavioural rebound effect.
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3.3.7 Secondary investigations of the data
3.3.7.1 Strategy adherence
The number of times the taught strategy (cognitive defusion, acceptance or relaxation) 
was used in relation to the number of chocolate cravings experienced over the five-day 
period was calculated for each group.
Defusion (n=45) Acceptance (n=45) Relaxation (n=45)
Sometimes 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 38.0
Nearly always 60.0 51.0 51.0
Always 2 0 . 0 29.0 1 1 . 0
Table 3.12 Percentage of strategy used in the mindfulness and non-mindfulness groups.
Table 3.12 shows that the majority of participants (60-80%) in the three groups used 
their taught strategy ‘nearly always’ or ‘always’ when they experienced a chocolate 
craving. Mean ratings of strategy use were significantly higher amongst those in the 
acceptance group (M = 3.09, SD = 0.70), compared to the control group (M = 2.73, SD 
= 0.65), t (8 8 ) = 2.49, p = 0.015. Differences between the defusion group (M = 3.00, SD 
= 0.64) and the control group approached significance; t (8 8 ) = 1.96, p = 0.054, but there 
were no significant differences between the acceptance and defusion groups, t (8 8 ) = 
0.628, p = 0.532.
3.3.7.2 Study’s helpfulness at reducing chocolate consumption.
All participants were asked to rate how helpful they found their participation in the 
study in terms of reducing their chocolate consumption using a five-point Likert scale (1 
= not at all helpful, 5 = extremely helpful).
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Defusion (n=45) Acceptance (n=45) Relaxation (n=45)
Not at all helpful 0 . 0 4.0 2 . 0
A little helpful 4.0 7.0 2 0 . 0
Moderately helpful 36.0 38.0 42.0
Very helpful 51.0 47.0 34.0
Extremely helpful 9.0 4.0 2 . 0
Table 3.13 Percentage of reported helpfulness of study participation in reducing 
chocolate consumption by the mindfulness and non-mindfulness groups.
Statistically, no significant differences in the reported helpfulness of the study was 
found between either the defusion and acceptance groups, t (8 8 ) = 1.465, p = 0.146 or 
the acceptance and relaxation groups, t (8 8 ) = 1.453, p = 0.142. A significant different 
was however reported between the defusion and relaxation groups, t (8 8 ) 3.109, p = 
0.003. The means indicated that the defusion group (M = 3.64, SD = 0.71) found their 
participation in the study to reduce their chocolate consumption more helpful than the 
control group (M = 3.13, SD = 0.84).
3.3.7.3 Suspicion probe
In order to check level of suspicion about the study, participants were asked to (1) guess 
which group (intervention or control) they thought they had been assigned to, (2 ) say if 
they noticed anything unusual about the bagged chocolates, (3) recall how many 
individual chocolates were given to them in the bag and (4) if they had any ideas about 
what the study aimed to explore in addition to helping them reduce chocolate 
consumption.
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Defusion
(n=45)
Acceptance
(n=45)
Relaxation
(n=45)
Guessed group (% 89.0 76.0 62.0
correct)
Unusual about 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0
chocolates (% yes)
Number in the bag (% 24.0 27.0 7.0
correct)
Ideas about study aims 47.0 29.0 36.0
(% yes)
Table 3.14 Suspicion probe percentage scores across the mindfulness and non­
mindfulness groups.
To explore possible placebo effects, the proportion of participants who believed they 
had been allocated to an experimental group was compared across the three conditions. 
Table 3.14 shows that a greater number of participants in the control group believed that 
they were in the intervention condition compared to the number of participants in the 
mindfulness groups who believed that they were in the control condition. A chi-squared 
analysis statistically supported the observed differences between the groups, x 2 (2 , A = 
135) = 28.79, p = 0.001. Thus whilst it is not possible to entirely rule out placebo 
effects, had these had a significant impact one would have also expected reduced 
chocolate consumption in the acceptance group relative to the control group. As shown 
in Table 3.3, this was not consistently the case.
All participants in the three groups failed to notice anything unusual about the 
chocolates in the bag (i.e. they failed to notice the distinctive mark). The majority of 
participants in the mindfulness groups and the control group incorrectly reported the 
number of chocolate in the bag given to them at baseline. Participants were told by the 
researcher that the bag contained 1 2  chocolates, which was incorrect (the bag contained 
14 chocolates). This finding therefore suggests that only a small percentage of the 
sample actually paid conscious attention to the bag of chocolates by counting the
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chocolates for themselves. Fewer participants in the control group (7%) compared to the 
mindfulness groups (defusion = 24%, acceptance = 27%) guessed the number of bagged 
chocolates correctly. A chi-square test revealed that the percentage of participants who 
correctly reported the number of chocolates in the bag did significantly differ between 
the groups, %2{2,N = 135) = 6.955, p = 0.031.
Table 3.14 also shows that approximately a third in the acceptance and control groups 
made some attempt to identify what the study was investigating in addition to what they 
already knew. This figure increased to nearly half for participants in the cognitive 
defusion group. None of the sample made suggestions which were completely accurate 
(i.e. suggested ideas which were directly related to the study’s hypotheses). Most were 
either related to the information given to participants at the start of the study (e.g. 
effectiveness of the strategy and resisting chocolate temptation) or unrelated to the study 
(e.g. nutrition and participants’ honesty). Ten participants did however suspect that the 
study was a measure of willpower or self-control. One participant also correctly 
identified that the study was comparing changes in questionnaire scores from baseline to 
follow-up. As previously stated, whilst it is not possible to entirely rule out placebo 
effects, had these had a significant impact one would have also expected reduced 
chocolate consumption in the acceptance group relative to the control group. As shown 
in Table 3.3, this was not consistently the case. A chi-square test revealed that the 
percentage of participants who made an attempt to guess the study’s aims did not 
significantly differ between the groups, %2 (2, A =135) = 3.113,p = 0.211.
3.3.7.4 Effects o f mindfulness (cognitive defusion and acceptance) on chocolate 
consumption when also practiced in other situations.
To identify if the participants applied their taught strategy to help resist temptation in 
other situations (i.e. in addition to helping to resist eating chocolate) a simple yes/no 
measure was taken. The researcher did not tell participants to either apply, or not apply, 
the strategy to any other tempting situations. If the strategy was applied to other 
situations, the participant had done so of their own accord. For the cognitive defusion 
group (n = 45), 23 participants (51%) and the acceptance group (n = 45), 27 participants
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(60%) said that they did apply the strategy to other situations. It was speculated that 
there would be a greater decrease in the amount of chocolate consumed by the 
mindfulness groups when the strategy was also applied to other situations compared to 
those who only used the strategy to resist eating chocolate. Applying the strategy to 
other situations was believed to reduce chocolate consumption due to participants have a 
better understanding of the strategy and an increased practice of using it.
Strategy applied to other Strategy not applied to other
situations situations
Bagged Other Bagged Other
chocolates chocolates chocolates chocolates
n Mean SD Mean SD n Mean SD Mean SD
Defusion 23 0.04 0 . 2 1 19.60 37.72 2 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 6.55 20.13
Acceptance 27 0.19 0 . 6 8 51.89 133.4 17 0.41 1.28 42.72 55.49
Table 3.15 Comparison of mean (and SDs) chocolate consumption across the groups 
(mindfulness and controls) depending on whether the strategy was applied to other 
situations.
An independent t-test using the mindfulness groups only (n = 90; applied to other 
situations, n = 50, not applied to other situations, n = 40) was carried out to identify if 
applying the mindfulness strategy to other situations would show a significant group 
difference in the amount of chocolate consumed. No significant difference was found 
between the groups (cognitive defusion and acceptance) for either measure of chocolate 
consumption; chocolates from the bag, t (87) = 0.405, p = 0.686, or other chocolates, t 
(8 8 ) = 0.825, p = 0.412.
5.5.7.5 Group differences in the perceived effectiveness o f the strategies (cognitive 
defusion, acceptance, control).
Analysis was carried out to investigate whether one particular strategy was rated more 
effective at follow-up compared to baseline between the different groups. The baseline 
measure was obtained by asking the participants at follow-up how effective they thought
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the strategy would be in helping them to resist eating chocolate when it was first taught 
to them five-days previously.
Effectiveness (SI) Effectiveness (S2)
n Mean SD Mean SD
Defusion 45 3.04 1.13 4.13 0.76
Acceptance 45 2.71 1.08 3.82 1 . 0 1
Relaxation 45 2.84 1.04 3.40 1 . 0 1
Table 3.16 Comparison of mean (and SDs) effectiveness ratings across the three groups 
(cognitive defusion, acceptance, and control) for the different strategies use at baseline 
and follow-up.
A 3x2 mixed ANOVA with group (cognitive defusion, acceptance, control) and time 
(baseline, follow-up) as the independent variables and effectiveness ratings as the 
dependent variable was carried out. The results showed a significant effect of time, F (1, 
132) = 54.630, p = 0.001, and group, F (2, 132) = 5.135, p = 0.007. No significant time- 
group interaction was evident, F (2, 132) = 2.135, p = 0.122.
Further independent t-tests were performed to identify if the perceived effectiveness of 
the strategies at baseline was significantly different between the groups (cognitive 
defusion, acceptance, and controls). The tests revealed no significant difference between 
effectiveness scores and any of the groups; cognitive defusion and acceptance, t (8 8 ) = 
1.433, p = 0.155, cognitive defusion and control, t (8 8 ) = 0.873, p = 0.385, acceptance 
and control, t (8 8 ) = 0.596, p = 0.553.
3.3.7.5.1 Association between effectiveness scores and chocolate consumption 
Baseline effectiveness scores were correlated with both chocolate consumption 
measures (chocolates from the bag and other chocolate) to investigate if there was any 
significant association between the variables. Pearson’s r correlation tests showed no 
significant correlations; effectiveness scores and chocolates from the bag, r = -0.081, 
effectiveness and other chocolates consumed, r = -0.095. The correlations were however
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in accordance with the assumption that, the greater the perceived effectiveness of the 
strategy the less amount of chocolate consumed.
3.3.8 Summary
To summarise, the findings show that the practice of the mindfulness strategy, cognitive 
defusion, was effective at reducing the amount of chocolate consumed over a five-day 
period compared to the practice of the non-mindfulness strategy, relaxation. Also, there 
was preliminary support for the theory that the defusion strategy works by interrupting 
automatic links between specific thoughts and chocolate consumption. This was evident 
by those who employed the defusion strategy experiencing relatively greater reductions 
in the extent to which chocolate consumption was automatic. Reductions in automaticity 
are also significantly associated with lower levels of chocolate consumption. There were 
no significant differences in chocolate consumption between the acceptance and control 
groups. A trend was however beginning to appear in the findings indicating that 
acceptance maybe positively associated with the mediator, self-control. There was no 
evidence of behavioural rebound effects at the end of the abstinence period.
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3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Summary
The current study had six aims. Aims 1 and 3 explored whether two mindfulness 
strategies (cognitive defusion and acceptance respectively) were helpful for changing 
the self-control related health behaviour; reducing chocolate consumption. Aims 2 and 4 
explored how these strategies brought about their effects over a five-day period. The 
potential mediators, automaticity and self-control, were investigated. It was 
hypothesised that if the cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies were effective at 
helping individuals resist chocolate, lower levels of chocolate consumption would be 
evident in these two groups relative to the relaxation control group. If cognitive defusion 
brought about these effects by reducing the extent to which chocolate was consumed 
automatically, it was also predicted that a reduction in automaticity (as assessed by the 
SRHI) would be shown amongst those in the cognitive defusion group compared to 
those in the control group, together with positive correlations between levels of 
automaticity reported at follow-up and amount of chocolate consumed. Likewise, if 
acceptance brought about its effects by increasing the availability of self-control 
resources (as assessed by the hand-grip task), it was predicted that an increase in self- 
control ability would be shown in the acceptance group relative to the control group, 
together with negative correlations between self-control ability at follow-up and amount 
of chocolate consumed. The study further aimed to explore whether the effects of the 
cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies were mediated by self-reported 
mindfulness, defusion and acceptance (Aim 5). Finally, for the acceptance and cognitive 
defusion strategies to have applied utility, the study tested for behavioural rebound 
effects (Aim 6 ).
The main findings demonstrated that compared to the control group, those in the 
cognitive defusion group ate significantly less chocolate from the bag (p = 0.046), and 
less chocolate according to the diary measure (p = 0.053). In support of the hypotheses, 
there was evidence that these changes were brought about by reductions in the extent to 
which chocolate consumption was automatic. There were no significant differences in 
chocolate consumption between the acceptance and control groups. The study failed to
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find any evidence that the cognitive defusion task influenced general levels of 
mindfulness. There were, however, overall increases in some forms of mindfulness 
across all groups (non-judging of inner experiences, decentering). The taste-task 
employed at the end of the requested period of abstinence showed no significant 
differences in chocolate consumption between the three groups, suggesting an absence 
of rebound effects amongst the cognitive defusion group. These findings demonstrate 
the impact of a mindfulness-based strategy (cognitive defusion) on health-related 
behaviours that require self-control over an extended period and could help individuals 
eat a healthier diet by reducing the consumption of a high sugar, high fat snack food.
3.4.2 Effects of mindfulness (cognitive defusion and acceptance) on chocolate 
consumption (Aims 1 & 3)
Chocolate consumption was measured using observations (bagged chocolates) as well as 
self-report (diary). The results showed that the cognitive defusion task significantly 
reduced the amount of chocolate consumed by participants outside the laboratory over a 
five-day period compared to the control group. These findings support previous research 
such as that by Gifford et al. (2004) who found mindfulness-based interventions, which 
included defusion strategies, useful to help people abstain or limit the intake of a craved 
substance. It also supports many other studies which have shown that cognitive defusion 
is an effective strategy for managing eating behaviours (Forman, Hoffman, McGrath, 
Herbert, Brandsma & Lowe, 2007; Forman, Butryn, Hoffman & Herbert, 2009; Gregg et 
al., 2007; Lillis, Hayes, Bunting & Masuda, 2009; Tapper et al., 2009). Although, given 
that the aforementioned literature typically combines the exploration of the effects of 
cognitive defusion with other mindfulness-based strategies (e.g. acceptance) it is 
difficult to conclude the true effectiveness of the defusion strategy, as opposed to 
mindfulness-interventions more generally. The current study however, via the use of a 
dismantling design, allowed for cognitive defusion to be explored as an individual 
strategy. As a result of this, compared to previous research (Forman et al., 2007; Forman 
et al., 2009; Tapper et al., 2009) the present findings offer a clearer understanding of 
which mindfulness-based strategies are effective at changing this self-control related
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health behaviour. It also allows for a definite conclusion to be made about the 
effectiveness of the defusion strategy whilst offering additional support to Moffitt et al. 
(2012) who explored the unique effects of cognitive defusion on chocolate consumption. 
Similarly to Moffitt et al. the current study concludes that cognitive defusion can be a 
brief and simplistic approach to efficiently manage the consumption of unhealthy snack 
foods.
In contrast to the cognitive defusion strategy, significantly lower levels of chocolate 
consumption were not evident amongst those practicing the acceptance strategy. The 
findings suggest that the participants accepted the urge to eat chocolate but then gave 
into it. The current study therefore fails to support existing literature which showed that 
accepting internal experiences is associated with improved health behaviour (Ostafm & 
Marlatt, 2008). In contrast to the current study however, past research has focused 
mainly on limiting alcohol consumption and pain reduction (Geiser, 1992; Hayes et al., 
1999; Ostafm & Marlatt, 2008). Thus, whilst acceptance strategies maybe effective for 
changing those specific self-control related health behaviours, its effectiveness may not 
have the capability of being generalised to other health behaviours, including resisting 
chocolate temptation. The current finding also fails to support studies showing that 
mindfulness-based acceptance strategies are effective for the treatment of dysfunctional 
eating behaviours (e.g. binge eating) (Anderson & Simmons, 2008, Baer et al.,
2005, Juarascio et ah, 2010, Kristeller et al., 2006; Safer, Telch & Chen, 2009). It may 
however be unfair to discuss the current findings in relation to these aforementioned 
studies given that the current sample did not have eating behaviours that would be 
deemed as dysfunctional. Rather, the current sample had unhealthy eating behaviours 
(i.e. overconsumption of chocolate) and this difference may have had a significant effect 
on the findings. Furthermore, contrary to the current study, the previously discussed 
research (e.g. Geiser, 1992; Hayes et al., 1999; Kristeller et al., 2006) failed to identify 
the effects of acceptance as a single mindfulness strategy which also may account for 
the null results. It is also possible that in the present study, participants in the acceptance 
group simply did not receive sufficient teaching and/or practice at the strategy to make it 
effective (see section 3.4.3.2 for a more comprehensive discussion of this point).
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3.4.3 Association between predictor mediators and chocolate consumption (Aims 2 & 
4)
3.4.3.1 Automaticity
The current study hypothesised that cognitive defusion may work by interrupting 
automatic links between specific chocolate-related thoughts (e.g. ‘I need something 
sweet’) and chocolate consumption, thus breaking the habit of automatic responding. 
The results provided support for the pre-stated hypothesis since those who employed the 
defusion strategy experienced greater reductions in the extent to which chocolate 
consumption was automatic compared to the acceptance and relaxation-control groups. 
Across all three groups lower levels of automaticity at follow-up were also significantly 
associated with lower levels of chocolate consumption, providing further support for the 
view that targeting snacking automaticity may be a helpful behaviour change strategy.
It is possible that the cognitive defusion strategy reduced automaticity via the 
processes of vigilant monitoring (i.e. paying increased attention to internal thought-cues 
to be able to inhibit the behaviour) and counter-conditioning (i.e. replacing the cued 
response with another more helpful response) (Papies, Stroebe & Aarts, 2008;
Prochaska et al., 1988; Sun et al., 2007). Vigilant monitoring was used to help the 
participants to identify when the behaviour (i.e. eating chocolate) was cued, and 
counter-conditioning was used to substitute the unwanted behaviour (i.e. eating 
chocolate) for the behaviour, describing their thoughts. In relation to the latter point, it is 
arguable that, as well as the defusion strategy, the acceptance and relaxation control 
strategies also used these processes (vigilant monitoring and counter-conditioning). 
Thus, whilst this explanation of the findings may account for why an overall reduction 
in automaticity scores was found across all three groups, it fails to explain why the 
defusion strategy was found to be more effective. It therefore appears that vigilant 
monitoring and counter-conditioning cannot be responsible for the differences in the 
amount of chocolate consumed between the groups. Rather, another factor may be 
having an effect. One such possibility is that the defusion strategy works by increasing 
the accessibility of goals (i.e. strengthening links between the cue and competing goals; 
Neal, Wood, Labrecque & Lally, 2012). Further investigation of this is advised.
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3.43.2 Self-control
It was predicted that acceptance strategies may work by helping individuals resist 
chocolate by freeing up self-control resources (as assessed by the hand-grip task) that 
would otherwise have been used for regulating chocolate cravings. Despite equivalent 
levels of strategy adherence to the cognitive defusion, those in the acceptance group 
failed to show a reduction in chocolate consumption relative to controls. The findings 
therefore do not support previous studies which have shown that the practice of 
mindfulness-based acceptance counteracts the deleterious effects of self-control 
depletion (Alberts et al., 2012; Masedo & Esteve, 2007). It is possible that in the present 
study participants simply did not receive sufficient practice at this strategy to make it 
effective. Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff (1988), for instance, suggests that whilst it is 
possible to improve self-control capacity with exercise, this process does require time. 
Muraven et al. (1999) also reported that individuals who exerted self-control over their 
eating habits performed better on an acceptance-based task (over-riding physical 
discomfort) but only after a period more than twice the length of the current study (two 
weeks). In further support of this, Alberts et al. (2010) showed that food cravings 
amongst overweight and obese individuals were only reduced after an acceptance based 
intervention lasting seven weeks. Other studies conducted over shorter periods have also 
shown increases in food cravings in response to acceptance strategies (e.g. Hooper et al., 
2012).
It is however important to note that participants in the acceptance condition in the 
current study did not show a significant increase in chocolate consumption relative to 
the control group over the five-day period. Thus any increase in chocolate cravings 
experienced by this group did not appear to be associated with increased consumption. 
This is relevant since one of the aims of mindfulness strategies is to reduce the extent to 
which individuals act upon their thoughts and feelings, thus making it possible to resist 
chocolate despite cravings. Contrary to the possibility that in the present study 
participants simply did not receive sufficient practice at this strategy to make it 
effective, Levitt et al. (2004) reported significant benefits of the acceptance strategy in 
changing self-control related health behaviours even after the task has been practiced
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very briefly (10 minutes). Although, Levitt and colleagues tested participants with panic 
and anxiety disorders using a self-control test, namely exposure to CO2 . This may have 
been perceived as threatening to the individual’s general health or well-being if the task 
caused them to experience a panic or anxiety attack. The current study used a non- 
clinical sample and a self-control task (hand-grip) which may not have been perceived 
as threatening (i.e. not performing well on the hand-grip task may not have been 
associated with an increased temptation for chocolate). Consequently, the participants in 
Levitt’s study may have tried to utilise the acceptance-strategy in a more effortful 
manner than those in the current study, thus demonstrating the effects of the acceptance 
strategy more clearly.
An alternative explanation for the null findings is that acceptance strategies are not 
suitable for enhancing health-related behaviours that require self-control. One reason is 
that acceptance requires the participant to focus on their feelings. Paradoxically, since 
feelings are linked to the stimuli the participant is trying to resist, this may actually 
make self-control more difficult (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; see also Kavanagh et al., 
2005). It is possible that acceptance strategies may be more helpful where the participant 
is trying to create new habits (e.g. participate in physical activity) rather than break old 
ones (van’t Riet et al., 2011). It is also a feasible suggestion that the participants simply 
did not understand the ‘urge surfing’ metaphor (Marlatt & Kristeller, 1999). In the 
current study participants were taught the strategy at the baseline session and then left to 
implement this strategy over the five-day period without any reminders. Research has 
however demonstrated the effectiveness of this strategy when the concept of ‘urge 
surfing’ was repeated throughout the intervention phase (Brown & Marlatt, 2009). It is 
therefore considered worthwhile to re-run the present study but to provide participants 
with repeated instruction (e.g. emails sent throughout the study period) of the taught 
strategy. Future research may also consider exploring the effect of alternate metaphors 
to help reduce chocolate consumption (e.g. ‘leaves on the stream’ Harris, 2009).
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3.4.4 Other self-report mediators (Aim 5)
In the current study a number of questionnaires were included to identify general 
impacts of the manipulations on mindfulness (Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, 
FFMQ, Baer et al., 2006; Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale, PHLMS, Cardaciotto et al., 
2008; Experiences Questionnaire, EQ, Fresco et al., 2007; Food Acceptance and Action 
Questionnaire, FAAQ, Juarascio et al., 2011). It was predicted that if the cognitive 
defusion and acceptance manipulations resulted in general increases in mindfulness, 
significantly higher self-reported mindfulness scores (as assessed by the FFMQ 
PHLMS, EQ and FAAQ) would be evident between baseline and follow-up in these 
groups compared to the control group. Contrary to prediction, the study failed to find 
any evidence that the cognitive defusion task or the acceptance task influenced general 
levels of mindfulness. Given that the tasks were specific to chocolate consumption it is 
perhaps not surprising that the effects did not generalise beyond this. There were, 
however, overall increases in some forms of mindfulness across all groups (non-judging 
of inner experiences, decentering). It is possible that these effects occurred as a result of 
participants monitoring their chocolate consumption by recording what they ate in their 
diary. It would be interesting to explore this in future research. It should also be noted 
that these increases were coupled by an overall reduction in acceptance of food cravings 
across all three groups and a reduction in acceptance in the acceptance group only. 
Again, whether these are temporary or more long-term effects of monitoring and/or 
trying to resist chocolate would also need to be explored in future studies. All four 
mindfulness questionnaires have however been reported to have high internal 
consistency (i.e. test re-test reliability) (FFMQ, Veehof et al., 2011; PHLMS, 
Cardaciotto, 2005; EQ, Carmody, Baer, Lykins & Olendzki, 2009; FAAQ, Juarascio et 
al., 2011). Thus, the reliability of the measures neither explains the significant changes 
in these measures across all groups nor indicates whether these changes are related to 
the study manipulations.
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3.4.5 Taste-task (Aim 6)
The current study tested for behavioural rebound by measuring the amount of chocolate 
consumed by the participant in the laboratory following the five-day period of 
abstinence. The findings showed no evidence of behavioural rebound effects, thus 
offering support to previous research recently conducted by Hooper et al. (2012). In 
view of this finding, it was concluded that amongst those in the cognitive defusion 
group, participants did not appear to compensate for their chocolate abstinence by 
increasing their intake later on, thus has applied utility. This finding suggests that 
cognitive defusion is more effective at changing the self-control related health behaviour 
compared to other strategies (e.g. thought suppression and cognitive restructuring) 
which have been widely criticised for producing rebound effects (Forman et al., 2013; 
McNally & Ricciardi, 1996; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994).
3.4.6 Limitations
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the current study. One such limitation 
is that, although differences between the cognitive defusion and control groups for the 
bagged chocolate reached statistical significance, group differences for the diary 
measure showed only a trend towards significance (p = 0.053). As a result, the findings 
should be treated with caution. Another limitation is that, whilst the hand-outs given to 
the intervention and control groups were matched as far as possible, in order to 
accurately reflect the cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies, and the ways in 
which they intend to be used in practice, differences were inevitable. Indeed, one 
potentially important difference is that in the five minute practice exercise only 
participants in the cognitive defusion group were asked to think about recent plans and 
thoughts in relation to chocolate (or to imagine future thoughts if no such plans came to 
mind). Participants in the control group were instead asked to think about a recent 
situation in which they had felt stressed (or to imagine future stressful events if no 
recent events came to mind). Participants in the acceptance group were asked to 
visualise their favourite type of chocolate in front of them. Thus it is possible that being 
asked specifically to think about chocolate-related thoughts at baseline is what brought
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about the lower levels of chocolate consumption in the cognitive defusion group, rather 
than the cognitive defusion strategy that was employed over the five-day period. 
Arguably, thinking about chocolate-related thoughts is an important component of the 
cognitive defusion strategy since it is one way in which the individual may be 
encouraged to see themselves as different from their thoughts. It is however possible 
that thinking about chocolate-related thoughts also prompted participants to engage in 
action planning in relation to their chocolate consumption. Given the evidence for the 
efficacy of action planning for behaviour change (e.g. Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) this 
may in turn have been responsible for the reduced chocolate consumption. Since action 
planning can impact upon habits (e.g. Holland et al., 2006) it might also account for the 
reduced automaticity amongst the cognitive defusion group in this study. It would be 
helpful to include an additional control in future studies to help rule out this possibility. 
It would also be informative to conduct additional studies that control for different 
aspects of the cognitive defusion strategy to help further pinpoint the exact elements that 
help bring about change, versus those elements that may be less important.
Additionally, since the diary measure included in the study relied on self-report, it is 
possible that it was subject to social desirability bias. Although the participants were 
blind to group allocation, therefore such effects should have been minimal. Furthermore, 
in contrast to this criticism, previous research has demonstrated the successful use of 
diaries to measure eating behaviour (Gersovitz et al., 1978) and high validity of such 
measures when tested empirically (Schlundt, 1995). It is difficult to avoid self-report 
measures when assessing dietary intake, so the inclusion of the bagged chocolate 
measure in this study adds weight to the findings. Another shortcoming of the present 
study may be its limited generalisation or interpretability of the effects. The current 
study was conducted on a group of adults who were motivated to reduce their chocolate 
consumption. It is unclear whether the cognitive defusion strategy would be as effective 
in less motivated people. Furthermore, whilst it is not outside the realm of possibility 
that demand effects could have driven some of the study’s effects, it is believed that this 
is highly unlikely. Participants, for instance, were probed for suspicion at the end of the
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study. Very few participants expressed suspicion of what the hypotheses were, 
suggesting that there is a low likelihood of demand effects.
Finally, the procedure of measuring self-control via the hand-grip task may also be 
considered a limitation of the current study. In an attempt to accurately record the length 
of time the hand-grip was squeezed, a single piece of paper was placed in between the 
handles to signal release of pressure causing the paper to fall. Participants were also 
instructed to hold the hand-grip in an upright position (e.g. not tilted to the side so that 
the paper would be supported by the side of the hand-grip). Despite these instructions, 
some participants had to be reminded to adhere to them whilst completing the task. As a 
result of this, slight movement of the paper signalling a release of grip was not always 
immediately detected by the researcher. This brings into question the reliability of using 
the hand-grip to measure self-control capacity (Muraven et al., 1998). Future studies 
may therefore benefit from using alternate measures of self-control capacity other than 
physical endurance (e.g. delayed outcomes or persistence at unsolvable anagram tasks, 
see Fujita, Trope, Liberman & Levin-Sagi, 2006).
3.4.7 Future research
The findings observed in relation to practicing the cognitive defusion strategy and 
improvements in reducing chocolate consumption is limited to the conclusion that there 
were significant group differences, given that a baseline measure of chocolate 
consumption was not taken. Including a baseline measure of chocolate consumption in 
future replications of the current study would help explore whether cognitive defusion 
also significantly reduces chocolate consumption relative to previous levels of chocolate 
intake. Such findings may then transfer to broader weight management attempts and 
also be extended to other health-related situations that require self-control, such as 
smoking cessation, alcohol consumption and safe sex. To verify this, in addition to 
including a baseline measure of chocolate consumption, future research would also need 
to include a measure of weight loss, and replicate the study using different sample 
groups. Furthermore, despite the current findings suggesting that cognitive defusion
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works by reducing automaticity, future research would benefit from exploring other 
measures of automaticity (e.g. lexical decision tasks, Webb & Sheeran, 2007) alongside 
other potential mediators (Neal et al., 2012).
Given the brevity of the intervention training in the current study, the findings for the 
cognitive defusion strategy are promising. The length of the chocolate challenge (i.e. 
abstinence period) used in the present study was only five days. Whilst this is an 
improvement over the 48-hour restriction period employed in similar previous research 
(e.g. Forman et al., 2007), it is difficult to make conclusions regarding the sustainability 
or maintenance of any behavioural changes observed. Thus to be confident of the utility 
of the cognitive defusion strategy for intervention, its effects would need to be 
demonstrated over a longer period. Although, prior to this, it is advised that a replication 
of the study using only the cognitive defusion strategy and control strategies is 
conducted to validate the effectiveness of this strategy in terms of resisting chocolate 
temptation. For instance, before the study is extended, certain weaknesses of the study’s 
design could be addressed. One study weakness was the choice of measures used to 
assess automaticity. In the current study, the SRHI failed to measure whether habits 
were automatic responses to specific thought cues. Thus, future research could tailor the 
SRHI to specific chocolate-related thoughts reported by the participants rather than to 
eating chocolate in general. Another design weakness was the inclusion of only one 
control group (relaxation). Previous research has shown that simply monitoring 
behaviour can cause a significant change (Quinn et al., 2010). The diary measure used in 
the current study required all participants to monitor their eating behaviour and therefore 
may have been the cause of changes in chocolate consumption. Future studies should 
include a ‘monitoring-only’ control group to rule out any possibility that changes in 
unhealthy eating behaviour were the result of behavioural monitoring.
3.4.8 Conclusion
The current study attempted to identify whether two mindfulness strategies (cognitive 
defusion and/or acceptance) were helpful for changing the self-control related health
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behaviour; reducing chocolate consumption, and to understand how they brought about 
their effects. The findings supported the view that mindfulness-based cognitive defusion 
has advantages over mindfulness-based acceptance for short-term abstinence from 
chocolate. The findings also showed the cognitive defusion strategy works by 
interrupting automatic links between chocolate consumption and thoughts that cue 
chocolate consumption. Although, given that there is very little prior research exploring 
the individual effects of cognitive defusion on chocolate consumption (Moffitt et al., 
2012) further research is needed to confirm the reliability of these findings. Thus follow- 
on studies should aim to both replicate and extend the exploration of how cognitive 
defusion is effective in helping people to resist chocolate temptation. It is believed that 
the present research highlights the importance of distinguishing between different types 
of mindfulness strategies and separating out their effects on behaviour. This is important 
since determining exactly which mindfulness strategies are helpful for which situations 
should help enhance both the efficacy and cost efficiency of mindfulness-based 
intervention. This study therefore provides an important step towards acquiring an 
understanding of which mindfulness strategies help change unhealthy eating behaviour, 
and identifying how they work.
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Using a brief mindfulness-based cognitive defusion strategy to reduce 
chocolate consumption. A further exploration of effects and mediators.
3.5 Introduction
3.5.1 Purpose of the study
The previous study (Study Two) showed that the practice of the defusion strategy 
significantly reduced chocolate consumption. The first aim of the current study was 
therefore to demonstrate the reliability of the previous study by replicating the findings. 
Study Two also showed support for the hypothesis that cognitive defusion works by 
interrupting automatic links between chocolate consumption and thoughts that cue 
chocolate consumption. The second aim of the current study was therefore to further 
investigate this possibility by exploring the effects of the defusion strategy on measures 
of automaticity, alongside other potential mediators (strengthening links between the 
cue and competing goals, Neal et al., 2012; Webb & Sheeran, 2007). The purpose of this 
was to identify more specifically how cognitive defusion changes the self-control related 
health behaviour, resisting chocolate. It was predicted that cognitive defusion may work 
by either (a) reducing automatic links between chocolate-related thoughts and chocolate 
consumption, and/or (b) increasing the accessibility of competing goals in response to 
chocolate-related thoughts.
3.5.2 Cognitive defusion reduces automatic links between thoughts and behaviour
It was predicted that the cognitive defusion strategy may reduce chocolate consumption 
by interrupting a persons’ automatic reaction to eat chocolate when experiencing 
chocolate-related thoughts. It is possible that this was achieved by the defusion strategy 
teaching individuals to become aware of thought cues and to describe them as ‘just 
thoughts’. As outlined in section 3.1.2.10, there is some indication that mindfulness- 
based cognitive defusion strategies maybe effective at disrupting automaticity between 
internal states (e.g. thoughts) and self-control related health behaviours (Bartholow et 
al., 2000; Ostafin & Marlatt, 2008; Tapper et al., 2009). These findings are however 
only suggestive and no clear conclusions can be drawn given that cognitive defusion
177
was analysed in conjunction with other mindfulness-based strategies. The previous 
study (Study Two) was the first to demonstrate the efficacy of the mindbus defusion 
strategy in breaking existing thought-behaviour responding. In order to test this finding 
further it was acknowledged that more robust measures of automaticity were needed. 
The current study therefore utilised Lexical Decision Tasks (LDTs), in addition to 
modified Self-Report Habit Index (SRHI) measures to explore the hypothesis that 
cognitive defusion reduces automatic links between chocolate-related thoughts and 
chocolate consumption. An overview of the new automaticity measures is provided.
3.5.3 New automaticity measures
3.5.3.1 Lexical decision tasks
The lexical decision task (LDT) is the classic and most frequently used task for semantic 
priming research and was first developed in the early 1970s (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 
1971). The task requires participants to identify letter strings as either words (i.e. found 
in an English language dictionary) or pronounceable non-words by pressing the 
corresponding key on a response box. Throughout a sequence of trials, two semantically 
related stimuli are subsequently presented, though only one (the target) is processed 
consciously, whereas the other (the prime) is processed unconsciously (Greenwald, 
Klinger & Schuh, 1995; Jacoby, Lindsay, Toth & Jeffrey, 1992; Reingold & Merikle, 
1988). Thus primes are said to be subliminal with responses to the prime being deemed 
‘automatic’ (Moors & De Houwer, 2006). The main dependent variable of interest is the 
difference in speed and/or accuracy between the conditions defined by the prime-target 
relationship within each trial. Typically, mean reaction latencies (error rates) in related 
or congruent trials are lower compared with those in unrelated or incongruent trials. 
Studies using LDTs have found that subliminally presented stimuli have a considerable 
influence on behaviour (Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; 
Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Greenwald, Draine & Abrams, 1996; Neuberg, 1988; 
Packard, 1957) although the scientific literature is not wholly consistent. For instance, 
after examining over 150 articles and 2 0 0  academic papers on subliminal priming 
Pratkanis & Aronson (1992) found no clear evidence of subliminal priming effects.
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These negative findings may however be explained by the incorrect use of priming 
techniques. Strahan, Spencer & Zanna (2002) proposed that subliminal priming will 
only be effective when used to prime goal-relevant cognitions, thus subliminally 
priming people with the concept of thirst should activate thirst-related cognitions. 
However, priming thirst-related cognitions did not always change behaviour. Thus it 
may be possible that being primed with goal-relevant cognitions will only lead to 
behavioural change when the individual is motivated to pursue the goal (Strahan et al., 
2002). Another possibility why not all priming studies have shown positive results may 
be because the apparent automaticity of behaviour can be accounted for by different 
strategic efforts of participants. The increased speed and accuracy of responding may 
have been due to participants being aware that a prime was followed by a semantically 
related target. As a result, participants may generate expectations about specific targets 
appearing after certain primes, and if expected targets appear then they react faster 
compared to the unrelated trials (Wentura & Degner, 2010). Others however have 
disputed this claim (Neely, 1997).
Despite the aforementioned criticisms, LDT are deemed by the majority to be 
highly reliable and valid in semantic priming research and as a measure of automaticity 
(e.g. Webb & Sheeran, 2007). In view of this, the current study used a specifically 
designed LDT to further explore how cognitive defusion strategies work by changing 
unhealthy eating behaviours.
3.5.3.2 Modified self-report habit index
The current study used SRHI measures to explore whether habit strength was a possible 
moderator between chocolate-related thought cues and chocolate consumption given 
that; research has shown strong habits to elicit greater behavioural automaticity when in 
the presence of cues compared to habits of low or moderate strength (e.g. Danner, Aarts 
& de Vries, 2008; Lally, Van Jaarsveld, Potts & Wardle, 2010). Self-Report Habit Index 
questionnaires (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) used in the previous study (see section 
3.1.4) measured automaticity by simply asked participants to rate how true each 
statement was for them in relation to the behaviour ‘eating chocolate’. SRHI measures 
in the current study were however modified in that the participants were asked to rate
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how true each statement was for them in relation to either the behaviour ‘eating 
chocolate when I need something sweet', ‘eating chocolate when I need a treat' or 
‘eating chocolate when I need an energy boost". The reason for this was because pilot 
studies demonstrated that the thought-cues ‘need something sweet’, ‘need a treat’ and 
‘need an energy boost' were most strongly associated with chocolate consumption (see 
whole of section 3.6 for full details of the pilot studies). It was predicted that this 
modification to the SRHI measures would allow for a more reliable and sensitive 
investigation of whether cognitive defusion strategies work by interrupting automaticity 
links between chocolate-related thoughts and chocolate consumption.
3.5.4 Cognitive defusion increases the accessibility of competing goals in response to 
chocolate-related thoughts
As an additional possibility to interrupting automatic links, the current study proposed 
that cognitive defusion strategies may reduce chocolate consumption by increasing the 
accessibility of competing goals in response to chocolate-related thoughts. This may be 
achieved by the defusion strategy encouraging the awareness of chocolate-related 
thoughts (i.e. internal cues) which in turn promotes the awareness of conflicting goals 
(e.g. wanting to lose weight).
3.5.4.1 What are goals?
Bargh (1990) defined goals as cognitive structures which can be triggered (i.e. primed) 
by cues in the environment, causing an automatic associative link to be formed between 
them. Thus, if goals are mental representations, it is logical to suggest that they can vary 
in their level of accessibility (Bargh, 1990). Accessibility is defined as the retrieval of 
goal information from long-term to short-term memory. This retrieval process can be 
achieved without conscious awareness. Once accessible, the goal is now said to be 
‘primed’ and therefore able to be used to assist individuals in responding to stimuli 
presented to them (Bruner, 1957). The accessibility of goals can be influenced by both 
internal (i.e. thoughts) and external (i.e. environmental) cues.
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3.5.4.2 Increasing goal accessibility>
There exists a vast amount of experimental evidence for the priming of goals. Chartrand 
& Bargh (1996) subliminally primed participants with either goal or control words and 
found that only the primed goal words influenced participant behaviour. Similar findings 
were also found by Fitzsimons & Bargh (2003). Furthermore, Shah & Kruglanski
(2 0 0 2 ) conducted a study whereby participants were asked to respond to words related 
to education and health goals (e.g. ‘educated’ and ‘knowledgeable’; ‘strong’ and ‘fit’) 
by indicating as fast and accurately as possible whether a target word represented a 
characteristic or a trait. Unknown to participants, subliminal priming of words 
representing the means for achieving each of these goals (e.g. ‘read’ and ‘exercise’) 
were presented on each trial prior to the target word. The results showed that 
participants’ responses to target words representing the education and fitness goals were 
faster following subliminal primes representing a means corresponding to a given goal 
than following a control word. Shah and Kruglanski therefore concluded that these 
faster reaction times were evidence of the goal’s accessibility being strengthened by 
subliminal exposure to the cues. The above studies clearly illustrate that primed goals 
can increase goal accessibility. This has been further supported by Shah (2003).
In addition to implicitly priming a goal, without awareness of the mediating processes 
that give rise to the goal’s accessibility, research has shown that cues which are 
incompatible with a goal can also trigger alternative goals. This in turn sets in motion 
processes that override temptation (Fishbach, Friedman & Kruglanski, 2003). For 
instance, a chocolate may seem attractive, but health goals incompatible with eating the 
chocolate should be triggered to counteract the value assigned to the chocolate. 
Chocolate in this case would strengthen the accessibility of a health goal to counteract 
the goal of eating the snack food. Thus, rather than increased chocolate consumption 
occurring when chocolate is present, Fishbach et al. would predict an increase in healthy 
eating. It was however argued that such a counteractive effect would only be evidenced 
if the health goal was important to the individual and if chocolate was associated with 
the incompatible goal of ‘being healthy’. In support of these assumptions, Fishbach et al.
(2003) found that the temptation of a fatty food triggered the goal of being health
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conscious in a person's eating behaviour. The procedure of Fishbach’s study involved 
dieters spending time in one of three situations: a room with popular fatty foods 
(temptation prime), a room with weight-watching magazines (diet [i.e. goal] prime), and 
a room with general interest magazines (neutral prime). All participants were asked to 
choose a reward for participating between a chocolate bar and an apple. The findings 
showed that the participants who were food primed and diet primed were more likely to 
choose the apple rather than the chocolate bar compared to control participants. This 
study demonstrates the effect of priming tasks on strengthening the accessibility of goals 
when in the presence of cues.
3.5.4.3 Using cognitive defusion to increase goal accessibility 
To date, no literature or evidence exists in terms of exploring whether cognitive 
defusion works by increasing the accessibility of competing goals. Thus, the current 
study was the first to investigate this possibility. To measure the effects of cognitive 
defusion on goal accessibility a LDT (similar to that used to explore if cognitive 
defusion works by reducing automaticity) was utilised. The only difference between the 
goal accessibility and automaticity LDTs was that the target words used to measure the 
current possibility related to commonly identified goals for wanting to reduce chocolate 
consumption (i.e. health or weight) rather than the word ‘chocolate’. The efficiency of 
using LDTs to measure goal accessibility has been previously supported (Webb & 
Sheeran, 2007).
5.5.5 Conclusions o f  literature review
3.5.5.1 Summaiy
There is evidence to suggest that LDTs are effective at measuring behavioural 
automaticity (Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 1996; Moors & De Houwer, 2006) and goal 
accessibility (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Fishbach et al., 2003). SRHI questionnaires are 
also considered reliable measures of habit strength (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). These 
two measures were therefore utilised in the current study in order to further explore the 
effects and mediators of cognitive defusion strategies.
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3.5.6 The current study
The current study was a partial replication of Study Two in that (1) the cognitive 
defusion strategies were compared to relaxation-control strategies, and (2 ) the 
intervention was conducted over a short period of five-days. Again, participants were 
asked to keep a bag of chocolates in their possession and to refrain from eating any 
chocolate or chocolate-related products (see section 3.2 for full details of the 
methodology used in Study Two). The current study differed from Study Two in that a 
baseline measure of chocolate consumption and a second, monitoring-only, control 
strategy (as opposed to the mindfulness-acceptance strategy) were included. A baseline 
measure was also incorporated into the design of the current study to allow for any 
changes in chocolate consumption to be identified. Study Two did not record prior 
levels of consumption, only group differences. The baseline measure consisted of the 
same chocolate diary as that used in the previous study. A monitoring control group was 
included in order to identify whether simply monitoring behaviour has an effect on 
chocolate consumption. Previous literature suggests that people are less likely to engage 
in self-control related behaviours when they are monitoring relevant behaviours, and 
vice versa (Baumeister, 2002; Polivy et al., 1986). Polivy et al. (1986), for example, 
amongst others (Baumeister et al., 1994; Hull, 1981) found that when behaviour is 
monitored, people are better able to resist temptation. The addition of this control group 
allowed for a more confident interpretation that it was the cognitive defusion strategy 
that was bringing about a change in unhealthy eating behaviour.
3.5.6.1 Aims and predictions
The first aim of the current study was to replicate the findings shown in Study Two; that 
the defusion strategy was effective as reducing chocolate consumption. The second aim 
was to further understand how mindfulness-based cognitive defusion strategies reduce 
chocolate consumption. It was hypothesised that cognitive defusion works by either 
reducing automaticity between chocolate-related thoughts and chocolate consumption 
(i.e. weakens cue [thoughts] -  response [chocolate] links), or by increasing the 
accessibility of competing goals in the presence of the cue (i.e. strengthens cue [thought] 
-  goal [health/weight] links). To date, no studies have examined the role of defusion
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strategies in reducing the automatic link between thought cues and behaviour, or in 
terms of increasing goal accessibility. The current study was therefore mainly 
exploratory however the following predictions were made.
• If the cognitive defusion strategy works by reducing automaticity between 
thoughts and behaviour, slower (longer) reaction time scores were expected 
following the semantically related prime in the LDT amongst those in the 
defusion group compared to those in the control groups. It was also expected that 
those in the cognitive defusion group would show lower SRHI scores at follow- 
up compared to baseline.
• If the cognitive defusion strategy works by increasing the accessibility of 
competing goals in the presence of the cue (i.e. strengthens cue [thought] -  goal 
[health/weight] links), faster (shorter) reaction time scores were expected 
following the semantically related prime in the LDT amongst those in the 
defusion group compared to those in the control groups.
• In line with earlier evidence (Danner, Aarts & de Vries, 2008; Lally, Van 
Jaarsveld, Potts & Wardle, 2010) it was hypothesised that habit strength would 
moderate the relationship between chocolate-related cues and chocolate 
consumption. As a result, it was predicted that individuals who scored most 
highly on the SRHI measures would demonstrate a greater decrease in RTs in the 
LDT measuring automaticity.
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3.6 Pilot studies
Given the novelty of this research, it was considered important to ensure that the design 
of each measure (SRHI and LDTs) used to explore the hypotheses was both appropriate 
and valid. Three separate pilot studies, in addition to a larger preliminary study were 
therefore conducted.
3.6.1 Pilot study one
To ensure maximum strength of automaticity and goal accessibility between chocolate- 
related thoughts and chocolate consumption, a pilot study was conducted in order to 
identify ( 1 ) which thought-cues people most commonly experience when eating, or 
nearly eating (i.e. trying to resist temptation) chocolate, and (2 ) the most frequently 
reported reason for wanting to reduce chocolate consumption. The findings from this 
pilot study assisted in the overall design of the current study and also determined which 
thought-cues where included in the automaticity and goal accessibility measures (SRHI 
and LDTs).
3.6.1.1 Method
5.6.1.1.1 Participants
Data were collected from 20 participants (10 males, 10 females) to identify food-related 
thoughts experienced immediately before eating, or nearly eating (i.e. temptation 
resisted) a chocolate or chocolate-related product. All participants were students from 
Swansea University and met the inclusion criteria which comprised a desire to reduce 
current levels of chocolate consumption, a fluent English speaker, not pregnant, not 
suffering past or present from an eating disorder and having no medical condition that 
affected what could and could not be eaten (e.g. high cholesterol, diabetes, 
hypoglycaemia, or food intolerances). Participants either took part voluntarily, or if a 
psychology student, received four course credits after attending both sessions. The study 
received ethical approval from Swansea University’s Psychology Department Research 
Ethics Committee.
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3.6.1.1.2 Design
The study employed a between-subjects design with two conditions (resist, non-resist). 
The resist group was asked to try to resist the temptation to eat chocolate over the three- 
day study period. The non-resist group was not asked to resist eating chocolate, but 
instead instructed to eat normally over the three days (i.e. participants in this group were 
free to eat as much chocolate as they typically would). Participants were alternately 
allocated to either the resist or non-resist condition.
3.6.1.1.3 Materials and apparatus
3.6.1.1.3.1 Chocolate and thought-cue diaries 
The design of the diaries was separated into two parts (see appendices T and U). The 
first part required the participant to keep a record of all chocolate and chocolate-related 
products they had eaten, or felt like eating, but resisted, for three consecutive days 
(Tuesday-Thursday). Example lists of chocolate and chocolate-related products were 
provided. There was a separate diary sheet (i.e. A4 page) for each of the three days. 
There was also a different diary for ‘chocolate eaten’ and ‘chocolate felt like eating’.
The diaries (chocolate eaten, chocolate felt like eating) were compiled as a single 
document, though in order to make the diaries visually distinctive they were printed on 
different coloured paper (pink for ‘chocolate eaten’ and green for ‘chocolate felt like 
eating’). The purpose of this was to try and reduce errors made when recording the 
different dietary information. The ‘chocolate eaten’ diary asked participants to record 
the time the chocolate was eaten, the type of chocolate/chocolate-related product eaten, 
the product brand, the size (in grams) and the overall portion (i.e. half, quarter) 
consumed. The ‘chocolate felt like eating’ diary asked participants to record the time 
they experienced the desire to eat chocolate and the type of chocolate/chocolate-related 
product they wanted to eat. Both diaries further asked participants to state using a yes/no 
response if they experienced any food-related thoughts immediately before eating, or 
nearly eating, the chocolate or chocolate-related product. The second part of the diary 
required the participant to record the content of these thoughts below the dietary entry. 
Examples of food-related thoughts were listed.
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At the start of each diary there was also an example page provided in order to show 
participants how to fill in the diaries correctly. Participants were advised that if they 
needed more space they should write on the reverse of the diaries. They were also 
notified that it was important that all details were recorded honestly and accurately. The 
diaries given to both groups (resist, non-resist) were identical. The resist group was 
however additionally told that resisting the temptation to eat chocolate can be difficult, 
so even though they were asked to try to not eat any chocolate or chocolate-related 
product they were not to worry if they did. They were simply asked to record what they 
had eaten in the ‘chocolate eaten’ diary provided.
3.6.1.1.4 Procedure
The study was carried out over five consecutive days (Monday-Friday). On Monday, the 
researcher met with the participants by individual appointments during which written 
consent was obtained. During this session, the participant was given their chocolate and 
thought-cue diaries and shown how to fill them in correctly. Participants were also 
informed to which group (resist, non-resist) they had been allocated. 19 This session took 
approximately 15 minutes to complete. Before leaving the session, participants were 
asked to keep the diaries in their possession at all times over the next three days (the 
diaries were not required to be completed on either Monday or Friday). On Friday, 
participants once again met with the researcher. At this session, the diary was returned 
and the information recorded in the diaries briefly discussed to ensure that all 
information was recorded in full and without error. This session lasted no longer than 15 
minutes and was concluded by thanking the participant for taking part. All participants 
were debriefed fully.
19 Participants were unaware of the other condition to which they had not been allocated.
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3.6.1.2 Results
3.6.1.2.1 Descriptive statistics
Chocolate consumption and food thoughts were measured using food and thought-cue 
diaries completed over three consecutive days. Two participants failed to return their 
diaries at the follow-up appointment. The data for these participants were therefore 
unavailable, yielding an n of 18 (resist, n = 9, non-resist, n = 9). The sample consisted of 
an equal ratio of males and females (resist: male = 4, female = 5; non-resist, male = 5, 
female = 4).
3.6.1.2.2 Identified chocolate-related thought cues
The purpose of recording the chocolate consumption data (e.g. type and weight of 
chocolate eaten) was to prompt participants to identify the thoughts they experienced 
immediately before eating, or nearly eating, a chocolate or chocolate-related product. As 
such, the chocolate consumption data were not analysed. Analysis was however carried 
out on the thought-cue data.
Analysis of the different thought-cues reported by the resist and non-resist groups failed 
to show much variation, apart from some thoughts in the former group expressed in 
relation to reasons for chocolate being resisted (e.g. “I remembered that I was taking 
part in the study”). The thought-cue data related to reasons for eating, or wanting to eat, 
chocolate for both groups were therefore analysed collectively.
3.6.1.2.3 Most commonly identified thought-cues
In order to identify the most common thought-cues, each thought was first categorised 
under a context relevant heading. For example, the thought “[chocolate] was being 
passed around. Everyone was having some” was categorised under the heading “others 
eating”, whereas the thought “last day and I felt a bit stressed” was categorised under the 
heading “relax”. There were 16 categories formulated in total. All category headings 
consisted of a single word or short phrase which people would easily associate with 
‘chocolate’. Next, the total number of thoughts in each category were summed, giving a 
total for each of the 16 categories. The total number of thoughts experienced within each
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category was also separately calculated for males and females. Sometimes the food 
thoughts experienced related to two or more of the thought-cue categories (e.g. the 
thought “helped as a distracter with writing essay in the library” was included under 
both the headings ‘take a break’ and ‘bored’). Whilst both of these categories were 
entered into the overall total, only one entry per category, per participant, was included 
in the overall summation of the data (i.e. if a participant had reported three times that 
they had eaten or nearly eaten chocolate for reasons related to stress, this was reported 
as one under the stress category, not three). Calculating the frequency of the thoughts 
experienced using this method allowed for increased reliability when attempting to 
identify the most common thought-cues (i.e. the most common thought-cue were 
identified fairly across the whole sample as opposed to being attributable to just one or 
two participants).
■ Males
■ Females
Thought-C ue Type
Figure 3.2 Different types of thought-cues and the frequency of each reported by males 
and females and across the whole sample (N = 18).
The frequency data in Figure 3.2 shows that more participants experienced thought-cues 
about ‘sweet craving’, ‘temptation’, and ‘hungry/quick snack’. Others including,
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‘energy boost', ‘taste’, ‘others eating’ and ‘treat’ were also reported by at least seven 
participants. Males appeared to report thought-cues related to ‘temptation’,
‘hungry/quick snack’ and ‘energy boost’ more frequently than females. Females 
experienced more thought-cues related to ‘sweet craving’, ‘treat’ and ‘others eating’.
3.6.1.2.4 Method o f choosing five thought-cue categories
From the seven highest reported thought-cues shown in Figure 3.2, an attempt was made 
to identify five (a more manageable number to include in SRHI and LDT measures) 
which most people would commonly associate with ‘chocolate’. When choosing the five 
thought-cue words/short phrases, their appropriateness to being used with the 
mindfulness cognitive defusion strategy was also taken into consideration. As ‘sweet 
craving’ was the highest reported thought-cue it was considered important that this was 
included as one of the chosen five. However, a decision had to be made on whether to 
use the word ‘sweet’ or ‘craving’. Given that this category was related more to 
participants wanting something tasting ‘sweet’ after a meal, or as a snack, over actually 
‘craving’ chocolate, the word ‘sweet’ was the preferred selection. The categories 
‘temptation’, ‘hunger/quick snack’ and ‘taste’ were considered to be similar and related 
to ‘sweet craving’ therefore were not selected for this reason. Including categories 
which were too similar in meaning was something that was avoided.
The remaining highest frequency categories were ‘energy boost’ and ‘treat’. Both were 
included due to their high frequency. The fact that they were also similar to some of the 
other lower frequency categories such as, ‘tired’, ‘bored’ and improve mood’ also led to 
them being chosen (i.e. if these lower frequency categories were merged with ‘energy 
boost’ or ‘treat’ their already high frequency would have been even greater). The next 
obvious category to choose based on frequency rating was ‘others eating’. This category 
was however rejected on the basis that this short phrase could be applied to many things 
other than chocolate. It was therefore considered that this cue was too vague in its 
contextual meaning to be used. Instead the next highest reported thought-cue was 
included, which was ‘take a break’.
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Given that the chosen thought-cues needed to allow the use of the defusion strategy to 
work effectively, out of the remaining 16 categories, 'relax’ was deemed the top 
category choice. The word ‘relax’ was changed to ‘stressed’ due to the fact that it was 
‘stress’ which appeared to be directly causing participants to eat, or nearly eat, chocolate 
whereas relaxation was the by-product of the behaviour. The word ‘stressed’ was 
therefore considered a stronger category heading to describe the thought-cue than that 
originally used.
3.6.1.2.5 Identified goals
Each participant who took part in this pilot study wanted to reduce their current intake 
of chocolate. The study aimed to identify the goals participants had in terms of why they 
wanted to reduce their chocolate consumption.
3.6.1.2.5.1 Reasons for wanting to reduce chocolate consumption 
Using the same sample of participants (N = 18), each was asked the question: “Why do 
you want to reduce the amount of chocolate you currently consume?” Figure 3.3 shows 
the different reasons given and their rate of frequency reported across the whole sample. 
Gender differences were also analysed.
191
■ Males
Females
Cost Frequency Quantity Weight Health 
Goal Type
Figure 3.3 Types o f goals and the number of each goal reported by males and females 
and across the whole sample (N = 18).
Figure 3.3 shows that there were five goals identified in total; cost (e.g. spending too 
much on money on chocolate), frequency (e.g. chocolate eaten too often), quantity (e.g. 
too much chocolate eaten), weight (e.g. increased fat), and health (e.g. can cause 
diabetes). The two most commonly identified goals were weight and health. Females 
reported these equally as reasons for wanting to reduce chocolate consumption. Males 
reported these goals slightly less, but were still the highest reported goals across the five 
identified. Frequency and quantity were considered to be underlying factors related to 
both weight and health. Given their high frequency ratings, these two goals (weight and 
health) were chosen for use in the current study.
3.6.1.2.6 Main observations
The main findings were that in the sample tested, the most common chocolate-related 
thought-cues were associated with needing something sweet, needing a treat, needing an 
energy boost, taking a break and being stressed. The most frequently reported reasons
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for wanting to reduce chocolate consumption were linked to health and weight factors. 
Males reported slightly different thought-cues and goals compared to females. To limit 
variation in the data it was therefore suggested that only females should be recruited in 
the current study (Study Three).
3.6.2 Pilot study two
Given the small sample size of Pilot Study One (N = 20), the aim of the second pilot 
study was to check the strength of association between the previously identified 
chocolate-related thought cues and the word ‘chocolate’. Thus, the purpose of Pilot 
Study Two was to confirm the reliability of the findings from Pilot Study One prior to 
the SRHI and LDTs being constructed. The study involved a large sample of 
participants completing a series of different word association tasks.
3.6.2.1 Method
3.6.2.1.1 Participants
The study involved 280 students ( 8 6  males, 194 females) from Swansea University. 
Participants were recruited via opportunity sampling. This was achieved using three 
methods; by inviting the participation of 1 ) students seated within large open work areas 
in the University’s library, 2) students attending psychology lectures, and 3) psychology 
PhD students available within the research department. Over half (n = 180) of the 
sample was recruited via method 1. The study had no specified inclusion criterion and 
participants took part on a voluntary basis. The study received ethical approval from 
Swansea University’s Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee.
3.6.2.1.2 Design
The study employed a between-subjects design with 14 conditions. The conditions either 
included single words (chocolate, sweet, treat, energy boost, take a break, relax, 
stressed, energy) or short phrases (need something sweet, need a treat, need an energy 
boost, need a break, need to relax, need energy). Participants were allocated to one of
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the 14 conditions using a single blind randomisation protocol. A total of 20 participants 
completed each condition. The identity of participating individuals was safeguarded via 
the use of numerical identification codes.
3.6.2.1.3 Materials and apparatus
3.6.2.1.3.1 Word association task 
For each condition of the word association task a single sheet of A4 paper was used (see 
appendix V). At the start of the word association task participants were asked to state 
their gender by circling the correct corresponding letter (i.e. F for female and M for 
male). Next was written the statement “Please list in the space below all single words or
short phrases that you associate with the word/short phrase.....................Please take as
much time as you need”. Relevant examples were provided for each condition to 
illustrate what was meant by a ‘single word’ or ‘short phrase’. For example, for the 
‘chocolate’ word condition ‘craving’ was given as a relevant example of a single word 
whereas ‘on a diet’ was given as a relevant example of a short phrase.
3.6.2.1.4 Procedure
Prior to giving written consent, participants were verbally briefed about what the study 
entailed. Specifically participants were told, “You will be asked to list as many single 
words or short phrases that you personally associate with a particular word or short 
phrase that will be highlighted in bold on the sheet of paper given to you”. It was 
emphasised to participants that any associations made should be meaningful to them as 
opposed to being general associations. Participants were left alone to complete the task. 
No time limit was enforced. The researcher collected the completed word association 
sheets and participants were verbally debriefed, thus informed of the intentions and 
purposes behind the research being carried out. Finally, the participants were thanked 
for taking part in the study.
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3.6.2.2 Results
Each of the 14 conditions (either single words or short phrases) was completed by 20 
different participants (i.e. no participant completed more than one of the conditions).
3.6.2.2.1 Measuring associations
In order to measure participants’ association between thought-cues and chocolate, the 
number of times the word chocolate was recorded for each individual thought-cue was 
summed (i.e. the higher the recalled frequency, the greater the perceived strength of 
association). Only if the specific word ‘chocolate’ had been recorded was it included in 
the analysis. Other words related to chocolate (e.g. sugar, sweets, candy) were not 
included. The reason for this was because the current study only utilised the word 
‘chocolate’ as stimuli in a lexical decision task. By limiting the analysis to the direct 
recall of the word ‘chocolate’ it was hoped that any associations found between the 
thought-cues and chocolate would be more reliable than measuring associations with 
chocolate-related terms.
3.6.2.2.2 Associations between identified thought-cues and the word ‘chocolate ’
Based on the findings of Pilot Study One, five thought-cues were explored. These were; 
sweet, stressed, energy boost, take a break, and treat.
Chocolate Association
Condition Yes (%)
Sweet 13 (65)
Stressed 2 (10)
Energy boost 8(40)
Take a break 1(5)
Treat 15(75)
Table 3.17 Frequency of associations between the different thought-cues and the word 
‘chocolate’ (sample total, N = 100; total per condition, n = 20).
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Table 3.17 shows that more participants made associations between ‘chocolate’ and the 
words, Treat (75%) and Sweet (65%). A large number of participants also associated 
‘chocolate’ with Energy boost (40%). Conversely, only a small number of participants 
associated ‘chocolate’ with Take a break (5%) and Stressed (10%).
Given that very few participants associated ‘chocolate’ with the word, ‘stressed’ yet 
some association to the opposing term ‘relaxing’ was evident (i.e. three participants 
wrote down this word during the word association task when presented with the word 
‘stressed’), it was decided that additional investigations were required in order to test the 
association between ‘relax’ and ‘chocolate’. Furthermore, some participants (n = 3 out 
of 8 who specifically wrote down energy boost in association with chocolate during the 
word association task) were noted to associate the piloted term ‘energy boost’ with the
90chocolate bar ‘Boost’. In order to rule out the possibility that chocolate was associated 
with this thought-cue due to the word ‘boost’ priming the participants’ association 
response, the thought-cue ‘energy boost’ was changed to ‘energy’.
All participants were told at the beginning of the study to record any single word or 
short phrase that they associated with the thought-cue they had been allocated. However, 
in an attempt to identify more personal associations between the thought-cues and the 
word chocolate, four of the original thought-cues (sweet, energy boost, take a break, and 
treat), in addition to the two new thought-cues (relax and energy) were re-piloted (using 
different participants) by writing the thought-cue in the style of a short phrase. Each 
phrase started with the word ‘need’ (e.g. need something sweet, need a treat, need 
energy). The word ‘stressed’ had been excluded based on previous data and was 
therefore not re-piloted.
20 In the word association task, these participants wrote on their A4 sheet that they associated the thought- 
cue ‘energy boost’ which the Cadbury chocolate bar ‘Boost’. It was thought that the association was not a 
result of energy boost being associated with chocolate, but that the association was caused by the thought- 
cue and this specific chocolate bar consisting of the same word; Boost.
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Chocolate
Association
Condition Yes (%)
Relax 2 (10)
Energy 1(5)
Need something sweet 15(75)
Need an energy boost 7(35)
Need a break 1(5)
Need a treat 15(75)
Need to relax 2 (10)
Need energy 2 (10)
Table 3.18 Frequency of associations between the modified thought-cue names and the 
word ‘chocolate’ (total sample, N = 160; total per condition, n = 20).
Table 3.18 shows that very few participants reported an association between the 
additional piloted thought-cues, relax and energy (both when written as a single word 
and as a short phrase), and the word ‘chocolate’. The thought-cues, ‘Need something 
sweet’ (75%), ‘Need an energy boost’ (35%), and ‘Need a treat’ (75%) were reported by 
the most number of participants when written as short phrases in comparison to when 
written as single words. Whilst ‘sweet’, when written as a short phrase (‘need something 
sweet’), was associated with chocolate by slightly more participants than when written 
as a single word (‘sweet’ = 13, ‘need something sweet’ = 15), ‘energy boost’ was 
associated with chocolate by slightly less participants when written as a short phase 
(‘need an energy boost’) compared to when written as single words (‘energy boost’ = 8, 
‘need an energy boost’ = 7). Similarly to ‘take a break’, the association between ‘need a 
break’ and chocolate was only reported by a small number of participants (‘take a break’ 
= 1, ‘need a break’ = 1).
3.6.2.2.3 Gender differences
Analyses were carried out to explore whether associations between the different 
thought-cues and the word ‘chocolate’ were affected by gender.
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□ MALE 
■ FEMALE
Figure 3.4 Effects of gender on the association between thought-cues and chocolate (i.e. 
the number of males and females to link chocolate with each single word and short- 
phrase thought-cue).
A chi-square test revealed that there was no significant difference in the percentage of 
males and females who reported associations between the different thought cues and 
chocolate (y2 = 12.68, df = 12, p = 0.393).
3.6.2.2.4 Association between the word ‘chocolate’ and identified thought-cues 
To determine whether the associations made between the thought-cues and chocolate 
could be reversed, 20 participants were given the word ‘chocolate’ and asked to list as 
many single words or short phrases that they associated with that word. The purpose of 
this was predominately for exploratory purposes only given that it was recognised that 
participants may not necessarily associate an identified thought-cue (e.g. treat) when 
presented with the word ‘chocolate’ despite possibly making an association when 
presented the other way around. The aim of this test condition was also to identify any 
associations with chocolate which had not been detected in previously conducted pilot 
studies.
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Chocolate Association
Condition Yes (%)
Sweet 9(45)
Treat 6(30)
Energy 1(5)
Relax 2 (10)
Stressed 0 (0)
Break 2 (10)
Table 3.19 Frequency of associations between chocolate and thought-cues (N=20).
Table 3.19 shows that when presented with the word ‘chocolate’ as opposed to a 
thought-cue, more participants recorded the cues ‘Sweet’ and ‘Treat’. The other four 
thought-cues were recorded by very few participants. Also, compared to Tables 3.17 and 
3.18, it appears that participants found it easier to associate chocolate to a thought-cue 
than to associate a thought-cue to chocolate. No novel associations with the word 
‘chocolate’ were identified when compared to results from previous pilots studies.21
3.6.2.2.5 Main observations
The main finding was that a higher number of participants reported an association 
between three of the five identified thought-cues in Pilot Study One (sweet, treat and 
energy boost) and the word ‘chocolate’, thus demonstrating the reliability of the findings 
in the previous pilot study. Interestingly, more participants reported an association with 
the word ‘chocolate’ when the thought-cues were written as a short sentence (e.g. need 
something sweet) as opposed to as a single word (e.g. sweet). Similarly to Pilot Study 
One, a higher number of females identified an association between the thought-cues and 
the word ‘chocolate’ compared to males, though no statistically significant gender
21 The thought-cues ‘take a break’ (75% recall) and ‘need a break’ (60% recall) were found to be strongly 
associated with the chocolate bar, ‘KitKat’. It was considered a possibility that the association had been 
derived from participants being aware of the well-advertised KitKat slogan (‘Have a break, have a 
KitKat’) as opposed to them making a genuine personal association between the word ‘break’ and 
‘chocolate’. In view of this, entries making reference to chocolate in this way were not included in part of 
the analysis.
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differences were evident. The findings also showed that both the thought-cues ‘sweet’ 
and ‘treat’ were most frequently associated with the word ‘chocolate’ when participants 
were asked to list as many personal associations with the word ‘chocolate’ instead of the 
thought-cue. Energy was only associated with ‘chocolate’ by a few participants. 
However, based on the moderate number of participants who had reported an 
association between ‘energy’ and chocolate, as shown in Pilot Study One and Pilot 
Study Two, it was decided that it would remain as one of the main identified thought- 
cues in the current study. In view of these findings, the current study used the three 
replicated thought-cues written as short phrases (i.e. ‘need something sweet’, ‘need a 
treat’, and ‘need an energy boost’) to measure automaticity and goal accessibility in the 
SRHI and LDT measures. A decision to invite only females to participate was finalised.
3.6.3 Pilot study three
The aim of this pilot study was to determine if a subliminal priming procedure using the 
identified thought-cues from Pilot Studies One and Two as primes was indeed, 
subliminal. Thus, the purpose of Pilot Study Three was to measure subliminal priming 
effects by identifying if participants could consciously see the thought-cues displayed in 
a lexical decision task. Furthermore, this pilot study aimed to explore whether the use of 
short thought-cue phrases (e.g. ‘need something sweet’), and the length of cue 
presentation time had an effect on participants’ ability to consciously process the cues’ 
displayed.
3.6.3.1 Measuring subliminal priming
Measuring subliminal priming typically involves the researcher asking the participant if 
they were able to recognise the flash (i.e. the mask replaced by the prime and then 
subsequently by the target word) presented on the screen. If appropriate, the researcher 
may also ask the participant if they were able to identify certain strings of letters as 
words or non-words. This is known as a ‘subjective’ measure (Cheesman & Merikle, 
1985). Subjective measures of awareness rely on participants’ self-reports of their 
perceptual experiences or conscious processing (e.g. they will be asked questions such
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as ‘did you recognise the word presented to you?’). Pilot Study Three utilised the same 
measuring design as that used by Cheesman & Merikle (1985).
3.6.3.2 Use o f short-phraseprimes
Whilst the majority of studies which have investigated the effects of semantic priming 
have shown convincing evidence that the meaning of a single word can be processed 
unconsciously (Bargh, Chen & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis, Bargh & Miedema, 2000), 
very few studies have investigated the priming effects of a short sentence (Draine & 
Greenwald, 1998). Draine & Greenwald predicted that a short two-word sentence (e.g. 
‘not evil’ or ‘not fair’) would be processed unconsciously and therefore it would be 
possible to obtain subliminal priming effects based on these phrase meanings. Contrary 
to prediction, their findings failed to show any evidence for unconscious processing of 
two-word sentence. Instead, the pattern of priming was determined by single-word 
components of these phrases. Draine & Greenwald therefore concluded that the 
cognitive unconscious is restricted to semantic processing of single, morphologically 
simple words and that more complex grammatical operations may require increased 
energy from working memory. Others have supported this, arguing that the priming 
effects of critical sentences may possibly result from activation triggered by any one of 
the phrase words (Balay & Shevrin, 1988; Fudin, 1986; Greenwald, 1992). This 
conclusion is reinforced by the failure to obtain phrase-level priming effects even with 
visible primes using relatively long (150ms) prime-target stimulus-onset asynchronies 
(SOAs; the time between the prime and the target word). From this study it is suggested 
that the context of a sentence is very difficult to process automatically and instead 
requires slow, conscious cognitive resources (Wason, 1959; Gough, 1965; Slobin,
1966). An alternate explanation could be that the semantics of a short sentence fall 
within the processing capabilities of unconscious systems, but the syntactic operations 
of combining the word ‘not’ with an adjective does not.
In contradiction to Draine & Greenwald’s findings, others have shown that the repetition 
of subliminal short phrases is effective (Conway & Bekerian, 1987; Sharkey & Mitchell, 
1985; Wentura & Brandtstadter, 2003; Wentura & Greve, 2004, 2005; West &
201
Stanovich, 1982) especially in relation to changing self-control related health 
behaviours, such as improving the success rates of people trying to quit smoking 
(Palmatier & Bronstein, 1982). Several additional experiments have also offered support 
to the notion that the unconscious is capable of processing complete sentences 
(Bronstein & Rodin, 1983; Kaplan, Thornton & Silverman, 1985). Such findings have, 
in part, been accounted for due to singular words being too unspecific to trigger priming 
effects compared to the use of sentences. Cohen & Farley (2008) also argued that a 
priming effect is found when using short sentence primes because humans have the 
ability to consciously process 40-60 pieces of information which is equivalent to this 
type of prime. Cohen & Farley did though also state that this is reaching the upper limits 
of a human’s cognitive capacity. Despite these findings, the literature on appropriate 
length of subliminal primes is inconsistent therefore no clear conclusions can be drawn. 
However, based on the greater association between short phrase chocolate-related 
thought-cues (e.g. ‘need a treat’) and chocolate in Pilot Study Two compared to single 
word cues (e.g. ‘treat’), it was considered important to pilot the subliminal effects of 
these short phrases. The short-phrases were each a total of three words. A mask (i.e. a 
procedure used to prevent participants from becoming fully aware of the priming event 
and/or the prime content) was also included in the lexical decision task. This was 
included because some have argued that when using a multi-word prime, the critical 
stimuli should always be presented using masking procedures in order to ensure that any 
measurable behavioural influences of the stimuli are indeed unconscious (Greenwald, 
1992).
3.6.3.3 Display time o f the cues
Previous studies have failed to explore the effects of a three-word short phrase in terms 
of semantic priming. Thus, with no other research to compare with, it is difficult to 
predict how long such cue phrases should be displayed for in order to allow for a 
priming effect to occur, yet still avoiding any conscious processing of the phrase itself. 
Calculating the correct presentation duration used in past lexical decision tasks have 
been based on assessing the time it takes for a word to be processed when reflected in its 
eye-pause (i.e. fixation time which is approximately 200-250ms). It has been identified
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that silent reading involves even more automatic word recognition (approximately 1 0 0  
ms) and also that many words can be processed during a single fixation, but typically 
they are thought to be processed by the end of the fixation (Wentura & Degner, 2010). 
Based on single word cues, current research has reported displaying the cues anywhere 
between 10 and 40 ms (Li, Paller & Zinbarg, 2008). The current study used three word 
cue phrases. It was therefore considered appropriate to use a longer presentation time of 
50ms given the increased length of the cue compared to a single word and thus the 
longer time needed for sufficient processing. Furthermore, 50ms, although being at the 
top-end of the range, would still allow the phrase to be processed before the fixation 
time lapsed.
i 3.6.3.4 Method
|
I 3.63.4.1 Participants
I
Data were collected from a total of 21 participants ( 8  males, 13 female) with a mean age 
of 21.48 (SD = 5.71). Participants were either students from Swansea University or
1i friends or family members of the experimenter. All participants took part voluntarily,
i
| had normal or corrected vision and were able to read English fluently. Participants were
|
| recruited via opportunity sampling. The study received ethical approval from Swansea
! University’s Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee.
3.63.4.2 Design
The study employed a between-subjects design with three conditions. The conditions 
differed in terms of the critical cue phrase presented in the lexical decision task. The 
three phrases consisted o f ‘need something sweet’, ‘need a treat’, and ‘need an energy 
boost’. Participants were alternately allocated to one of the three conditions using a 
single blind randomisation protocol.
203
3.63.4.3 Materials and apparatus
3.6.3.4.3.1 Lexical decision task 
A sequential priming paradigm adapted from Webb & Sheeran (2007) was used to 
measure the strength of association between the critical cue phrases and the target word 
(chocolate). The visual display and response recording for the lexical decision task were 
controlled by Cedrus SuperLab Pro (version 2.04) software. The task was presented on a 
Sony laptop computer with a 15.4 inch screen. Participants were seated 100cm from the 
computer screen. For the first six participants tested (age; M = 23.00, SD = 7.92), an 
experimental trial consisted of the following sequence of events; ( 1 ) presentation of a 
fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 1500 ms, (2 ) presentation of the prime 
phrase for 33ms, (3) presentation of a mask consisting of a row of 20 crosses (length of 
the longest prime phrase) for 225 ms, (4) presentation of a word/non-word until the 
participants responded, and finally, (5) presentation of a blank screen for 2000 ms as an 
inter-trial interval. The SOA was therefore set at 275ms. All trials were presented in a 
constant order. It was believed that the cue phrases were presented sufficiently fast so as 
to be outside of participants’ conscious awareness (Strahan et al., 2002). The results 
from the initial data analysis (n = 6 ) however revealed that the 33ms presentation time 
of the prime was too long (i.e. participants reported seeing part of the cue phrases). As a 
result of this, the task was amended by shortening the prime presentation time to 17ms. 
The rest of the sequence for the experimental trials remained unchanged. All 
words/phrases displayed were placed on the central vertical and horizontal axis. Words 
were presented in black, bold, size 35, Arial and lowercase font on a white background. 
Characters were between 4-6mm tall. All target words and non-words were matched to 
the word ‘chocolate’ based on word length. The non-words were pronounceable and 
obtained from a validated database (Rastle, Harrington & Coltheart, 2002).
The task commenced with a practice run consisting of eight trials. Next, participants 
completed the primed lexical decision task which consisted of one block of 2 0  trials (not 
randomised), including 1 critical trial, 9 neutral-word trials, and 10 non-word trials. On 
the critical trial, the word ‘chocolate’ was shown after being preceded by one of the 
critical cue phrases. These cue phrases were generated from the results of Pilot Studies
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One and Two. Two control trials were also included. One control trial presented the 
critical cue phrase (e.g. need something sweet) followed by a word matched to chocolate 
(e.g. aeroplane). The other control trial presented a cue phrase matched to a critical cue 
phrase (e.g. need something heavy) followed by the target word, ‘chocolate’. The 
neutral and non-words were preceded by both the critical and neutral cue phrases. All 
words and non-words were presented twice. The cue phrases were displayed four times 
in total, twice for each of the word trials, and twice for each of the non-word trials. 
Participants responded using a Cedrus RB-730 seven-button response box. Button 1 (far 
left) was pressed to indicate a non-word and button 7 (far right) was pressed to indicate 
a word. The labels ‘NW’ and ‘W’ were placed above the corresponding buttons to 
remind the participant of which buttons to press.
3.6.3.4.3.2 Written recall tasks 
Two written tasks (see appendix W) were completed after the lexical decision task. The 
purpose of these was to identify whether the subliminal priming procedure was indeed 
subliminal. At the start of the first task participants were asked to state their age and 
gender. Next, they were asked to write down any words/phrases they had seen during 
the computer task using an open-ended response format. The task specifically stated “In 
the space below, please list any words or short phrases you saw immediately BEFORE 
the row of X’s were displayed during the computer task. If you did not see any words or 
short phrases, please leave the space blank”. The second written task required 
participants to choose which of the seven phrases listed they had been exposed to during 
the lexical decision task. Only one of the phrases listed (the critical cue phrase) was 
previously presented to the participants, though they were not informed of this. Instead 
the task stated “Using the list of short phrases below, please circle which one(s) you saw 
immediately BEFORE the rows of X’s were displayed during the computer task. If you 
did not see any of the short phrases listed, please circle the response ‘none of the above’. 
The first of these written tasks were identical for each condition. The second of these 
written tasks differed between the conditions in order to include the condition specific 
critical cue phrase.
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3.63.4.4 Procedure
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to identify how well individuals 
are able to recognise words compared to non-words. They were also made aware that 
they would be asked to recall any words or short phrases they saw immediately before 
the row of X’s (i.e. the mask) were displayed. After given written consent, participants 
completed one of the three lexical decision tasks. The task lasted between 2-3 minutes. 
Next, participants completed the two written tasks one after the other. Before leaving, 
the participants were verbally debriefed and thanked for their participation.
3.6.3.5 Results
3.6.3.5.1 Initial stages o f choosing an appropriate cue presentation time 
Initially a test was carried out to explore whether the cue phrases were identifiable at a 
longer duration of 50ms display by two participants completing the lexical decision task. 
In the written recall tasks both participants correctly reported seeing all of the cue 
phrases, including the phrase as a whole (e.g. need a lift) as opposed to only one or two 
phrase words displayed in the computer task. As a result of this, the task was repeated 
but this time the cues were presented at 33ms and then at 17ms.
3.6.3.5.1.1 Cue phrases presented for 33ms.
Six participants (3 males, 3 females) completed one of the three lexical decision tasks in 
which the cue phrases were presented at 33ms. Each of the three tasks were completed 
by two different participants. The results from the open-recall written task showed that 4 
of the 6  participants (3 females and 1 male) reported seeing between 1 and 4 of the cue 
phrase words. This included a combination of both the first and third words in the 
phrase, though predominately the last word seemed to be most consciously recalled. 
Only one of the four participants correctly identified the critical cue phrase in the second 
forced choice written task.
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3.6.3.5.1.2 Cue phrases presented for 17ms.
With part of the cue phrases being correctly identified when displayed for 33ms, it was 
decided that this presentation time should be reduced. Displayed at the new time of 
17ms (this was the maximum display time capacity of the laptop used) the study was 
repeated using a new sample of 15 participants (5 males, 10 females). Each of the three 
tasks was completed by five participants. The results from the open-recall written task 
showed that 5 of the 10 participants (all female) reported seeing between 1 and 5 of the 
cue phrase words. Again, the majority of the words consciously recalled were the last 
word of the phrase. All of the five participants correctly identified the critical cue phrase 
in the second forced choice written task, though some also reported that they thought 
they saw some other phrases listed which were not actually displayed in the task. As a 
result, these findings informed follow-on studies (i.e. the preliminary study and the 
current study [Study Three]) to use the reduced display time of 10ms in an attempt to 
conceal the cues from conscious awareness.
3.6.3.5.2 Main observations
The findings from this pilot study showed that cue presentation at 50, 33, and 17ms 
failed to prevent conscious awareness of the short phrase primes. This finding was 
contrary to previous semantic priming literature (Li, Paller & Zinbarg, 2008), though 
this is the first study to explore the effects of a three-word prime. Thus, with no other 
research to compare to, it was considered important to amend the design of the priming 
paradigm so that they meet the suggestions of these findings. This entailed reducing the 
presentation time of the prime cues for the shorter duration of 1 0  ms and subsequently 
using a different computer for the delivery of the LDT in order to allow for the correct 
functioning of this new display time.
3.6.4 Preliminary study
The aim of this preliminary study was to test the validity of the final design for the main 
study (Study Three) based on the findings from Pilot Studies One, Two and Three. Both 
the SRHI and LDT measures were included.
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3.6.4.1 Method
3.6.4.1.1 Participants
The study employed a student sample of 54 participants (21 males, 33 females) recruited 
by sending an email to the undergraduate and postgraduate population at Swansea 
University. The mean age of the sample was 23.5 years (SD = 5.66). Of the 54 
participants recruited, nine reported that they were currently dieting in an attempt to lose 
weight. All participants were over the age of 18, were able to read English fluently, had 
normal or corrected vision and also had a desire to reduce their current chocolate intake. 
None had taken part in any previous study conducted by the researcher. Participants 
received either a remuneration of £5 or one psychology course credit for taking part. 
Ethical approval was provided by Swansea University Psychology Department Research 
Ethics Committee.
3.6.4.1.2 Design
The study employed a mixed-subjects design with two conditions (gender and dietary 
status).
3.6.4.1.3 Materials and apparatus
3.6.4.1.3.1 Demographic questionnaire
All participants were asked to state their age, gender and dietary status. Participants 
were further asked to provide a reason for why they wanted to reduce their current 
intake of chocolate (see appendix X).
3.6.4.1.3.2 Self-report habit index
Habit strength was measured using the self-report habit index (SRHI; Verplanken & 
Orbell, 2003). The SRHI consisted of 12 items. For the purpose of this preliminary 
study, the questionnaire was adapted in such a way that it referred to the habit of eating 
chocolate in response to the thoughts ‘need something sweet’, ‘need a treat’ and ‘need 
an energy boost’. Thus, three SRHI questionnaires were completed by each participant. 
Participants indicated their response on a seven-point scale ranging from 0 (completely
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disagree) to 4 (completely agree). Each of the SRHI measures were found to have the 
same high internal reliability score (coefficient alphas = .94).
3.6.4.1.3.3 Locus o f control scale
The locus of control scale (Rotter, 1966), commonly called the I-E scales was 
administered in its original 23-item forced choice (between two alternatives, ‘a’ or ‘b’) 
format (plus 6  filler items). For example, item 3 states; “a. One of the major reasons 
why we have wars is because people don’t take enough interest in politics, b. There will 
always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them". Responses of non-filler 
items were summed with a higher score signifying a greater external locus of control. 
Within the preliminary study, the LOC scale was used merely as a filler task.
3.6.4.1.3.4 Lexical decision task
The lexical decision tasks were the same as those used in Pilot Study Three (see section 
3.6 .3.4.3.1) except that the block of 20 trials were randomised. Cue phrases were also 
only displayed for the duration of 10ms. In order to achieve this, a different computer 
(desktop) which had a refresh rate of lOOhtz, was used. The dependent variable was the 
mean reaction time in response to the critical trial compared to the mean reaction time in 
response to the two control trials. Only trials to which participants responded correctly 
were used in the analysis.
3.6.4.1.3.5 Cue-phrase recall task
The same open-ended task as Pilot Study Three (see section 3.6.3.4.3.2) was used to 
identify if the cue-phrases presented during the lexical decision tasks were consciously 
processed (see appendix W).
3.6.4.1.4 Procedure
Prior to taking part in the study, participants read the study information form (see 
appendix Y) and provided written consent (see appendix Z). Participants were tested 
individually in the laboratory. First, three SRHI questionnaires were completed. The 
order in which the SRHI questionnaires were completed was randomised for each
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participant. Next, participants completed the demographic questionnaire, followed by a 
filler task (locus of control scale). The purpose of the filler task was to try and prevent 
the participants from correctly guessing the aim of the study. Participants then 
completed three lexical decision tasks. Participants completed the three LDTs in the 
same order as they completed the three SRHI questionnaires. Lastly, the participants 
completed the cue phrase recall task. At the end of the study the participants were 
debriefed (see appendix AA), thanked for taking part and received payment. The study 
took approximately 15 minutes to complete.
3.6.4.2 Results
3.6.4.2.1 Participants
In total 54 students participated. After excluding four participants because they correctly 
identified either one or two cue words displayed in the lexical decision tasks, the final 
sample totalled 50.
3.6.4.2.2 Lexical decision task: computing scores
Three lexical decision tasks were completed. The target word (‘chocolate’) and the 
matched neutral target word (‘aeroplane’) were used in all tasks, though the critical cues 
(either ‘need something sweet’, ‘need a treat’, or ‘need an energy boost’) differed. The 
matched neutral word cues (e.g. need a holiday) also differed depending on the critical 
cue used. The non-words were identical for all three tasks.
Trial combinations Prime Target
Critical cue-critical response association need something sweet chocolate
Critical cue-neutral response association need something sweet Neutral
Neutral cue-critical response association Neutral chocolate
Filler trials Neutral Neutral
Table 3.20 Example of prime-target combinations used to measure dependent variables.
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Evidence of a priming effect was determined by measuring cue-response association 
strength. Cue-response association strength was indexed by participants’ response 
latencies to the target word ‘chocolate’ when it was preceded by the critical cue (either 
‘need something sweet’, ‘need a treat’, or ‘need an energy boost’). Strength of the 
neutral cue (e.g. ‘need something small’) and the target word (‘chocolate’) was also 
measured (control one), in addition to the strength of the critical cue (e.g. ‘need 
something sweet’) and the neutral target word (‘aeroplane’) (control two). The latter two 
cue-response associations acted as control trials. To obtain a measure of automaticity, 
the reaction time score (ms) for the critical trial (i.e. critical cue paired with the target 
word) was compared with both control trials. Lower reaction times indicated strong cue- 
response association strength (i.e. greater behavioural automaticity).
3.6.4.2.3 Lexical decision task: treatment o f outliers
For both critical and control trials across each task, errors and outliers were examined 
and excluded at the individual level (i.e. for individual reaction time [RT] scores). This 
was achieved by removing trials with errors (i.e. pressed the ‘non-word’ key when 
presented with a word or pressed the ‘word’ key when presented with a non-word). 
Across the whole sample (n = 50), four individual trials (out of 486) were errors 
(0.82%). An additional check for outliers (i.e. reaction time scores lower than 100ms or 
greater than 4000ms; Mogg, Bradley & Williams, 1997) was also conducted. No such 
outliers were detected. Means and SDs were then calculated for each participant for the 
three experimental trials (1 critical, 2 controls). Participants who responded +/- 3.5 
standard deviations from the mean were discarded (Ratcliff, 1993). In total, 13 
individual trials (out of 486) were identified as outliers (+/- 3.5 SDs), thus 2.67%. To 
avoid depleting the sample size to that which would not be experimentally viable, the 
participants were not removed from the data entirely but instead removed as individual 
values within the dataset. Outliers were removed in order to avoid biasing subsequent 
analyses.
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3.6.4.2.4 Strength o f cue-response association
3.6.4.2.4.1 Analysis o f individual reaction time scores fo r  critical and control 
trials across each o f the three lexical decision tasks.
The mean and SDs calculated for each trial type (critical trial, control one, and control 
two) are displayed in Table 3.21.
Trial types n Mean SD
Sweet Critical 49 598.08 275.29
Control one 49 535.92 160.50
Control two 50 612.78 233.43
Treat Critical 49 604.33 274.46
Control one 50 596.82 247.28
Control two 47 629.72 297.16
Energy Boost Critical 49 609.18 300.88
Control one 48 609.40 274.62
Control two 48 585.88 179.60
Table 3.21 Mean response latencies and standard deviations comparing the critical trial 
with the control trials individually across the three lexical decision tasks (sweet, treat 
and energy boost).
A series of within-subject t-tests comparing the strength of cue-response association 
between the critical trial and each of the control trials were carried out for each lexical 
decision task (sweet, treat and energy boost). The results showed no statistically 
significant difference between any of the cue-response pairs analysed; sweet: critical- 
control one, t (47) = 1.173, p = 0.247, cohen’s d = 0.28, critical-control two, t (48) = 
0.103, p = 0.918, cohen’s d = -0.06; treat: critical-control one, t (48) = 0.522, p = 0.604, 
cohen’s d = 0.03, critical-control two, t (45) = 0.423, p = 0.674, cohen’s d = -0.09; 
energy boost: critical-control one, t (46) = 0.775, p = 0.442, cohen’s d = -0.00, critical- 
control two, t (46) = 0.037, p = 0.971, cohen’s d = 0.09.
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3.6.4.2.4.2 Analysis o f averaged reaction time scores fo r  critical and control 
trials across the three tasks.
The mean and SDs calculated for each trial type (critical trial, control one, and control 
two) are displayed in Table 3.22.
Trial types n Mean SD
Critical 47 590.24 207.56
Control one 48 571.19 149.65
Control two 45 600.32 156.03
Table 3.22 Mean response latencies and standard deviations comparing the averaged 
reaction times of the critical trial with the control trials across the three lexical decision 
tasks (sweet, treat, energy boost).
Within-subject t-tests comparing the strength of cue-response association between the 
critical trial and each of the control trials revealed no significant difference between the 
critical trial and control one, t (44) = 0.171, p = 0.865, cohen’s d  = 0.11, or between the 
critical trial and control two, t (42) = 0.479, p = 0.634, cohen’s d = -0.05.
3.6.4.2.5 Relationship between self-report measure o f  automaticity and RT scores 
Self-Report Habit Index (SRHI) measures were employed to obtain a second measure of 
automaticity (with the first measure of automaticity being RT scores on the lexical 
decision tasks). Bivariate correlations (Pearson) between cue-response association 
strength (control two trial minus the critical trial; i.e. critical cue-neutral response minus 
critical cue-critical response) and the three sets of SRHI scores (need something sweet, 
need a treat, need an energy boost) were calculated for each lexical decision task 
separately and shown in Table 3.23. A calculation of the control two trial minus the 
critical trial was used instead of raw RT scores in order to control for some participants 
responding faster than others overall. It was predicted that higher SRHI scores would be 
significantly positively correlated with reaction time performance on the critical trial 
(control two minus critical) of the corresponding lexical decision task.
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Strength of Cue-Response (RT) n SRHI score
Sweet - Control two minus Critical 49
Sweet
-0.248
Treat Energy
Treat - Control two minus Critical 46 -0.116 •
Energy Boost - Control two minus Critical 47 • 0.006
Table 3.23 Pearson correlations between the RT score of the critical trial (control two 
minus critical) for each individual lexical decision task and SRHI scores for the 
corresponding critical cue (either sweet, treat, or energy boost).
Table 3.23 shows that none of the variables correlated significantly. These findings 
suggest that self-reported habit scores and RT scores on the critical trials (control two 
minus critical) failed to act as complimentary measures of automaticity. This was 
contrary to prediction. Furthermore, only the relationship between performance on the 
lexical decision task and the SRHI for ‘energy boost’ was in the predicted direction. The 
correlation was however extremely small, effectively indicating no correlation between 
the variables.22
22 The correlation analysis was also repeated by including 1) only SRHI items measuring automaticity (i.e. 
items 2,3,5,8 and 10), 2) participants highest SRHI score across the three measures (sweet, treat, and 
energy boost) and the RT of the critical trial (control two minus critical) which corresponded to the SRHI 
scale of which the highest level of automaticity was scored, and 3) the latter repeated but including only 
SRHI items measuring automaticity. None of the correlations reached statistical significance. Correlations 
ranged between -0.299 to 0.526. Furthermore, to rule out the possibility that the insignificant findings 
were cause by chocolate consumption not being an automatic behaviour in response to the different 
thought cues for many of the participants, the analysis was conducted by including only participants who 
indicated high automaticity (i.e. scored above 24 on the SRHI; Lally, Van, Jaarsveld, Potts & Wardle, 
2010). The new n values for the thought cues were; sweet = 29, treat = 32, energy boost = 27. Again, no 
significant correlations were evident between SRHI scores (above 24 only) and the strength of the cue- 
response (RT, control two minus critical trial). Correlations ranged between -0.150 and 0.247.
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3.6.4.2.6 Repetition o f section 'strength o f cue-response association ’ including only 
those participants who scored over 24 on the SRHI measures.
3.6.4.2.6.1 Analysis o f individual reaction time scores fo r  critical and control 
trials across each o f the three lexical decision tasks.
Given that there were no significant differences found when comparing the strength of 
the cue-response association between the critical and the control trials across the whole 
sample, the data were re-analysed using only those who reported high automaticity for 
the behaviour, eating chocolate. It was acknowledged that the non-significant 
differences previously reported may be due to the fact that, for some participants, eating 
chocolate was not automatic. Thus, including those individuals who reported high 
automaticity was expected to provide more reliable and informative findings.
The mean and SDs calculated for each trial type (critical trial, control one, and control 
two) are displayed in Table 3.24.
Trial types n Mean SD
Sweet Critical 29 621.14 330.08
Control one 29 511.72 149.37
Control two 29 573.52 178.41
Treat Critical 31 610.26 300.22
Control one 32 594.63 229.02
Control two 30 648.97 318.05
Energy Boost Critical 26 611.08 311.77
Control one 26 607.81 286.89
Control two 26 567.35 152.37
Table 3.24 Mean response latencies and standard deviations comparing the critical trial 
with the control trials individually across the three lexical decision tasks (sweet, treat 
and energy boost) including only those who scored highly (24 or above) on the SRHI 
measures.
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A series of within-subject t-tests comparing the strength of cue-response association 
between the critical trial and each of the control trials were carried out for each lexical 
decision task (sweet, treat and energy boost). The results showed significant differences 
between; sweet: critical-control one, t (28) = 2.164, p = 0.041, cohen’s d = 0.43, and 
treat: critical-control one, t (31) = 2.030, p = 0.051, cohen’s d = 0.06. No significant 
differences were found between the following paired analyses: sweet: critical-control 
two, t (28) = 1.001, p = 0.325, cohen’s d=  0.18; treat: critical-control two, t (31) = 
0.684, p = 0.499, cohen’s d = -0.13; energy boost: critical-control one, t (26) = 1.993, p 
= 0.057, cohen’s d = 0.01, critical-control two, t (26) = 0.919, p = 0.366, cohen’s d = 
0.18, though the critical-control one trial analysis for ‘energy boost’ was nearing 
significance.
3.6.4.2.6.2 Analysis o f averaged reaction time scores fo r  critical and control 
trials across the three tasks.
The mean and SDs calculated for each averaged trial type (critical trial, control one, and 
control two) are displayed in Table 3.25.
Trial types n Mean SD
Critical 27 604.85 185.32
Control one 31 574.35 162.49
Control two 24 589.79 162.08
Table 3.25 Mean response latencies and standard deviations comparing the averaged 
reaction times of the critical trial with the control trials across the three lexical decision 
tasks (sweet, treat, energy boost) including only those who scored highly (24 or above) 
on the SRHI measures.
A within-subject t-tests comparing the strength of cue-response association between the 
critical trial and each of the control trials revealed no statistically significant difference 
between the critical trial and control one, t (34) = 1.008, p = 0.321, cohen’s d — 0.18, or 
between the critical trial and control two, t (32) = 0.098, p = 0.923, cohen’s d = 0.09.
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3.6.4.2.7 Reasons for wanting to reduce chocolate consumption
Participants were asked to provide a reason for why they wanted to reduce the amount 
of chocolate they currently consume. Analysis of this qualitative data showed that the 
reasons could be categorised under three distinct headings; health (n = 41), weight (n =
18) and cost (n = 8 ). Some participants provided more than one reason, thus their answer 
was categorised under each related heading. Three participants failed to provide ‘actual’ 
reasons for wanting to reduce chocolate consumption, instead only general statements 
about their chocolate eating habits were provided (e.g. I frequently eat chocolate and 
want to reduce eating it to only once a week).
3.6.4.2.8 Effects o f sex and dietary status on self-report and behavioural automaticity 
scores.
Analyses were carried out to identify the effects of participant sex and dietary status on 
self-report (SRHI) and behavioural automaticity scores (lexical decision task RTs).
Females (n=31) Currently Dieting (n=7) Not Dieting (n—24)
SRHI-Sweet 26.43 (11.96) 29.33 (10.89)
SRHI-Treat 26.14(11.28) 28.33 (11.82)
SRHI-Energy 25.00 (9.92) 25.70(11.01)
Critical Trial-Sweet 485.57 (88.08) 614.33 (316.42)
Critical Trial-Treat 575.29 (202.43) 546.75 (211.77)
Critical Trial-Energy 514.71 (89.94) 586.04 (258.59)
Males (n=19) Currently Dieting (n=2) Not Dieting (h—1 7)
SRHI-Sweet 17.50 (4.95) 25.65 (12.55)
SRHI-Treat 18.00 (4.24) 26.06(11.40)
SRHI-Energy 20.00 (1.41) 21.29(12.16)
Critical Trial-Sweet 652.50 (81.32) 616.13 (367.06)
Critical Trial-Treat 590.00 (29.70) 705.19(373.19)
Critical Trial-Energy 665.00 (155.56) 678.25 (414.46)
Table 3.26 Means (and SDs) on the SRHI and critical trial RT measures according to 
sex and diet status.
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A 2-way MANOVA (with the three individual SRHI measures and critical trial RT 
scores for sweet, treat and energy boost) showed no significant main effects of sex 
(SRHI-sweet, F (1, 46) = 1.621, p = 0.210; SRHI-treat, F (1, 46) = 1.162, p = 0.287; 
SRHI-energy, F (1, 46) = 1.261, p = 0.268; critical trial-sweet, F (1, 46) = 0.231, p = 
0.633; critical trial-treat, F (1, 46) = 0.368, p = 0.547; critical trial-energy, F (1, 46) = 
0.745, p = 0.393) or diet status (SRHI-sweet, F (1, 46) = 1.127, p = 0.294; SRHI-treat, F 
(1, 46) = 0.984, p = 0.327; SRHI-energy, F (1, 46) = 0.032, p = 0.860; critical trial- 
sweet, F (1, 46) = 0.032, p = 0.860; critical trial-treat, F (1, 46) = 0.031, p = 0.860; 
critical trial-energy, F (1, 46) = 0.074, p = 0.787) on any measure. There were 
insufficient number is each cell (males = 19, females = 31, dieting = 9, not dieting = 41) 
in order to carry out further tests for interactions."
3.6.4.2.9 Main obsemations
The main findings from this preliminary study suggested that the analysis of the strength 
of cue-response association was partially supported. Only when presented with the cues 
‘need something sweet’ and ‘need a treat’ did participants respond significantly faster on 
the critical trial compared to the control two trial. These findings suggest that 
participants responded more automaticity when the critical cue (e.g. need something 
sweet) preceded the word ‘chocolate’ compared to when the critical cue preceded a 
neutral word (e.g. aeroplane). None of the participants responded significantly faster to 
the critical trial compared to the control two trial. Reaction time scores were however 
relatively similar across all trial types. Furthermore, the findings showed no significant 
relationship between the SRHI measure and reaction time scores on the LDTs, 
suggesting that habit strength did not correlate with the LDT measure of automaticity. 
Further investigation is needed to confirm this. The results also suggested that the SRHI 
and LDT may be measuring two different things given that contrary to prediction, higher 
SRHI scores were not significantly positively correlated with reaction time performance
For exploratory purposes only, the analysis was repeated but looking at both males (n=T9) and current 
dieters (n=9) despite the reduced sample sizes. The findings were more varied compared to when these 
participants were excluded from the analysis. It was therefore suggested that only females should be 
recruited to follow-on studies.
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on the critical trial (control two minus critical) of the corresponding lexical decision 
task.
Despite this preliminary study not producing findings consistent with predictions, the 
sample size used in this preliminary study was considerably smaller than that used in the 
main study (Study Three). The recruitment criteria were also made more stringent to 
avoid variation within the data. In view of these changes, the originally designed SRHI 
and LDT measures was used in Study Three in an attempt to answer the question; how 
does a mindfulness-based cognitive defusion strategy work?
3.7 Reminder of the aims and hypotheses of the current study
The first aim of the current study (Study Three) was to demonstrate the reliability of the 
previous study by replicating the findings. Study Two showed support for the hypothesis 
that cognitive defusion works by interrupting automatic links between chocolate 
consumption and thoughts that cue chocolate consumption. The second aim of the 
current study was to further investigate how cognitive defusion changed the self-control 
related health behaviour, resisting chocolate. This was achieved by exploring the effects 
of the defusion strategy on other measures of automaticity, alongside other potential 
mediators (Neal et al., 2012; Webb & Sheeran, 2007). It was hypothesised that cognitive 
defusion works by either (a) reducing automatic links between chocolate-related 
thoughts and chocolate consumption (i.e. weakens cue [thoughts] -  response [chocolate] 
links), and/or (b) by increasing the accessibility of competing goals in the presence of 
the cue (i.e. strengthens cue [thought] -  goal [health/weight] links).
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3.8 Method
3.8.1 Participants
Female students (N = 113) from Swansea University who expressed an interest in 
reducing their chocolate intake took part in a study on ‘chocolate eating’. Only those 
who met the inclusion criteria (i.e. female adults who were not pregnant or suffering 
from a medical condition which affected what could and could not be eaten) were 
invited to participate. On attendance of all four sessions, participants received a payment 
of £20. The study received ethical approval from Swansea University’s Psychology 
Department Research Ethics Committee.
3.8.2 Design and randomisation
The study employed a mixed-subjects design with three conditions (cognitive defusion, 
relaxation, and monitoring [task only]). Laboratory measures were taken at four separate 
sessions, conducted over a two week period. Participants were alternatively allocated to 
either the intervention or one of two control conditions using a single blind 
randomisation protocol.
3.8.3 Materials and apparatus
3.8.3.1 Questionnaires completed during Session 1 only (week one).
3.8.3.1.1 Demographic
Participants completed a demographics questionnaire asking for information regarding 
age and diet status (see appendix BB).
3.8.3.1.2 Behavioural goals
Two measures of behavioural goals were completed (see appendix CC). The first 
required an open response (“please give the main reason why you want to reduce the 
amount of chocolate you currently consume”) whereas the second required a closed 
response (“out of these two options [health and weight] which most closely relates to the 
reason why you want to reduce the amount of chocolate you currently consume?”). The
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purpose of these measures was to identify participants’ primary motivational factor for 
wanting to reduce their chocolate intake.
3.8.3.2 Questionnaires completed during Session 3 only (week two)
3.8.3.2.1 Need for affect scale
Maio and Esses’s (2001) Need for Affect scale comprises 26 items. The scale ranges 
from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree) and is used to rate the extent to which 
participants’ agree with items such as “I would prefer not to experience either the highs 
or lows of emotion” and “1 feel like I need a good cry every now and then”. The scale 
can be divided into measuring a person’s level of motivation to approach emotions and a 
person’s level of motivation to avoid emotions. A score on this scale was calculated by 
first, reverse scoring the negatively keyed items, and second summing the scores for the 
13 items assessing motivation to approach emotions and the 13 items assessing the 
motivation to avoid emotions separately. Higher scores represented higher levels of the 
attribute. To obtain a total NFA score, the scores from the ‘approach’ subscale were 
subtracted from the ‘avoidance’ subscale. The questionnaire was found to have only 
moderate internal consistency, with a Cronbach alpha score of .66.
3.8.3.3 Questionnaires completed during Sessions 3 and 4 (week two)
3.8.3.3.1 Self-report habits index
Habit strength regarding eating chocolate in response to either ‘needing something 
sweet’, ‘needing a treat’ or ‘needing an energy boost’ was assessed with the self- 
reported habit index (SRHI) (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). The scale comprises 12 
items. An example item measuring habit was “Eating chocolate when I need something 
sweet is something I do without thinking”. All items were measured on a five-point 
scale ranging from ‘I completely disagree’ (0) to ‘I completely agree’ (4). Coefficient 
alphas of the measure at baseline and at follow-up were .75 and .90 respectively, which 
indicated moderate to high internal reliabilities of this 12-item questionnaire. The items 
of each respective SRHI were summed to obtain an overall score.
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3.8.3.4 Questionnaires completed during Session 4 only (week two)
3.8.3.4.1 Need for cognition
The need for cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984) uses 18 items to assess 
individual’s tendency to engage in and enjoy thinking. Participants used a scale from -4 
(very strong disagreement) to +4 (very strong agreement) to rate the extent to which 
they agree with items such as “I only think as hard as I have to” and “I really enjoy a 
task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems”. A score on need for 
cognition was first calculated by reverse scoring the negatively keyed items. Next, the 
final score for each participant was calculated by tallying the individual scores from 
each of the 18 questions. Higher scores indicated a greater need for cognition. This 
questionnaire was found to have extremely poor internal consistency (Cronbach alpha 
score .32).
3.8.3.4.2 Suspicion probe
To explore participants’ suspicion about the main aims of the study, a brief 
questionnaire was completed (see appendix DD). Questions consisted of “Do you think 
you were in an intervention or control group?”, “Did you notice anything unusual about 
the chocolate in the bag?”, “How many chocolates were in the bag?” and “ Other than 
the amount of chocolate consumed, do you have any other ideas about what is being 
investigated in this study?”. The suspicion probe used in the current study was the same 
as that used in Study Two.
3.8.3.4.3 Measure o f strategy adherence
To identify participant adherence to using the taught strategy to help them resist eating 
chocolate, participants were asked the question; “How much did you use the strategy?” 
Responses were made using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (always) (see 
appendix EE).
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3.8.3.4.4 Self-reported strategy evaluation
Participants were asked to rate how helpful they found their participation in the study in 
terms of reducing their chocolate consumption using a five-point Likert scale (1 = not at 
all helpful, 5 = extremely helpful) (see appendix FF).
3.8.3.4.5 Additional adherence questions
Participants were asked to report the extent to which they kept the bagged chocolates in 
their possession over the five-days (1= not at all or hardly at all, 3 = nearly all the time). 
Additionally, participants were asked how sure they were that they had not missed any 
entry from the diary measures using a five-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all sure) to 
5 (very sure) (see appendix GG).
3.8.3.5 Measures o f chocolate consumption
The current study used the same two measures of chocolate consumption as those used 
in Study 2 (number of chocolates eaten from the bag and total amount of chocolate, in 
grams, recorded in the diary; see section 3.2.3.4.2). This study however used two 
chocolate diaries in total, one completed during week one and one completed during 
week two. The only difference between the diaries was that the diary completed during 
week one instructed the participant to eat chocolate as they ‘normally’ would (i.e. not to 
change their chocolate eating habits as a result of taking part in the study), whereas the 
diary completed during week two instructed participants to try to resist eating any 
chocolate or chocolate-related product, recording items only where they failed to resist 
eating chocolate.
3.8.3.6 Lexical decision tasks
The study employed two LDTs. One aimed to identify if different critical cues (i.e. 
thoughts) prime behavioural responses to the word ‘chocolate’. The other aimed to 
identify the strength of the association between these thoughts and goals for reducing 
chocolate consumption. There were three different versions of the critical cue prime task 
(need something sweet, need a treat, need an energy boost). For the goals task, there 
were six different versions, one for each of the critical cues corresponding to weight and
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one for each of the critical cues corresponding to health. The critical cues and 
behavioural goals used in the LDTs were chosen based on the findings of pilot studies 
previously conducted (see section 3.6). Participants completed only one version of each 
LDT which related most closely to them as an individual. The automaticity LDT was 
determined by participant's highest score on the SRHI measures (prime; need something 
sweet, need a treat, or need an energy boost). For the automaticity LDT, ‘chocolate’ was 
always used as the target word. The goal LDT was determined by participant’s highest 
score on the SRHI measures (prime) and the option selected on the closed goals measure 
(target word; health or weight).
3.8.3.6.1 Chocolate prime tasks 
The lexical decision tasks used were similar to those used in Pilot Study Three and the 
Preliminary Study (i.e. three individual tasks differing by the critical prime cue 
displayed, either ‘need something sweet’, ‘need a treat’, or ‘need an energy boost’; see 
sections 3.6.3 and 3.6.4) except that each task consisted of three blocks of 20 trials. 
There was one critical trial (i.e. the target word was shown after being preceded by the 
critical cue prime phrase [critical cue-critical response]), two control trials (control one 
-  a matched target word was shown after being preceded by the critical cue prime 
phrase [critical cue-neutral response]; control two - the target word was shown after 
being preceded by a matched cue prime [neutral cue-critical response]), seven neutral 
trials (a neutral matched target word was shown after being preceded by a matched 
neutral cue prime) and ten non-word trials (a neutral matched non-word target was 
shown after being preceded by a matched neutral cue prime). Thus 3/60 of the trials 
were critical with 50% words and 50% non-words. The purpose of the 51 filler trials 
which were unrelated to the target words (i.e. critical cues) was to disguise the tasks’ 
purpose. All trials were randomised within blocks and ran continuously (i.e. without any 
time breaks between blocks). Each task commenced with eight practice trials, followed 
by four buffer trials. There was a ‘participant controlled’ time break between the 
practice and buffer trials.
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3.83.6.2 Goal tasks
The goals LDTs were the same as the chocolate prime tasks except that the target words, 
filler words and non-words were changed. The target word was either ‘weight’ or 
‘health’ and all filler and non-words were matched accordingly in length.
See appendix HH for a detailed description of the different trials included in the 
chocolate prime and goal LDTs.
3.8.3.7 Intervention
The intervention drew on the mindfulness concept, cognitive defusion. The same written 
booklet, metaphor (e.g. mindbus) and practice exercise as that used in Study Two (see 
section 3.2.3.6) were employed.
3.8.3.8 Control
Two different control groups were used. In one group participants were taught the same 
muscle relaxation technique as that used in Study Two (see section 3.2.3.7). This 
technique aimed to help participants resist eating chocolate by taking the stress out of 
cravings and also by helping them to be in a physical and mental state whereby they are 
better able to deal with difficult situations. In the other group participants were told to 
simply monitor their chocolate eating behaviour. This strategy was also taught to the 
relaxation and defusion groups. Participants were told that although they should try their 
best to not eat chocolate resisting temptation is difficult, therefore if they do not always 
manage this they should record what chocolate or chocolate-related product they 
consumed in the chocolate diary provided. The purpose of this was to see if writing 
down what they had eaten helped them to resist temptation when they next experienced 
a chocolate craving. In order to match the control groups teaching material with the 
intervention groups teaching material, written instruction booklets were given to all 
participants (see appendices O, defusion; Q, relaxation and II, monitoring only). The 
relaxation group also completed a practice exercise in a similar manner to the defusion 
group (i.e. five minutes whereby they were asked to utilise the strategy). As a practice 
exercise was not considered appropriate for the monitoring only control group, these
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participants were given the same length of time (measured using a stopwatch) to 
complete a word search and anagram task. The words used in these tasks were the same 
as some of those used in the relaxation condition.
3.8.4 Procedure
The study was conducted over a 12-day period. Participants met with the researcher on 
each Monday and Friday. The study commenced on Monday of week one and concluded 
on Friday of week two. Participants were divided into three groups (cognitive defusion n 
= 56, relaxation n = 24, monitoring n = 28).
3.8.4.1 Week one— Monday (Session 1)
Participants first completed a written consent form (see appendix JJ). Next, participants 
were asked to provide demographic information (e.g. age and diet status) and also a 
reason for why they wanted to reduce their current chocolate intake. This acted as a 
measure of behavioural goals (i.e. what is driving them to reduce their chocolate 
consumption). Both an open and a closed response was required, with the open response 
being completed first. Following this, participants were given a ‘chocolate diary’ and 
provided with both verbal and written instructions (i.e. an example page) on how to fill 
it in correctly. Their task was to record all chocolate and chocolate-related products 
consumed over the next five days (Monday-Friday). Participants were told to eat 
‘normally’ during this period, therefore not to change their chocolate eating habits as a 
result of taking part in the study.
3.8.4.2 Week one — Friday (Session 2)
At this session, participants returned their chocolate diary. The researcher discussed 
each recorded entry with the participant to ensure that all the information had been 
recorded honestly and accurately. Further details were obtained from the participant 
where product details were vague or incomplete.
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3.8.4.3 Week two -  Monday (Session 3)
At the beginning of this session, participants completed a series of questionnaires. These 
consisted of three Self-Report Habit Index (SRHI) measures and the Need for Affect 
Scale (NAS). The order of the SRHI measures was counterbalanced within participants. 
The NAS acted as a filler task. The purpose of this was to distract the participants from 
making a connection between the SRHI measures and the lexical decision tasks. The 
NAS was also completed in order to allow the researcher sufficient time to score the 
three SRHI measures. The highest scored SRHI measure determined which critical 
prime lexical decision task was selected for each participant.24 The goals lexical 
decision task was selected based on which of the closed responses (health or weight) 
was circled by the participant. The two LDTs were completed in a counterbalanced 
order within participants. Next, participants were taught their allocated strategy 
(cognitive defusion, relaxation, monitoring) which they had been randomly allocated. 
Once the practice exercise has been completed and the task for the next five-days had 
been explained fully, participants were given a small bag of chocolates and instructed to 
keep these chocolates in their possession as much as possible until the end of the study. 
A second chocolate diary was also given to participants.
3.8.4.4 Week tM>o -  Friday (Session 4)
First, participants completed three SRHI measures. These were the same measures as 
those completed at Session 3. Next, a filler task, the Need for Cognition Scales (NFC), 
was completed prior to the completion of the two lexical decision tasks. Again, the 
LDTs were the same as those completed at Session 3. All questionnaires and LDTs were 
performed in an identical order to those at the Monday session. Lastly, the number of 
bagged chocolates was counted and recorded and each diary entry discussed again to 
ensure that the information was reported in full and without error. Participants also 
answered questions related to strategy adherence, in addition to completing a suspicion
24 If  a participant scored equally on more than one SRHI measure (e.g. a participant scored 21 for ‘need 
something sweet’, 21 for ‘need a treat’ and 16 for ‘need an energy boost’) the first high score measure 
completed in the counterbalanced order was used to determine which lexical decision task was selected.
In other words, if  the participant received the three SRHI measures in the counterbalanced order; need a 
treat, need something sweet and need an energy boost, and scored the same on the ‘treat’ and ‘sweet’
SRHJ measures, then the ‘need a treat’ version o f  the LDT would have been completed.
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probe measure. Before leaving, participants received payment, were thanked for taking 
part, and debriefed fully (see appendix KK).
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3.9 Results
3.9.1 Data screening
S. 9.1.1 Non-adherence to using the taught strategy
Two participants in the relaxation group reported that they did not use the taught 
strategy at all when they experienced a chocolate craving during week two of the study. 
Given that the study aimed to explore the effectiveness of using the different strategies 
on resisting chocolate temptation, these two participants did not allow for this to be 
investigated, and were excluded from subsequent analyses (N = 111; cognitive defusion,
25n = 57, relaxation-control, n = 26, no-task control, n = 28).
3.9.1.2 Suspicion probe
The suspicion probe data showed that two participants (one from the defusion group and 
one from the relaxation group) noticed that the comers had been cut on the bagged 
chocolates. These participants were therefore excluded. This resulted in 111 participants 
for the chocolate diary measure (n = 57 in the defusion group, n = 26 in the relaxation 
group and n = 28 in the no-task group) and 109 participants for the bagged chocolate 
measure (n = 56 in the defusion, n = 25 in the relaxation group, and n = 28 in the no-task 
control group). Being aware of these identification marks may have caused the 
participants to guess that the number of chocolates eaten from the bag was being 
monitored, and thus, a main dependant variable of the study.
3.9.1.3 Removal o f outliers
Outliers were first detected by identifying scores above or below 3.5 standard deviations 
(SDs) from the mean. One participant in the relaxation group was removed from the 
sample due to their chocolate intake being 3.5 SDs above the mean (as measured by the 
chocolate diary during week two). No outliers were found for any questionnaire measure 
at either baseline or follow-up using this identification method. This resulted in 108
23 Smaller control samples were recruited in comparison to the defusion sample given that it was 
anticipated that some analyses of the data would consist o f the two control groups being combined, thus 
equalling similar numbers in both the experimental and control groups.
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participants in total (n = 56 in the defusion group, n = 24 in the relaxation group and n = 
28 in the no-task group).
Outliers were also detected by looking at the Lexical Decision Task (LDT) data. The 
treatment of outliers followed a four-stage process to ensure that the data accurately 
represented typical reaction time (RT) scores whilst still retaining a sufficient sample 
size to ensure the study was adequately powered. First, at the individual level (i.e. for 
individual RT scores) errors (i.e. incorrect responses, such as a ‘word’ being recognised 
as a ‘non-word’) were removed. Across the whole sample (N = 108) 50 individual trials 
(out of a total 4068) were errors (1.2%). The mean percentage of errors across 
participants was 1.23% (range 1 [2.78%] -  4 [11.11%]). For the 36 individual trials 
across both the prime and the goal LDTs (i.e. 18 trials for the prime task [9 for baseline 
and 9 for follow-up] and 18 trials for the goal task [9 for baseline and 9 for follow-up]), 
77 participants made no errors, 28 participants made one error, 4 participants made two 
errors, 2 participants made three errors, and 2 participants made four errors. Although 
errors were removed from the dataset and thus, from subsequent analyses, because the 
number of errors made were fairly low and consistent across the sample, no participants 
(i.e. complete data for the LDT amongst those who made errors) were excluded.
Second, individual trials with RTs <100 or >4000 ms were identified given that 
extremely low RTs cannot be valid in a lexical decision task, and extremely high RTs 
tend to reflect lapses of attention or a second thought about the decision. All participants 
scored between 100 and 4000 ms, therefore no outliers were detected using this process.
Third, means were calculated at the individual level for each trial type for the chocolate- 
prime and goal-target tasks at both baseline and follow-up (baseline; chocolate-prime - 
critical trial, chocolate-prime - control trial one, chocolate-prime - control trial two, 
goal-target - critical trial, goal-target - control trial one, goal-target - control trial two; 
follow-up; chocolate-prime - critical trial, chocolate-prime - control trial one, chocolate- 
prime - control trial two, goal-target - critical trial, goal-target - control trial one, goal- 
target - control trial two). No participants were found with extreme mean RTs (i.e. less
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or greater than 3.5 SDs) on the critical or control trials of the LDT, therefore no data 
were removed.
Fourth, the number of trials removed for each of the nine trial types (critical trial, 
control trial one, and control trial two, each repeated three times) for the two tasks 
(chocolate-prime and goal-target) at both time points (baseline and follow-up) were 
identified. The data showed that only one participant had 33% of data removed (i.e. 
exclusions of critical trial scores, not including filler trials), whereas the rest of the 
sample had 22% or less data removed from the different trial types. This suggested that 
there was sufficient data available for the majority of the sample therefore no data was 
justified for exclusion.
In addition to identifying outliers, histograms were created to check the normal 
distribution of the LDT data (i.e. reaction time scores). Histograms of participants’ mean 
reaction latencies showed that the data were satisfactorily normally distributed, with no 
detrimental skewness evident.
3.9.1.4 Summaiy
From the different data screening processes carried out, five participants were removed 
from the dataset in total (4 from the relaxation group and 1 from the defusion group). 
This reduced the original sample size N = 1 1 3 t o N = 1 0 8  (defusion, n = 56; relaxation, 
n = 24; no-task, n = 28).
3.9.2 Group demographics
Demographic information was examined to inform of any noteworthy baseline group 
differences which may affect later analysis.
3.9.2.1 Age and diet status
Demographic data for the sample were first examined for differences in gender and diet 
status using independent t-tests and chi-square tests of independence.
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Defusion Relaxation No task
(n=56) (n=24) (n=28)
Age (M, SD) 22.75 (6.45) 21.92 (5.73) 21.50 (4.10)
Currently dieting (% yes) 7.0 8.0 11.0
Table 3.27 Mean and standard deviations of age and percentage of diet status for the 
different groups.
For each of the three groups, participants’ age and current diet status were shown to be 
very similar. In support of this observation, three independent t-tests showed no 
significant difference in age between any of the groups (defusion -  relaxation, t (78) = 
0.547, p = 0.586; defusion -  no-task, t (82) = 0.934, p = 0.353; relaxation -  no-task, t 
(50) = 0.305, p = 0.762). Chi-square analysis also showed no significant group 
differences in diet status, %2 (2, N = 108) = 0.312, p = 0.856. The majority of 
participants were in their early to mid-twenties and not on a diet (i.e. not actively trying 
to lose weight by changing their eating habits).
3.9.2.2 Task adherence
3.9.2.2.1 Abstinence from chocolate
More than half (58.9%) of the participants in the defusion group, 41.6% of participants 
in the relaxation group and 53.6% of participants in the no-task group successfully 
remained abstinent from chocolate during the second week of the study. This was 
according to the bagged chocolate and diary measure.
3.9.2.2.2 Possession o f bagged chocolates
Participants followed instructions around keeping the bagged chocolates with them at 
‘virtually all times’.
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Defusion (n=56) Relaxation (n=24) No Task (n=28)
Most of the time 13.0 17.0 29.0
Nearly all the time 87.0 83.0 71.0
Table 3.28 Reported percentage of time the bagged chocolates were kept in the 
participants’ possession for the mindfulness and non-mindfulness control groups.
Table 3.28 shows that the majority of participants across all three groups kept the 
bagged chocolates in their possession nearly all of the time during week two of the 
study. No participants in either the mindfulness or control groups reported that they keep 
the chocolates with them ‘not at all or hardly at all’. All returned chocolates in the bags 
still contained the distinctive mark (i.e. indicating that no chocolates had been 
substituted).
3.9.23 Accuracy o f recorded diaiy entries
Participants were asked to report how sure they were that they had accurately and fully 
recorded all chocolate products consumed during week two in the diary provided. The 
majority of participants in all three groups reported being ‘very sure’ they had 
completed the diary in full and there were no unrecorded entries of chocolate 
consumption (cognitive defusion, 93%; relaxation, 92%; no-task, 93%). The remainder 
of the participants in the three groups reported being ‘fairly sure’ that all chocolate- 
products consumed had been recorded. Reasons including being under the influence of 
alcohol, not having access to the diary at the time of eating, or simply forgetting, were 
given. These participants were still included in the analysis given that they were mostly 
sure that the diary was completed in full, but were erring on the side of caution as they 
had been asked to rate honestly how sure they were that everything eaten was recorded.
3.9.3 Main analyses
3.9.3.1 Effects o f cognitive defusion on chocolate consumption (Aim 1)
To identify any effects of the cognitive defusion strategy on chocolate consumption 
relative to the control strategies (relaxation and no-task), chocolate intake for both
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measures (diary and bagged chocolates) were compared across the three groups. The 
diary measured chocolate consumption in grams whereas the bagged chocolates 
measured chocolate consumption in terms of the overall number of chocolates eaten. For 
the diary measure, participants were asked to record accurate gram weight of the 
chocolate or chocolate-related product consumed by looking at the products’ packaging. 
If exact gram weight was not given, participants were asked to provide the name, 
approximate size and brand of the product, allowing the research to obtain the gram 
weight from the brand website, or from supermarkets (e.g. Tesco).
Given that the data showed positive skewed distributions for both measures of chocolate 
consumption (bagged chocolate and diary), all analyses were conducted using non- 
parametric tests.
3.93.1.1 Diaiy
Table 3.29 compares chocolate consumption for groups practicing different mindfulness 
(cognitive defusion) and non-mindfulness (relaxation and no-task) strategies at baseline 
and follow-up. Chocolate consumption as recorded by the diary provides a measure of 
all ‘other’ chocolates and chocolate-related products (i.e. non-bagged chocolates).
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5
Mann-Whitney U tests showed no significant difference in terms of baseline 
chocolate consumption between the groups; defusion -  relaxation, z = -0 .8 6 6 , p = 
0.386, cohen’s d = -0.17; defusion -  no-task, z = -0.432, p = 0.666, cohen’s d -  0.21; 
relaxation -  no-task, z = -1.101, p = 0.271, cohen’s d = 0.40. At follow-up, all three 
groups consumed less chocolate than at baseline. The relaxation group was shown to 
consume the greatest amount of chocolate and the defusion group the least amount of 
chocolate. When looking at the difference in the amount of chocolate consumed at 
follow-up compared to baseline, contrary to prediction, the most reduction was 
evident for the relaxation group (-546.34). More in line with the pre-stated 
hypotheses, the least reduction in chocolate consumption was evident for the no-task 
group (-469.29).
Using change scores, two Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out to explore if  the 
identified reduction of ‘other’ chocolate consumed at follow-up compared to 
baseline significantly differed between the mindfulness (cognitive defusion) and 
control (relaxation, no-task) groups. The results showed no significant difference 
between either the defusion and relaxation groups (z = -0.441, p = 0.659, cohen’s d = 
-0.11) or between the defusion and no-task groups (z = -0.925, p = 0.355, cohen’s d 
= 0.29). These results suggest that practicing mindfulness (defusion) and non­
mindfulness (relaxation and no-task) strategies had a similar effect on chocolate
26consumption and therefore fail to support the pre-stated hypothesis. However, 
participants were told during week two of the study (follow-up) to resist chocolate, 
whereas they were told to ‘eat normally’ during week one (baseline). These change 
score analyses may therefore be concealing the effects o f the defusion task given that 
consumption was not compared under the same conditions (i.e. like for like). As a 
result, Mann-Whitney U-tests were conducted to identify if there were any 
significant differences between the groups in terms of the amount of ‘other’ 
chocolates consumed at follow-up only. The results showed no significant difference 
between the defusion and no-task groups (z = -1.220, p = 0.223, cohen’s d = -0.36).
A trend towards significance was however shown between the defusion and 
relaxation groups (z = -1.822, p = 0.068, cohen’s d  = -0.45) with the relaxation group
26 Non-significant findings were also found when the analysis was re-calculated with the control 
groups (relaxation and no-task) combined (n = 52), z = -0.341, p = 0.733.
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consuming more chocolate at follow-up (M = 52.01, SD = 70.26) relative to the 
defusion group (M = 25.18, SD = 47.93).
3.9.3.1.2 Bagged chocolates 
Table 3.30 compares the number of chocolates consumed from the bag for groups 
practicing different mindfulness (cognitive defusion) and non-mindfulness 
(relaxation and no-task) strategies at follow-up.
Number of bagged chocolates consumed
Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Defusion (n = 56) 0.82 2.36 0.00 14.00
Relaxation (n = 24) 1.75 3.50 0.00 14.00
No-task (n = 28) 1.00 2.37 0.00 1 1 . 0 0
Table 3.30 Comparison of mean (and SD) chocolate consumption (bagged 
chocolates) across the three groups (mindfulness [cognitive defusion] and controls 
[relaxation and no-task]) at baseline and follow-up.
Two Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out to compare the number o f chocolates 
eaten from the bag in the mindfulness (cognitive defusion) and the control 
(relaxation, no-task) groups. These showed a non-significant difference between the 
defusion and relaxation groups (z = -1.788, p = 0.074) and between the defusion and 
no-task groups (z = -0.703, p = 0.482). This suggests that the defusion strategy did 
not significantly help to reduce the amount of chocolates consumed compared to the 
control strategies (relaxation and no-task), and thus the pre-stated hypothesis were 
not supported.27
3.9.3.1.3 Total amount o f  chocolate consumed (bagged and non-bagged 
chocolate combined)
To identify the overall amount o f chocolate consumed (in grams) across the three 
groups, both measures of chocolate consumption (‘other’ chocolates and bagged
27 Non-significant findings were also found when the analysis was re-calculated w ith the control 
groups (relaxation and no-task) com bined (n = 52), z = -1.468, p = 0.142.
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chocolates) were summed. To calculate this, first the total number o f bagged 
chocolates eaten was re-coded from the total number o f chocolates eaten to the total 
amount of chocolates eaten in grams at the individual level. Chocolates from the bag 
each weighed approximately 9.5 grams.
Total grams of chocolate consumed
Defusion (n = 56) 32.98 (64.39)
Relaxation (n = 24) 67.85 (92.69)
No-task (n = 28) 62.04(109.13)
Table 3.31 Comparison of mean (and SD) total chocolate consumption (‘other’ 
chocolate and bagged chocolates) in grams across the three groups (mindfulness 
[cognitive defusion] and controls [relaxation and no-task]).
| Using Mann-Whitney U tests, statistically significant differences were not found
|
| between the defusion and no-task control groups (z = -1.162, p = 0.245, cohen’s d  =
j -0.32). The finding between the defusion and the relaxation group was however
nearing significance (z = -1.879, p = 0.060, cohen’s d  = -0.44).
i
fi
3.9.3.2 Effects o f  group on automaticity and goal accessibility (Aim 2)
Given that the analyses using change scores did not show a significant reduction in
i
| chocolate consumption by the defusion group compared to the control groups it is
i
difficult to accurately explore how cognitive defusion works to reduce chocolate 
consumption. However, when consumption of ‘other chocolates’ (i.e. diary measure) 
at follow-up only was explored, a trend towards significance in the predicted 
direction was evident. Thus investigations were still carried out to identify any 
effects the different groups (mindfulness and non-mindfulness) had on levels of 
automaticity and goal accessibility. Each is explored individually; first, automaticity, 
and second, goal accessibility.
3.9.3.2.1 Automaticity 
Automaticity was measured in two ways; 1) using reaction time scores (RTs) on a 
Lexical Decision Tasks (LDT) and 2) responses given on Self-Report Habit Index 
(SRHI) questionnaires.
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3.9.3.2.1.1 Lexical decision task 
This LDT aimed to explore the hypothesis that cognitive defusion works by reducing 
automatic links between chocolate-related thoughts and chocolate consumption 
(chocolate-prime task). The task included one critical trial and two control trials. The 
critical trial consisted of the critical cue being paired with the critical prime. Control 
trial one consisted of the critical cue being paired with the neutral prime. Control 
trial two consisted of the neutral cue being paired with the critical prime. For this 
chocolate-prime task, the critical cue was the word ‘chocolate’ and the critical cues 
were either ‘need something sweet’, ‘need a treat’ or ‘need an energy boost’. Further 
details of the LDTs can be found in sections 3.6 .3.4.3.1, 3.6.4.1.3.4 and 3.8.3.6 .
G roup
Prim e Type Defusion Relaxation No-task Total %
Sweet 43.0 42.0 43.0 42.59
Treat 30.0 54.0 36.0 37.03
Energy boost 27.0 4.0 2 1 . 0 20.38
Table 3.32 Percentage of participants who completed each prime-type LDT for the 
mindfulness and non-mindfulness groups.
A chi-square test revealed that statistically, the percentage of participants who 
completed the LDT containing the critical prime ‘need something sweet’, ‘need a 
treat’ or ‘need an energy boost’ did not significantly differ between the defusion and 
control (relaxation, no-task) groups, %2 (4 ,N=  108) = 6.836, p = 0.145.
3.9.3.2.1.1.1 Chocolate-prime task 
Given that there was no difference between the two control groups for chocolate 
consumption, in order to make the interpretation of the results more clear the 
following analyses for the chocolate-prime task were conducted with the control 
groups collapsed to form a single control group.
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Defusion (n=56) Controls (n=52)
Mean (SD) M ean (SD)
Baseline
Critical Trial 506.14(142.82) 527.55 (187.59)
Control Trial One 512.23 (173.22) 493.63 (147.10)
Control Trial Two 564.37 (190.85) 551.97 (203.41)
Follow-up
Critical Trial 440.90 (69.35) 474.68 (138.13)
Control Trial One 456.59 (76.32) 472.97 (169.17)
Control Trial Two 478.46 (80.69) 491.59(134.01)
Table 3.33 Means and standard deviations of RTs for the critical and control trials in 
the chocolate-prime LDT at baseline and follow-up for the mindfulness and 
combined control groups.
A 2 (time; baseline, follow-up) x 2 (group; defusion, control) x 3 (trial type; critical, 
control one, control two) repeated measures ANOVA showed no significant main 
interaction between time, trial type and group, F (2, 212) = 0.193, p = 0.825, r | p2 = 
0.002, time and group, F (1, 106) = 0.911, p = 0.341, rip2= 0.009, trial type and 
group, F (2, 212) = 1.624, p = 0.200, r|p2= 0.015, or time and trial type, F (2, 212) = 
1.854, p = 0.159, r|p2= 0.017. There was also no significant main effect of group, F 
(1, 106) = 0.182, p = 0.671, r |p2 = 0.002 though, a significant main effect of time, F 
(1, 106) = 19.915, p = 0.001, r|p2= 0.158 and trial type, F (2, 212) = 10.823, p = 
0.001, r|p = 0.093 was evident. The means indicated that RTs increased at follow-up 
(M = 468.37) compared to baseline (M = 526.04). It is though probably that these 
findings represent practice effects. Furthermore, mean RTs on the critical and control 
one trials were similar (M = 486.81, M = 485.87 respectively). RTs on the control 
two trial was however slower in comparison (M = 521.59) suggesting that the 
control two trial was responsible for the main effect of trial type evident. Post-hoc 
analyses using repeated measure t-tests supported this assumption, showing 
significant differences between critical-control two trials, t (107) = 3.819, p = 0.001 
and control one-control two trials, t (107) = 3.752, p = 0.001. No significant 
difference was evident between critical-control one trials, t (107) = 0.384, p = 0.702.
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In summary, the findings show that practicing a mindfulness strategy (cognitive 
defusion) did not significantly improve RTs on the LDT compared to a control 
strategy (relaxation or no-task). Thus, the findings suggest that levels of automaticity 
in the defusion group were not weakened given that higher RTs, which represent 
slower automaticity following relevant chocolate-related primes, were not evident. A 
significant main effect of trial type was also found to be caused by participants 
recognising the word ‘aeroplane’ (i.e. neutral word) slower when preceded by the 
critical prime ‘chocolate’.
3.9.3.2.1.2 Self-report habit index scores 
As previously stated, the hypothesis that the defusion strategy works by reducing 
automaticity was measured in two ways; 1) LDTs and 2) Self-Report Habit Index 
questionnaires. The following analysis explores the latter of these two methods. Each 
participant completed three SRHI measures at baseline. These were then repeated at 
the follow-up time point. The SRHIs were tailored specifically to the behaviours; 
eating chocolate when I need something sweet, eating chocolate when I need a treat, 
and eating chocolate when I need an energy boost.
Defusion (n=56) Relaxation (n=24) No-task (n=28)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Baseline
Sweet 32.34 (8.28) 30.38 (9.51) 36.12(7.30)
Treat 31.20 (8.36) 32.21 (9.41) 33.82 (8.24)
Energy boost 25.73 (10.57) 24.46 (12.29) 28.75 (11.42)
Follow-up
Sweet 27.77 (8.71) 26.17(9.51) 29.21 (10.93)
Treat 26.96(10.27) 26.00(10.60) 28.89 (11.50)
Energy boost 22.82(11.14) 19.25 (11.28) 26.07 (13.30)
Table 3.34 Means and standard deviations of scores for the three self-report habit 
index measures at baseline and follow-up for the mindfulness and non-mindfulness 
groups.
A 2 (time; baseline, follow-up) x 3 (group; defusion, relaxation, no-task) x 3 (SRHI; 
sweet, treat, energy boost) repeated measures ANOVA also showed no significant
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main interaction between time, prime and group, F (4, 210) = 1.401, p = 0.235, r |p2 = 
0.001, time and group, F (2, 105) = 0.244, p = 0.784, r | p2 = 0.004, prime and group, F 
(4, 210) = 0.716, p = 0.582, pp2 = 0.004 or time and prime, F (2, 210) = 2.272, p = 
0.106, ripF = 0.044. There was also no significant main effect of group found, F (2, 
105) = 1.937, p = 0.149, p p2 = 0.003 though, a significant main effect of time, F (1, 
105) = 28.86, p = 0.001, r\p2= 0.224 and prime, F (2, 210) = 35.04, p = 0.001, r | P2 = 
0.369 was evident. The means indicated that SRHI scores decreased at follow-up (M 
= 25.97) compared to baseline (M = 25.97). This was in line with the pre-stated 
predictions. Mean SRHI scores for each prime (sweet, treat, and energy boost) also 
showed the most reduction for the ‘energy’ prime (M = 24.55) compared to the 
‘sweet’ prime (M = 30.33) or the ‘treat’ prime (M = 29.68). A series of post-hoc 
repeated measure t-tests also inferred that the main effect of prime was represented 
by a greater decrease in automaticity amongst those who reported an association 
between the thought-cue ‘need an energy boost’ and chocolate. This was 
demonstrated by significant differences between the primes; sweet-energy boost, t 
(107) = 7.876, p = 0.001 and treat-energy boost, t (107) = 5.905, p = 0.001. No 
significant differences were found between the primes, sweet-treat, t (107) = 1.290, p 
=  0 .200 .
In summary, these findings suggest that practicing a mindfulness strategy (cognitive 
defusion) did not significantly decrease self-reported automaticity scores compared 
to a control strategy (relaxation or no-task). A reduction in automaticity was evident 
at follow-up compared to baseline for all groups, though more so amongst
• 9 52participants who reported eating chocolate in response to needing an energy boost.
The null findings presented previously may have resulted from links between these 
chocolate-related thoughts (need something sweet, need a treat, and need an energy 
boost) and behaviour simply not being automatic for some participants. In view of 
this, the above analysis was repeated but this time using only the SRHI measure 
which each participant had scored most highly on at baseline.
28 These findings remained evident even when a bonferroni correction was applied.
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Defusion (n=56) Relaxation (n=24) No-task (n=28)
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Baseline
Highest SRHI score 35.23 (7.10) 34.33 (8.59) 37.71 (7.36)
Follow-up
Highest SRHI score 27.96 (9.35) 26.38 (10.45) 29.68 (12.02)
Table 3.35 Means and standard deviations of the most highly scored self-report habit 
index measure at baseline and follow-up for the mindfulness and non-mindfulness 
groups.
A 2 (time; baseline, follow-up) x 3 (group; defusion, relaxation, no-task) repeated 
measures ANOVA showed no significant time x group interaction, F (2, 105) = 
0.070, p = 0.932, r|p2= 0.001 or main effect of group, F (2, 105) = 1.365, p = 0.260, 
rjp2 = 0.025. A significant main effect of time, F (1, 105) = 55.12, p = 0.001, r |p2 = 
0.344 was however evident. The means indicate a reduction in automaticity at 
follow-up (M = 28.06) compared to baseline (M = 35.68). The findings also suggest 
that practicing the defusion strategy did not significantly decrease self-reported 
automaticity scores compared to a control strategy (relaxation or no-task). It may 
therefore be concluded that excluding data suggestive of low automatic links 
between the tested thoughts and behaviour had no different effect on the overall 
findings compared to when this data was included in the analysis. The null findings 
therefore seem unlikely to be caused by some participants having non-automatic 
links between thoughts and behaviours. In summary, from analysis of the SRHI 
measure the scores suggest that the cognitive defusion strategy is not reducing 
automaticity between thoughts and behaviours.
3.9.3.2.2 Goal Accessibility 
Goal accessibility was only measured using a LDT.
3.9.3.2.2.1 Lexical decision task 
This LDT aimed to explore the hypothesis that cognitive defusion works by 
increasing the accessibility of competing goals in response to chocolate-related 
thoughts (goal-target task). Similarly to the LDT measuring ‘automaticity’, the task
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included one critical trial and two control trials. The critical trial consisted of the 
critical cue being paired with the critical prime. Control trial one consisted of the 
critical cue being paired with the neutral prime. Control trial two consisted of the 
neutral cue being paired with the critical prime. For this goal-target task, the critical 
cue was either the word ‘health’ or ‘weight’. The critical cues were the same as those 
used in the chocolate-prime task (either ‘need something sweet’, ‘need a treat’ or 
‘need an energy boost’). Again, further details of the LDTs can be found in sections 
3.6.3.4.3.1, 3.6.4.1.3.4 and 3.8 .3.6 .
3.9.3.2.2.1.1 Goal-target task 
Again, given that there was no difference between the two control groups for 
chocolate consumption, in order to make the interpretation of the results more clear 
the following analyses for the goal-target task were conducted with the control 
groups collapsed to form a single control group.
Defusion (n=56) Control (n=52)
Mean (SD) M ean (SD)
Baseline
Critical Trial 485.23 (104.01) 497.24 (130.99)
Control Trial One 473.93 (78.39) 485.83 (129.58)
Control Trial Two 506.58 (124.13) 518.40 (159.43)
Follow-up
Critical Trial 465.66 (90.71) 474.75 (92.14)
Control Trial One 468.24 (84.21) 468.01 (90.83)
Control Trial Two 464.46 (66.77) 485.43 (127.45)
Table 3.36 Means and standard deviations o f RTs for the critical and control trials 
for the goal-target LDT ([health or weight cue) at baseline and follow-up for the 
mindfulness and combined control groups.
A 2 (time; baseline, follow-up) x 2 (group; defusion, control) x 3 (trial type; critical, 
control one, control two) repeated measures ANOVA showed no significant main 
interaction between time, trial type and group, F (2, 212) = 0.363, p = 0.696, r|p2 = 
0.007, time and group, F (1, 106) = 0.013, p = 0.182, riP2= 0.001, trial type and 
group, F (2, 212) = 0.231, p = 0.794, rjp2= 0.004 or time and trial type, F (2, 212) =
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2.180, p = 0.116, r \ f  = 0.038. There was also no significant main effect of group 
found, F (1, 106) = 0.507, p = 0.478, r\p2 = 0.005 though, a significant main effect of 
time, F (1 , 106) = 7.488, p = 0.007, r\p2 = 0.066 and trial type, F (2, 212) = 3.309, p = 
0.038, rip = 0.046 was evident. The means indicated that RTs decreased at follow-up 
(M = 470.90) compared to baseline (M = 494.31). Although again, it is probably that 
these findings represent practice effects. Furthermore, mean RTs for all three trial 
types (critical, control one and control two) were fairly similar (M = 480.52, M = 
473.89, M = 493.41 respectively). RTs on the control two trial was however the 
slowest relative to the critical and control one trial. Post-hoc analyses using repeated 
measure t-tests to compare the critical and control trials showed only a significant 
difference between control one-control two trials, t (107) = 2.217, p = 0.029. No 
significant difference was evident between either the critical-control one trials, t 
(107) = 1.174, p = 0.243 or the critical-control two trials, t (107) = 1.528, p = 0.129.
In summary, the findings show that practicing a mindfulness strategy (cognitive 
defusion) did not significantly improve RTs on the goal-target LDT compared to a 
control strategy (relaxation or no-task). Thus, the findings suggest that accessibility 
o f goals in the defusion group were not strengthened given that lower RTs, which 
represent higher accessibility following relevant chocolate-related primes, were not 
evident. A significant main effect of trial type was also suggestive o f participants 
responding more slowly to a neutral word (e.g. family) when primed with a critical 
cue (e.g. need something sweet) than when a critical cue was primed with a neutral 
cue (e.g. need some money).
3.9.4 Exploratory analyses
Whilst it is acknowledged that additional analyses o f the data increases the risk of 
type 1 error, due to the novelty of the current research it was considered important to 
investigate the data fully given that the findings may usefully inform future studies 
and predictions. Exploratory analyse of 1) automaticity as a potential mediator and 
2 ) associations between automaticity and chocolate consumption were therefore 
conducted.
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3.9.4.1 Exploring baseline automaticity as a potential mediator 
Previous analyses suggested that a weak association between the thought-cues and 
chocolate consumption was unlikely to have a negative impact on the overall 
findings, though the effects of group on automaticity and goal accessibility were not 
in the predicted direction. It was therefore considered worthwhile to look at the 
SRHI scores and to categorise participants into two groups; those who scored more 
highly on the SRHI measure, and those who scored lower on the SRHI measure. 
Both categories were based on the SRHI measure that determined which LDT each 
participant completed. The divide between high and low levels of automaticity (i.e. 
habit strength) was based on baseline SRHI median split of 36 for the whole 
population. If a participant scored the median (36) they were categorised in the high 
automaticity group. To increase the sample size, the control groups (relaxation and 
no-task) were combined. The main purpose of this analysis was to see if  those with 
high habit strength showed what was initially predicted in terms of the pattern of 
RTs for the chocolate-prime LDT.
3.9.4.1.1 Effects o f  high levels o f  self-reported automaticity on task 
performance between the mindfulness and non-mindfulness groups.
High Automaticity
Defusion (n=27) Controls (n=32)
Baseline Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Critical Trial 475.60(106.63) 523.47(174.17)
Control Trial One 500.53 (119.35) 502.95 (163.34)
Control Trial Two 577.28 (248.81) 579.46 (246.64)
Follow-up
Critical Trial 441.31 (74.58) 485.98 (147.80)
Control Trial One 456.06 (58.26) 483.66 (167.98)
Control Trial Two 479.41 (92.03) 512.96 (154.25)
Tible 3.37 Mean and standard deviations (SDs) for baseline and follow-up RT 
scores for the prime LDT whereby the defusion and control (relaxation and no-task 
ccmbined) were divided into high automaticity based on SRHI median split scores.
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A 2 (time; baseline, follow-up) x 2 (group; defusion vs. controls) x 3 (trial type; 
critical, control one, control two) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted using 
high automaticity participants only. A time x trial type x group interaction was 
expected. The findings however showed no significant interaction between or time, 
trial type and group, F (2, 114) = 0.242, p = 0.786, time and group, F (1, 57) = 0.195, 
p = 0.661, trial type and group, F (2, 114) = 1.002, p = 0.370, or time and trial type,
F (2, 114) = 2.226, p = 0.113. Unlike group, F (2, 56) = 1.127, p = 0.331, a 
significant effect of both time, F (1, 57) = 6.155, p = 0.016 and trial type, F (2, 114)
= 12.902, p = 0.001 was evident.
The means indicated that RTs increased at follow-up (M = 478.06) compared to 
baseline (M = 527.29). Though, it is again possible that these findings represent 
practice effects. Mean RTs for the critical and control one trials were fairly similar 
(M = 483.55, M = 486.44 respectively). RTs on the control two trial was however 
slower in comparison (M = 538.03). Post-hoc analyses using repeated measure t-tests 
to compare the critical and control trials showed significant differences between the 
critical-control two trials, t (58) = 4.260, p = 0.001 and control one-control two trials, 
t (58) = 3.807, p = 0.001. No significant difference was evident between the critical- 
control one trials, t (107) = 1.174, p = 0.243.
In summary, these findings suggest that practicing a mindfulness strategy (cognitive 
defusion) did not significantly improve RTs on the chocolate-prime LDT compared 
to a control strategy (relaxation or no-task) when only high automaticity participants 
were included in the analysis. Overall, the findings were very similar to those which 
compared RTs on the chocolate-prime LDT scores the whole sample (i.e. including 
both low and high automaticity participants). These results therefore suggest that 
possessing stronger links between the thought-cues and chocolate did not 
significantly affect performance on the LDT.
3.9.4.2 Associations between automaticity and chocolate consumption 
To explore whether chocolate consumption was associated with levels of 
automaticity, correlations between the SRHI measures and chocolate consumption 
and between LDTs and chocolate consumption (at baseline) were carried out. 
Separate correlations were conducted for the chocolate-prime and goal-target LDTs.
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The main purpose of this analysis was to see whether, a) higher levels of chocolate 
consumption at baseline were associated with higher levels of automaticity at time 1 
(baseline), b) a greater reduction in automaticity was associated with a greater 
decline in chocolate consumption as shown via the chocolate-prime LDT, and c) a 
greater increase in the accessibility of goal-related thoughts was associated with a 
greater decline in chocolate consumption as shown via the goal-target LDT.
SRHI Automaticity Chocolate consumption
(baseline) (baseline)
Sweet .063
Treat .048
Energy boost .165
Highest scored SRHI .093
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed)
Table 3.38 Pearson's correlations between baseline SRHI scores for the three 
individual measures (sweet, treat, and energy boost) in addition to the SRHI which 
participants scored most highly on and baseline chocolate consumption.
Across the whole sample, SRHI scores at baseline showed no significant (Pearsons) 
correlations with the baseline diary chocolate consumption measure. The positive 
direction of the correlations however suggested that at baseline, higher levels of 
chocolate consumption were associated with higher levels of automaticity. The 
findings failed to reach statistical significance.
Furthermore, across the whole sample, baseline RTs for the critical trial on the 
chocolate-prime LDT (r = -.106) and goal LDT (r = -.129) showed no significant 
(Pearsons) correlation with the baseline diary chocolate consumption measure. 
However, both correlations were in the predicted negative direction. This suggests 
that respectively; (1) higher RTs, represented by decreased automaticity, and (2) 
lower RTs, represented by increased accessibility of competing goal cues (when 
primed which chocolate thoughts [e.g. need something sweet]) was associated with a 
reduction in the amount of chocolate consumed.
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To explore whether 1) a reduction in automaticity (SRHI and chocolate-prime LDT) 
and 2) an increase in accessibility (goal-target LDT) was associated with a greater 
decline in chocolate consumption (diary measure), change scores were calculated by 
subtracting baseline scores from follow-up scores for each measure.
SRHI Automaticity Chocolate consumption
(change scores) (change scores)
Sweet -.067
Treat -.143
Energy boost -.060
Highest scored SRHI -.145
Table 3.39 Pearson’s correlations between change scores for SRHI scores for the 
three individual measures (sweet, treat, and energy boost) in addition to the SRHI 
which participants scored most highly on and chocolate consumption.
Table 3.39 shows that SRHI change scores were negatively associated with 
chocolate consumption change scores. Contrary to prediction, these findings suggest 
that higher automaticity was associated with a greater decline in chocolate 
consumption. The findings again failed to reach statistical significance.
Using change scores, no significant correlations (Pearsons) were also found between 
either the critical trial on the chocolate-prime LDT and chocolate (r = 0.131), or the 
critical trial on the goal LDT and chocolate (r = 0.090). Both correlations were 
positive. Whilst this suggests that a greater reduction in automaticity was associated 
with a decline in chocolate consumption, it does not suggest that a greater increase in 
accessibility was associated with the same behavioural outcome. All findings 
however failed to reach statistical significance.
29 The LDT analysis conducted in sections 3.9.3 and 3.9.4 were repeated using a more conservative 
approach. This approach consisted of only including participants who completed all nine trials 
correctly for each of the LDTs (chocolate-prime and goal-target). The nine trials consist of the critical 
trial and the two control trials. Each trial type was completed three times for each LDT, totalling nine 
experimental trials. It was thought that by having more accurate RT data, the loss of power from the 
reduced sample size would be outweighed. Similar, non-significant findings were shown for all 
analyses.
249
3.9.5 Secondary investigations of the data
3.9.5.1 Strategy adherence
Participants in the cognitive defusion and relaxation groups were taught a strategy 
which they were told to use whenever they were tempted to eat chocolate during 
week two of the study. The number of times the taught strategy (cognitive defusion 
and relaxation) was used in relation to the number of chocolate cravings experienced 
was calculated for each group.
Defusion (n=56) Relaxation (n=24)
Sometimes 2 1 . 0 13.0
Nearly always 47.0 62.0
Always 32.0 25.0
Table 3.40 Percentage of strategy use in the defusion and relaxation groups.
A chi-square test revealed that the percentage o f participants who used their strategy 
either sometimes, nearly always or always did not significantly differ between the 
defusion and relaxation control groups: %2 (2 ,N=  80) = 1.85, p = 0.40.
3.9.5.2 Study’s helpfulness at reducing chocolate consumption 
All participants were asked to rate how helpful they found their participation in the 
study in terms of reducing their chocolate consumption using a five-point Likert 
scale (1 = not at all helpful, 5 = extremely helpful).
Defusion (n=56) Relaxation (n=24) No-task (n=28)
Not at all helpful 0 . 0 8 . 0 0 . 0
A little helpful 7.0 8 . 0 7.0
Moderately helpful 23.0 38.0 14.0
Very helpful 52.0 33.0 61.0
Extremely helpful 18.0 13.0 18.0
Table 3.41 Percentage of reported helpfulness of study participation in reducing 
chocolate consumption by the mindfulness and non-mindfulness groups.
No significant differences in the reported helpfulness of the study was found 
between the defusion and no-task groups, t (82) = 0.477, p = 0.634. A significant
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different was however reported between the defusion and relaxation groups, t (78) 
2.125, p = 0.037 and between the relaxation and no-task groups, t (50) = 2.144, p = 
0.037. The means indicated that the defusion group (M = 3.80, SD = 0.82) found 
their participation in the study to reduce their chocolate consumption more helpful 
than the relaxation group (M = 3.33, SD = 1.09). The no-task group (M = 3.89, SD = 
0.79) however reported greater helpfulness of the study compared to the relaxation 
group.
3.9.5.3 Suspicion probe
In order to check level of suspicion about the study, participants were asked to recall 
how many individual chocolates were given to them in the bag and if  they had any 
ideas about what the study aimed to explore in addition to helping them reduce 
chocolate consumption.
Defusion
(n=56)
Relaxation
(n=24)
No Task 
(n=28)
Number in the bag (% 23.0 13.0 14.0
correct)
Ideas about study aims (% 27.0 2 1 . 0 46.0
yes)
Table 3.42 Suspicion probe percentage scores across the mindfulness and non- 
mindfiilness groups.
A chi-square test revealed that the percentage o f participants who correctly reported 
the number of chocolates in the bag did not significantly differ between the defusion 
and control (relaxation, no-task) groups, %2 (2,N =  108) = 1.727, p = 0.422. 
Furthermore, a chi-square test revealed that the percentage o f participants who made 
an attempt to guess the study’s aims did not significantly differ between the defusion 
and control (relaxation, no-task) groups: %2 (2, N =  108) = 4.769, p = 0.092.
3.9.6 Brief summary
The current study first aimed to address the questions; does practicing the cognitive 
defusion strategy reduce chocolate consumption, and second, if  so, how does it
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work? Two separate hypotheses were explored. The first predicted that cognitive 
defusion works by reducing automatic links between chocolate-related thoughts and 
chocolate consumption. The second predicted that cognitive defusion works by 
increasing the accessibility of competing goals in response to chocolate-related 
thoughts. The results of this study failed to show any effects of practicing the 
cognitive defusion task for five-days on either consumption, the habit questionnaires 
(SRHI) or the LDTs (chocolate-prime and goal-target) compared to the control tasks 
(relaxation and no-task). The findings also showed that chocolate-related thoughts 
were not automatically linked with chocolate consumption as predicted. The findings 
failed to replicate those previously reported in Study Two (see section 3.3). Thus, the 
current study did not show evident that the cognitive defusion strategy is effective 
for changing the self-control related health behaviour, resisting chocolate.
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3.10 Discussion
3.10.1 Summary
The first aim of the current study was to demonstrate the reliability of Study Two by 
replicating the findings that, practicing a mindfulness-based cognitive defusion 
strategy significantly reduces chocolate consumption. The second aim of the current 
study was to further investigate how the defusion strategy brought about its effects. 
Two possibilities were explored, (1) cognitive defusion works by interrupting 
automatic links between chocolate consumption and thoughts that cue chocolate 
consumption, and/or (2 ) cognitive defusion works by strengthening links between 
the cue and competing goals. The main findings showed that contrary to Study Two, 
practicing the cognitive defusion strategy for a five-day period did not show any 
significant effect on chocolate consumption as measured by either the chocolate 
diary or the bagged chocolates. The results also failed to show any effects of the 
cognitive defusion task on the self-report habit index (SRHI) questionnaire or the 
priming tasks. The defusion strategy was therefore not found to be effective at 
changing the self-control related behaviour, unhealthy eating. Furthermore, its 
effects were not evident to be brought about by either reducing behavioural 
automaticity or increasing goal accessibility. Caution is however needed when 
drawing such conclusions given that it is difficult to explain how cognitive defusion 
works when it did not help people resist temptation in the first instance. More 
research is therefore needed to establish the conditions under which cognitive 
defusion strategies assist self-control related health behaviours, as well as identify 
the mechanisms of change.
3.10.2 Effects of cognitive defusion on chocolate consumption (Aim 1)
As in Study Two chocolate consumption was measured using both observations 
(bagged chocolates) and self-report (diary). The same period o f abstinence (five- 
days) was also completed. The findings of the current study however did not support 
those previously reported in Study Two. For instance, there were no significant 
group differences found between the defusion and control groups for either the 
number of chocolates eaten from the bag, or the total number of ‘other grams’ eaten
253
as measured by the chocolate diary30. The current study also did not extend 
previously conducted research in this area (e.g. Moffitt et al., 2012). One reason for 
the inconsistency between findings may be due to the inclusion of a baseline 
measure of chocolate consumption. The lack of a baseline measure was considered a 
limitation of Study Two. This is because only differences in chocolate consumption 
between the mindfulness and non-mindfulness control groups could be identified, as 
opposed to significant reductions in chocolate consumption across the groups using 
change scores. Although, it is possible that completing the baseline consumption 
measure, in addition to the second chocolate diary measure (completed during week 
two) in the current study caused participants to become fatigued and bored with the 
task. Consequently, the self-report data in the second chocolate diary may have been 
subject to greater inaccuracies, thus causing non-significant findings to be found.
Participants were also not asked to refrain from eating chocolate or 
chocolate-related products during the baseline period (i.e. week one of the study). 
Instead, they were asked to ‘eat normally’ and to simply record any chocolate 
consumed during that period in the chocolate diary provided. Whilst this gave a 
measure of their normal chocolate intake, it failed to provide a baseline measure of 
consumption when attempting to resist chocolate. Thus, consumption was not 
measured under the same conditions. As a result, analysing the data using change 
scores may have concealed any additional effects of the defusion task. In support of 
this, non-parametric tests using only the data from the follow-up diary measure 
showed a trend towards significance between the defusion and relaxation groups in 
terms of the amount of ‘other’ chocolates consumed. More specifically, those who 
practiced the defusion task were evident to consume less chocolate than those who 
practiced the relaxation task. It would therefore be worthwhile to include a baseline 
consumption measure in future research whereby participants are asked to refrain 
from eating chocolate or chocolate-related products during this period.
An additional limitation of including the baseline diary measure is that, 
asking people to record their consumption of ‘unhealthy foods’ has been found to 
impact their consumption of that food (Rennie, Coward & Jebb, 2007). The baseline 
diary measure may therefore not accurately reflect actual consumption, but an
30 The diary analysis was conducted using change scores (i.e. consumption at follow-up minus 
consumption at baseline)
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already reduced level of consumption. Consequently, this reduction o f ‘normal' 
chocolate consumption would have made the behaviour more difficult to change and 
therefore account for the null findings in Study Three compared to Study Two.
Despite the noted limitations, the inclusion of the baseline chocolate diary was useful 
for identifying that the means and standard deviations for this consumption measure 
were very similar for both the defusion and control groups. This suggests that those 
allocated to the defusion group did not consume particularly unhealthy quantities of 
chocolate at baseline (i.e. whilst eating normally), or as previously discussed, these 
reports of consumption may be under-estimates of their normal intake. The cognitive 
defusion task, which aimed to help them resist chocolate temptation, may therefore 
have been less effective for those in the defusion group compared to those in the 
relaxation and no-task groups. In view of this, it is possible that the findings were 
subject to floor effects and thus account for the inconsistent findings between the 
studies (Study Two and Study Three). Another explanation for the inconsistency 
between the current findings and those previously reported in Study Two may be due 
to subtle differences31 in the sample, such as their motivation for participating. 
Compared to Study Two32 a higher payment (£20) was awarded due to the increased 
duration and demands of the study (e.g. attendance of four sessions over a two-week 
period compared to two sessions over a five-day period). The current study’s sample 
may therefore have been more highly motivated by the financial reward of 
participating rather than the reward of changing their eating behaviours.
The current study also assumed that focusing on goals would increase a person’s 
intention to engage in the activities that would help to achieve the goal. Some 
researchers have however reported that staying focused on goals for too long will 
negatively affect the experience of these activities and thus make it far more likely 
that the goals will not be achieved (Fishbach & Choi, 2012). In other words, people’s 
intrinsic motivation to pursue their goal decreases. In support of this, Fishbach & 
Choi found that after three days participants who focused on the long-term goal of 
dental flossing (e.g. reducing tooth decay) flossed significantly less than participants
31 For an overview of all the differences between the studies, see appendix LL
32 A payment of £10 was awarded to participants in Study Two.
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who focused on what it was like to floss (e.g. the feeling of cleanliness). It was 
concluded that when embarking on a health goal people should beware of focussing 
on their goal too long. It is therefore possible that the null findings were the result of 
the defusion task placing too much emphasis on the person to keep focused on their 
goal over a period of time. Ultimately, this was detrimental to their goal o f resisting 
chocolate temptation from being achieved. Whilst this explanation is feasible, it fails 
to account for the significant differences in levels of chocolate consumption between 
the defusion and control groups demonstrated in Study Two.
3.10.3 How cognitive defusion works. Exploration o f potential mediators (Aim 2)
The findings from the previous study (Study Two) were not replicated (i.e. the 
defusion strategy was not shown to be significantly effective at reducing chocolate 
consumption compared to the control strategies). It is therefore very difficult to 
explain how cognitive defusion brings about its effects. However, given that trends 
towards significance were shown between the defusion and relaxation groups for the 
diary and bagged chocolate measures, exploratory investigations were carried out to 
identify any effects the different strategies (defusion and controls) had on levels of 
automaticity and goal accessibility.
3.10.3.1 Automaticity
Based on the evidence from Study Two, it was predicted that cognitive defusion 
reduces chocolate consumption by interrupting a person’s automatic reaction to eat 
chocolate when experiencing chocolate-related thoughts. Contrary to this, the current 
study showed that cognitive defusion did not significantly decrease self-reported 
automaticity scores (as measured by the SRHI) relative to either control strategy 
(relaxation or no-task) at follow-up compared to baseline. Furthermore, when 
exploring baseline automaticity as a potential moderator (i.e. comparing participants 
who scored high on the SRHI with those who scored low on the SRHI) the findings 
again showed no significant group difference between performance on the lexical 
decision task (i.e. individuals who scored most highly on the SRHI measure did not 
demonstrate a greater decrease in RT). This challenges the possibility that the null 
findings were caused by some participants simply not possessing an automatic link 
between the chocolate-related thoughts and chocolate consumption. Although, since
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the analysis to test this was carried out using a median split, there is still some 
possibility that the null findings were caused by a weak thought-cue-behaviour 
association at baseline. The SRHI does not have a pre-defined cut-off to identify 
behaviour as being habitually strong or habitually weak (Lally et al., 2010). Thus, 
caution is needed when interpreting analyses based on the categorisation of 
participants into high and low automaticity groups using SRHI scores.
Practicing the cognitive defusion strategy also did not significantly affect reaction 
time (RT) scores on the Lexical Decision Task (LDT) compared to the control 
strategies. More specifically, mean reaction time scores did not significantly differ 
between the defusion and control groups. The results therefore failed to support the 
pre-stated hypothesis which stated that higher RTs (i.e. slower responses) would be 
evident following a relevant prime, representing lower automaticity for the defusion 
group compared to the control groups. Similarly to Pratkanis & Aronson (1992) the 
latter findings showed no clear evidence of subliminal priming effects on behaviour. 
One explanation for this finding is that some of the participants may have been 
consciously aware of the primes, causing them to respond more quickly and 
accurately in trials when it was followed by a semantically related target (e.g. need 
something sweet -  chocolate). The primes were however presented for an extremely 
short duration (10 ms) thus rendering this explanation unlikely. The reverse 
argument would be that the 1 0  ms presentation time o f the primes was not a 
sufficient amount of time to process the three-word sentence (see section 3.10.4 for a 
further discussion of this point). Given that the current study was the first to explore 
the effects of a three-word prime, further investigation needs to be undertaken in 
order to explore this possibility.
3.10.3.2 Goal accessibility
It was alternatively proposed that the defusion strategy works by increasing the 
accessibility of competing goals in response to chocolate-related thoughts. Similarly 
to the automaticity LDT, there were no significant group differences in mean RT 
scores (i.e. lower RTs [faster responding] was not evident in the defusion group 
compared to the control groups following a relevant prime), suggesting that 
practicing the cognitive defusion strategy did not significantly strengthen goal 
accessibility compared to either of the control strategies (relaxation or no-task). This
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finding fails to extend previous literature which has found that subliminally priming 
participants with goal words significantly influences participant behaviour (e.g. 
Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002; Shah, 2003). Furthermore, the 
null findings do not offer additional support to a previous study by Fishbach et al. 
(2003) who reported that, priming individuals with health goals incompatible with 
eating chocolate strengthens the accessibility of the goal to counteract the behaviour. 
Fishbach et al. argued that such a counteractive effect would only be evidenced if  the 
health goal was important to the individual. Given that the current study matched the 
goal cues (health or weight) presented in the LDT to each participant as best as 
possible, it therefore unlikely that this would be a valid explanation for the null 
findings.
3.10.4 Study limitations and future research
It is important to note that there are a number of limitations in the current study and 
thus, many opportunities for future research. First, given that the findings from Study 
Two were not replicated, the current study questions the efficacy of a brief 
mindfulness-based cognitive defusion strategy to reduce chocolate consumption. 
Future research therefore needs to explore whether a brief cognitive defusion 
intervention is a reliable strategy for changing this self-control related health 
behaviour. Thus will help to identify whether Study Two was simply a spurious 
result, or whether there are specific factors that moderate the effects o f the strategy 
in order to allow it to work. One possibility would be to refine the measures of 
automaticity and goal accessibility used in the current study. For example, each 
could be made more specific to the participants by letting them identify their own 
personal critical cues as opposed to asking participants to choose from a fixed 
number of options (e.g. which thought-cue and health goal is most true o f you?). 
Whilst careful thought in relation to the design and the logistics of achieving this 
would be needed, this change may be advantageous because for many behaviours 
including unhealthy eating, identifying critical cues are challenging as these cues are 
often a reflection of subjective internal states (Adriaanse et al., 2009). Identification 
of these subjective internal states as critical triggers for unhealthy behaviours 
requires substantial introspection, which some people are believed to lack (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). The current study may therefore be criticised for limiting the strength
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of the defusion strategy’s effects. It is however important to note that various pilot 
studies were previously conducted to explore the reliability of the three critical cues 
used in the current study (need something sweet, need a treat, and need an energy 
boost) to trigger the automaticity of eating chocolate using the advised diary method 
(Adriaanse et al., 2009). In view of this, it is believed that the current study used the 
best methods, albeit within its parameters, to obtain reliable results.
Irrespective of the latter discussion point, the need to modify the automaticity 
measures (SRHI and LDT) is acknowledged, especially as the results of the current 
study suggest that each were measuring different things. For instance, contrary to 
predictions, in the preliminary study and also the current study, higher SRHI scores 
were not found to be significantly positively correlated with reaction time 
performance on the critical trial (e.g., need something sweet -  chocolate) of the 
corresponding LDT. Other measures of automaticity, such as Implicit Association 
Tasks (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998) should therefore be explored in 
future studies. Alternatively, the LDTs could be repeated but instead include a 
greater number o f trials. In the current study, the critical and control trials were 
presented three times per task (automaticity and accessibility). The reason for 
repeating the trials was to increase the chance o f obtaining at least one RT score for 
all participants (i.e. allowing for two errors being made). The inclusion o f further 
trials would have extended the duration of the current study to one which was likely 
to cause participants to become fatigued and distracted and thus negatively impacted 
their performance on the tasks. Increasing the repetition of trials in future studies 
would however make the data more reliable in that the RT scores would be more 
representative for each individual (i.e. in the current study, those with only a single 
RT score was deemed unrepresentative of their performance). Excluding these 
participants from the data analysis was not possible given that the sample size would 
have been significantly reduced and consequently, under powered. Furthermore, a 
greater number o f trials would allow for the exclusion of RT scores within 100 and 
4000ms (i.e. not considered to be outliers) that might have been due to brief lapses in 
participant concentration. Due to the limited number of trials used in the current 
study, all RT scores were included. Thus, it is possible that some mean scores were 
skewed by extremely fast or slow responses.
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Despite the previously conducted pilot studies showing that a short three-word 
sentence (e.g. need a treat) was associated more with chocolate than a single word 
(e.g. treat) (see section 3.6.2), future research may benefit from reducing the 
complexity of the current study by repeating the automaticity and goal accessibility 
tasks using singular cues. The main reason for this is that previous research has 
shown that a short two-word sentence was not processed unconsciously (Draine & 
Greenwald, 1998). Instead, Draine & Greenwald (1998) found that the pattern of 
priming was determined by single-word components of these phrases. Many others 
have supported this (Balay & Shevrin, 1988; Fudin, 1986; Greenwald, 1992). Thus, 
it is possible that automatically processing the whole three words was very difficult 
and as a result, some participants were only primed by one part of the sentence (e.g. 
beginning, middle or end). If the primed word was either the first (e.g. ‘need’) or 
second (e.g. ‘something’), it is unsurprising that no priming effect was found in 
either the automaticity or goal accessibility LDTs as these words did not contain the 
main cue prime (e.g. ‘sweet’). Furthermore, some argue that in order for more than 
one cue word to be unconsciously processed, the cue needs to be presented slowly 
(Gough, 1965; Li et al., 2008; Slobin, 1966; Watson 1959).
Based on the findings of the pilot studies (see section 3.6.3) the three-word 
phrases were presented for 10ms. As previously stated, due to the speed o f the cue 
presentation, it is again possible that only part of the three-word phrase was 
unconsciously processed. These findings contrast with past research which has 
shown that the unconscious is capable of processing complete sentences (Bronstein 
& Rodin, 1983; Cohen & Farley, 2008; Kaplan et al., 1985). One way to reduce the 
complexity of the current priming tasks is to use the same method as Papies, Aarts & 
Stroebe (2007) and de Witt Huberts and colleagues (in revision). In both these 
studies sentence primes were presented word by word, with each word remaining on 
the screen for a longer duration of 200ms. With these studies consistently showing a 
significant priming effects between restrained eaters and hedonic thoughts, it may be 
worthwhile for future research to explore the effects of changing the display of the 
sentence primes in this way. Furthermore, given the novelty o f this research and the 
inconsistency in the existing literature on both the appropriate length o f the cue and 
the duration of its presentation, additional exploratory investigations are needed 
before it can be reliably applied to help understand how the cognitive defusion 
strategy works to change unhealthy eating behaviour.
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Another limitation is that the present study included a mixed sample o f dieters (i.e. 
those actively trying to lose weight) and non-dieters. It is possible that dieting 
moderated the association between strength of cue and behavioural response. It 
would therefore be interesting to conduct a follow-up of the present study but with 
dieters only. Being more selective in those recruited to the study may also help to 
further understand how the defusion strategy changes self-control related health 
behaviours. Taking the prediction that cognitive defusion may bring about its effects 
by strengthening accessibility between the thought-cue and competing goals as an 
example, research has shown that keeping in mind one’s higher-order goal greatly 
facilitates self-control by preventing dieters from processing food cues entirely in 
pleasurable terms (e.g. Hofmann, Van Koningsbruggen, Stroebe, Ramanathan & 
Aarts, 2010; Papies, Stroebe & Aarts, 2007; Papies, Stroebe & Aarts, 2008; Shah, 
Friedman & Kruglanski, 2002; Stroebe, Mensink, Aarts, Schut & Kruglanski, 2008; 
Van Koningsbruggen, Stroebe, Papies & Aarts, 2011). In the aforementioned studies, 
priming dieters with a dieting goal reduced attentional bias to palatable food, and 
increased their perceptual processing of healthy food objects. Others have also 
shown that environmental diet primes helped dieters, but not non-dieters, control 
their eating behaviour, making them more likely to choose a healthy snack food (e.g. 
apple) over an unhealthy snack food (e.g. chocolate bar) (Fishbach, Friedman & 
Kruglanski, 2003) and also consume less high-calorie snack foods (Anschutz, Van 
Strien & Engels, 2008; Papies & Hamstra, 2010). In view of this it might be inferred 
that increased accessibility of health goals for the cognitive defusion strategy is 
achieved by the task reminding dieters of their higher-order goal o f dieting.
Partially related to the previous point, future research could also extend the current 
study by investigating whether the cognitive defusion task increased the accessibility 
of health goals is associated with hedonic ratings (see Connell & Mayor, 2013). 
Connell & Mayor, for instance, found that increasing health goals is only effective in 
decreasing expected pleasure derived from unhealthy junk foods for people who 
harbor positive affect towards junk food brands. It is therefore likely to be 
counterproductive for people who harbor negative affect towards junk food brands. 
Replications of the current study may benefit from including a measure of hedonism 
about chocolate brands (e.g. ‘is comforting’, ‘is delicious’) following the priming 
tasks. Finally, the current study is limited in that it only explored the effects of
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cognitive defusion on two individual mediators; automaticity and goal accessibility. 
It is advised that future research would benefit from considering other potential 
mediators (e.g. number of cravings experienced).
3.10.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the current study failed to replicate the findings from Study Two, 
therefore questioning the efficacy of a brief mindfulness-based cognitive defusion 
strategy (i.e. the mindbus task) to reduce chocolate consumption. It is possible that 
the inconsistency between the findings were due to a number of changes made to the 
design of the original study (e.g. inclusion of a baseline measure o f chocolate 
consumption). The current study also did not further develop our understanding of 
how the cognitive defusion strategy brings about its effects given that, (1 ) levels of 
automaticity in the defusion group were not shown to be weakened and lower SRHI 
was also not found, and (2 ) accessibility of goals in the defusion group were not 
shown to be strengthened. Due to the fact that the current study did not show any 
significant effect of the defusion strategy on chocolate consumption, it was difficult 
to draw any reliable conclusion from these results. Future studies could be improved 
by modifying the LDTs and by enforcing even more stringent criteria during the 
recruitment process. An exploration of alternative mediators and moderators was 
also suggested.
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3.11 General discussion (studies 2 & 3)
3.11.1 Limitations and future research
In addition to those previously discussed, there are a number of limitations present in 
Studies Two and Three. First, similar to past research (e.g. Forman et al., 2007; 
Stirling & Yeomans, 2004) low consumption of the bagged chocolate was evident in 
both studies. Despite the use of a transparent bag to allow the participants to see the 
chocolates and be tempted by them, in future work it may be more desirable to ask 
participants to regularly look at the chocolates in addition to keeping them in their 
possession. Although not officially recorded in the data, some participants reported 
that despite having the bagged chocolates in their possession, they actively avoided 
looking at the chocolates and instead kept them ‘out of sight’ (e.g. in their rucksack 
or coat pocket). As a result of this, the purpose o f asking participants to carry the 
bagged chocolates with them over the five-day period (i.e. to increase levels of 
temptation) might not have been as effective as initially thought. Second, the 
findings from the current studies were based on self-reported snacking behaviour and 
previous research has shown that individuals have a tendency to underreport their 
caloric intake (e.g. Muhlheim, Allison, Heshka & Heymsfield, 1998; Rennie,
Coward & Jebb, 2007). Using a more objective measure of eating behaviour in 
future studies is therefore advised (e.g. weight loss amongst dieters). It is however 
important to note that food diaries are considered the most sophisticated naturalistic 
eating measures currently available (De Castro, 2000).
Third, the short period of time (five-days) in which chocolate was resisted may also 
be considered a limitation. For instance, some participants stated on completion of 
the study that they were able to resist temptation because they knew that they could 
resume eating chocolate in only a few days. This may account for the low levels of 
chocolate consumption evident in both Study Two and Three. In view of this, it is 
suggested that the research is repeated but over an extended period. Furthermore, the 
study was only conducted over weekdays (i.e. Monday-Friday). Weekend days (i.e. 
Saturday and Sunday) were excluded in order to reduce variability in the data whilst 
also limiting respondent burden in terms of diary completion. However, with respect 
to future research, including weekend days may help to explore the reliability of 
individual mindfulness-based strategies more widely, thus also encompassing
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changing eating behaviours. Hart et al. (2011), for instance, found that there are a 
number of differences in individual’s eating habits on weekends compared to 
weekdays, with weekends being a greater risk for increased intake of fat, non­
nutrient dense snack foods, and reduced fruit and vegetables. Finally, whereas the 
current studies were not designed to evaluate the effects of mindfulness-based 
strategies on weight loss, the inclusion of weight loss measures (e.g. BMI) would be 
helpful to test the effectiveness of these strategies on health issues associated with a 
reduction in unhealthy eating behaviours. Future studies could also focus on 
monitoring the regulation of intake of a range of unhealthy snack foods (e.g. sweets, 
biscuits, cakes, crisps) as opposed to the promotion of abstinence from a single food 
(chocolate). This may prove useful given that participants often reported substituting 
chocolate and chocolate-related products for other high sugar, high fat snack foods.
3.11.2 Conclusion
Although the findings from Study Two were not replicated in Study Three, the 
current studies are two of only a few (Moffitt et al., 2012) which have specifically 
aimed to explore the effects of individual mindfulness strategies on reducing 
chocolate consumption. The null findings demonstrated in Study Three should 
therefore not be perceived as negative. Rather, the findings from both studies should 
collectively be viewed as a positive step forward in understanding how brief 
mindfulness-based interventions work and how they bring about their effects. Whilst 
it is acknowledged that further research is needed to confirm the effects o f cognitive 
defusion on chocolate consumption, and to identify more precisely how it brings 
about its effects, the teaching and practice of the cognitive defusion strategy is easy 
to implement and imposes few demands on practitioners. Thus, the relatively simple 
nature of the strategy means it could, in the future, be usefully incorporated into 
existing weight loss and healthy eating interventions. As a result, cognitive defusion 
may prove to have clinical use. This is important especially as many health problems 
(e.g. obesity, addiction, and inactivity) require self-control in order to bring about 
behavioural change. The findings from the current studies also demonstrate the 
benefits of using a dismantling design to distinguishing between different types of 
mindfulness strategies and separating out their effects on behaviour. Compared to 
more traditional mindfulness-based interventions which incorporate several
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mindfulness strategies (Bowen et al., 2009; Brewer et al., 2009; Hayes, Strosahl & 
Wilson, 1999; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Linehan, 1993; Segal, Williams & Teasdale, 2002) 
it is believed that the identification of individual strategies to help change specific 
self-control related health behaviours will facilitate the establishment of targeted and 
cost-effective mindfulness interventions. In conclusion, the current research provides 
a useful building block on which to further develop knowledge and understanding of 
how mindfulness-based interventions work and how they bring about their effects.
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Chapter Four 
Effects of a brief cognitive defusion task on chocolate craving
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Chapter overview
The study described in the present chapter aimed to explore an alternative 
explanation to those investigated in Chapter Three (decreasing automaticity and/or 
increasing goal accessibility) for how the mindfulness-based strategy cognitive 
defusion changes unhealthy eating behaviours. It is proposed that cognitive defusion 
decreases chocolate consumption by reducing chocolate cravings. An investigation 
of the effects of a brief cognitive defusion task (the ‘mindbus’) on chocolate cravings 
was therefore conducted. It was hypothesised that this strategy may reduce cravings 
by limiting working memory (i.e. loading the visuo-spatial sketchpad; Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1968) and preventing the elaboration of intrusive thoughts. This hypothesis 
was based on the notion that visual imagery is at the core o f the craving experience, 
and craving-related imagery can be interrupted, or reduced, by completing an 
alternative task which occupies the same limited working memory resources. If the 
mindbus task works by reducing craving-related imagery, it was predicted that the 
number of cravings experienced by the defusion group would be significantly less
33than those reported by participants in two control groups . This, in turn, would lead 
to a significant reduction in chocolate consumption. The results of the current 
research aimed at broadening our understanding of how cognitive defusion brings 
about its effects. A literature review on food cravings and how they can be reduced 
using competing imagery tasks is provided.
4.1.2 What are food cravings?
Craving for food is a cognitive-emotional appetitive state distinct from physiological 
states such as hunger (Lafay et al., 2001; Pelchat, 2002) or nutritional status (Pelchat 
& Schaeffer, 2000). Weingarten & Elston (1991) defined food cravings as intense
33 The control groups (relaxation and no-task) completed tasks which were not considered to be 
predominately imagery-based.
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desires or urges to eat specific foods. Cravings have also been described as intrusive 
thoughts about food (May et al., 2010). These intrusive thoughts have an important 
role in maintaining dysfunctional eating behaviours (McManus & Waller, 1995; 
Mitchell, Hatsukami, Eckert & Pyle, 1985). Several studies have demonstrated that 
cravings can lead to increased intake of high calorie foods, snacking and binge eating 
(Basdevant, Craplet & Guy-Grand, 1993; Gendall, Joyce, Sullivan & Bulik, 1998; 
Schlundt, Virts, Sbrocco & Pope-Cordle, 1993; Waters, Hill & Waller, 2001). 
Cravings for chocolate have been found to be especially problematic in that, attempts 
to resist chocolate often causes a greater desire for it, subsequently leading to 
unwanted (over) consumption (Rogers & Smit, 2000).
4.1.3 How do food cravings lead to consumption?
When experienced, cravings form a mental cycle of elaboration of an initial intrusive 
thought, in which relevant information about the desired food is brought from long­
term memory into the person’s working memory in image form (Kavanagh, May & 
Andrade, 2009; May, Andrade, Kavanagh & Penfound, 2008; May, Panabokke, 
Andrade & Kavanagh, 2004). The elaboration process most commonly involves the 
formation and focus on sensory images of the desired target (e.g. mental stimulation 
of the sight, sound, smell, taste, and feel of an experience) though the expectancy 
about satisfying the desire (e.g. I’d be able to concentrate better once I’ve had 
chocolate) and planning ways of achieving the desire (e.g. I could buy a chocolate 
bar) also play a role. The intrusive images are initially pleasurable, but can become 
distressing when the individual realises that the food item may not always be 
immediately available. The feelings aroused by the image cause the craving to 
intensify, resulting in the individual actively striving to satisfy it. The only way this 
is achieved is by consuming the craved item. Some have argued that cravings, and 
subsequently consumption, can be reduced by controlling the elaboration of these 
sensory images (Kavanagh et al., 2009). One means of doing so is via the technique 
of limiting working memory (i.e. loading the visuo-spatial sketchpad).
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4.1.4 Reducing cravings by limiting working memory
There is evidence to suggest that mental imagery is a key component o f food 
cravings and that craving-related imagery is predominately visual in nature (May, 
Andrade, Panabokke & Kavanagh, 2004). It has therefore been suggested that 
cravings can be reduced by introducing information in the same sensory modality as 
the imagery associated with the craving (Elaborated Intrusion Theory; Kavanagh, 
Andrade & May, 2005). The visuo-spatial sketchpad (VSSP) in working memory is 
essential for vivid imagery (Baddeley & Andrade, 2000), thus concurrent tasks that 
rely on the same system will compete for priority and the limited cognitive 
resources. Hence, when one of these components is loaded with a task corresponding 
to the VSSP’s abilities, it prevents it from being simultaneously used to construct the 
vivid sensory images which increase cravings. Once it has reached its maximum 
capacity, any other task which requires a demand on its cognitive resources cannot 
be performed (Green et al, 2000; Tiggemann, Kemps & Parnell, 2010).
4.1.5 Evidence that food cravings can be reduced by loading the visuo-spatial 
sketchpad
Several studies have found that performing a visual imagery task which loads the 
VSSP reduces food cravings (Harvey, Kemps & Tiggemann, 2005; Kemps et al., 
2004). Kemps and Tiggemann (2007), for instance, found that participants who 
completed concurrent imagery tasks experienced significant reductions in vividness 
of chocolate craving imagery compared to those who completed an auditory task 
(loading the phonological loop [another component of working memory] rather than 
the VSSP). This study demonstrates how imagery may be disrupted with the use of a 
competing task in the same modality. This effect has been replicated by May, 
Andrade, Panabokke & Kavanagh (2010) who showed that a concurrent imagery 
task reduced craving but an auditory task had no effect. In another study, when pre­
schoolers were asked to create ‘vivid fantasies’ o f a different food product (e.g. the 
crunchiness and saltiness of pretzels), they were able to resist temptation (i.e. delay 
gratification) of a marshmallow sweet for an extra 17 minutes compared with 
thinking about marshmallows or thinking about less obviously pleasurable aspects of 
pretzels (e.g. their size) (Mischel & Baker, 1975). Loading the VSSP using dynamic 
visual noise (Quinn & McConnell, 1996), side-to-side eye movements (Kemps et al.,
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2004) and forehead tracking (i.e. watching one's forefinger moving in 1cm jumps 
across one's forehead) (McClelland, Kemps & Tiggemann, 2006) have also been 
found to reduce food cravings. These studies demonstrate that the VSSP can be 
loaded by a diverse range of visual imagery tasks.
From the aforementioned literature it appears that visual imagery is a key component 
of cravings. Visuo-spatial tasks may therefore be useful to help people resist every 
day cravings and support abstinence attempts. Recent research has also shown that 
even very simple visual tasks, such as watching a flickering pattern of random black 
and white dots (i.e. dynamic visual noise) have been shown to reduce food cravings 
(for a review, see Kemps & Tiggemann, 2010). A limitation of visual imagery 
however is that the effects of visuo-spatial tasks on cravings are often not tested 
outside the laboratory. Thus, the technique of limiting working memory has limited 
suitability for take-home use. Some are simply too embarrassing to perform in public 
(e.g. forehead tracking; McClelland, Kemps & Tiggemann, 2006) or require 
specialised software (e.g. visual noise; Quinn & McConnell, 1996).
Some researchers are however beginning to use novel tasks which avoid 
these problems. In a study by Andrade, Pears, May & Kavanagh (2012), for 
example, plasticine modelling was utilised as a task to reduce chocolate craving. The 
effects of the task were compared to a simple verbal task loading the phonological 
loop (e.g. counting). Craving was induced by presenting participants with chocolate 
and asking questions relating to it. Participants were then asked to mould shapes out 
of plasticine, namely cubes and pyramids in an alternate fashion, or to count aloud in 
ones. The plasticine task was conducted out of sight of the participant (i.e. under the 
table at which they sat). The task was carried out in this manner so that the 
participants could engage working memory by visualising an image of the shape, 
moment by moment, in visuo-spatial memory as they were moulding it. Craving was 
measured using three versions of a craving experience questionnaire (CEQ) and 
frequency of chocolate related thoughts was measured using thought probes 
throughout the ten minute intervention. The authors found a significant reduction in 
craving strength, imagery, and frequency in the plasticine modelling condition 
compared to the control group. Furthermore, participants in the experimental 
condition experienced less intrusive thoughts about chocolate. The results clearly
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show that cravings were reduced by loading the VSSP, though given how recently 
this study was conducted further research is needed to verify these findings.
4.1.6 An alternative imagery task: mindfulness-based cognitive defusion
The current study proposed that an alternative imagery task, namely cognitive 
defusion may change unhealthy eating behaviours by reducing chocolate cravings in 
the same way as the imagery tasks previously discussed (e.g. clay modelling, 
Andrade et al., 2012; imagining common sights; Kemps & Tiggemann, 2007); by 
loading the VSSP. Cognitive defusion is taught to participants using image-based 
metaphors such as, the ‘mindbus’ (see Tapper et ah, 2009; Jenkins & Tapper, 2013). 
The mindbus metaphor asks individuals each time they experience a craving to 
picture themselves as the driver of the bus (i.e. being in control of their planned 
route, for example to not eat chocolate) and their thoughts as merely passengers. The 
metaphor is used to first, encourage participants to notice unwanted chocolate- 
related thoughts and second, discourage them from entering into cycles of 
rumination and thought elaboration (Alberts et al., 2010). The current study 
predicted that the mindfulness-based defusion task reduces chocolate cravings by the 
participants constructing the mental image of the ‘mindbus’. Like cravings, the 
mindbus task requires visual working memory resources in order to construct mental 
images. Thus, it was believed that the cognitive defusion strategy may act as a 
concurrent visual task. Consequently, the visuo-spatial sketchpad becomes loaded, 
and due to its limited capacity, prevents the elaboration of any chocolate cravings 
experienced, or at least, decreases the number of cravings elaborated on.
4.1.7 Evidence that the 'mindbus’ task works by reducing food cravings
To date no research has attempted to understand whether the defusion strategy brings 
about its effects by reducing cravings. The present study therefore aimed to breech 
this research gap.
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4.1.8 Current study
Self-reported chocolate cravers were assigned to one of three conditions; cognitive 
defusion, relaxation control, or no-task control. The procedure was a partial 
replication of that used by Andrade et al. (2012) in that all participants underwent a 
craving induction before completing a ten-minute intervention phase. During the 
intervention, the participants were asked to sit in front of five chocolate products and 
to let their mind wander, but to resist eating the chocolate. To help participants to 
cope with their cravings, those in the defusion group were also asked to use a 
defusion strategy (mindbus) whenever they experienced a thought that they wanted 
to eat chocolate, whereas those in the relaxation group were asked to use a relaxation 
strategy (tense and relax hand muscles). The no-task group were given no additional 
instructions. Every 60 seconds an alarm sounded and participants told the 
experimenter what they were thinking at that moment. At the end of the intervention 
phase participants completed two measures assessing chocolate cravings.
It was hypothesised that if  the cognitive defusion strategy brings about its effects by 
reducing chocolate cravings then;
• A significant reduction in self-reported chocolate cravings would be evident 
amongst those in the defusion group relative to the control groups at follow- 
up compared to baseline
• The defusion group would experience less chocolate-related thoughts over 
the ten-minute intervention phase compared to the control groups.
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4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
Participants were 60 people (18 male, 42 female; mean age = 22.45 years, SD =
6.51) who had responded to an email sent to students of Swansea University calling 
for ‘chocolate lovers’. All participants met the inclusion criteria which comprised: 
not being pregnant, having no current or past history o f an eating disorder or medical 
condition which affects normal eating behaviour, ability to read English fluently, and 
no previous participation in any other study conducted by the experimenter. 
Participants were asked to refrain from consuming any chocolate or chocolate- 
related products (e.g. drinks or other chocolate flavoured items) from midnight the 
night before the day of testing, and to refrain from ingesting any food or drink except 
water for two hours before the experiment. A ‘chocolate goody bag’ was given to 
participants as a token of appreciation for taking part. Swansea University’s 
Department of Psychology research ethics committee approved the study.
4.2.2 Design and randomisation
The study employed a mixed-subjects design with three conditions (cognitive 
defusion, relaxation, and no-task). Participants were alternately assigned to one of 
these conditions using a single blind randomisation protocol.
4.2.3 Materials and apparatus
4.2.3.1 Demographics questionnaire
The current study used the same brief demographics questionnaire as that used in 
Study 3 (see section 3.8.3.1.1).
4.2.3.2 Measures o f  chocolate cravings
Chocolate cravings were measured using three versions of the Craving Experience 
Questionnaire (CEQ_Snow, CEQ_S10m, CEQ_F10m) (Andrade, Pears, May & 
Kavanagh, 2012). The CEQ_Snow asked about current chocolate cravings 
experienced (i.e. ‘right now’). It consisted of eleven items in total, four relating to 
craving strength (e.g. ‘how strongly do you want some chocolate?’), five relating to
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craving imagery (e.g. ‘how vividly are you picturing chocolate?’), and two related to 
craving intrusiveness (e.g. ‘when you’re thinking about chocolate how intrusive are 
the thoughts?’). The CEQ_S10m items were the same as the CEQ_Snow except that 
the questions referred to the time they ‘most wanted chocolate’ over the previous ten 
minute period, rather than the present moment, and was completed after the 
experimental phase. As a result, the tense of the items was changed. The CEQ_F10m 
also measured cravings during the ten minutes o f the experimental phase. It 
measured the frequency of craving during this period (e.g. four items in total relating 
to ‘how often’ chocolate cravings were experienced) in addition to craving imagery 
and craving intrusiveness. Craving strength was not measured using this 
questionnaire.
All three questionnaires were scored using a visual analogue scale with the anchor 
points ‘not at all’ and ‘extremely’. Overall, the scales had high Cronbach’s alpha 
ratings of .91 for the CEQ_Snow baseline, .91 for the CEQ_Snow at follow-up, .89 
for the CEQ_S10m, and .91 for the CEQ_F10m. The strength, imagery and 
intrusiveness subscales of the four measures were also highly reliable, with 
Cronbach’s alpha ratings between .81 and .90, with the exception of the 
intrusiveness subscale for CEQ_Snow_a for which Cronbach’s alpha was .74, 
CEQ_Snow_b for which Cronbach’s alpha was .56, and CEQ_S10m for which 
Cronbach’s alpha was .79.
4.2.33 Chocolate stimuli and craving induction measure
To stimulate chocolate cravings, participants were shown two different bars o f their 
most preferred type of chocolate (Dark: Green & Black’s Organic Dark Chocolate 
70% cocoa lOOg and Cadbury Boumeville 200g; Milk: Galaxy, 125g and Nestle 
Aero 1 lOg; White: Nestle Milkybar, lOOg and Lindt Lindor White Chocolate lOOg) 
and two different boxes of chocolates (Cadbury Milktray 400g and Ferrero Rocher 
300g). The craving induction measure consisted o f 12 questions corresponding to the 
chocolate stimuli (see appendix MM). Each question was verbally asked by the 
experiment, allowing sufficient time for participants to give a thoughtful answer. The 
bars of chocolate were on display for the entire craving induction procedure (i.e. 
when all 12 questions were asked). The boxed chocolates were only on display when 
questions 7-12 of the craving induction were asked given that the first six questions
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were unrelated to these products. The boxed chocolates were also added half way 
through the induction in order to further help increase the rate of cravings as the 
process progressed.
4.2.3.4 Strategy and task information sheets
The information sheets given to the intervention group (cognitive defusion) stated 
that reducing chocolate cravings can be difficult. It therefore may be helpful for 
participants to think of themselves as different from their chocolate cravings by 
imaging that they were the driver of a bus and their chocolate cravings like 
passengers (see appendix NN). The information sheets given to the relaxation- 
control group also stated that chocolate cravings can be difficult, but that it may be 
helpful for participants to try to physically relax in order to counteract the negative 
effects of feeling stressed (see appendix OO). The cognitive defusion and relaxation 
conditions were taught their allocated strategy using a briefer version o f the written 
booklets used in Studies Two and Three (see section 3.2.3.6 ). The control no-task 
group was not taught a specific strategy but were instead only told to simply let their 
mind wander (see appendix PP). This information was included within the task 
instructions.
The task instructions stated that the experimental phase would last ten minutes, and 
during that time participants should sit in front of the chocolates whilst letting their 
mind wander (i.e. free to think about whatever they wanted). The task instructions 
also informed participants that they would be asked to briefly describe what they 
were thinking about when prompted by the experimenter at various time points 
during the experimental phase. Participants were advised to keep their eyes open at 
all times and to avoid engaging in any activity which was unrelated to the task. The 
instructions ended by providing participants with the opportunity to ask the 
experimenter questions if they did not fully understand what was required o f them. 
Participants in all three conditions were given the same written task instructions. The 
defusion and relaxation groups were however also given additional instructions. 
Tlese additional instructions stated that the defusion and relaxation groups should 
use their taught strategy whenever they found themselves thinking about chocolate 
(vhilst letting their mind wander) during the experimental phase.
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4.23.5 Thought-prohe measure
The thought-probe measure recorded the thoughts experienced by participants when 
each beep sounded during the ten minute experimental phase. It consisted of ten 
individual sections (see appendix QQ). Each section consisted of a single line, 
allowing the experimenter to record the response given in the form of a short written 
phrase. The three options, chocolate-related, task-related, and other were also listed 
in each section. A tick was placed next to the option which was most related to the 
contents of the thought-probe response.
4.23.6 Pleasantness questionnaire
Participants rated the pleasantness of the task they had performed during the study’s 
experimental phase using a scale o f 1 - not at all pleasant, to 5 - neither pleasant nor 
unpleasant, to 10 - extremely pleasant (see appendix RR).
4.2.3.7 Strategy adherence measure
Participants in each condition were asked how often they used their strategy 
(cognitive defusion, relaxation or no-task) during the ten minute experimental phase 
using a four-point scale (1 = not at all, 2 = sometimes, 3 = nearly always, 4 = 
always) (see appendix SS).
4.2.4 Procedure
Participants were tested individually. The study commenced with participants 
completing a written consent form (see appendix TT), followed by a short 
demographics questionnaire. Participants also rated how much they craved chocolate 
using the CEQ_Snow. The study continued with participants undertaking the craving 
induction. The procedure of the craving induction did not explicitly ask participants 
to imagine chocolate. Instead, participants were asked to state their preferred choice 
o f chocolate of out the options, white, milk or dark. Once a choice had been made, 
participants were next shown two bars of chocolate from their chosen type. These 
chocolate bars were of different brands and were also partially unwrapped, but with 
the wrappers still visible. Whilst these chocolate bars where on display, the 
participant was asked questions 1 - 6  of the craving induction measure. The second 
part of the craving induction procedure involved a line of squares from the chocolate
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bar chosen in question six being placed on the table in front of the participant.
Lastly, the participants were shown two closed boxes of chocolates and asked 
questions 7-12 of the induction measure. All chocolate (bars, squares and boxes) was 
left on the table in front of the participant for the remainder of the study. Next, 
participants completed the CEQ_Snow for a second time, followed by the 
experimental phase.
At the start of the experimental phase participants were alternately allocated to one 
of three conditions (cognitive defusion n = 30, relaxation n = 15, no-task n = 15).
The conditions differed in terms of what the participant was required to do during the 
experimental phase to help them reduce their chocolate cravings, and as a result, 
resist eating chocolate. Participants who were allocated to the cognitive defusion and 
relaxation groups were taught their strategy using a written information sheet. This 
consisted of a brief description of the strategy and how the strategy may help reduce 
chocolate cravings. These groups were also given instructions regarding what they 
should do during the experimental phase. In the cognitive defusion group, 
participants were informed that for the next ten minutes they would be left alone in 
the experimental cubicle and during this time they should sit still and let their mind 
wander. Whenever they found themselves experiencing a thought that they wanted to 
eat chocolate, they were instructed to use the defusion strategy. Participants in the 
relaxation control condition were informed of the same instruction. However, they 
were instead told that whenever they found themselves experiencing a thought that 
they wanted to eat chocolate, they should use the relaxation strategy. The no-task 
group only received the task instructions (i.e. no specific strategy was taught) and 
told to simply let their mind wander.
Participants in all three conditions were told that from time to time during the ten 
minute period, a beep would sound as a cue to tell the experimenter ‘what you are 
thinking about right at that moment’. Participants were informed that only a short 
phrase was required and that they would not have to remember these thoughts or 
describe any thought which they considered to be private. Instead, participants were 
given the option to describe such thoughts using the phrase, ‘something personal’. 
After each thought had been recorded, the participants were prompted to return 
immediately to their task. A total of ten beeps sounded using an electronic beeping
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device (Invisible Clock-II) at intervals of every 60 seconds. When the experimental 
phase had ended, participants completed the cravings questionnaires, CEQ_S10m 
and CEQ_F10m. The experimenter then went through the thought-probe responses 
with the participant to categorise them as chocolate-related, task-related or other (i.e. 
unrelated to chocolate or the task). Lastly, participants were asked to rate the 
pleasantness of the task they had performed during the study and to answer a 
question measuring how often they used their strategy (i.e. strategy adherence) 
during the experimental phase before being debriefed (see appendix UU). The study 
duration averaged 30 minutes.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics
4.3.1.1 Data screening
Outliers in the questionnaire measures (CEQ_Snow_a, CEQ_Snow_b, CEQ_S10m, 
CEQ_F10m) were identified by using z-scores. Scores above or below 3.5 standard 
deviations (SD) from the mean were removed. One participant scored less than 3.5 
SD on the CEQ Snow b. This questionnaire was used to identify if the chocolate 
induction procedure was effective at inducing chocolate cravings. Given that the data 
was in the predicted direction (i.e. the induction procedure increased the number of 
chocolate cravings experienced compared to the number o f chocolate cravings before 
the induction) and also that it was possible that this outlier may have been the result 
o f the induction procedure being more effective across the whole sample than 
demonstrated for this particular individual, it was deemed justified to include this 
participant in the dataset. This was providing that non-parametric tests were used 
when analysing data which incorporated the outlier. All subsequent analyses 
whereby the outlier was not present were carried out using parametric statistical 
tests. Normal distribution of the questionnaire data was checked by looking at the 
skewness of the data via histograms. Although the CEQ_F10m scores showed a 
platykurtic distribution and slight positive skew for some o f the other measures (e.g. 
CEQ_Snow_b), it was concluded that none was to a degree which would impact 
negatively on the data analysis. Outliers were also checked, using the procedure 
described above, in relation to the frequency of chocolate thoughts experienced 
during the 1 0  minute task, and also, participants’ adherence to using the taught 
strategy over the 10 minute period. No further outliers were detected.
4.3.1.2 Group demographics
The whole sample consisted of 60 participants (defusion n = 30, relaxation n = 15, 
no-task n = 15).
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Mean Age 
(SD)
Gender (% 
female)
Dieting (% 
no)
Whole Sample (n = 60) 22.45 (6.51) 70.0 91.7
Defusion (n = 30) 21.80 (5.71) 76.7 96.7
Relaxation (n = 15) 22.67 (6.20) 66.7 80.0
No-task (n = 15) 23.53 (8.40) 60.0 93.3
Table 4.1 Demographic information for both the whole sample and the individual 
mindfulness and control groups.
Table 4.1 shows that for each of the three groups, participants’ age, gender and 
current diet status were very similar. Three independent t-tests showed no significant 
difference in age between any of the groups (defusion -  relaxation, t (43) = 0.467, p 
= 0.643; defusion -  no-task, t (43) = 0.818, p = 0.418; relaxation -  no-task, t (28) = 
0.322, p = 0.750). Chi-square analysis also showed no significant group differences 
in gender or diet status (%2 (2, N = 60) = 1.429, p = 0.490 and %2 (2, N = 60) = 3709, 
p = 0.157 respectively). The majority of participants were in their early to mid­
twenties, female and not on a diet (i.e. actively trying to lose weight by changing 
their eating habits).
4.3.2 Effectiveness of the craving induction
To evaluate the effectiveness o f the craving induction, pre-induction and post­
induction chocolate craving scores were calculated for each participant by averaging 
their responses to the 11 questions on the craving questionnaire (CEQ_Snow).
Pre-Induction Post-Induction
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Defusion (n = 30) 4.60(1.71) 7.37 (1.46)
Relaxation (n = 15) 4.59 (2.32) 6.73 (2.31)
No-task (n = 15) 4.24(1.82) 7.01 (1.69)
Table 4.2 Average response scores on the chocolate craving questionnaire 
(CEQ_Snow) pre- and post-induction for the three individual groups.
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Table 4.2 shows that craving levels increased across all three groups after the 
induction procedure was completed. Compared to baseline, chocolate craved by the 
defusion and no-task groups increased by an average score of 2.77 whereas the 
relaxation group increased by an average score of 2.14. These findings suggest that 
the chocolate craving induction was effective at inducing chocolate cravings.
The effectiveness of the craving induction was supported by a 3 (group) x 2 (time) 
ANOVA showing amain effect for time, F (1, 57) = 231.58, p = 0.001. No 
significant main effect for group, F (2, 57) = 0.302, p = 0.741, or an interaction 
between time and group, F (2, 57) = 1.479, p = 0.236 were found.
4.3.3 Effects of a mindfulness cognitive defusion technique on craving
To analyse the effects of the ‘mindbus’ defusion technique on craving, mean craving 
scores before and after the intervention period, and the scores on the strength, 
imagery and intrusiveness subscales were calculated. It was hypothesised that a 
significant reduction in self-reported chocolate cravings would be evident amongst 
those in the defusion group relative to the control groups at follow-up compared to 
baseline.
280
Average Strength Imagery Intrusiveness
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Mean
(SD)
Pre-Intervention 
(CEQ Snow b)
Defusion (n = 30) 7.37 7.34 8 . 0 2 5.82
(1.46) (1 .8 8 ) (1.58) (2.47)
Relaxation (n = 15) 6.73 6 . 6 8 7.23 5.57
(2.31) (2.55) (2.40) (3.16)
No-task (n = 15) 7.01 6.98 7.41 6.03
(1.69) (1.89) (1.78) (2.06)
Post-Intervention
(CEQ_S10m)
Defusion (n = 30) 6.87 6.98 6.65 7.18
(1.62) (1.99) (2.25) (1 .8 8 )
Relaxation (n = 15) 6.39 6.52 6.25 6.47
(1.91) (2.26) (2.56) (2.17)
No-task (n = 15) 6.73 7.08 6.92 5.57
(2.15) (2.33) (2.27) (2.82)
Post-Intervention 
(CEQ_F10m) 
Defusion (n = 30) 6.26 6.18 6.04 6.95
(1.69) (1.75) (2.24) (1.72)
Relaxation (n = 15) 5.85 5.90 5.67 6.23
(1 .8 8 ) (2.14) (2.51) (2.40)
No-task (n = 15) 5.81 5.98 5.72 5.67
(2.24) (1.87) (2.52) (2.93)
Table 4.3 CEQ total average scores before (CEQ_Snow_b) and after (CEQ_S10m 
and CEQ_F10m) the experimental tasks, and scores on the craving strength, imagery 
and intrusiveness subscales. Scores are shown as mean ratings for each o f the three 
groups.
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A Mann-Whitney U-test carried out on mean craving scores pre-intervention 
(CEQ_Snow_b) showed no differences between the defusion group and the two 
control groups (relaxation; z = -0.650, p = 0.515, no-task; z = -0.578, p = 0.563). 
These findings suggest that all three groups reported a similar number of cravings 
prior to the intervention being completed.
Independent samples t-test on mean craving scores post intervention showed no 
differences between the defusion and relaxation groups, CEQ_S10m; t (43) = 0.880, 
p = 0.384, cohen’s d = 0.27, CEQ_F10m; t (43) = 0.727, p = 0.471, cohen’s d = 0.23 
or between the defusion and no-task groups, CEQ_S10m; t (43) = 0.233, p = 0.817, 
cohen’s d = 0.07, CEQ_F10m; t (43) = 0.756, p = 0.454, cohen’s d = 0.23.34 These 
findings were inconsistent with the pre-stated hypothesis.
Despite the previously reported non-significant findings and small effect sizes, 
further tests on the effects of the intervention were conducted for exploratory 
purposes. This involved calculating craving change scores by subtracting post­
intervention craving scores from pre-intervention craving scores. Mann-Whitney U 
tests showed no significant differences between the defusion and relaxation groups 
for either post-intervention craving measure; CEQ_S10m; M = 0.41, SD = 1.63, Z = 
-0.048, p = 0.962, CEQ_F10m; M = 1.08, SD = 1.94, Z = 0.000, p = 1.000, or 
between the defusion and no-task groups, CEQ_S10m; M = 0.41, SD = 1.63, Z = - 
0.349, p = 0.727, CEQ_F10m; M = 1.08, SD = 1.94, Z = -0.157, p = 0.876. Again, 
these findings demonstrated no significant differences between the groups, thus 
failing to support the study’s hypothesis.
The first item on the CEQ_S10m measure (completed post-intervention) asked 
participants to think about the time they most wanted chocolate during the ten minute 
intervention period and to report how long it lasted. The average score for each 
group was calculated and comparative analysis was conducted.
34 Combining the two control groups (relaxation and no-task) and comparing this single control group 
with the defusion group showed no difference in the outcome of the analysis.
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M ean SD
Defiision (n = 30) 133.00 131.84
Relaxation (n = 15) 107.67 149.35
No-task (n = 15) 180.00 129.78
Table 4.4 Mean and standard deviations for the average time duration (seconds) 
each group most wanted chocolate during the intervention period.
Statistically, no significant difference were found between the defusion and 
relaxation groups, t (43) = 0.581, p = 0.564, cohen’s d = 0.18 or between the 
defusion and no-task groups, t (43) = 1.133, p = 0.263, cohen’s d = -0.36 in terms of 
how long they most wanted chocolate during the ten minute intervention period. This 
finding shows that, contrary to prediction, the defusion group did not crave chocolate 
significantly less than the control groups.
4.3.4 Responses to thought probes
Responses to the ten thought probes during the intervention period were analysed. It 
was hypothesised that the defusion group would experience less chocolate-related 
thoughts over the ten-minute intervention phase compared to the control groups.
Defusion
(n=30)
Relaxation
(n=15)
No-task
(n=15)
Thought type Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Chocolate-related 5.30 (2.23) 4.33 (2.55) 6.47 (2.39)
Task-related 0.67(1.15) 0.73 (1.49) 0.13 (0.35)
Neutral 4.03 (1.94) 4.93 (2.28) 3.40 (2.20)
Table 4.5 Mean and standard deviation scores for the number of chocolate-related, 
task-related and neutral thoughts experienced by the three groups over the 10 minute 
intervention period.
Independent t-tests showed no significant difference between the defusion and 
control groups in terms of the number of chocolate-related thoughts experienced 
(defusion vs. relaxation; chocolate-related t (43) = 1.306, p = 0.199, cohen’s d = 
0.40; defusion vs. no-task; chocolate-related t (43) = 1.616, p = 0.133, cohen’s d = -
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0.51). Although statistically the findings do not support the pre-stated hypothesis, a 
medium effect size was found between the defusion and control groups.
4.3.5 Secondary investigations of the data
4.3.5.1 Task pleasantness
Retrospective ratings of pleasantness when performing the defusion, relaxation and 
no-task tasks for ten minutes during the intervention period were calculated.
M ean SD Mode
Defusion (n = 30) 6.37 1.97 5
Relaxation (n = 15) 6.67 1.68 8
No-task (n = 15) 7.13 2.20 6
Table 4.6 Pleasantness ratings of the task performed by each o f the three groups.
Mann-Whitney U-tests showed no statistical difference in rated task pleasantness for 
the defusion task compared to the relaxation (control) task, z = -0.513, p = 0.608, or 
for the defusion task compared to the no-task (control) task, z = -1.365, p = 0.172.
4.3.5.2 Strategy adherence
The number of times participants used their taught strategy (cognitive defusion, 
relaxation control or no-task control) over the ten minute intervention period in 
relation to the number of chocolate cravings experienced was calculated for each 
group.
Defusion (n = 30) Relaxation (n = 15) No-task (n —15)
Not at all 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Sometimes 16 (53%) 9 (60%) 5 (33%)
Nearly always 11 (37%) 6 (40%) 7 (47%)
Always 3 (10%) 0 (0%) 3 (20%)
Table 4.7 Frequency of strategy used in the mindfulness and control groups.
35 Combining the two control groups (relaxation and no-task) and com paring this single control group 
w ith the defusion group showed no difference in the outcome o f  the analysis; defusion vs. control; 
chocolate-related t (58) = 0.158, p = 0.875.
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No significant difference were found between the defusion and control groups 
(relaxation, t (43) = 0.839, p = 0.406, no-task, t (43) = 1.354, p = 0.183) in relation to 
how often they used the taught strategy during the ten minute intervention period.
4.3.6 Summaiy
The findings showed that the craving induction procedure used in the current study 
was successful at inducing chocolate cravings in the sample. The mindfulness 
cognitive defusion technique however showed no significant effect on the number of 
chocolate cravings experienced compared to two non-mindfulness control 
techniques. No significant differences in the number of chocolate-related thoughts 
experienced by the defusion group were also found. The effect sizes of this particular 
analysis were however evident to be of medium strength.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Summary
The study in the current chapter aimed to further explore how the mindfulness-based 
strategy cognitive defusion changes unhealthy eating behaviours. It was proposed 
that the effects of cognitive defusion on chocolate consumption were mediated by 
the total number of cravings experienced. More specifically it was theorised that, as 
an imagery task, the mindbus strategy would reduce cravings by limiting working 
memory (i.e. loading the visuo-spatial sketchpad), thus preventing the elaboration of 
intrusive thoughts. Contrary to prediction, the results showed no significant 
differences in the number of chocolate cravings experienced between the three 
groups (defusion, relaxation and no-task). Additionally, there were no significant 
differences in the number of chocolate-related thoughts experienced by the defusion 
group relative to the control groups. In conclusion, the current study found no 
statistically significant evidence for an effect o f cognitive defusion on cravings. It 
was therefore presumed that the defusion task does not reduce chocolate 
consumption by influencing cravings, but instead by an alternative means.
4.4.2 Discussion of the findings
4.4.2.1 Effects o f  a mindfulness cognitive defusion technique on craving 
It was hypothesised that the effects of the defusion strategy on chocolate 
consumption were meditated by the number o f cravings experienced. This prediction 
was based on the notion that craving-related imagery can be interrupted by the 
completion of an alternative task which occupied the same working memory 
resources. The results of the present study however showed that the imagery-based 
cognitive defusion task did not reduce cravings either during (as measured by the 
CEQ_S10m) or immediately after (as measured by the CEQ_F10m) the ten-minute 
intervention relative to two control tasks (i.e. body relaxation and mind wandering). 
Thus the theory that visualisation of the ‘mindbus’ would reduce cravings by 
interfering with craving imagery was not supported. These findings therefore suggest 
that the effects of the defusion strategy on reducing chocolate consumption cannot be 
accounted for by the Elaboration Intrusion Theory (Kavanagh et al., 2005) which 
states that loading working memory required for visual imagery (i.e. visuo-spatial
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sketchpad, VSSP) reduces cravings. The results of the current study also suggest that 
a reduction of cravings in the defusion group was not evident because the mindbus 
task did not load the VSSP in the same way as other visuo-spatial tasks (Andrade et 
al., 2012; Kemps et al., 2004, 2005; Kemps & Tiggemann, 2009; McClelland et al., 
2006; Steel et al., 2006). Further discussion of these findings is relation to similar 
studies, is at present, impossible. This is because, to my knowledge, the current 
study is the first to explore whether the defusion strategy brings about its effects by 
reducing cravings as a result of loading the VSSP.
Unlike the current study which used a mental imagery task (i.e. the 
participant imagining themselves as the ‘driver’ and their thoughts as ‘passengers’), 
much of the aforementioned literature explored the effects o f physical imagery tasks 
(e.g. clay modelling; Andrade et al., 2012) on cravings. The different visual 
modalities used may therefore account for the inconsistency between the findings. 
Shaping plasticine, for instance, might be rendered more vivid in imagery than the 
mindbus task, consequently loading the VSSP more effectively and therefore 
demonstrating the effects of the task more clearly. Furthermore, compared to the clay 
modelling task, the mindbus strategy allowed participants to look at the chocolates 
on the table in front of them without getting distracted (e.g. when clay modelling, 
participants need to look at the clay from time to time). Research has shown that 
participants are more likely to avert their gaze from distracting stimuli when 
attempting more complex tasks (Doherty-Sneddon, Bruce, Bonner, Longbotham & 
Doyle 2002; Glenberg, Shroeder & Robertson, 1998; Meskin & Singer, 1974). As a 
result, it is believed that the simplicity o f the mindbus task relative to the clay 
modelling task increased the chance of the sight of the chocolates provoking 
cravings. In support of this, using the CEQ_S10m measure as an example, the 
findings of the current study showed that the defusion group reported an average 
number of cravings between 6.87 and 7.18, whereas Andrade et al. (2012) reported 
that those in the clay modelling group experienced a mean number of cravings 
between 2.64 and 3.29.
4.4.2.2 Possible explanations fo r  nonsignificant group differences 
One possible explanation for the non-significant differences between the groups is 
that, the current study considered the defusion strategy to be an imagery task and the 
relaxation and no-task (i.e. mind wandering) strategies as non-imagery tasks. It could
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however be argued that both control tasks also involved some degree of imagery. 
When trying to ‘take the stress out of the craving’ for instance, the relaxation group 
may have visualised their muscles tensing and relaxing. Moreover, the no-task group 
were allowed to let their mind wander (i.e. daydream). The participants in this group 
may therefore have used imagery when freely elaborating on their thoughts 
(Teasdale et al., 1995). If all three tasks were imagery-based then it is unsurprising 
that no group differences were found. This is because the mindbus and control tasks 
had the capability o f loading the visuo-spatial sketchpad in the same way, thus acting 
as ‘control processes’ to disrupt the cognitive elaboration of intrusive thoughts.
Future replications o f the present study could usefully explore the effects of the 
mindbus task on cravings when compared to sufficiently matched control tasks on 
their ability to load the visual-spatial sketchpad (i.e. general resource load).
Due to all the participants being self-reported ‘chocolate lovers’, it may also be 
suggested that non-significant differences between the groups were caused by the 
chocolate being perceived as ‘positive temptation’ (i.e. something that still gives 
pleasure during abstinent attempts). Like the control groups, the defusion group may 
therefore have only casually abided by their task instructions to help them to avoid 
eating the chocolate. In support of this, the majority o f participants across all three 
groups reported using their strategy, ‘sometimes’. It would be interesting to see if 
significant group differences in the number of cravings experienced was found when 
the same participants are faced with the challenge of resisting a ‘negative temptation’ 
(i.e. something that is unpleasant during abstinent attempts). This, for example, 
could be something deemed more of an immediate threat to their health. Changing 
the sample in this way may help to identify whether the defusion group had received 
sufficient training in order to be appropriately skilled in the mindbus technique.
Another explanation for the null findings may be that the current study was 
significantly underpowered in order for an effect o f the defusion strategy to be 
evident. The sample comprised of a total o f 60 participants with small group sizes 
(defusion, n = 30; relaxation, n = 15; no-task, n = 15). Whilst significant effects of 
imagery-based tasks on cravings have been previously reported using similar sample 
sizes (Andrade et al., 2012), more recently it has been suggested that studies 
exploring the effects of cognitive defusion on chocolate consumption require larger
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samples in order for significant group differences to be demonstrated. In a sample of 
56 participants (defusion group, n = 16, control groups, each n = 14), Hooper et al. 
(2012) reported that when the amount of chocolate participants ate in a normal week 
was accounted for, the three groups did not differ significantly in the amount of 
chocolate eaten or the amount of cravings experienced. The effects sizes reported in 
Hooper’s study were however very small.36 Similar strength effect sizes were also 
reported in the current study when exploring the effects of the defusion strategy on 
cravings. Increasing the sample size in future research may therefore be unhelpful.
Of interest however, the findings for the number o f chocolate-related thoughts 
experienced by the defusion group in the current study compared to the control 
groups showed medium to large effect sizes.
It may also be argued that the null effects were due to the mindbus strategy being a 
task of general distraction rather than selective interference with imagery. If this was 
however correct, a significant difference between the defusion and no-task group 
would have been expected as the latter group were permitted to think about 
chocolate and not asked to suppress their thoughts in any way. Previous research has 
also demonstrated the significant effects of the defusion strategy on chocolate 
cravings relative to distraction tasks (Hooper et al., 2012) therefore rendering this 
explanation unlikely. Alternatively, the null findings may be due to all three groups 
being aware that the study aimed to explore chocolate cravings. Whilst this could not 
be avoided, it is recognised that it is difficult to measure cravings without asking 
participants to introspect about it, which may act as a spur for elaboration across all 
groups. This suggestion would though imply that the participants did not use their 
taught strategies when in fact the findings showed that all participants used their 
strategy at least sometimes during the ten-minute intervention period.
4.4.23 Responses to thought probes
In addition to showing no significant differences in self-reported chocolate cravings 
between the defusion and control groups, the mindbus task was found to be 
ineffective at reducing the frequency of intrusive craving-related thoughts. This was
36 In H ooper’s study the means were in the predicted direction for the am ount o f  chocolate eaten but 
not for the number o f cravings experienced.
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demonstrated by all three groups showing no significant differences in the mean 
number of chocolate-related thoughts reported in response to the thought-probes 
during the ten-minute intervention phase. With no other research in which to 
compare, it is impossible to state whether these findings are supportive or 
contradictory in nature.
An explanation for the defusion group not experiencing significantly less chocolate- 
related thoughts compared to the control groups is that, the intervention phase was 
too short to demonstrate the effects of the defusion task on cravings. Participants 
were required to use their taught strategy each time they experienced a chocolate 
craving over a brief ten-minute period. The current study therefore does not allow for 
the exploration of whether the defusion tasks effectively reduce chocolate-related 
thoughts, or whether one or more of the control strategies has reduced impact on 
chocolate-related thoughts when applied over a longer time period. It would 
therefore be useful for future research to extend the intervention time phase beyond 
ten-minutes. Another option would be to provide an extended amount of training 
time which would end once participants had reported competence in the strategy.
4.4.3 Limitations and future research
There were several weaknesses in the present study that point to potential directions 
for future research. First, cravings were measured by self-report, leaving room for 
inaccuracies given that the craving questionnaires relied on participant’s accounts of 
their craving experiences during the study. This however may not necessarily be a 
limitation of the study because identifying an alternative measure of cravings would 
be very difficult. Rather, this point highlights the lack of available methodologies for 
use in craving studies. Additionally, although there is no direct evidence to lead to 
such as conclusion, it is possible that some of the participants misinterpreted the 
questions on the post-intervention craving measures (CEQ_S10m and CEQ_F10m) 
and based their responses on how they were feeling about chocolate at that particular 
moment in time instead of how they felt during the intervention phase. If 
misinterpretation of questions occurred, this may have had an effect on the overall 
total of cravings reported post-intervention by the different groups. Second, the 
present study was conducted in a comparatively homogeneous sample of
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undergraduate students who were, for the majority, not currently dieting and only 
reported chocolate cravings slightly above moderate intensity. The findings may 
therefore have been different if  individuals with potentially more severe craving 
control problems were tested. Future research should aim to extend the present 
findings to individuals who experience frequent and/or intense food cravings, such as 
“ chocoholics” , as well as binge eaters, overweight or obese individuals who are 
trying to lose weight, or those suffering from an eating disorder such as bulimia 
nervosa (Schlundt et al., 1993; Sitton, 1991; Waters et al., 2001).
Third, although the different groups were found to be demographically similar (e.g. 
age and diet status) the majority of participants were female. Several studies have 
found increased food craving (Dye et al., 1995) and consumption (Barr, Janelle & 
Prio, 1995; Johnson, Corrigan, Lemmon, Bergeron & Crusco, 1994) during the luteal 
phase of the menstrual cycle. It is therefore possible that this had an effect on the 
data as a measure of menstruation was not taken. Future replications o f the study 
should ensure that participants are matched across condition according to phase of 
their menstrual cycle.
A fourth weakness of the present study is that the training o f the defusion and control 
strategies was very brief. Delivering the instructions o f how to use the strategies over 
a slightly longer experiential training period (to allow the practice to form some level 
o f mindfulness skill) may have demonstrated the effects o f the defusion strategy on 
cravings more clearly. Furthermore, it could be argued that the current study was too 
artificial in nature. Sitting in front of a selection of chocolate products in silence for 
ten-minutes is not an activity which many people would carry out in their daily 
routine. It would therefore be useful to explore the effects of the mindbus task on 
chocolate cravings outside of a laboratory setting by conducting the study over an 
extended period of time. This would allow participants to use their taught strategy 
each time they experienced a chocolate craving in a number of different natural 
settings (e.g. at work or at home).
A final limitation of the current study is that during the ten-minute intervention 
phase, the number of chocolate-related thoughts was measured as opposed to 
cravings. Cravings were only measured after the intervention phase had been
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completed. To obtain a more accurate measure of the effects of the defusion strategy 
on chocolate cravings, future studies could ask participants to self-record each time 
they experienced a craving. Participants could also rate their strength of each craving 
using a Likert or visual analogue scale. It is however important to bear in mind that 
similarly to measuring thoughts, such a process, while o f some value, may also 
interfere with the effectiveness of the intervention.
4.4.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, the present study failed to demonstrate that the defusion strategy 
brings about its effects (i.e. changes unhealthy eating behaviour) by limiting craving- 
related intrusive thoughts. More specifically, the mindbus task did not appear to 
reduce cravings by loading working memory and thus, prevent thought elaboration. 
The findings instead suggest that participants practicing the defusion strategy 
experience a similar number of cravings to those practicing non-mindfulness based 
control strategies. Further investigations are therefore needed in order to understand 
how the cognitive defusion works to reduce chocolate consumption.
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Chapter Five 
General Discussion
5.1 Research aims
There is a large body of literature demonstrating the effects of mindfulness-based 
therapies across a range of different health and non-health related areas (e.g. Hayes, 
Masuda et al., 2004; Hayes, Wilson et al., 2004; Teasdale et al., 2000), but less 
understanding of how these therapies work (Baer, 2009). The aim of the current 
thesis was therefore to identify how mindfulness brings about its' effects. Three 
mindfulness-based mechanisms were explored over four studies; resulting in two 
different but complementary lines of enquiry. The first study examined whether 
practicing mindfulness positively effects behaviour change by increasing attentional 
control. Studies 2-4 used a dismantling design to separate and explore individual 
mindfulness strategies widely used within mindfulness-based interventions. These 
studies examined how mindfulness exerts its effects on self-control related health 
behaviours, using unhealthy eating behaviour as an example. More specifically,
Study One aimed to examine differences between experienced, novice and non­
meditators in their ability to regulate attention to emotionally motivating stimuli 
(chocolate) using dot-probe and emotional Stroop tasks. Study Two aimed to 
investigate the effects of brief versions of the mindfulness-based cognitive defusion 
and acceptance strategies on chocolate consumption over a five-day period. Study 
Three sought to replicate the findings from Study Two, whilst additionally exploring 
whether the defusion strategy was effective at reducing chocolate consumption by 
either reducing automaticity and/or increasing goal accessibility. Study Four 
explored the alternate possibility that the effects of the defusion technique previously 
demonstrated in Study Two were mediated by a reduction in the number o f chocolate 
cravings experienced. A full discussion of these studies can be found in earlier 
chapters.
The purpose of this final chapter is to focus on the implications of the findings and 
the ways in which they can help to fully exploit mindfulness as an intervention for 
changing unhealthy behaviours. A discussion of the implications of each individual
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study, in addition to a more general discussion of the research implications is 
provided.
5.2 Is mindfulness experience associated with reduced attentional bias to 
chocolate-related stimuli What are the implications o f this?
Most mindfulness-based interventions highlight attention as a core component 
(Bishop et al., 2004, Brown & Ryan, 2003; Walach et al., 2006). As a result, there 
has been much research conducted on whether greater mindfulness training enhances 
an individual’s ability to control their attention to emotionally distracting stimuli 
(e.g. Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Jha et al., 2007; Moore et al., 2012, Wenk- 
Sormaz, 2005). The findings however are mixed, with some suggesting that more 
experienced meditators perform more effectively on attentional control tasks 
compared to novice meditators (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007) and others the 
opposite (Dickenson et al., 2013). As previously discussed in Chapter Two, one 
explanation for these conflicting results is that some studies use methods (e.g. 
randomised control trials) which do not allow the experimental groups sufficient 
training to become ‘experienced’ meditators (e.g. Semple et al., 2010). The findings 
therefore fail to demonstrate the effects of long-term meditation on attentional 
control. To avoid this limitation, Study One extended the current literature by using a 
between-subject design which consisted of three groups; meditative naive 
participants, novice meditators and experienced meditators. It was believed that 
having a clearer understanding of the effects of different mindfulness experience 
would have important implications from an applied point of view. For instance, if  the 
non-meditators were found to have better attentional control compared to meditators, 
but no differences were evident between the novice and experienced meditators, then 
small amounts of mindfulness meditation maybe just as beneficial for attentional 
control as more extensive training. This is important from an applied perspective 
given the presumed relationship between attentional control and behaviour (Cox, 
Pothos & Hosier, 2007; Waters & Feyerabend, 2000; Waters et al., 2003; Field & 
Eastwood, 2005).
The results of this study provided no evidence that meditation experience, 
irrespective of whether it was determined by participant self-assessment, frequency
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or length of practice, or the type of attentional controls used (focused attention 
and/or open monitoring) was statistically associated with attentional bias to 
chocolate-related stimuli, as measured by the dot-probe and emotional Stroop tasks. 
In addition, no statistically significant associations were found between the predicted 
mediators (self-reported mindfulness, attentional control and self-control scores) and 
the attentional bias measures. The effect sizes for both sets o f analyses also failed to 
reach even moderate strength, thus suggesting that no effect of meditation experience 
on attentional control was evident, or likely to be evident, even with the recruitment 
o f a larger sample. It was therefore concluded that those trained in mindfulness 
meditation do not attend to emotionally attractive stimuli any less than those who 
have not received mindfulness training. This however maybe somewhat 
understandable given that mindfulness meditation teaches practitioners to 
‘experience’ all stimuli in the present moment, irrespective of whether it is deemed 
good or bad (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). In view of these findings, it was instead suggested 
that another process of the mindfulness training was responsible for bringing about 
behavioural change. Emotionally motivating stimuli elicit internal cues such as 
thoughts and feelings (Adriannse et al., 2009), thus one possibility was that 
mindfulness training works by teaching practitioners to perceive and experience 
internal cues differently. Study Two investigated this alternative possibility.
5.3 Are two brief mindfulness strategies derived from Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy effective at reducing chocolate consumption, and how?
To my knowledge there have been only two previous attempts to improve diet using 
mindfulness-based interventions; Alberts et al. (2010) and Tapper et al. (2009). Both 
these interventions however employed a broad range of mindfulness-based strategies 
that are likely to have influenced a wide range of different psychological processes. 
Such an approach makes it more difficult to identify the precise mechanisms at work. 
The aim of Study Two was therefore to extract just two mindfulness-based strategies 
commonly used in mindfulness interventions to be able to test the effects o f these 
strategies in isolation. The main interest of Study Two was also to look at ‘b rief 
versions of these strategies rather than labour intensive ones. Thus, both the 
cognitive defusion and acceptance strategies were taught over a short 30-minute 
period. This was considered sufficient to ensure that participants gained
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understanding of, and competency at, using such techniques, yet was not overly 
demanding on the participants in terms of time and effort. Using brief versions of the 
strategies was also believed to limit the difficulties generated by attrition and 
adherence to applied research studies (Dumville, Torgerson & Hewitt, 2006) and 
formal mindfulness-interventions more generally (e.g. Shennan, Payne & Fenlon, 
2010).
The results of this study showed participants in the cognitive defusion group ate 
significantly less chocolate than the control group. There were no significant 
differences in chocolate consumption between the acceptance and control groups. 
These findings highlight the importance of disentangling the effects of different 
mindfulness-based techniques. By doing so, the findings provide new evidence that 
different mindfulness strategies are more or less effective for changing different 
types of health behaviours. This has important implications for the development of 
new and existing mindfulness-based interventions in that they can be tailored more 
specifically in order to bring about the quickest and most successful behavioural 
change. In Study Two, the defusion strategy was shown to be effective at reducing 
chocolate consumption, whereas the acceptance strategy failed to demonstrate 
similar effects. It would therefore be advised to incorporate the defusion strategy into 
mindfulness-based interventions aimed at changing unhealthy eating behaviour, but 
not the acceptance strategy.
It may however be possible that the acceptance strategy is more effective for other 
health-related behaviours such as those which require create new habits, rather than 
breaking existing habits. Another possibility is that only certain mindfulness 
strategies remain effective when taught and implemented in ‘b rie f form. Thus, 
acceptance may not necessarily be ineffective at reducing chocolate consumption, 
but the brief, simplified version used in Study Two was insufficient at demonstrating 
behavioural change in the same way at the defusion strategy. It would therefore be 
interesting for future research to explore whether the brief acceptance strategy is 
made more effective by improving the training provided. Future research also needs 
to understand further exactly ‘how! the different strategies work. Study Two showed 
some, but not wholly sufficient, evidence that the defusion strategy brought about its 
effects by reducing automaticity between chocolate-related thoughts and chocolate
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consumption. Study Three aimed to extend these findings in addition to exploring 
another potential mediator; increasing goal accessibility.
5.4 Does a brief mindfulness-based cognitive defusion intervention really reduce 
chocolate consumption, and if  so, does it work by either reducing automaticity 
and/or increasing goal accessibility?
There is some evidence to suggest that mindfulness training, when taught in its more 
complex, formal form effectively changes unfavourable eating behaviours for more 
favourable ones (Alberts et al., 2010; Kristeller & Hallett, 1999; Tapper et al., 2009). 
None of these studies, however, have attempted to replicate their findings in order to 
test both the reliability and validity of the data. This has important implications for 
the long-term success and usefulness of mindfulness-based interventions. Study Two 
showed that those practicing a brief defusion strategy ate significantly less chocolate 
and chocolate-related products than those practicing a relaxation-control strategy 
over a five-day period. Given the novelty of such research, the study was repeated, 
making only small adjustments to the design, in order to confidently conclude that a 
brief defusion strategy successfully reduced chocolate consumption. As a result, 
Study Three was conducted. Contrary to Study Two, Study Three did not find 
evidence to suggest that the defusion strategy was more effective than two control 
strategies (relaxation and no-task) at helping participants to resist chocolate. This 
highlights the importance of replicating findings within mindfulness research, 
especially when such research is conducted with the potential of informing 
government and health officials. It was assumed that one possibility for the 
inconsistency between these studies was caused by the changes to the design. 
Whereas this was intended to improve the credibility o f the research, these 
amendments may have been somewhat detrimental to the overall outcome. Future 
research would thereby benefit from conducting an exact replication of Study Two to 
truly establish if a brief cognitive defusion intervention can bring about positive 
behavioural change. Failing to do so may result in a substantial amount o f time and 
money being wasted on the development and delivery of a new mindfulness-based 
healthy eating intervention.
297
Despite non-significant group differences found in Study Three, for exploratory 
purposes, further investigations to understand how the defusion strategy may have 
brought about its effects were conducted. There exists a large body of literature 
which has explored the association between behaviour and automaticity (Bargh et 
al., 1996; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Greenwald et al., 1996) and behaviour and 
goals (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah & Kruglanski, 
2002). However, there is no research combining both automaticity and goals with 
mindfulness in order to explore how behavioural change is brought about. Study 
Three therefore specifically looked to examine whether cognitive defusion either 
works by weakening links between chocolate-related primes and chocolate 
consumption, and/or strengthening links between chocolate-related primes and 
competing goals. Contrary to prediction, there was no evidence that the strategy 
worked by reducing levels of automaticity between chocolate-related thoughts and 
chocolate consumption, as measured by a lexical decision task and self-report habit 
index measures. Study Two did however show a reduction in automaticity using the 
SRHI. It would therefore be worthwhile to explore this prediction further. There was 
also no evidence to suggest that the defusion strategy worked by increasing goal 
accessibility; this was again measured using a lexical decision task. Irrespective of 
this, it would be interesting for future research to adjust the goal accessibility lexical 
decision task to see whether this alters the sensitivity of the measure. These may, for 
instance, include using primes that are not implicit, and also increasing the number 
o f critical trials (Hassin, Aarts & Ferguson, 2005). Another option would be to 
provide participants with feedback on their performance of the LDTs. Having a 
better understanding of the complex interaction between eating behaviour and 
automaticity, and eating behaviour and health goals will again help to inform the 
development of effective mindfulness interventions by understanding how the 
different mechanisms work.
5.5 Does the brief cognitive defusion intervention work by reducing the number of  
chocolate cravings experienced?
Food cravings are often described as ‘intrusive thoughts’ which become intensified 
with thought elaboration (May et al., 2010). The brief defusion task used in the 
current research aimed to distance thoughts from the person experiencing them, thus
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breaking the elaboration cycle. In view of this, Study Four explored the possibility 
that cognitive defusion reduces chocolate consumption by decreasing chocolate 
cravings. More specifically it was hypothesised that this would be achieved by the 
‘mindbus’ defusion task loading visuo-spatial memory given that this task requires 
the individual to form a mental picture of themselves as the ‘driver’ and their thought 
as ‘passengers’. This study was believed to be the first to investigate this explanation 
o f how cognitive defusion strategies bring about their effects.
The findings failed to support the pre-stated hypothesis, as no significant differences 
in chocolate cravings between the mindfulness and non-mindfulness groups were 
found. There were also no significant differences in the number of chocolate-related 
thoughts experienced in the defusion group compared to the control groups. Thus 
Study Four demonstrated no evidence for an effect of cognitive defusion on 
cravings. In other words, defusion strategies neither prevent cravings from occurring 
nor do they provide a ‘cure’ for chocolate cravings. Instead cognitive defusion 
encourages individuals to change their perspective o f their cravings rather than the 
cravings themselves. Cravings can be distressing and also very distracting, thus it is 
acknowledged that interventions that reduce cravings are viewed as beneficial 
(Andrade et al., 2012). Whilst such interventions (e.g. thought suppression) are 
successful at bringing about behavioural change in the short-term, there is evidence 
to suggest that their benefits are not sustained long-term (Wegner, 1989). The 
findings for Study Four therefore have important implications in that they can advise 
existing interventions of an alternative way of dealing with cravings, not just in 
terms of changing unhealthy eating behaviours, but also other addictive type 
behaviours. To extend this research it may first however be worthwhile investigating 
the general effects of the mindbus strategy on working memory.
5.6 Do the findings support the hypothesis that mindfulness changes unhealthy 
eating behaviours using top-down regulatoiy processes?
Some existing literature has supported the opinion that the beneficial effects o f 
mindfulness on health-related behaviours are caused by top-down, as opposed to 
bottom-up regulatory processes (Fresco et al., 2007; Garland et al., 2010; however 
see Grabovac et al., 2011). The current thesis aimed, in part, to strengthen previous
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research by investigating whether mindfulness changes unhealthy eating behaviours 
by influencing how individuals manage their responses to tempting external and/or 
internal cues. More specifically, it was predicted that mindfulness may lead to 
positive health-behavioural changes by increasing self-control as a result of 
increased awareness of, and attention to such cues. Study One explored the effects of 
mindfulness training on attention to chocolate cues in the environment, thus focusing 
on the top-down influence of the physical properties (e.g. taste and smell 
palatability) of food on the ‘cognitive and emotional brain’ (see Figure 1.1). The 
remaining studies explored the effects of mindfulness training on the individual’s 
ability to notice internal cues (i.e. thoughts and feeling), subsequently allowing 
temptation to be resisted. These studies predominately focused on the top-down 
processes involved in mental imagery, impulsivity and the hedonic values of food.
Contrary to expectation, in the current research there was no evidence to 
suggest that mindfulness worked by either improving attentional control (Study 
One), or by reducing the emotional salience of chocolate-related cues via 
acceptance-based techniques (Study Two). These findings may however be 
explained by both processes being more strongly attributed to bottom-up regulatory 
strategies (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Slagter et al., 2007; van Leeuwen et al., 2009). 
Study Two did however show that the mindfulness-based strategy, cognitive 
defusion, successfully changed unhealthy eating behaviours using a top-down 
process. This process involved strengthening executive control, causing a reduction 
o f behavioural automaticity to chocolate and chocolate-related food items. It was 
therefore concluded that the mindfulness-based defusion strategy works by 
overriding impulsive, automatic responses and instead enabling goal-oriented 
actions. Caution should though be taken given that these early findings were not 
replicated in a later study. The precise mechanisms of how the defusion strategy 
heightened goal success and accessibility (Study Three) and reduced imagery-based 
thought elaboration (Study Four) also presently remain unclear. In view o f this, 
additional exploration of the top-down processes involved in mindfulness and its 
effects of eating behaviour is advised.
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5.7 Summary o f  the main research implications
5.7.1 Contribution to wider mindfulness research
Differentiating between distinct mindfulness components and testing the individual 
effects of each one will help facilitate a more detailed understanding of the different 
components. Exploring the effects of individual mindfulness components will also 
benefit future mindfulness research because those which currently investigate 
mindfulness more generally make it difficult to identify the precise mechanisms at 
work, and consequently, dilute the effects of any one component (Tapper et al.,
2009; Holzel et al., 2011). Furthermore, discussing the potential mechanisms 
underlying mindfulness allows future investigations into whether mindfulness as a 
clinical intervention adds something unique to existing clinical interventions (e.g. 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy) and if so, what that unique factor is.
5.7.2 Helping to identify how mindfulness changes self-control related behaviours 
Understanding how mindfulness works and its relevance to help change self-control 
related behaviours will be conducive for the flexible and more targeted application of 
mindfulness training both within clinical and community settings. Furthermore, if  
some aspects of mindfulness training were empirically found to be ‘inert’, this also 
highlights the possibility that certain ‘unhelpful’ components could be eliminated 
from mindfulness-based training programs. Consequently, such research will 
facilitate the establishment of targeted and cost-effective programs which 
specifically utilise mindfulness mechanisms that are most relevant for a particular 
behaviour type.
5.7.3 Improving health and health research
The findings will contribute towards ensuring that the population maintains a healthy 
diet. This in turn will lead to improved general well-being and decreased risk of 
developing chronic conditions linked with unhealthy eating behaviours (Kopelman, 
2007). Moreover, health psychologists are frequently asked to offer their expertise in 
the development of new government health initiatives (Johnston, Weinman, &
Chater, 2011). Thus, the findings of this research can make a significant contribution 
to public health policy and services which aim to reduce active engagement in 
unhealthy behaviours (Welsh Assembly Government, 2010). Furthermore, if  the 
mindfulness strategies explored in the interventions are effective at reducing
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unhealthy eating, they could be incorporated into commercial and community 
healthy eating programs. Also, with such a large percentage of people eating 
unhealthy diets, offering a quick, simple and effective intervention may encourage 
its use by a diverse population and not limit its use to ‘meditative types’. 
Consequently, this may help reduce the onset of major health problems associated 
with unhealthy eating and have a positive effect on society more widely. Lastly, 
given the theoretical overlap between overeating and other health-damaging 
behaviours (e.g. smoking, alcohol/drug abuse) the results from the current studies are 
believed to have relevance beyond diet, thus should generalise to a range of different 
health-related behaviours.
5.8 Limitations and future research
Study One aimed to determine whether mindfulness brings about behavioural change 
by reducing attentional bias. The implication of this study is that the results could be 
generalised to a range of health-related behaviours whereby attention is considered a 
key component, such as addiction (Field & Cox, 2008). The findings however 
showed no significant differences in attentional control between meditators and non­
meditators. Whilst this finding suggests that mindfulness does not bring about its 
effects by reducing attentional bias to emotionally motivating stimuli, the data were 
only correlational in nature. This design cannot account for cause and effect and 
therefore may explain the non-significant findings identified. In view of this it would 
be worthwhile to attempt to manipulate mindfulness in order to directly assess its 
impact on attentional bias in future research. This could be achieved by allocating 
meditation naive participants to experimental and control groups. Each would be 
asked to complete similar measures to those employed in Study One, though the 
participants allocated to the experimental group would also undergo mindfulness 
training over a two week period (Tang et al., 2007). Similarly to Study One, it would 
be expected that if mindfulness training enhances attentional control and reduces 
attentional bias then performance amongst the experimental participants on all 
measures would be enhanced at follow-up. An alternative follow-on study to Study 
One could use an intervention approach whereby a mobile phone application is used 
to assist in the practice of mindfulness or relaxation-control (i.e. 10 minutes of 
practice each day) over a longer-period o f time (e.g. two weeks). Making these
302
changes to the study’s design is believed to reveal a more clear and robust 
understanding of the effects of mindfulness training on attentional control. This 
approach does however exclude the investigation of experienced meditators; a 
limitation which has been earlier discussed.
As earlier stated, previous attempts to improve diet, using mindfulness-based 
interventions, employ a broad range of mindfulness-based strategies (Alberts et al., 
2010; Tapper et al., 2009). Given the limited time available for the delivery of 
current interventions, the individual effects of the different strategies are likely to 
become weakened and sometimes even go undetected. Consequently this can result 
in the publication of findings stating that mindfulness-based interventions are 
ineffective for bringing about a particular behavioural change whilst also offering 
little understanding of how such an effect, or lack of, is brought about. The findings 
from Study Two is therefore relatively novel in that it is able to inform health 
policies and interventions that, for reducing chocolate consumption, practice of a 
brief mindfulness-based cognitive defusion strategy is sufficient to bring about 
change, and change quickly (over a five-day period). However, a limitation of Study 
Two was that measures of the actual impact o f mindfulness on health (e.g. weight 
loss, improvements in blood pressure) were not recorded. Instead the findings tell us 
simply that a brief defusion strategy reduces chocolate consumption. It is possible 
that the participants’ substituted one type of unhealthy snack food for another (e.g. 
crisps), therefore their chocolate consumption was reduced, but there were no 
positive implications for their overall health. Future studies are advised to investigate 
this. It would also be interesting to expand on this research by employing a sample 
of participants that have already successfully reduced their chocolate intake, and 
thus, potentially, seen improvements in their overall health. These participants may 
be more highly motivated to maintain this behavioural change in order to keep hold 
of the positive health outcomes. It is thus worthwhile to ask the question; does the 
defusion strategy work any better or worse for these individuals? In other words, 
does this mindfulness-based strategy only work during the initial stages of 
behavioural change or does it extend to maintaining it also?
Future research would also benefit from identifying any difficulties people have 
when trying to learn brief mindfulness-based strategies. This again has implications
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for the development of interventions that are tailored specifically to each individual. 
Due to its novelty, at this stage in the current research the mindfulness strategies 
were taught with the general assumption that all people will learn, understand and 
use the concept in a similar manner; in the way they were asked to. However, this 
may not have been the case for all. Some people, for example, may have been kinetic 
learners, therefore have found the practice exercise of the teaching process very 
beneficial. Others however may have benefited from the literature provided (i.e. the 
written booklet) as they learn by acquiring ‘information’. It would therefore by 
useful to identify which form of teaching the mindfulness strategies would be most 
effective for each individual and adjust the learning process accordingly. This could 
be achieved by simply asking participants ‘In which way do you learn the best?’. It is 
possible that subtle differences between how those in Study 2 and those in Study 3 
learned the strategy may account for the inconsistency between the research findings. 
Despite the current research not controlling for differences in learning ability of an 
unfamiliar strategy, Study 2 and 3 did take into consideration difficulties when 
implementing the taught strategies. This was evident by using only ‘b rie f versions 
of the strategies, enabling them to be taught over a short period of time. The 
implication of this was that, if effective in reducing chocolate consumption (as 
shown in Study Two), then these strategies may attract a wider range of the 
population to use them, including those who are non-meditative types (i.e. do not 
believe in the effects of meditation), impulsive individuals (i.e. want to reap the 
rewards of practicing a strategy very quickly) or those people with very little time to 
dedicate to such practice (i.e. a person with both a family and a demanding job). 
Future research would benefit from the recruitment o f such individuals to test not 
only the effects of the strategies and identifying how it is bringing about its effects, 
but to explore whether the aim of scaling down mindfulness interventions to that of 
individual, brief strategies truly does increase its use by a greater number of people.
A frequently reported limitation of mindfulness research is whether participants 
using a general mindfulness based questionnaire can reliably report on the quality 
and/or magnitude of their mindfulness for a particular behaviour. This limitation is 
particularly relevant for Studies One and Two whereby participants are asked to rate 
their level of mindfulness. The data were used to identify if  mindfulness acted as a 
potential mediator. There exist many ‘general’ measures of mindfulness (Baer et al.,
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2306; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Cardaciotto et al., 2008), however less are specific to 
certain behaviours. A new Mindful Eating Scale has however recently been devised 
(Hulbert-Williams et al, 2013). It may therefore be argued that future investigations 
of the effects of brief mindfulness strategies on healthy eating behaviour should be 
accessed using more specific types of measures. The posing of this question however 
leads to the further questions; how would one go about validating such a self-report 
instrument and what are objective measures of mindfulness? These questions also 
need to be addressed in future research.
The three mindfulness-based mechanisms chosen for investigation in the present 
research (attention, cognitive defusion and acceptance) were based on their ease of 
separation from formal interventions, and their testability using available behavioural 
and self-report measures. There are however many different mindfulness 
components that make up mindfulness-based interventions, thus exploring the effects 
of each one of these components and identifying how they work to bring about their 
effects is important. Future studies need to look at each component individually 
across a range of different self-control related health behaviours. It would also be 
worthwhile to explore different combinations of the mechanisms in order to 
understanding whether this strengthens or weakens its effects. It is however 
suggested that piloting these combinations should be carried out prior to any main 
analysis. It is also critical that the investigations go beyond merely answering the 
questions; do these strategies or combinations work? Answering the additional 
question of ‘how’ is also extremely important otherwise the development of 
mindfulness research will remain somewhat stunted. To mature the field of 
mindfulness training even further, it is also important to go beyond the questions 
‘does mindfulness work?’ and ‘how does mindfulness work?’ and ask more about 
how best to teach it. In studies 2-4, the different groups were taught by the same 
researcher who had received professional mindfulness training. This was deemed 
necessary in order to correctly attribute the observed changes in mindfulness-based 
intervention studies to the active ingredient of mindfulness per se rather than many 
nonspecific factors (e.g. positive expectations, confidence o f the teacher in the 
effectiveness of the intervention). Recent research however has shown that on-line 
teaching of mindfulness via a virtual coach can be effective at increasing the number 
of times participants meditated and the length of practice (Hudlicka, 2011, 2013). As
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‘real* mindfulness teachers are not always available or affordable to delivery 
mindfulness-based interventions, this training method offers the next best alternative. 
Testing this method of training alongside the current research which aims to identify 
which mindfulness strategies work and how, may have even greater implications of 
improving the overall effectiveness of mindfulness-based interventions.
5.9 Conclusion
With poor diet now overtaking smoking as the one of the main causes of ill health 
(Scarborough et al., 2011), it is unsurprising that government officials and health 
professional are searching for alternate ways of tackling this problem. One 
suggestion is to incorporate mindfulness into the National Health Service (NHS) and 
beyond (e.g. in schools) (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
[NICE], 2009; Kuyken et al., 2013). For decades research has demonstrated the 
positive effects of mindfulness on changing unhealthy behaviours for more 
favourable ones (Baer, 2003; Bishop, 2002; Grossman et al., 2004). But is knowing 
it works enough to justify such changes within our health-care and education 
systems? The simply answer to this question is, no. The current thesis was able to 
demonstrate this, highlighting the potential problems of current mindfulness-based 
interventions due to their complexity, and the importance o f understanding that one 
mindfulness-based intervention does not ‘fit’ all health-related behaviours to bring 
about change. From the findings, it was recommended that further dismantling 
designs are needed in order to gain a better understanding o f which mindfulness 
mechanisms work and, more importantly, how they work. The aim of the current 
research was not to dispute the effects of mindfulness previously reported. Instead, it 
aimed to highlight the need to take stock of what the existing literature tells us, and 
more importantly, what is does not. Identifying the gaps in the literature is believed 
to unlock important information of how best to develop mindfulness research and 
mindfulness-based interventions in future years.
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Appendices
The following documents are included in the appendices.
Document Title/Description of Document
A Study One screening questionnaire
B Study One meditation practice questionnaire
C Study One demographics questionnaire
D Study One participant information sheet
E Study One consent form
F Study One debrief form
G Study Two poster
H Study Two screening questionnaire
I Study Two demographics questionnaire
J Study Two chocolate questionnaire
K Study Two strategy adherence and acceptability questionnaire
L Study Two cravings questionnaire
M Study Two suspicion probe
N Chocolate diary
O ‘Seeing your thoughts differently’ cognitive defusion strategy booklet 
P ‘Accepting our feelings’ acceptance strategy booklet
Q ‘Relaxation’ control strategy booklet
R Study Two consent form
S Study Two debrief form
T Pilot Study One chapter three, chocolate diaries, non-resist group
U Pilot Study One chapter three, chocolate diaries, resist group
V Pilot Study Two chapter three, example of the word association task
W Pilot Study Three chapter three, written recall tasks
X Preliminary Study chapter three, demographic questionnaire
Y Preliminary Study chapter three, participant information sheet
Z Preliminary Study chapter three, consent form
AA Preliminary Study chapter three, debrief form
BB Study Three demographic questionnaire
CC Study Three behavioural goals measure
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DD Study Three suspicion probe
EE Study Three strategy adherence measure
FF Study Three self-reported strategy evaluation
GG Study Three task adherence questionnaire
HH Study Three description of the different trials included in the chocolate
prime and goal lexical decision tasks 
II ‘Monitoring your chocolate eating’ control strategy booklet
JJ Study Three consent form
KK Study Three debrief form
LL List of differences between studies 2 and 3
MM Study Four craving induction questions
NN ‘Seeing your thoughts differently’ brief version of the cognitive
defusion strategy booklet for study four 
OO ‘Relaxation’ brief version of the control strategy booklet for study four
PP ‘Mind wandering task’ study four
QQ Study Four thought-probe measure
RR Study Four pleasantness questionnaire
SS Study Four strategy adherence measure
TT Study Four consent form
UU Study Four debrief form
W  Department of Psychology, Ethics Committee Memo -  Study One
WW Department of Psychology, Ethics Committee Memo -  Study Two
XX Department of Psychology, Ethics Committee Memo -  Pilot Study
One, chapter three
YY Department of Psychology, Ethics Committee Memo -  Pilot Study
Two, chapter three
ZZ Department of Psychology, Ethics Committee Memo -  Pilot Study
Three, chapter three
A1 Department of Psychology, Ethics Committee Memo -  Preliminary
Study, chapter three 
B 1 Department of Psychology, Ethics Committee Memo -  Study Three
Cl Department of Psychology, Ethics Committee Memo -  Study Four
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Appendix A
Participant Number: 
Screening Questionnaire
Are you over 18 years old? □  Yes □  No
Do you have normal or corrected vision (not colour-blind)? If the latter, please make 
sure you bring your glasses with you to the study.
□  Yes □  No
Do you suffer from epilepsy? □  Yes □  No
Are you currently on a diet to lose weight? □  Yes □  No
How many times (if any) have you dieted to lose weight in the past year?
(By dieting we mean attempting to lose weight by trying to alter your normal 
eating habits).
n
L_- □ □ □
I haven’t 
dieted before
About 1-5 
times
About 6-24 
times
25 times or 
more
What is your first language? ......................................................................................
Are you a British native? If not, how long have you lived in the UK?
□  Yes □  No
!
.....................years
You will be asked to fast for three hours before you take part in the study. Will this 
be something you will be able to do? □  Yes □  No
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Appendix B
P a r t ic ip a n t  N u m b e r :
Meditation Practice Questionnaire 
We would be grateful if you could provide us with the following information
1. Do you have any experience of meditation? {If no, please go to question 12)
□ Yes □ No
2. Are you currently practicing meditation? □ Yes □ No
3. How often do you meditate?
4. How long do you meditate for during each session?
5. What type of meditation do you practice? Please describe. (Techniques may 
include: walking, sitting, breathing, reflexology, sound therapy, body scanning, 
silence, tai-chi, stone therapy, etc)
6 . How long have you practiced meditation?
7. Why do you meditate?
8 . Describe your pattern of meditation use (e.g. continuous since you began 
practicing, started practicing then stopped for a few years, etc)
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9. How would you class yourself in terms of your experience of meditation?
I  Novice □ Experienced
10. Have you attended any meditation retreats in the past? If so, please describe (e.g. 
for how long, type of meditation, year completed)
□ Yes □ No
11. Have you received any formal or informal training, teachings or other meditation 
instruction? (If yes, please describe)
□ Yes □ No
12. Do you have any experience of yoga? (If no, please go to question 16)
□ Yes □ No
13. How often do you practice yoga?
14. What particular type of yoga do you practice? (E.g. do you practice any 
breathing or relaxation techniques?)
15. How long have you practiced yoga?
16. Do you have other activities/hobbies that involve meditative practices? (I f yes, 
please describe, i f  no please go to question 17)
□ Yes □ No
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17. Do you now use or have you ever used any breathing exercises? (If yes, please 
describe. I f  no, you have now completed this questionnaire)
□ Yes I  No
18. Are there any additional comments or other information about your meditation 
practices that you think may be useful?
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Appendix C
P a r t i c ip a n t  N u m b e r :
Demographic Questionnaire 
We would be grateful if you could provide us with the following inform ation
What is your sex? □  Male □  Female
What is your age? ............... years
Are you currently studying? □  Yes □  No
What is the highest level of qualification you have achieved UNTIL NOW at school, 
college or since leaving education? (Please tick 1 box.)
□  Higher degree (e.g. MA, MSc, PhD, PGCE)
□  First degree (e.g. BA, BSc)
□  A-Levels / Highers
□  GCSE or equivalent -  please specify the level:________________
□  Trade or technical certificate -  please specify the level:_________________
□  NVQ / BTEC / HND -  please specify the level:_____________________
□  Left school without formal qualifications
□  Other (please specify):________________________
What is your current occupation?_________________________________
What is your ethnic origin?
White □ White-British
□ White-Irish
□  Other White background (please specify)................................................
Black or Black British □ Caribbean
□ African
□  Other Black background (please specify)................................................
Asian or Asian British □ Indian
□ Pakistani
□  Bangladeshi
□ Chinese
□  Other Asian background (please specify)................................................
Mixed □ White & Black Caribbean
□ White & Black African
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□  White & Asian
□  Other Mixed background (please specify).
□  Other Ethnic background (please specify).
□  I decline to say
Have you ever been diagnosed with any psychological disorder? (e.g. stress, 
depression) If so, please provide details. □  Yes □  No
Do you have any physical conditions that affect what you eat? If so, please provide 
details. □  Yes □  No
Are you pregnant? □  Yes □  No
How much do you like chocolate?
I hate it I love it
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
How often do you eat chocolate?
Never Every Day
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Thank You!
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Appendix D
Meditation and Attentional Control 
Participant Information Sheet
Welcome to this study on meditation and attentional control!
Before you decide whether or not to participate, it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being conducted and what it will involve. Please take time to 
read the following information carefully.
What is the purpose of the study?
We are looking at the relationship between meditation and attention towards a range 
of different words and pictures. We will provide further details at the end of the 
study.
Who is carrying out the research?
The research is led by Mrs Kim Jenkins and Dr Katy Tapper at Swansea University’s 
Psychology Department. The research is funded by the National Institute for Social 
Care and Health Research (NISCHR) and has been approved by the Swansea 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee.
Can anyone take part?
We are looking for males and female who can speak fluent English. It is also 
important that you are NOT currently dieting to lose weight. In addition, the study is 
not suitable for individuals who suffer from epilepsy or who are colour-blind.
What happens if I agree to take part?
You will be asked to complete two computer-based tasks designed to assess 
responses towards different items. These should take no longer than 30 minutes. You 
will also be asked to complete a series of questionnaires about a variety of topics, 
including questions relating to your eating habits, daily thoughts, personality, and 
intelligence. Finally you will be asked to provide some background information 
about yourself such as your level of education, gender, age, ethnic origin. You will 
also be asked to provide information on any meditation training/practice you may or 
may not have undertaken both past and present. The whole session should last no 
longer than 1 hour. As a token o f our appreciation, you will receive £ 8  at the end of 
the session. Please note, you will be asked to fast for at least three hours prior to 
completing the study.
Where will the study take place?
The study will take place in the Psychology Department at Swansea University. This 
is located on the 9th floor of the Vivian Tower (cognitive science lab, room 932-5). 
Alternatively, the study can be carried out at a location more convenient for you.
What if I wish to withdraw?
Your participation is entirely voluntary. You will be free to withdraw at any time 
you wish, without giving a reason.
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What will happen to the information you collect?
All information collected will be anonymous. An analysis o f the information will 
form part of our report at the end of the study and may be presented to interested 
parties and published in scientific journals and related media. Unfortunately we are 
unable to give you any personal feedback about your individual scores.
What if I have other questions?
If you have any questions about the study then please ask them now. Alternatively if 
you have any further questions after the study has been completed, please do not 
hesitate to contact us at the following:
Mrs Kim Jenkins 
Department of Psychology 
Swansea University 
Swansea 
SA2 8 PP
Telephone: 01792 5 1 3 3 7 3 J B H H P  
Email: 290921@swansea.ac.uk
Dr Katy Tapper 
Department of Psychology 
Swansea University 
Swansea 
SA2 8 PP
Telephone: 01792 602567 
Email: k.tapper@swansea.ac.uk
I’d like to take part! What do I do now?
Please contact Kim to arrange an appointment.
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Appendix E
Consent Form
Title of the project: Meditation and Attentional Control 
Researchers: Mrs Kim Jenkins, Dr Katy Tapper
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the 
above study. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have had these 
answered satisfactorily.
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from 
the study at any time, without having to give a reason.
I have been informed that the confidentiality of the data I provide will be 
safeguarded.
I am 18 years of age or older.
Data Protection: I agree to the University processing personal data that I have 
supplied. I agree to the processing of such data for any purposes connected with the 
Research Project as outlined to me.
I agree to take part in the study.
Your name Date Signature
Researchers name Date Signature
Mrs Kim Jenkins 
Department of Psychology 
Swansea University 
Swansea 
SA2 8 PP
Telephone: 01792 513373 
Email: 290921@swansea.ac.uk
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Appendix F
Meditation and Attentional Control
Debriefing Form
Thark you for participating in this study! The research aims to explore the 
relationship between meditation and an individual’s ability to control their attention 
towards unhealthy foods (in this instance chocolate). Previous studies have found 
that individuals with poor attentional control for unhealthy foods show an increase in 
their weight one year later. This may be because the more you attend to these food 
items the more likely you are to eat them. We are interested in whether meditators 
are better able to control their attention in the presence o f unhealthy foods. This is 
important since it may mean that meditators are more able to resist eating unhealthy 
foods.
The two computer-based tasks you were asked to complete were designed to see how 
easily you were distracted by the tempting foods. Comparing results on these 
computer-based tasks between those who meditate and those who do not meditate 
should help us determine whether meditation is associated with better attentional 
control in the presence of unhealthy food cues. You were also asked to fast for at 
least three hours prior to taking park in the study. We are more likely to notice food 
cues when we are hungry so the purpose of this was to make the food cues in the 
computer-based tasks as distracting as possible.
Additionally, you were asked to fill in a series of questionnaires. These were used to 
assess other factors (such as eating habits, sensitivity to reward, and ability to self- 
regulate behaviour) that we think may impact upon the relationship between 
meditation and attention.
Ultimately we hope our findings will help inform interventions designed to help 
people maintain a healthy diet by reducing consumption of unhealthy snacks.
If you know anyone else who may participate in this study, please do not reveal this 
information to them since it could influence their responses.
If you are concerned by any of the health issues raised in the questionnaires please 
contact your GP. Further information on healthy eating can also be found at the 
following websites:
http://www.nhs.uk/LiveWell/Goodfood/Pages/Goodfoodhome.aspx
http://www.bbc.co.uk/health/treatments/healthv living/nutrition/index.shtml
If you have any other questions about the research, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the following:
Mrs Kim Jenkins Dr Katy Tapper
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Swansea University Swansea University
Swansea Swansea
SA2 8 PP SA2 8 PP
Telephone: 01792 513373 Telephone: 01792 602567
Email: 290921@swansea.ac.uk Email: k.tapper@swansea.ac.uk
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Like chocolate, but eat too much?
Ta ke pari i n our study and ea rn yourself f  10!
We are looking for males and females who want 
to reduce their level of chocolate consumption.
If you decide to take part you will be given a small 
bag of chocolates and asked to keep them in your 
possession at all times over a period of 5 
consecutive days. You will be required to try your 
best to not eat the chocolates in the bag or any 
other chocolates or chocolate-related products 
until the end of the study. Please note that 
certain inclusion criteria apply to this study.
If you are interested in taking part, or would like 
to know more, please contact the  researcher 
using the details below.
The study will be carried out at Swansea University,
Singleton Park, Swansea, SA2 8PP.
Appendix H
Screening Questionnaire
Are you over 18 years old? □  Yes □  No
Do you want to reduce the amount of chocolate you consume? □  Yes □  No 
Are you pregnant? □  Yes □  No
Are you currently suffering from, or have suffered in the past from an eating disorder?
□  Yes □  No
Can you speak/read English fluently? □  Yes □  No
Do you have a medical condition that affects what you can and can’t eat (e.g. high 
cholesterol, diabetes, hypoglycaemia, or food intolerances) specifically in relation to 
chocolate? □  Yes □  No
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Appendix I
P a r t i c i p a n t  N u m b e r :
Demographics Questionnaire 
We would be grateful if you could provide us with the following information
What is your sex? □  Male □  Female
What is your age? ..................years
Are you a student or a member of staff at the university?
□  Student □  Staff
If  you are a student, what is your current level of study?
□  Undergraduate □  Postgraduate □  n/a
If you are a member of staff, what is your current occupation within the University?
Are you currently dieting to lose weight? 
□  Yes □  No
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Appendix J
P a r t i c i p a n t  N u m b e r :
Chocolate Questionnaire 
Using the rating scales provided, please answer the following questions.
1. How much do you like chocolate?
I hate it I love it
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
2. How often do you eat chocolate?
Never Every day
1 2 3 4 5 6  7
3. How much do you want to reduce the amount o f chocolate you consume?
Not very much Very much
1 2 3 4 5
Appendix K
Participant Number: 
Strategy Adherence and Acceptability Questionnaire
How many times did you use the strategy?
Not at all 
Sometimes 
Nearly always 
Always
How helpful did you find the strategy?
Not at all helpful 
A little helpful 
Moderately helpful 
Very helpful 
Extremely helpful
Please rate how effective you thought the taught technique would be to help you to 
resist eating chocolate.
On Monday
Not very effective -  1 2 3 4 5 -  Very effective
On Friday
Not very effective -  1 2 3 4 5 -  Very effective
Did you apply the technique you used to help you deal with other situations (e.g.
everyday life situations such as, work or family) as opposed to just ‘trying to resist
eating chocolate’? If so, what situations? Describe.
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Appendix L
P a r t i c i p a n t  N u m b e r :
Cravings Questionnaire
If you had cravings for chocolates, overall how distressing did you find them?
Not at all distressing 
A little distressing 
Moderately distressing 
Very distressing 
Extremely distressing
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Appendix M
Suspicion Probe
1. Do you know/have you guessed what group you were in, the control or 
experimental?
Guessed -
Actual Group -
2. Did you notice anything unusual about the chocolates given to you by the 
researcher?
Yes/No
If yes, what did you notice?
3. How many chocolates were in the bag given to you by the researcher?
4. Other than the amount of chocolate consumed during the week, do you have any 
other ideas about what is being investigated in this study?
Yes/No
If yes, what do you think was being investigated?
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Appendix N 
Chocolate Diary
Resisting the temptation to eat chocolate can be difficult. Therefore, even though we 
want you to try to not eat any chocolate or chocolate-related products over the next 5 
days, don't worry if you do. We simply ask that you keep a record of the chocolate you 
do eat in this diary. There is a separate diary sheet for each of the 5 days. If you need 
more space, please write on the back. It is important that you record details as honestly 
and accurately as you can. An example page has been provided to help you to fill in 
the diary correctly.
Any product consumed which contains chocolate must be recorded in the diary. 
These may include:
Chocolate bars (e.g. galaxy, milkybar, twix)
Ice-creams (e.g. chocolate flavoured, mars ice-cream bar, magnum)
Chocolate coated fruit and nuts (e.g. raisins, brazils)
Chocolate milk products (e.g. milkshakes, yoghurts)
Cakes and desserts (e.g. trifle, fudge cake, jaffa cakes, muffins)
Biscuits (e.g. chocolate chip cookies, kitkat, digestives)
Pastries (e.g. pain au chocolat)
Chocolates from the bag (e.g. celebrations)
Chocolate cereal s/cereal bars (e.g. coco pops, cadbury brunch bars)
Chocolate spreads (e.g. nutella)
Chocolate drinks (e.g. hot chocolate)
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Appendix O
Seeing  your thoughts differently
Throughout your life you will make many plans, such as doing more exercise, 
changing jobs, or trying to eat more healthily. Sometimes it's difficult to stick 
to these plans. One reason is that our thoughts can sabotage our intentions.
For example, you may find that you tell yourself that just one chocolate won't 
do any harm, that it's too difficult to resist chocolate when you're so tired, or 
that you will try harder tomorrow.
In situations like these it can be helpful to think of yourself as DIFFERENT 
from your thoughts.
Imagine you are the driver of a bus, driving towards healthy eating. Your 
thoughts are a bit like passengers on the bus. They may say ’I really need 
chocolate', ‘I can't concentrate on work without chocolate', or Til just have one 
chocolate and eat less at dinner time'. Your job as the driver of the bus is to 
stick to your planned route, regardless of what your thoughts are saying.
Here are a couple of strategies you might like to try:
MindBus Strategies
Describe your passengers.
For example, This passenger is telling me T'm tired and I need a sugar boost'. 
Then KEEP DRIVING!
Let your passengers know who’s in charge.
I f  your passengers are telling you to buy chocolate, let them know who is in 
charge. Then KEEP DRIVING!
Give your passengers a voice.
For example, if you find yourself saying 'I can't resist this chocolate any 
longer', try saying it with a different accent, or even singing it. Then KEEP 
DRIVING!
The Mind Bus
You're allowed to  eat 
chocolate, it's the 
weekend!
You don't smoke 
or drink, enjoy
your chocolate! Chocolate is
your friend1
Remember, you are 
the driver of the  
bus -  your thoughts 
are simply 
passengers!
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Practice exercise
This exercise will help you practice seeing your thoughts as separate from 
yourself.
First, choose ONE of the MindBus strategies listed above.
Then think of a recent plan you have made in relation to chocolate and any 
unhelpful thoughts you may have experienced in relation to that plan (for 
example, wanting to eat less chocolate but telling yourself that you don't have 
the willpower). If no such plans and thoughts come to mind, try to imagine the 
types of things you might tell yourself when you try to resist chocolate over 
the next few days.
For the next 5 minutes you will be asked to close your eyes and imagine this 
situation and these thoughts. You should then imagine yourself using your 
chosen MindBus strategy to help you to ’keep driving the bus' (in other words, 
resist eating the chocolate.) Remember, your thoughts are simply passengers - 
don't let them sabotage your plans.
When you are ready, close your eyes and begin the task. The researcher will 
inform you when the 5 minutes has ended.
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Task
Over the next 5 days, we would like you to carry the bag of chocolates 
provided around with you (note; these must be kept in your possession as 
much as possible, for example, taken to work, to university, the pub etc.) We 
would also like you to try to resist eating any kind of chocolate, including the 
chocolates in the bag. Whenever you find yourself tempted to eat chocolate 
we would like you to try to use one of the MindBus strategies outlined above 
('Describe your passengers', ‘Let your passengers know who's in charge', or 
'Give your passengers a voice'.) Use the strategy for the length of time 
which you find it helpful.
Please decide now which strategy you are going to try. (You are free to 
switch to one of the other strategies at a later point.)
Resisting chocolate is difficult, so you may find that you can't always manage 
this. I f  so don't worry, simply make a note of what you have eaten on the 
diary sheets provided.
I f  you have any further questions, or if there is anything you don't 
understand, please ask nowl
Good Luck!
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Appendix P
Accepting our feelings
In order to deal with uncomfortable feelings we often try to control them. 
Unfortunately, we usually fail to win the struggle with our emotions. For 
example, getting rid of cravings for foods such as chocolate is very difficult.
So, if control is not the most effective strategy for dealing with unpleasant
i feelings, what is?
i
I
i
[ Take a few minutes to look at the picture below.
I m ay  as  
w ell ea t 
s o m e th in g
I’m  not go ing  to  
be ab le  to  
co n ce n tra te  
w h ils t I’m  
fee lin g  th is  
hungry / —
I c a n ’t  co p e  
w ith  th is  any  
lo n g er ,
I really  want 
chocolate
go ing  to  cut 
dow n on 
ch o co la te
I’ve g o t no 
w illp o w e rI’m so  
hungry
Co F e e lin g s  o f hu ng er F ee lin g s  o f hu ng er
H un gry  dogH ungry person
What's going on? The person and the dog are both experiencing the same 
unpleasant feelings of hunger. However, by battling with these feelings the 
person is also experiencing a whole range of additional, distressing thoughts. In 
some ways, she's made her life even more difficult.
What's the alternative?
We could simply accept our difficult feelings.
Accepting feelings may not get rid of the discomfort they bring with them, but 
by not struggling to control the feelings we leave more energy for getting on 
with all the other things in life that are important to us.
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‘Urge Surfing1
Accepting uncomfortable feelings rather than trying to control them may help 
with situations in which you are trying to resist temptation. One strategy that 
can help you to be more willing to experience these feelings is 'urge surfing'. 
Urge surf ing is the process by which you "ride the wave" of your urges or 
cravings. By being aware of your urges and cravings, you can surf them instead 
of 'sinking', or giving in to them.
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Practice exercise
This exercise aims to help you practice accepting your thoughts.
Visualise your favourite type of chocolate in front of you and get in 
touch with any cravings you have to eat it. Take a few  moments to do so. 
Deliberately become aware of any thoughts linked to th e cravings (e.g. 
think about how it looks, how it smells, and how it may taste). For the  
next 5 minutes you will be asked to close your eyes and get in touch with 
th ese  feelings. Just observe your feelings and see  what they do. Don't 
struggle with them. Instead, try to use the urge surfing' metaphor and 
ride each urge' one at a time. The goal here is not to like or dislike the  
feelings or urges. We aren't evaluating them. The goal is to experience 
them without needless defence. Remember, you have the choice to 
accept your feelings and cravings; you don't have to try and control 
them.
When you are ready, close your eyes and begin the task. The researcher will 
inform you when the 5 minutes has ended.
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Task
Over the next 5 days, we would like you to carry the bag of 
chocolates provided around with you (note; th ese  must be kept in your 
possession as much as possible, for example, taken to work, to 
university, the pub etc.) We would also like you to try to resist eating 
any kind of chocolate, including the chocolates in the bag. Whenever 
you find yourself tempted to eat chocolate we would like you to try to 
use the urge surf ing' strategy outlined above. Use the strategy for  
the length of time which you find it helpful.
Resisting chocolate is d ifficult, so you may find that you can't always 
manage this. I f  so don't worry, simply make a note of what you have 
eaten on the diary sh eets  provided.
I f  you have any further questions, or if th ere is anything you 
don't understand, please ask now!
Good Luck!
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Appendix O
Relaxation
Everyone needs a certain amount of s tress  to live well. I t 's  what gets  
you out of bed in the morning and gives us th e vitality and ze st  to do all 
sorts of things. Without it, we would have no motivation for many of 
life's chores.
However, stress becomes a problem - ’d istress' - when we experience 
too much of it. Too much stress  can result in a range of health problems, 
including obesity, since being 'stressed' can sometimes cause people to 
overeat. This is because it is often  more d ifficu lt to resist temptation 
(i.e. food cravings) when we're stressed . With th e most popular foods 
craved during times of s tress  being high sugar foods, such as chocolate, 
it is maybe unsurprising that stress  is often  associated with weight gain.
One way to counteract stress and its negative e f fec t s  is to relax!
Like exercising in order to get f it , doing relaxation exercises once won't 
make you 'fit'; learning to relax takes time and practice in order for you 
to become proficient. For relaxation techniques to be of real use, you 
will need to build them into your everyday life.
There are many approaches to learning to relax; none is right' for 
everyone - it is more a m atter of finding an approach th a t  makes sense 
and works for you. However, let's take time to consider ju s t  one simple 
physical method.
Muscle Relaxation
Muscle relaxation doesn 't aim to achieve deep relaxation or require you 
to lie down for half an hour! Rather, it aims to reduce uncomfortable 
levels of stress, so th a t  you can continue with your current 
activity/plans more effectively.
How does it work?
For each of the areas of the  body, it is suggested th a t  you tense up and 
then relax muscle groups. As you get b e t te r  with time at relaxing these  
creas, you are advised to try  using less tension before  relaxing.
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Practice exercise
This exercise will help you practice using th e  'relaxing your muscles' 
technique.
First, make sure that you are sitting upright and comfortable in your chair.
Then think of a recent situation in which you have felt stressed. I f  no situation 
comes to mind, try to imagine the types of stressful events you may experience 
over the next 5 days.
For the next 5 minutes you will be asked to close your eyes and imagine this 
situation and these stressful thoughts and feelings. At the same time you will 
be asked to practice the muscle relaxation technique by slowly tensing the 
muscles as much as you can and then relaxing them fully. First start by tensing 
the arm muscles by clenching your fists and then unclenching your fists. Next 
move onto the abdominal muscles. Again, tense the stomach muscles as tight as 
possible, then relax. The last muscle group you will be asked to practice 
relaxing is the leg muscles. To do this, tense your thighs and then relax your 
thighs.
When you are ready, close your eyes and begin the task. The researcher will 
inform you when to move onto the next muscle group and also when the 5 
minutes has ended.
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Task
Over the next 5 days, we would like you to carry the bag of 
chocolates provided around with you (note; th ese  must be kept in your 
possession as much as possible, for example, taken to work, to 
university, the pub etc.) We would also like you to try to resist eating 
any kind of chocolate, including the chocolates in th e bag. Whenever 
you find yourself tempted to eat chocolate we would like you to try to 
use the 'relaxing your muscles' strategy outlined above. Use the  
strategy for the length of time which you find it helpful.
Resisting chocolate is d ifficult, so you may find that you can't always 
manage this. I f  so don't worry, simply make a note of what you have 
eaten on the diary sh eets provided.
I f  you have any further questions, or if there is anything you 
don't understand, please ask now!
Good Luck!
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Appendix R
Consent Form
Title of the project: Resisting Temptation 
Researchers: Mrs Kim Jenkins, Dr Katy Tapper
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above study. I 
have had the opportunity to ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from 
the study at any time, without having to give a reason.
I have been informed that the confidentiality of the data I provide will be 
safeguarded.
I am 18 years of age or older.
I am available to attend Session 1 on Monday and Session 2 on Friday.
I agree to carry the bag of chocolates with me wherever I go over the next 5 days.
I understand that I must try my best to resist eating chocolate until the end of the 
study.
Data Protection: I agree to the University processing personal data that I have 
supplied. I agree to the processing of such data for any purposes connected with the 
Research Project as outlined to me.
I agree to take part in the study.
Your name Date Signature
Researchers name Date Signature
411
Appendix S
Resisting Temptation 
Debriefing Form
Thank you for participating in this study! We are interested in the way in which 
different techniques may help people resist the temptation to eat unhealthy snacks (in 
this instance, chocolate). It was predicted that the effectiveness o f each technique 
would be reflected by the amount o f chocolate consumed at the end of the study (i.e. 
the more effective the technique the less the amount of chocolate eaten).
In this study participants were randomly placed into one of three groups. Group 1 
was asked to try to view their thoughts about chocolate as ‘just thoughts’. Group 2 
was asked to try to accept their chocolate cravings. Group 3 was asked to use 
relaxation to try and deal with their chocolate cravings. This latter group acted as the 
control group. A control group means that individuals in this group were treated 
exactly the same as the experimental groups, but were not exposed to the factors 
being tested (in this instance, mindfulness meditation techniques).
We are interested in identifying; a) whether mindfulness techniques may be an 
effective way of helping to cut back on unhealthy snacking, and b) whether one type 
of mindfulness technique is more effective than another. It was predicted that, as a 
result of practicing these mindfulness techniques (thought distancing and accepting 
feelings) individuals in Group 1 and Group 2 would consume fewer chocolates 
compared to the controls (Group 3).
The prediction that Group 1 would consume less chocolate was based on the theory 
that acknowledging your thoughts and seeing your thoughts as separate from 
yourself would interrupt automatic behaviour. In other words, being aware of your 
thoughts would break the ‘habit’ of eating chocolate in response to the excuses and 
justifications we may give to ourselves.
The prediction that Group 2 would consume less chocolate was based on the theory 
that accepting our feelings and not trying to control them increases our strength (i.e. 
willpower) to not give into craving. At both sessions 1 and 2 a hand grip task was 
completed. This task was a measure of self-regulation. Previous research has shown 
that our ability to self-regulate our behaviour (e.g. resisting eating chocolate) is 
similar to a muscle in the body. When we are asked to complete a task which 
requires us to use self-regulation (in this instance, looking at and exploring the 
chocolates on the table but not eating them) our ability to self-regulate depletes over 
time, similar to the way in which a muscle would tire if  required to repeatedly lift a 
heavy weight. We therefore predicted that participants would hold the second hand 
grip for a shorter period of time at session 1. However, self-regulation has shown to 
improve with practice just as a muscle strengthens with exercise. Given that self­
regulation (e.g. resisting eating chocolate) had been practiced by all participants it 
was predicted the second hand grip at session 2 (Friday) would be held for a longer 
period of time for each group compared to the same measure at session 1 (Monday). 
However, the technique used by Group 2 (accepting feelings) was predicted to 
increase people’s self-regulation ability even more. As a result o f this, it was
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assumed that individuals in Group 2 would hold the hand grip for the longest amount 
of time at session 2 (Friday).
Additionally, you were asked to fill in a series of questionnaires. These were used to 
assess other factors (such as, eating habits and ability to self-regulate behaviour) that 
we think may impact upon people’s ability to resist temptation.
You may or may not have noticed that each chocolate in your bag had one comer 
removed. The comer was cut in order for the researcher to be able to identify the 
‘original’ chocolates and detect if any had been substituted. Also, all participants 
were told that there were twelve chocolates in the bag when really there were 
fourteen. Participants were told this because we wanted to see if  you would be 
tempted to eat the ‘extra’ chocolates which the researcher had seemingly not 
accounted for.
At the end of the study, participants were left alone for 3 minutes while the 
researcher went to get their £10 payment. Participants were told that they had 
successfully completed the study therefore during this time period they were allowed 
to eat as much chocolate as they wanted from the bowl of chocolates provided. The 
reason for doing this was because we wanted to see if  individuals in groups 1 and 2  
(i.e. those who had been practicing the mindfulness meditation techniques) 
continued, or did not continue, to use these techniques to help them to resist the 
temptation to eat chocolate in situations where the eating o f chocolate was permitted.
Ultimately we hope our findings will help inform interventions designed to help 
people maintain a healthy diet by reducing consumption of unhealthy snacks.
If you know anyone else who may participate in this study, please do not reveal this 
information to them since it could influence their responses.
If you are concerned by any of the health issues raised in the questionnaires please 
contact your GP. Further information on healthy eating can also be found at the 
following websites:
http://www.nhs.uk/LiveWell/Goodfood/Pages/Goodfoodhome.asnx 
httn://www.bbc.co.uk/health/treatments/healthv living/nutrition/index.shtml 
If you have any other questions about the research, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the following:
Mrs Kim Jenkins 
Department of Psychology 
Swansea University 
Swansea 
SA2 8 PP
Telephone: 01792 513373 
Email: 290921@swansea.ac.uk
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Dr Katy Tapper 
Department of Psychology 
Swansea University 
Swansea 
SA2 8 PP
Telephone: 01792 602567 
Email: k.tapper@swansea.ac.uk
Appendix T 
Group 1
C h oco la te  D iaries
Part 1: Chocolate Consumption: ‘chocolate you eat' a n d 'chocolate you fee l like eating'
We ask that you keep a record of the chocolate and chocolate-related products you eat or 
feel like eating, but resist, over the  next 3 days. There is a separate  diary sheet for each of 
the 3 days. There is also a different diary for 'chocolate ea ten ' and 'chocolate you felt like 
eating'. If you need more space, please write on the back. It is important tha t  you record all 
details honestly and accurately. Example pages have been provided to help you to fill in the 
diaries correctly.
Any product consumed, or that you would have liked to have consumed, which contains 
chocolate must be recorded in the  diary. These may include the  following: (Please note that 
this is not an exhaustive list.)
Chocolate bars (e.g. galaxy, milkybar, twix)
Ice-creams (e.g. chocolate flavoured, mars ice-cream bar, magnum)
Chocolate coated fruit and nuts (e.g. raisins, brazils)
Chocolate milk products (e.g. milkshakes, yoghurts)
Cakes and desserts (e.g. trifle, fudge cake, jaffa cakes, muffins)
Biscuits (e.g. chocolate chip cookies, kitkat, digestives)
Pastries (e.g. pain au chocolat)
Chocolates from the bag (e.g. celebrations)
Chocolate cereals/cereal bars (e.g. coco pops, cadbury brunch bars)
Chocolate spreads (e.g. nutella)
Chocolate drinks (e.g. hot chocolate)
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Part 2: Food Thoughts
in th e  spaces provided, w e  w a n t  you to  w ri te  dow n  w h a t  th o u g h ts  you have 
im m edia te ly  b efo re  eating , or nearly  ea ting  (i.e. t e m p ta t io n  res is ted )  a ch o c o la te  or 
choco la te -re la ted  p roduct.
S om e of th e  th o u g h ts  you have  m ay include:
I've w orked ex trem ely  hard  to d a y  so I am  going to  t r e a t  m yself  by ea t in g  ch o co la te .  
I'm feeling really s tre ssed ,  so I am  going e a t  ch o co la te  t o  c h e e r  m yself up.
The chocola te  d e sse r ts  on th e  m e n u  look to o  good  to  re fuse .
Eating chocola te  helps to  pass t h e  t im e  w h e n  I'm bo red .
I n eed  to  ea t  choco la te  a f te r  my d in n e r  to  satisfy my s w e e t  craving.
Again, it is important that you record your thoughts honestly and accurately.
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6
E X A M P L E
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
9.40am Choc chip cookie Yes
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
11.10am Chocolate yoghurt Yes
Food Thought: ‘' v . r  P"- rnr-rc^cy: c 'Q ?r :c o?r
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
2.30pm Diary Milk Yes
Food Thought: ; v r 'n : r r  ^nr.r.n:n'- r r ‘ : r^r' / ap^e^ec .  :: p r - c a ^ c  ■' cr?;r; * v?~r. rr tnc
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
6.15pm Hot chocolate No
Food Thought:
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TUESDAY
CHOCOLATE FELT LIKE EATING
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
421
WEDNESDAY
CHOCOLATE FELT LIKE EATING
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
422
THURSDAY
CHOCOLATE FELT LIKE EATING
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
Time felt like 
eating
Type Food Thoughts 
Y/N
Food Thought:
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Appendix U 
G roup 2
C h oco la te D iaries
Part 1: Chocolate Consumption: 'chocolate you eat' and 'chocolate you fee l like eating'
Resisting the tem ptation  to ea t  chocolate can be difficult. Therefore, even though we want 
you to try to not eat any chocolate or chocolate-related products over the next 3 days, 
don 't  worry if you do. Simply record what you do eat in the diary (chocolate eaten) 
provided. We also ask tha t  you record any chocolate and chocolate-related products th a t  
you feel like eating, but resist. There is a separate  diary shee t for each of the 3 days. There 
is also a different diary for 'chocolate ea ten ' and 'chocolate you felt like eating'. If you need 
more space, please write on the back. It is important tha t  you record all details honestly 
and accurately. Example pages have been provided to help you to fill in the diaries 
correctly.
Any product consumed, or tha t you would have liked to have consumed, which contains 
chocolate must be recorded in the  diary. These may include the  following: (Please note that 
this is not an exhaustive list.)
• Chocolate bars (e.g. galaxy, milkybar, twix)
• Ice-creams (e.g. chocolate flavoured, mars ice-cream bar, magnum)
• Chocolate coated fruit and nuts (e.g. raisins, brazils)
• Chocolate milk products (e.g. milkshakes, yoghurts)
• Cakes and desserts (e.g. trifle, fudge cake, jaffa cakes, muffins)
• Biscuits (e.g. chocolate chip cookies, kitkat, digestives)
• Pastries (e.g. pain au chocolat)
• Chocolates from the  bag (e.g. celebrations)
• Chocolate cereals/cereal bars (e.g. coco pops, cadbury brunch bars)
• Chocolate spreads (e.g. nutella)
• Chocolate drinks (e.g. hot chocolate)
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Part 2: Food Thoughts
In t h e  sp ac es  p rovided , w e  w a n t  you to  w ri te  do w n  w h a t  th o u g h ts  you have 
im m ed ia te ly  b e fo re  ea ting , o r  nearly  ea t in g  (i.e. t e m p ta t io n  res is ted) a ch o c o la te  or 
ch o c o la te - re la ted  p roduc t.
S om e of t h e  th o u g h ts  you h av e  m ay  include:
•  I've w orked  ex tre m e ly  hard  to d a y  so I am  going to  t r e a t  m yself  by e a t in g  
ch o co la te .
•  I'm feeling really s t re s se d ,  so  I am  going e a t  ch o co la te  to  c h e e r  m yself  up.
•  T he ch o co la te  d e s s e r t s  on  th e  m en u  look to o  good  to  re fuse .
•  Eating ch o co la te  he lps  to  pass  t h e  t im e  w h e n  I'm bored .
•  I n ee d  to  e a t  ch o c o la te  a f te r  my d in n e r  to  satisfy my s w e e t  craving.
Again, it is important that you record your thoughts honestly and accurately.
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Appendix V
P a r t i c ip a n t  N u m b e r :
Word Association Task
Gender: M / F {please circle the correct response)
Please list in the space below all single words (e.g. craving) or short phrases (e.g. on 
a diet) that you associate with the word: CHOCOLATE. Please take as much time as 
you need.
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Appendix W
P a r t i c ip a n t  N u m b e r :
Written Recall Task
Age:
Gender: M / F (please circle the correct response)
In the space below, please list any words or short phrases you saw immediately 
BEFORE the rows o f X ’s were displayed during the computer task. If you did not 
see any words or short phrases, please leave the space blank.
427
Using the list o f short phrases below, please circle which one(s) you saw 
immediately BEFORE the rows of X ’s were displayed during the computer task. If 
you did not see any of the short phrases listed, please circle the response ‘None of 
the above'.
• Need something light
• Need an early start
• Need a taxi
• Need something sweet
• Need an adventure
• Need a pay rise
• Need something quick
• None of the above
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Appendix X
P a r t i c ip a n t  N u m b e r :
D e m o g ra p h ic s  Q u e s t io n n a i r e
Age:
Gender: M / F (please circle the correct response)
Are you currently dieting? Y /N  (please circle the correct response)
In the space below, please give the reason why you want to reduce the amount of 
chocolate you currently consume.
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Appendix Y
Chocolate Eating and Word Recognition
Participant Information Sheet
Welcome to this study on Chocolate Eating Habits and Word Recognition!
Before you decide whether or not to participate, it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being conducted and what it will involve. Please take time to read 
the following information carefully.
What is the purpose of the study?
We are interested in identifying the types of habits people have in relation to eating 
chocolate. We will provide you with further details at the end of the study.
Who is carrying out the research?
The research is led by Mrs Kim Jenkins and Dr Katy Tapper at Swansea University's 
Psychology Department. The research is funded by the National Institute for Social Care 
and Health Research (NISCHR) and has been approved by the Swansea Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee.
Can anyone take part?
We are looking for males and females who want to reduce their current level of 
chocolate consumption. Both dieters and non-dieters are welcome to participant. It is 
important that participants have normal or corrected vision and are able to read English 
fluently.
What happens if I agree to take part?
First you will be asked to complete a series of short questionnaires which will ask you to 
provide information about your age, gender, dietary status and behaviour relating to 
eating chocolate. Next you will be asked to complete three computer tasks. Each of these 
computer tasks will require you to identify if the word displayed on the computer screen 
is a word or a non-word (i.e. not a recognised word in the English language) by pressing 
one of two keys on a response box. The study will take approximately 15 minutes to 
complete. As a token of our appreciation, you will receive a small payment of £5 at the 
end of the study.
Where will the study take place?
The study will take place at Swansea University. Participants will be asked to meet the 
researcher for each study session outside the lifts on the 9th floor of the Vivian Tower.
What if I wish to withdraw?
Your participation is entirely voluntary. You will be free to withdraw at any time you 
wish, without giving a reason.
What will happen to the information you collect?
All information collected will be confidential. An analysis of the information will form 
part of our report at the end of the study and may be presented to interested parties and 
published in scientific journals and related media. Unfortunately we are unable to give 
you any personal feedback about your individual scores.
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Chocolate Eating and Word Recognition
What if I have other questions?
If you have any questions about the study then please ask them now. Alternatively if you 
have any further questions after the study has been completed, please do not hesitate to 
contact us at the following:
Mrs Kim Jenkins 
Department of Psychology 
Swansea University 
Swansea 
SA2 8 PP
Telephone: 01792 513373 
Email: 290921@swansea.ac.uk
Dr Katy Tapper 
Department of Psychology 
Swansea University 
Swansea 
SA2 8 PP
Telephone: 01792 602567 
Email: k.tapper@swansea.ac.uk
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Appendix Z
Consent Form
Title of the project: Chocolate Eating and Word Recognition 
Researchers: Mrs Kim Jenkins, Dr Katy Tapper
1. I confirm that I have been briefed about what the study entails. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
from the study at any time, without having to give a reason.
3. I understand that the confidentiality of the data I provide will be safeguarded.
4. I am 18 years of age or older.
5. I have normal or corrected vision.
6 . I am able to read English fluently.
7. I want to reduce the amount of chocolate I currently consume.
8 . I have not taken part in any previous study run by Kim Jenkins
9. Data Protection: I agree to the University processing personal data that I have 
supplied. I agree to the processing o f such data for any purposes connected 
with the Research Project as outlined to me.
1 0 . 1 agree to take part in the study.
Your name Date Signature
Researchers name Date Signature
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Appendix AA
Chocolate Eating and Word Recognition 
Debriefing Form
Thank you for participating in this study!
You may or may not have been aware but each letter string you were asked to 
identify as either a word or a non-word in the computer tasks were preceded by a 
masked (i.e. presented very quickly and then replaced with a string of X ’s) prime 
(i.e. a short word phrase). Although you might not be able to recall seeing the primes 
consciously, they were presented at a speed which would allow you to process them 
unconsciously. One of the tasks included the prime phrase ‘need something sweet’, 
another included ‘need a treat’ and another included ‘need an energy boost’. The 
study aimed to identify if  you responded more quickly to the target word ‘chocolate’ 
when it was preceded by one of these three chocolate-related primes compared to 
neutral (i.e. chocolate un-related) primes (e.g. need a lift). Responding more quickly 
on these trials would suggest that you are more likely to find yourself eating 
chocolate before you have realised you are doing so. We believe that encouraging 
people to become aware of their automatic behaviour may help to reduce the amount 
o f chocolate they consume.
The study also aimed to explore if there was a relationship between people’s 
chocolate eating habits and their performance on the computer tasks. In order to 
measure your chocolate eating habits we asked you to complete three questionnaires, 
each corresponding to a particular chocolate eating behaviour which was used as the 
prime phrases in the computer tasks. Then we compared the scores on these 
questionnaires to your task performance. The reason for this was to identify if  a 
faster response to the target word ‘chocolate’ when it was preceded by a chocolate- 
related prime phrase was related to the strength o f the person’s habit. For instance, if 
someone reports that, without thinking, they eat chocolate when they need something 
sweet, it was predicted that they would respond quickly to the word chocolate when 
preceded with the prime phrase ‘need something sweet’. However, if someone 
reports that they always think before they eat chocolate in response to needing 
something sweet, then it was predicted that they would respond more slowly given 
that they behave less automatically. Thus, it was expected that the stronger the habit, 
the more automatic the behaviour, hence faster reaction times on the critical trials of 
the computer tasks.
Finally the study aimed to identify if habit strength and task performance differed 
between males and females, and also, between those who are, and are not, dieting. 
The results from this study will assist in the design and recruitment of a future 
related study.
If you know anyone else who may participate in this study, please do not reveal this 
information to them since it could influence their responses.
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If you have any other questions about the research, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the following:
Mrs Kim Jenkins 
Department of Psychology 
Swansea University 
Swansea 
SA2 8 PP
Telephone: 01792 5 1 3 3 7 3 ^H i 
Email: 290921@swansea.ac.uk
Dr Katy Tapper 
Department of Psychology 
Swansea University 
Swansea 
SA2 8 PP
Telephone: 01792 602567 
Email: k.tapper@swansea.ac.uk
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Appendix BB
P a r t i c ip a n t  N u m b e r :
D e m o g ra p h ic s  Q u e s t io n n a i r e
Age: ___________
Gender: M / F (please circle the correct response)
Are you currently dieting? Y /N  (please circle the correct response)
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Appendix CC
In the space below, please give the main reason why you want to 
reduce the amount of chocolate you currently consume.
436
Out of the two options below, which most closely relates to the 
reason why you want to reduce the amount of chocolate you 
currently consume? PLEASE SELECT ONE OPTION ONLY.
• Health
• Weight
437
Appendix DD
Suspicion Probe
1. Did you notice anything unusual about the chocolates given to you by the 
researcher?
Yes/No
If yes, what did you notice?
2. How many chocolates were in the bag given to you by the researcher?
3. Other than the amount of chocolate consumed during the week, do you have 
other ideas about what is being investigated in this study?
Yes/No
If yes, what do you think was being investigated?
Appendix EE
P a r t i c ip a n t  N u m b e r :
Strategy Adherence Questionnaire
How much did you use the strategy?
1. Not at all
2. Sometimes
3. Nearly always
4. Always
Appendix FF
P a r t i c i p a n t  N u m b e r :
S t r a te g y  E v a lu a t io n  Q u e s t io n n a i r e
How helpful did you find your participation in this study in terms of reducing 
chocolate consumption?
1. Not at all helpful
2. A little helpful
3. Moderately helpful
4. Very helpful
5. Extremely helpful
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Appendix GG
P a r t i c ip a n t  N u m b e r :
T a s k  A d h e r e n c e  Q u e s t io n n a i r e
1. To what extent did you keep the chocolates with you?'
1 . Not at all or hardly at all
2. Most of the time
3. Nearly all the time
2. How sure are you that you haven’t missed anything on the diary? 
Not at all sure- 1 2 3 4 5 -Very Sure
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Appendix II
Monitoring your chocolate eating
There is evidence to suggest that simply monitoring health behaviours is a 
useful tool for reaching health goals (in this instance, reducing the amount of 
chocolate you currently consume). This strategy has also been found to be 
effective when people are trying to change an unhealthy behaviour (e.g. eating 
too much chocolate) for a more favourable health behaviour (e.g. eating less 
chocolate). One way of monitoring how much chocolate you eat is to write down 
all the chocolate and chocolate-related products you consume.
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Task
Over the next 5 days, we would like you to carry the bag of chocolates 
provided around with you (note; these must be kept in your possession as 
much as possible, for example, taken to work, to university, the pub etc.) We 
would also like you to try to resist eating any kind of chocolate, including the 
chocolates in the bag.
Resisting chocolate is difficult, so you may find that you can't always manage 
this. I f  so don't worry, simply make a note of what you have eaten on the 
diary sheets provided.
I f  you have any further questions, or if there is anything you don't 
understand, please ask now!
Good Luck!
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Appendix JJ
Consent Form 
Title of the project: Reducing Chocolate Consumption 
Researchers: Mrs Kim Jenkins, Dr Katy Tapper
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above
study. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have had these
answered satisfactorily.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
from the study at any time, without having to give a reason.
3. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the data I provide will be 
safeguarded.
4. I am 18 years o f age or older.
5. I have normal or corrected vision.
6. I am not pregnant.
7. I have not suffered, past or present, from an eating disorder.
8. I do not have a medical condition that affects what I can and can’t eat (e.g. 
high cholesterol, diabetes, hypoglycaemia, or food intolerances.
9. I am able to read and speak English fluently.
10 .1 want to reduce the amount o f chocolate I currently consume.
11 .1 have not taken part in any previous study run by Kim Jenkins
12 .1 am available to attend all four sessions run over the two week study period.
13.1 agree to carry the bag o f chocolates with me wherever I go during week 2 of 
the study.
14 .1 understand that I must try my best to resist eating chocolate during week 2 
of the study.
15. Data Protection: I agree to the University processing personal data that I have 
supplied. I agree to the processing o f such data for any purposes connected 
with the Research Project as outlined to me.
16 .1 agree to take part in the study.
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Your name Date Signature
Researchers name Date Signature
Appendix KK
Reducing Chocolate Consumption 
Debriefing Form
Thank you for participating in this study! We appreciate your help, and hope you 
found the experience both beneficial and enjoyable.
We are interested in the way in which different strategies may help people resist the 
temptation to eat unhealthy snacks (in this instance, chocolate). It was predicted that 
the effectiveness o f each strategy would be reflected by the amount o f chocolate 
consumed at the end o f the study (i.e. the more effective the strategy the less the 
amount of chocolate eaten).
You were randomly allocated one o f three groups. Group 1 was asked to use a 
mindfulness meditation strategy called ‘cognitive defusion’ to try and view their 
thoughts about chocolate as ‘just thoughts’. Group 2 was asked to use relaxation to 
try and cope with their chocolate cravings. Group 3 was allocated to a ‘monitoring’ 
group. For those in this group, the same questionnaires and computer tasks were 
completed, but no specific strategy was taught. The reason for this was that merely 
monitoring health behaviours has been shown to be a useful tool for reaching health 
goals.
The aim of the study was to see whether the defusion group would see benefits over 
and above those in the other groups and if so, why? (i.e. how does this strategy 
work). One possibility is that acknowledging your thoughts and seeing your thoughts 
as separate from yourself would interrupt automatic behaviour. In other words, being 
aware of your thoughts would break the ‘habit’ of eating chocolate in response to the 
excuses and justifications we may give to ourselves. Whilst we expected all groups 
to benefit from recording their chocolate consumption in the chocolate diaries, we 
did not expect the relaxation strategy to provide any additional benefits.
You were asked to fill in a series of questionnaires and complete two computer- 
based tasks. These were used to assess levels of self-reported and behavioural 
automaticity, in addition to goals related to why participants wanted to reduce their 
intake of chocolate. We believe that these factors may impact upon people’s ability 
to resist temptation and also may help to explain how the mindfulness strategy 
‘cognitive defusion’ brings about behavioural change (i.e. reduction in the amount of 
chocolate consumed)
You may or may not have noticed that each chocolate in your bag had one comer 
removed. The comer was cut in order for the researcher to be able to identify the 
‘original’ chocolates and detect if  any had been substituted. Also, all participants 
were told that there were twelve chocolates in the bag when really there were 
fourteen. Participants were told this because we wanted to see if  you would be 
tempted to eat the ‘extra’ chocolates which the researcher had seemingly not 
accounted for.
Ultimately we hope our findings will help inform interventions designed to help 
people maintain a healthy diet by reducing consumption of unhealthy snacks.
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If you know anyone else who may participate in this study, please do not reveal this 
information to them since it could influence their responses.
If you are concerned by any of the health issues raised in the questionnaires please 
contact your GP. Further information on healthy eating can also be found at the 
following websites:
http://www.nhs.uk/LiveWell/Goodfood/Pages/Goodfoodhome.asnx 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/health/treatments/healthv living/nutrition/index.shtml
If you have any other questions about the research, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the following:
Mrs Kim Jenkins Dr Katy Tapper
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology
Swansea University Social Sciences Building
Swansea City University London
SA2 8PP Whiskin Street, EC1R OJD
Telephone: 01792 513373 Telephone: 02070 408500
Email: 290921@swansea.ac.uk Email: Katy.Tapper.l@city.ac.uk
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Appendix LL
Differences between Study 2 & Study 3
Possibilities why non-significant findings were shown fo r  Study 3 compared to Study 
2 :
• Introduction of the baseline measure of chocolate consumption. Maybe 
participants were fed up with recording accurately by the second week.
• Subtle differences in the population in terms of their motivations for 
participating. For example, there was a bigger payment (£20) for Study 3 
compared to Study 2 (£10).
• Study 2 included males and females, whereas Study 3 only included females.
• Study 3 required the participants to attend more sessions (4 in total) 
compared to Study 2 (2 in total).
• Both studies consisted o f three groups. However Study 2 had two 
mindfulness groups and one control group, whereas Study 3 had one 
mindfulness group and two control groups.
• Differences in measures used between the two studies:
Study 2 Study 3
How much chocolate is liked. Goal measure
How often chocolate is eaten. More detailed cravings questionnaire
Level of desire to reduce choc. 
Consumption.
Need for affect scale
Big 5 Need for cognition scale
DEBQ LDTs
Mindfulness (FFMQ & PHLMS) More specific SRHIs
Experiences questionnaire 
(decentering)
Food acceptance and awareness scale
Taste-test
Hand grip task
• Questionnaires in Study 2 were completed online via SurveyMonkey whereas 
all questionnaires in Study 3 were completed at the individual sessions with 
the researcher present.
• Difference between the defusion interventions -  no additional check of 
participants’ level of understanding of the taught strategy taken in Study 3 
compared to Study 2.
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• Unsure about Study 2, but for Study 3 a lot of ‘groups' of friends 
participated. Despite asking them not to discuss the study between 
themselves, there may have been an element of ‘friendly competition’ going 
on (i.e. who would succeed at the task and not eat any chocolate). On the 
other hand, if  a friend /housemate had seen another friend give in and eat 
chocolate they may have done so too. This may account for the similarities in 
eating behaviour between the different groups.
• Study 3 included a small number o f University staff whereas Study 2 only 
consisted of student participants.
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Appendix M M
Craving Induction -  Questions
1. Which chocolate bar looks the most attractive?
2. Which chocolate bar do you think smells best?
3. Which chocolate bar do you think would taste the best?
4. Which chocolate bar do you think cost more?
5. Which chocolate bar are you most tempted to sample now?
6. Which chocolate bar would you most like to try at the end of the experiment?
7. Which box of chocolates looks the most attractive?
8. Which box o f chocolates has the best variety?
9. Which box o f chocolates do you think smells best?
10. Which box of chocolate do you think would taste the best?
11. Which box of chocolates do you think cost more?
12. Which box of chocolates would you be tempted to sample now?
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Appendix NN
Seeing your thoughts and feelings differently
Chocolate cravings can be difficult. I t  may help to think of yourself as 
DIFFERENT from your chocolate cravings.
Imagine you are the driver of a bus. Your chocolate cravings are a bit like 
passengers on the bus. Your job as the driver of the bus is to stick to your 
planned route regardless of what your chocolate cravings are saying.
Sometimes it can also help to describe these passengers. For example, ‘this 
passenger is telling me that I'm tired and I need a sugar boost'. Or ‘this 
passenger is reminding me how hungry I am'.
I could really eat 
some chocolate right 
now!
That 
chocolate 
looks so good!
I wonder what those 
chocolates taste 
like?
The M ind Bus
Remember, you are 
the driver of the bus 
-  your cravings are 
simply passengers!
'hi.Kfc*
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Your task
For the next 10 minutes we would like you to simply sit in front of the 
chocolates and let your mind wander. You are free to think about whatever you 
like, though please keep your eyes open and avoid engaging in any other 
activities.
Additionally, whenever you find yourself thinking about the  
chocolates we would like you to  try  to  use the stra tegy  described  
above and imagine th ese  thoughts and feelings as passengers on your 
bus.
The researcher will stop you from time to time to ask you what you are thinking 
about. You will only be asked to provide a brief description of your thought (e.g. 
a short phrase such as eating chocolate, going on holiday, something private). 
Once the researcher has recorded your thought, you will be asked to 
immediately return to the task.
I f  you have any questions please ask the researcher now, otherwise please let 
the researcher know you are ready to begin.
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Appendix OO
Trying to relax
Chocolate cravings can be difficult. I t  may help to RELAX when you 
experience a chocolate craving.
Try to relax. Whenever you experience a chocolate craving, think about 
relaxing your muscles.
Sometimes it can also help if you tense up and then relax muscle groups. 
For example you could clench and then unclench your fis ts .
Relaxing will help 
Take the stress 
out of the 
craving
Chocolate cravings 
may be less difficult 
when I am not tense.
I'm feeling like I 
want chocolate, so 
I'll try to relax.
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Your task
For the next 10 minutes we would like you to simply sit in front of th e  
chocolates and let your mind wander. You are free  to think about 
whatever you like, though please keep your eyes open and avoid engaging 
in any other activities.
Additionally, whenever you find yourself thinking about the  
chocolates we would like you to try  to  use th e stra tegy  described  
above to try  to  relax.
The researcher will stop you from time to time to ask you what you are 
thinking about. You will only be asked to provide a brief description of  
your thought (e.g. a short phrase such as eating chocolate, going on 
holiday, something private). Once the researcher has recorded your 
thought, you will be asked to immediately return to the task.
I f  you have any questions please ask th e researcher now, otherwise 
please let the researcher know you are ready to begin.
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Appendix PP
Your task
For the next 10 minutes we would like you to simply sit in front of the 
chocolates and let your mind wander. You are free to think about whatever you 
like, though please keep your eyes open and avoid engaging in any other 
activities.
The researcher will stop you from time to time to ask you what you are thinking 
about. You will only be asked to provide a brief description of your thought (e.g. 
a short phrase such as eating chocolate, going on holiday, something private). 
Once the researcher has recorded your thought, you will be asked to 
immediately return to the task.
I f  you have any questions please ask the researcher now, otherwise please let 
the researcher know you are ready to begin
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Appendix OO
Thought-probe measure
1............................................................................
Chocolate related 
Task related
Other (unrelated to chocolate or the task)
2...............................................................
Chocolate related 
Task related
Other (unrelated to chocolate or the task)
 3 ....................................................................
Chocolate related
Task related
Other (unrelated to chocolate or the task)
 4 ....................................................................
Chocolate related
Task related
Other (unrelated to chocolate or the task)
 5 ....................................................................
Chocolate related
Task related
Other (unrelated to chocolate or the task)
 6..................................................................
Chocolate related
Task related
Other (unrelated to chocolate or the task)
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7Chocolate related 
Task related
Other (unrelated to chocolate or the task)
8 ...........................................................................
Chocolate related 
Task related
Other (unrelated to chocolate or the task)
 9 ....................................................................
Chocolate related 
Task related
Other (unrelated to chocolate or the task)
1 0 ...................................................................
Chocolate related
Task related
Other (unrelated to chocolate or the task)
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Appendix RR
T a s k  P le a s a n tn e s s  R a t in g
Using the scale below, please rate the pleasantness of the task?
Not at all Neither pleasant
pleasant nor unpleasant
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 <
Extremely
pleasant
 10
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Appendix SS
Group 1 -  cognitive defusion
How much did you ‘try to see your thoughts and feelings as different from yourself 
during the 10 minutes?
1. Not at all
2. Sometimes
3. Nearly always
4. Always
Group 2 - relaxation
How much did you ‘try to relax’ during the 10 minutes?
1. Not at all
2. Sometimes
3. Nearly always
4. Always
Group 3 - control
How much did you ‘let your mind wander’ during the 10 minutes?
1. Not at all
2. Sometimes
3. Nearly always
4. Always
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Appendix TT
Consent Form
Title of the project: Chocolate Cravings
Researchers: Mrs Kim Jenkins, Prof Paul Bennett, Dr Katy Tapper
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet for the above 
study. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and have had these 
answered satisfactorily.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw
from the study at any time, without having to give a reason.
3. I have been informed that the confidentiality of the data I provide will be 
safeguarded.
4. I am 18 years of age or older.
5. I am not pregnant.
6. I have not suffered, past or present, from an eating disorder.
7. I do not have a medical condition that affects what I can and can’t eat (e.g.
high cholesterol, diabetes, hypoglycaemia, or food intolerances.
8. I am able to read English fluently.
9. I have not taken part in any previous study run by Kim Jenkins
10. Data Protection: I agree to the University processing personal data that I have 
supplied. I agree to the processing o f such data for any purposes connected 
with the Research Project as outlined to me.
11 .1 agree to take part in the study.
Your name Date Signature
Researchers name Date Signature
Appendix UU
Chocolate Cravings
Debriefing Form
Thank you for participating in this study! We appreciate your help, and hope you 
found the experience both beneficial and enjoyable.
We are interested in the way in which different strategies may help people reduce 
their chocolate cravings. It was predicted that the effectiveness of each strategy 
would be reflected by the number of chocolate cravings reported at the end of the 
study compared to at the start o f the study.
At the beginning of the study you were shown a range o f chocolate products and 
asked a series of questions. The purpose of this was to make you crave chocolate. 
This was important for the second part of the study whereby you were randomly 
allocated to one of three groups. Group 1 was asked to use a mindfulness meditation 
strategy called ‘cognitive defusion’ to try and view themselves as different from their 
chocolate cravings. Group 2 was asked to use relaxation to try and reduce their 
chocolate cravings. Group 3 was allocated to a ‘mind wandering’ group. For those in 
this group, the same initial instructions as the defusion and relaxation groups (‘to let 
your mind wander’) were given, but no specific strategy was taught.
The aim o f the study was to see whether the defusion group would report fewer 
cravings at the end of the study compared to the two other groups which acted as 
control groups (i.e. we didn’t expect these strategies to reduce chocolate cravings). 
Chocolate cravings were measured by the questionnaires you completed. 
Additionally, at certain times during the 10 minute task you were asked by the 
experimenter ‘what you were thinking about right at that moment’. The reason for 
this was to identify how often you used your allocated strategy during this time 
period.
Ultimately we hope our findings will help inform interventions designed to help 
people maintain a healthy diet by reducing their chocolate cravings and 
consequently, their consumption of unhealthy snacks.
I f  you know anyone else who may participate in this study, please do not reveal this 
information to them since it could influence their responses.
I f  you have any other questions about the research, please do not hesitate to contact 
us at the following:
Mrs Kim Jenkins 
Department of Psychology 
Swansea University 
Swansea 
SA2 8PP
Telephone: 01792 513373 
Email: 290921@swansea.ac.uk
Prof Paul Bennett 
Department o f Psychology 
Swansea University 
Swansea 
SA2 8PP
Telephone: 01792 295840 
Email: p.d.bennett@swansea.ac.uk
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Appendix VV
Mem)
Tn: Kimberley Jenkins Student No. 290921
From: I>i\ Steve Stewart-Williams
for Departmental Ethics Committee 
Copy: Dr. Kan Tapper
Date: 21st February. 2011
Re: Meditation and Attentions! Control
Your proposed study. “Meditation and Attcntional Control”, has been reviewed and 
is approved. Provided that the information obtained is kept absolutely confidential 
and that no personally identifiable information is entered on computer, you may 
proceed with your study.
Piease ensure that the signed copy of this Ethical Approval, together with any otlier 
paperwork associated with your research, is included in vour final write up.
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Appendix WW
Department ofPsychology
ETHICS
COMMTTXEE
Memo
To: Kimberley J enkins
Student Number(s): 290921 
From: Dr. Rob Lowe
for Departmental Ethics Committee 
Copy: Dr. Katy Tapper
Date: 14lil October, 2011
Re: Resisting Temptation
Your proposed stud)’. “Resisting Tem ptation”, has been reviewed and is approved. 
Provided that the information obtained is kept absolutely confidential and that no 
personally identifiable information is entered on com puter, you m ay proceed with 
your study.
Please ensure that the signed copy o f  this Ethical Approval, together with any other 
paperwork associated w'ith your research, is included in your final write up.
In order for your study to be displayed on the Experim ent M anagem ent System  
(Participant Pool):
1. Forward this approval via email to Dr. Irene Reppa 
(l.reppaw.iswansea. ac.uk)
AND
2. Send a request for your study to be m ade visible, via the link on the EMS 
w ebsite (see Researcher Documentation for details).
•  P a g e  1
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Appendix XX
Department ofPsychology
ETHICS
COMMITTEE
Memo
To: Kimberley Jenkins
Student ]\umber(s): 290921
From: Dr. Jeremy Tree
for Departmental Ethics Committee
Copy: Dr. Katy Tapper
Date: 7th March, 2012
Re: Association between thought cues and
chocolate consumption -  pilot study
Your proposed study. “Association between thought cues and chocolate consum ption 
-  pilot study” , has been reviewed and is approved. Provided that the information 
obtained is kept absolutely confidential and that no personally identifiable information 
is entered on computer, you may proceed with your study.
Please ensure that the signed copy of this Ethical Approval, together with any other 
paperwork associated with your research, is included in your final write up.
In order for your study to be displayed on the Experim ent M anagem ent System  
(Participant Pool):
1. Forward this ap proval via email to Dr. Irene Rcppa 
(i. repp ay.'.;S\v ansea.ac.uk)
AND
2. Send a request for your study to be made visible, via the link on the F.MS 
w ebsite ( see Researcher Documentation for details).
•  P a g e  1
466
Appendix YY
Department of
Psychology
ETHICS
COMMITTEE
Memo
To: Kimberley Jenkins
Student Number(s): 290921 
From: Dr. Jo Saunders
for Departmental Ethics Committee 
Copy: Dr. Katv Tapper
Date: 26th April, 2012
Re: Word Association -  Pilot Study
Your proposed study.”W ord Association — Pilot Study”  , has been reviewed and is 
approved. Provided that the information obtained is kept absolutely confidential and 
that no personally identifiable information is entered on com puter, you m ay  proceed 
with your study.
Please ensure that the signed copy o f  this Ethical Approval, together with any other 
paperwork associated with your research, is included in your final write up.
In order for your study to be displayed on the E x p erim en t M an ag em en t System  
(P a rtic ip an t Pool):
1. Forward this approval via email to Dr. Irene Reppa 
(i.reppaffi.swaasea.ac.uk)
AND
2. Send a request for your study to be made visible, via the link on the EMS 
website (see Researcher Documentation for details).
•  P a g e  1
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Appendix ZZ
Department of
Psychology
ETHICS
COMMITTEE
Memo
To: Kimberley Jenkins
Student Number(s): 290921 
From: Professor Toby Llovd-Jones
for Departmental Ethics Committee 
Copy: Dr. Katy Tapper
Date: 22nd May, 2012
Re: Subliminal Priming Check -  Pilot Study
Your proposed siudy, ’’Subliminal Priming Check - Pilot S tudy”, has been reviewed 
and is approved. Provided that the information obtained is kept absolutely 
confidential and that no personally identifiable informal ion is entered on computer, 
you m ay proceed with your study.
Please ensure that the signed copy o f this Ethical Approval, together with an}' other 
paperwork associated with your research, is included in your final w rite up.
In order for your study to be displayed on the Experiment M anagem ent System  
(Participant Pool):
1. Forward this approval via email to Dr. Irene Rcppa 
(i.reppa(o;swansea.ac.uk)
AND
2. Send a request for your study to be made visible, via the link on the EMS 
website (see Researcher Documentation for details).
•  P a g e  1
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Appendix A1
Department ofPsychology
ETHICS
COMMITTEE
Memo
To: Kimberley ,1 enkins
Student .Number(s): 290921 
From: Dr. Jo Saunders
for Departmental Ethics Committee 
Copy: Dr. Ka tv Tapper
Date: 12th June, 2012
Re: Chocolate Eating and Word Recognition -
Pilot Stud}
Y our proposed study, "C hocolate Eating and Word Recognition -  P ilot S tudy", has 
been review ed and is approved. Provided that the information obtained is kept 
absolutely confidential and that no personally identifiable inform ation is entered on 
computer, you m ay proceed with your study.
Please ensure that the signed copy o f this Ethical Approval, together w ith any other 
paperwork associated w ith your research, is included in your final write up.
In order for your study to be displayed on the Experim ent M anagem ent System  
(Participant Pool):
1. Forw ard this approval via email to Dr. Irene Rcppa 
(i. reppafa'swansea. ac .uk)
AND
2. Send a request for your study to be made visible, via the link on the EMS 
w ebsite (see R esearcher Documentation for details).
•  P a g e  1
Appendix B1
Department of
Psychology
ETHICS
COMMITTEE
Memo
To: Kimberley Jenkins
Student N umber(s): 290921 
From: Dr. Steve Stewart-Williams
for Departmental Ethics Committee 
C'op>': Dr. Kan Tapper/Professor Paul Bennett
Date: 16th July, 2012
Re: Reducing Chocolate Consumption
Your proposed study, “Reducing Chocolate Consum ption”, has been reviewed and is 
approved. Provided that the information obtained is kept absolutely confidential and 
that no personally identifiable information is entered on com puter, you m ay proceed 
with your study.
Please ensure that the signed copy o f  this Ethical Approval, together with any other 
paperwork associated with your research, is included in your finalw rite  up.
In order for your study to be displayed on the E x p erim en t M an ag em en t System  
(P a rtic ip a n t Pool):
1. Forward this approval via email to Dr. Irene Reppa 
(i . repp a ifii is wan sca.ac.uk)
AND
2. Send a request for your study to be m ade visible, via the link on the EMS 
w ebsite (see Researcher Documentation for details).
•  P a g e  1
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Appendix C l
Department of «
Psychology
ETHICS
COMMITTEE
Memo
To: Kimberley Jenkins
Student Number(s): 290921 
From: Dr. Jeremy Tree
for Departmental Ethics Committee 
Copy: Professor Paul Bennett
Date: 7th August, 2012
Re: Effect of mindfulness meditation on chocolate
cravings
Y our proposed study. “Effect o f mindfulness m editation on chocolate cravings”, has 
been reviewed and is approved. Provided that the inform ation obtained is kept 
absolutely confidential and that no personally identifiable information is entered on 
computer, you may proceed with your stud)’.
Please ensure that the signed copy o f  this Ethical Approval, together with any other 
paperwork associated with your research, is included in your final write up.
In order for your study to be displayed on the Experim ent M anagem ent System  
(Participant Pool):
1. Forw ard this approval via email to Dr. Irene Reppa 
(i.reppafiisw ansea.ac.uk)
AND
2. Send a request for your study to be made visible, via the link on the EMS 
website (see Researcher Documentation for details).
•  P a g e  1
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